Der Essay geht der Frage nach, ob es eine besondere, methodisch einheitliche Art der Philosophie gibt, die man mit gutem Grund ‚Analytische Philosophie’ nennen könnte. Als Beispiele werden Kriterien wie Klarheit, gedankliche Übersicht und das Gewicht von Argumenten besprochen. Das Ergebnis der Suche ist negativ. Die These lautet, dass die interessante analytische Philosophie nicht deshalb interessant ist, weil sie analytisch ist, sondern weil sie gute Philosophie ist.

Most analyses of our mental states in analytical philosophy rest on a particular conception of experience, which we can call the nominalist conception. Absent from this conception is what is traditionally called the inner experience of mental states. Any attempt to describe this inner experience inevitably comes into conflict with the nominalist conception of experience. I believe both that the nominalist conception is the right conception of experience, and that there is inner experience of mental states. Hence I see a (...) problem. It is this problem which I will develop in what follows. (shrink)

Most analyses of our mental states in analytical philosophy rest on a particular conception of experience, which we can call the nominalist conception. Absent from this conception is what is traditionally called the inner experience of mental states. Any attempt to describe this inner experience inevitably comes into conflict with the nominalist conception of experience. I believe both that the nominalist conception is the right conception of experience, and that there is inner experience of mental states. Hence I see a (...) problem. It is this problem which I will develop in what follows. (shrink)

Dignity is humanitys most prized possession. We experience the loss of dignity as a terrible humiliation: when we lose our dignity we feel deprived of something without which life no longer seems worth living. But what exactly is this trait that we value so highly? In this important new book, distinguished philosopher Peter Bieri looks afresh at the notion of human dignity. In contrast to most traditional views, he argues that dignity is not an innate quality of human (...) beings or a right that we possess by virtue of being human. Rather, dignity is a certain way to lead ones life. It is a pattern of thought, experience and action – in other words, a way of living. In Bieris account, there are three key dimensions to dignity as a way of living. The first is the way I am treated by others: they can treat me in a way that leaves my dignity intact or they can destroy my dignity. The second dimension concerns the way that I treat other people: do I treat them in a way that allows me to live a dignified life? The third dimension concerns the view that I have of myself: which ways of seeing and treating myself allow me to maintain a sense of dignity? In the actual flow of day-to-day life these three dimensions of dignity are often interwoven, and this accounts in part for the complexity of the situations and experiences in which our dignity is at stake. So, why did we invent dignity and what role does it play in our lives? As thinking and acting beings, our lives are fragile and constantly under threat. A dignified way of living, argues Bieri, is humanitys way of coping with this threat. In our constantly endangered lives, it is important to stand our ground with confidence. Thus a dignified way of living is not any way of living: it is a particular way of responding to the existential experience of being under threat. It is also a particular way of answering the question: What kind of life do we wish to live? This beautifully written reflection on our most cherished human value will be of interest to a wide readership. (shrink)

Jakmile někdo začne mluvit o „analytické filosofii“, vytváří tím dojem, jako kdyby existoval nějaký zvláštní druh filosofie, kterou lze odlišit od ostatních druhů, a to pomocí jisté metody, tzv. „analýzy“. Otázky, které si chci v této souvislosti položit, znějí následovně: O jaké názory se opírá představa, že skutečně existuje takovýto zvláštní druh filosofie? Které z nich je třeba považovat za neopodstatněná dogmata a u kterých se naopak jedná o opravdové myšlenky? A konečně: V jakém světle se nám filosofie ukáže, když (...) dogmata zavrhneme a přidržíme se myšlenek? (shrink)

Secundum Petrum Bieri dualismus ontologicus hoc trilemma generat: 1) Status mentis non sunt status physici. 2) Status mentis causalitatem exerceunt in regionem statuum physicorum. 3) Regio statuum physicorum est causaliter clausa. Haec tertia propositio a Bieri “physicalismum methodologicum” exprimere dicitur. Ut hoc trilemma solvat, Bieri unum eius membrorum reicere suadet. Hylemorphismus causalitatem mentis ut causalitetem formalem explicat, relationem vero hominis ad mundum ut causalitatem efficientem. Unde clausura causalis mundi de causalitate efficiente intelligi potest, quae in physica investigatur. (...) Liberum arbitrium ab intentione mentis originem trahit. Etiam possibilitas libertatis humanae ex intentionalitate mentis explicari potest. Libertas adhuc hominis ut electio unae duarum optionum intelligi potest. Homo eligens rationes ponderat, quae sunt abstractae et distinctae a causis efficientibus rerum materialium, quae sunt concretae. Doctrina hylemorfica insuper fundamenum sufficiens ad problema identitatis personae per tempus solvendum praebere potest. Quoniam omnia elementa materialia in homine per tempus mutantur – imo DNA mutari potest –, principium identitatis immateriale esse debet. Pro principio identitatis igitur forma substantialis personae accipi potest, quae est metaphysica explicatio naturae mentis, quae actionem liberam electione deliberata per intentionalitatem libertatemque arbitrii inchoare potest)Peter Bieri formulates the assumptions of the ontological dualism via a trilemma: 1) Mental states are not physical states. 2) Mental states have causal effects in the realm of physical states. 3) The realm of physical states is causally closed. Bieri labels the third sentence of this trilemma as methodological physicalism. In order to solve this trilemma Bieri proposes to abandon one of the three premises. Hylomorphism explains mental causality as formal causality, and the relation between human beings and the world as efficient causality. Thus, the causal closure of the world can be understood as closure of the efficient causes, which are studied by physics. Free decision begins with the intentionality of the mind. The possibility of human freedom can also be explained through the intentionality of the mind. Human freedom can be understood as a choice between two alternatives. When choosing, human beings weigh reasons which are abstract and distinct from the efficient causes of material objects that are concrete. Hylomorphism can, further, provide sufficient grounds for solving the issue of personal identity through time. Since all the material elements in a human being change through time – even the DNA can change – the principle of identity cannot be material in character. Thus, it is the substantial form of a person (i.e. the metaphysical explanation of the mind, which is capable of initiating free action through its intentionality and freedom of choice in deliberate decision making) that can be accepted as the principle of identity. (shrink)

In seinem Beitrag Was bleibt von der Analytischen Philosophie? hat Peter Bieri all das aufgelistet, was ihm an der gegenwärtigen Analytischen Philosophie missfällt. In dieser Replik wird erstens die Geschichte der Analytischen Philosophie in Erinnerung gerufen. Zweitens wird in Auseinandersetzung mit Bieris Kritik folgendes Bild von Philosophie entworfen: Es gibt überdauernde philosophische Fragen, und Philosophie sollte nicht als ein essayistisches Unternehmen, sondern als der systematische Versuch verstanden werden, Antworten auf diese Fragen zu finden. Allerdings lassen sich philosophische Fragen (...) niemals definitiv beantworten; deshalb kann das Ziel nur sein, einen möglichst vollständigen Überblick über die verschiedenen Antworten zu geben und dabei zugleich klar zu machen, was für und was gegen diese Antworten spricht. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz reagiert auf Peter Bieris Kritik der analytischen Philosophie und argumentiert, dass Begriffsklärung zwar innerhalb eines Rahmens wissenschaftlicher Sprache stattfinde, philosophische Grundbegriffe – so genannte kategoriale Begriffe – sich aber selbst nicht mehr innerhalb dieses Systems klären lassen. Alle philosophischen Grundbegriffe können zwar klar erkannt, ihrerseits aber nicht vermittels deutlicher Begriffe bestimmt werden. Deshalb rekurriert etwa Frege zur Erläuterung der Unterscheidung zwischen den kategorialen Begriffen „Begriff“ und „Gegenstand“ auf die Metapher des Ungesättigten. In Grundlagenfragen wird auch der analytische (...) Philosoph zum Metaphoriker beziehungsweise genauer: zum Katachretiker. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz reagiert auf Peter Bieris Kritik der analytischen Philosophie und plädiert dafür, die systematischen sprachphilosophischen Einsichten des späten Wittgenstein als dauerhaft und weiterführend anzusehen, was insbesondere für unser Verständnis des Mentalen weitere Fortschritte verspricht. Er wendet sich gegen rein ,therapeutische Lesarten' von Wittgenstein und gegen die Streichung des erkenntnistheoretischen Impulses aus der Sprachphilosophie.

This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor ...

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

A complete system of classical Aristotelian logic intended for honors high school and college.

In a thoughtful reassessment of the meaning of life and death, a noted philosopher offers a new definition for life that contrasts a world dependent on biological maintenance with one controlled by state-of-the-art medical technology. Tour.

This article explores how sexualities and space are constitutive of each other in that sexualities are enacted and encoded in and across different scales and sites. In particular, this article aims to investigate how space and heteronormativity interact to complicate once more distinctions between spatial categories such as public/private and, more importantly, urban/rural through the gateways of the train station around the turn of the 20th century. Against the background of urbanization, changes in transport and the particular dangers that were (...) associated with cities and towns from the late 19th century onwards, this article is interested in looking at how train stations as locations of displacement function as sexualized spaces while at the same time providing opportunities to police and govern non-conformist female sexuality. The transformation from rural ‘good’ sexuality to ‘dangerous’ urban sexuality took place precisely at the arrival points in the cities so that train stations became hugely symbolic in collective and individual constructions of sexuality. We argue that a distinctive spatial perspective generates innovative interpretations of social interactions within a given historical context. (shrink)

Ohne Rücksicht auf disziplinäre Schranken bringt dieses Buch verschiedene nicht-reduktionistische Lerntheorien miteinander ins Gespräch. In einem offenen Diskurs, der die Konzepte zueinander in Beziehung setzt, werden die unterschiedlichen Perspektiven kritisch abgewogen und hinsichtlich ihrer Stärken und Schwächen diskutiert.

Delo se loteva vprašanja aktualnosti pojma subjekta v filozofiji in politiki skozi analizo tistih avtorjev, ki so ga domnevno najbolj radikalno pokopali: pokaže, da vznik radikalno novega in problematika subjekta zavzema osrednje mesto v Deleuzovi filozofiji, kakor tudi v Lyotardovi pozni misli posvečeni praznini, v Foucaultovi obravnavi biopolitike in biooblasti, v delu Negrija in Hardta o Imperiju, ter nazadnje v Badioujevi predelavi temeljnih filozofskih kategorij biti, resnice in subjekta, na osnovi katerih je dandanes znova možna renesansa filozofije. Ta ima po (...) Badiouju štiri razsežnosti, ki se v delu Vznik subjekta nenehno prepletajo: »V osnovi želja filozofije implicira razsežnost upora: ni filozofije brez nezadovoljstva mišljenja v njegovem soočenju s svetom, kakršen je. Pa vendar želja filozofije vključuje tudi logiko: to je, prepričanje v moč argumenta in uma.«. (shrink)

Not only the direct physical experiences of deployment can severely harm soldiers’ mental health. Witnessing violations of their moral principles by the enemy, or by their fellow soldiers and superiors, can also have a devastating impact. It can cause soldiers’ moral disorientation, increasing feelings of shame, guilt, or hate, and the need for general answers on questions of right and wrong. Various attempts have been made to keep soldiers mentally sane. One is to provide convincing causes for their deployment, which (...) risks an “end justifies the means” way of thinking. The good cause can provide a moral justification for horrible atrocities. Another method, introduced in the USA, Canada, and Australia, aims to strengthen military personnel’s resistance by promoting and maintaining a happy, optimistic state of mind through the use of positive psychology. Alongside making soldiers “morally fit” for all kinds of situations, the focus could also be on moral recovery and forgiveness. Such a care-based military ethics approach, aimed at mutual understanding and interdependence, could help soldiers handle the emotional impact of moral conflicts. This demands that military units reflect on their organizational culture and rethink oaths and codes of conduct that focus mainly on efficiency and readiness, as well as the soldierly self-image with its seemingly still deeply rooted warrior ethos. Today, resilience and positive psychology in the military is apparently mainly geared to assuring its soldiers’ readiness. An appropriate set of virtues and understanding of virtue ethics that are less centered on self-perfection and autonomy could point to a different form of character-building and lead to a better understanding of others. (shrink)

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next (...) twenty or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to higher-order metaphysics as well as to the contributions to this volume. We discuss five topics, corresponding to the five parts of this volume, and summarize the contributions to each part. First, we motivate the usefulness of higher-order quantification in metaphysics using a number of examples, and discuss the question of how such quantifiers should be interpreted. We provide a brief introduction to the most common forms of higher-order logics used in metaphysics, and indicate a (...) number of questions which can be raised in such systems using logical vocabulary alone. Using a further example, we return to applications of higher-order logics in metaphysics. We also mention key developments in the history of higher-order logic as it pertains to metaphysics. Finally, we mention certain arguments which have been raised against the use of higher-order logic, and some ways of responding to them. (shrink)

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...) bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. (shrink)

In this lucid and penetrating book, Peter A. Schouls considers Locke's major writings in terms of the closely related ideas of freedom, progress, mastery, reason, and education.