Can a man intend to do the impossible? That is, can a man undertake to do some action, A—and not merely to come as close as possible to doing A with the hope that the doing of A will result—when he believes he has no chance of doing A?

Building on two nonproblematic claims, I argue for a qualified endorsement of Hume's intuition that there must be a time-difference between cause and effect. Those claims are: (i) that the statement 'A caused B' is meaningful only if we have a criterion for saying 'A' and 'B' refer to distinct events; and (ii) that an adequate view of what it is to be an event must illuminate the enterprise of seeking to establish a singular causal statement. Specifically, I argue there (...) must be a time-difference when cause and effect are modifications of the same physical object. (shrink)

B. F. Skinner has argued that those who are serious about ending war, pollution, etc., must face the fact that the received methods of changing behavior have proved ineffective. According to Skinner, we must replace 'weak' methods of control such as control via praise and blame and control via Rousseau's 'natural contingencies of things' with Skinner's 'strong' methods of control. It is argued that Skinner's case for the continued ineffectiveness of such methods of control rests on the unargued assumption that (...) we are stuck with the highly centralized forms of social organization that characterize present-day advanced societies, forms that place barriers between man and man and between man and nature. Drawing on the anarchist tradition in political thought, it is argued that a radical decentralization — which cannot be dismissed as Utopian — would bring a new effectiveness to what Skinner dismisses as 'weak' forms of control. (shrink)

B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a ?scientific? approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open?ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show (...) that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory?based rationale for universally valid judgments without involving one in a ?non?scientific? approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory?based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state good. (shrink)

The fundamental tenet of modern empiricism is the view that all non-analytic knowledge is based on experience. Let us call this thesis the principle of empiricism. [1] Contemporary logical empiricism has added [2] to it the maxim that a sentence makes a cognitively meaningful assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, only if it is either (1) analytic or self-contradictory or (2) capable, at least in principle, of experiential test. According to this so-called empiricist criterion (...) of cognitive meaning, or of cognitive significance, many of the formulations of traditional metaphysics and large parts of epistemology are devoid of cognitive significance--however rich some of them may be in non-cognitive import by virtue of their emotive appeal or the moral inspiration they offer. Similarly certain doctrines which have been, at one time or another, formulated within empirical science or its border disciplines are so contrived as to be incapable of test by any conceivable evidence; they are therefore qualified as pseudo- [p. 42:] hypotheses, which assert nothing, and which therefore have no explanatory or predictive force whatever. This verdict applies, for example, to the neo-vitalist speculations about entelechies or vital forces, and to the "telefinalist hypothesis" propounded by Lecomte du Noüy. (shrink)

Reminiscences of Peter, by P. Oppenheim.--Natural kinds, by W. V. Quine.--Inductive independence and the paradoxes of confirmation, by J. Hintikka.--Partial entailment as a basis for inductive logic, by W. C. Salmon.--Are there non-deductive logics?, by W. Sellars.--Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference, by R. C. Jeffre--Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice, by R. Nozick.--The meaning of time, by A. Grünbaum.--Lawfulness as mind-dependent, by N. Rescher.--Events and their descriptions: some considerations, by J. Kim.--The individuation of events, by D. Davidson.--On properties, by (...) H. Putnam.--A method for avoiding the Curry paradox, by F. B. Fitch.--Publications (1934-1969) by Carl G. Hempel (p. [266]-270). (shrink)

The unique role of the second derivative of position with respect to time in classical mechanics is investigated. It is indicated that mechanics might have been developed around other order derivatives. Examples based on $\overset \ldots \to{x}$ and $\overset....\to{x}$ are presented. Kirchhoff's argument for using ẍ is given and generalized.

The so-called "non-commutativity" of probability kinematics has caused much unjustified concern. When identical learning is properly represented, namely, by identical Bayes factors rather than identical posterior probabilities, then sequential probability-kinematical revisions behave just as they should. Our analysis is based on a variant of Field's reformulation of probability kinematics, divested of its (inessential) physicalist gloss.

In the thesis I criticize the project of showing that the primary qualities mentioned in a special "scientific" or "objective" conception of the world enjoy a status that secondary qualities do not, and suggest how the appeal of such a distinction might be overcome. ;Descartes argued that we erroneously ascribe illusory "secondary" qualities to the world. In the painting analogy of the First Meditation I identify a line of reasoning that has been previously overlooked yet is crucial to the success (...) of Descartes's project. I show why Descartes's explanation of how we come to have the supposedly erroneous beliefs is unacceptable, and that contemporary accounts of so-called projective error fail for similar reasons. These failures suggest that an explanation of the thoughts we do have cannot succeed without appeal to more than the limited resources Descartes took to be available. ;Pursuing this suggestion I examine alternatives to the form of anti-skeptical reasoning of the painting analogy. I develop a modified transcendental strategy that resembles aspects of Davidson's treatment of error, while respecting the realism that motivates the project in question. I argue that beliefs about the colors of objects, for example, are systematically related and that the attribution of systematic disagreement cannot be justified. This shows that the systematic error Descartes claimed to find in our ordinary judgements is not fully intelligible. ;Finally I survey some contemporary alternatives to Descartes's account. Many dispositional analyses of qualities aim to revise our ordinary understanding of these qualities, thus taking for granted a prior demonstration of the distinction in question. I argue that no non-revisionary dispositional analysis of these qualities can succeed. I show that the notion of "anthropocentricity" is irrelevant to the project. Lastly I consider accounts that characterize primary qualities by their explanatory power. Previous arguments show that identifying some objects as possessing certain qualities is a condition of identifying beliefs as beliefs about those qualities. I end with a lesson about the limits of the explanatory power of a special austere conception of the world. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of "semi-r.e." for subsets of ω, a generalization of "semirecursive" and of "r.e.", and the notion of "weakly semirecursive", a generalization of "semi-r.e.". We show that A is weakly semirecursive iff, for any n numbers x 1 ,...,x n , knowing how many of these numbers belong to A is equivalent to knowing which of these numbers belong to A. It is shown that there exist weakly semirecursive sets that are neither semi-r.e. nor co-semi-r.e. On the (...) other hand, we exhibit nonzero Turing degrees in which every weakly semirecursive set is semirecursive. We characterize the notion "A is weakly semirecursive and recursive in K" in terms of recursive approximations to A. We also show that if a finite Boolean combination of r.e. sets is semirecursive then it must be r.e. or co-r.e. Several open questions are raised. (shrink)

It is shown that for every nonzero r.e. degree c there is a linear ordering of degree c which is not isomorphic to any recursive linear ordering. It follows that there is a linear ordering of low degree which is not isomorphic to any recursive linear ordering. It is shown further that there is a linear ordering L such that L is not isomorphic to any recursive linear ordering, and L together with its ‘infinitely far apart’ relation is of low (...) degree. Finally, an analogue of the recursion theorem for recursive linear orderings is refuted. (shrink)

1. Object of this note . In his lively essay, “Between Analytic and Empirical,” , Mr. J. W. N. Watkins challenges the empiricist identification of synthetic statements with empirical ones by arguing that there exists an important class of statements which are synthetic, i.e. not analytically true or false, and yet not empirical. I find Mr. Watkins's arguments very stimulating, but I do not think they provide a sound basis for his contention. In the present note, I wish to indicate (...) what seem to me the principal flaws in Mr. Watkins's reasoning, and to make some additional comments on the issues raised by his discussion. (shrink)