CHAPTER ONE THE WORLD AS WILL TO POWER /. What there is for Nietzsche Any philosophical system which claims to be at all comprehensive must answer, ...

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the individuals to (...) follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: (1) Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? (2) Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the (...) individuals to follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.

This chapter addresses the distinction between private and public and the difference between ‘public’ and ‘official’. Drawing on a comparative analysis of Asian cities, it looks at the ways in which the local, the national and the global levels, which serve different, sometimes contrasting, interests, are negotiated and reconciled in the city. The chapter suggests that different forms of reconciliation have brought about an alternative ‘insitutionalisation’ of the public space. Such an institutionalisation is reflected in the access to, and dissemination (...) of, information—e.g., access to the media—and, above all, in the control over the common goods. The public sphere is used to voice discontent, leading to a new definition of the ‘common good’; that is, the inclusion, or non-exclusion, of large sections of the population which, though initially marginal, can become significant in shaping urban politics. (shrink)

Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems is considered from a metacognitive perspective. Two examples are discussed in terms of the proposed perceptual symbol theory. First, recent results in research on feeling-of-knowing judgement are used to argue for a representation of familiarity with input cues. This representation should support implicit memory. Second, the ability of maintaining a theory of other people's beliefs (theory of mind) is considered and it is suggested that a purely simulation-based view is insufficient to explain the available (...) evidence. Both examples characterize areas where Barsalou's theory would benefit from additional detail. (shrink)

Schmitz zieht in diesem Buch die Bilanz eines mehr als fünfzigjährigen Fortschreitens im Dienst der Aufgabe, den Menschen ihr wirkliches Leben begreiflich zu machen. Er stellt zu diesem Zweck vier Säulen seines Werkes vor - unter den Titeln: Subjektivität, Mannigfaltigkeit, Leib und Gefühl, Welt - und bringt grundlegende Fragestellungen der Neuen Phänomenologie zur Sprache: Der Leib war seit der...

The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...) by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required. (shrink)

Die klassischen Gegenuberstellungen in der Philosophie gleichen oft dem Verschieben von Figuren im Theater oder auf dem Schachbrett. Das liegt daran, dass man alles fur einzeln und Identitat mit etwas fur selbstverstandlich halt. Es versteht sich aber nicht von selbst, dass alles, was ist, selbst ist. Selbstsein, Einzelheit, Identitat mit etwas haben tiefliegende und kontingente Voraussetzungen in der Dynamik des spurbaren Leibes. Von dieser hangt durch die subjektiven (nicht neutralen) Tatsachen des affektiven Betroffenseins auch das Selbstbewusstsein der Person ab. Um (...) sich mit etwas zu identifizieren, muss sie sich schon kennen, und dafur bedarf sie der leiblichen Dynamik, wie fur alles Konkrete der aus dieser sich ergebenden leiblichen Kommunikation. Durch die Ambivalenz von Eintauchen in den Leib und Auftauchen aus ihm wird die Person labil und zwiespaltig. Als Wege zu ihrer Stabilisierung und Integration werden hier die Fassung, die Komik und der Humor erortert. Alle Erfahrung wird auf leibliches Verstehen zuruckgefuhrt. Aber was ist der spurbare Leib im Gegensatz zum sichtbaren und tastbaren Korper? Er muss erst begrifflich freigelegt werden, denn seine eigentumliche Ausdehnung und Dynamik waren der europaischen Intellektualkultur unbekannt. (shrink)

The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...) ostensibly shared features of quantum phenomena and conscious phenomena (e.g., complementarity, nonspatiality, acausality, spontaneity, and holism) and connections (ontology, causation, and knowledge), the qualia problem (subjectivity, explanatory gap etc.). But there are many problems, especially questions regarding realism and the nature and role of conscious observers; • QCC are conceptually challenging, because there are definitory problems and some crucial ontological and epistemological shortcomings. It is instructive to compare them with recent proposals for understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). QCC are not sufficient for a quantum theory of mind, nor might they be necessary except perhaps in a very broad sense; • QCC are also empirically challenging. Nevertheless, QCC could be relevant and important for the mindbody problem: QCC might reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. But QCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. QCC restrict accounts of nomological identity. The discovery of QCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone. But there are also problems with QCC in the framework of other ontologies. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and (...) unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

Ein stetig beschleunigtes Weltgeschehen, medial drangend prasent, die Eigendynamik von globalen "Machten und Gewalten" lassen nach einer "Weltautoritat", zumindest aber nach klugen und partizipativen Formen der Steuerung Ausschau halten, nach verantwortlichen und wertegeleiteten Akteuren. Dies Buch tut das neben dem Blick auf die politische "Global Governance" in den Bereichen Finanzwirtschaft, Medien, Zivilgesellschaft und Religionen. Denn immer haufiger werden religiose Akteure in Konflikten auch alsvermittelnde, friedensstiftende Krafte wahrgenommen und angerufen.

The paper is replaced by a new version (12-2019): DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3572846 -/- Physical phenomena emerge from the quantum fields everywhere in space. However, not only the phenomena emerge from the quantum fields, the law of the conservation of energy must have its origin from the same spatial structure. This paper describes the relations between the main law of physics and the mathematical structure of the “aggregated” quantum fields.

Europa ist nicht nur eine Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion, sondern in hohem Masse auch eine Gemeinschaft der politischen und sozialethischen Werte. Sie sind unverzichtbar in einer grenzuberschreitenden Union, in die jedes Land seine kulturelle Identitat mit ihren vielfaltigen Werten und Traditionen einbringen kann und die trotz aller Unterschiede weiter zusammenwachst. Vertreter der Sozialethik aus dem katholischen, dem orthodoxen und dem evangelischen Bereich erschliessen die jeweiligen Grundzuge und Schwerpunkte und entwickeln zukunftstrachtige Perspektiven fur Europa. Fur den Weg der europaischen Lander in ihrer (...) Vielgestaltigkeit zu einer wirklich humanitaren und sozialgerechten Gemeinschaft sind Innovationen auch aus christlicher und okumenischer Perspektive notwendig. Sie fordern in der Gesundheits- und Sozialwirtschaft die konkrete Gestaltung einer Gesellschaft fur soziale Gerechtigkeit, fur den sozialen Frieden, fur Bildungsgerechtigkeit und fur einen okonomischen Ausgleich in der Marktwirtschaft. Im Fokus stehen nicht zuletzt auch die arbeitsrechtlichen Kriterien der Kirchen im Blick auf die europaischen Vorgaben und die Bereitschaft zu einem offenen Dialog mit dem Islam. Die Beitrage in diesem Buch geben Anstosse und Anregungen zu weiteren Uberlegungen und konkreten Schritten. (shrink)

Die Person ist nur Person, indem sie zugleich prapersonal ist, und bringt doch etwas unvorhersehbar Neues auf: ihre Fahigkeit zur Selbstbestimmung durch Selbstzuschreibung als Fall mehrerer Gattungen. Mit ihrem Durchbruch aus der Gefangenschaft in Situationen entsteht die Welt als Antwort auf das menschliche Ansprechen mit satzformiger Rede, die aus Situationen schopft. Diese Doppelgesichtigkeit von Verankerung und Neubildung in der Epigenese wird in dem Buch an verschiedenen Themen verfolgt. Dazu gehoren u. a. Enge und Weite, Leib und leibliche Kommunikation, Sucht, Intentionalitat, (...) Geschichte und Praxis. Am Schluss steht ein Ruckblick auf das Abendland. Die antike Philosophie mit Welt- und Menschspaltung, das mittelalterliche Christentum mit Bindung des affektiven Betroffenseins an die Macht als zentrales Thema, die Neuzeit mit dem gegen Situationen und leibliche Kommunikation blinden Weltbild der Naturwissenschaft haben die Menschen vom Einblick in ihr wirkliches Leben abgelenkt. Die noch unverlorene Kraft kritischer Aufklarung lasst einige Hoffnung auf einen Neubeginn des menschlichen Selbst- und Weltverstandnisses im Abendland ubrig. (shrink)

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are (...) correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically. (shrink)