Between the 1960s and the 1970s, Marxism reached its maximum success in Italy, but that phase also corresponded to the crisis of the Italian Communist Party’s cultural hegemony, challenged by both the attacks coming from the New Left and innovative readings of Marx’s works. Marxist historicism, on which the Italian Communist Party had based its cultural policy after the the Second World War, consequently suffered heavy attacks. This article illuminates one of the responses to historicism’s decline, providing an account of (...) the book series La Scienza Nuova, issued by the publishing house Dedalo in Bari and edited by the communist intellectual Mario Spinella, who was able to remain loyal to his party demonstrating, at the same time, cultural autonomy. Also grounding on archival documents, the article posits that Spinella’s aim was to attract New Left readers by selecting books on topics and by authors that were in fashion in Italy and abroad, but incorporating them into a theoretical framework based on Marxist historicism, in order to preserve the latter in an evolving cultural environment. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo consiste en mostrar el carácter social del contractualismo de Fichte. Para realizar ese propósito se comienza examinando la conexión entre trabajo y ciudadanía como una condición de la legitimidad política. Luego se presenta esa conexión en el marco del siempre posible desarrollo histórico de la naturaleza humana. Por último, se indican las razones de la recepción de Fichte como un precursor del socialismo germánico.

Review of: Communauté (Gemeinschaft), Martin Buber (2018) Paris: Éditions de l’éclat, 157 pp., ISBN 978-2-84162-432-4, p/bk, €10.

As systems based on opaque Artificial Intelligence (AI) continue to flourish in diverse real-world applications, understanding these black box models has become paramount. In response, Explainable AI (XAI) has emerged as a field of research with practical and ethical benefits across various domains. This paper not only highlights the advancements in XAI and its application in real-world scenarios but also addresses the ongoing challenges within XAI, emphasizing the need for broader perspectives and collaborative efforts. We bring together experts from diverse (...) fields to identify open problems, striving to synchronize research agendas and accelerate XAI in practical applications. By fostering collaborative discussion and interdisciplinary cooperation, we aim to propel XAI forward, contributing to its continued success. Our goal is to put forward a comprehensive proposal for advancing XAI. To achieve this goal, we present a manifesto of 27 open problems categorized into nine categories. These challenges encapsulate the complexities and nuances of XAI and offer a road map for future research. For each problem, we provide promising research directions in the hope of harnessing the collective intelligence of interested stakeholders. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a regularity theory of causation. The theory aims to be reductive and to align with our pre‐theoretic understanding of the causal relation. We show that our theory can account for a wide range of causal scenarios, including isomorphic scenarios, omissions, and scenarios which suggest that causation is not transitive.

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true, while present best theories are demonstrably (...) completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. (shrink)

Hacemos una lectura del “Tratado sobre los principios de la teología” de Guillermo de Occam, y echamos un vistazo a la Escolástica tardía que esta obra representa tan bien, revisando diferentes referencias bibliográficas, que me han permitido conocer y analizar diferentes conceptos y enfoques acerca de este singular tema. De hecho, se trata de una obra mayor, de gran calibre, pero de autor incierto, generalmente atribuida a Occam, aunque la autoría real está en disputa. Lo cierto es que se trata (...) de un momento culminante de una época de la historia del pensamiento occidental; una en la que su autor, con briosa arquitectura, levanta un edificio que perenniza el pensar occamista, comentándolo, glosándolo y dándole forma enciclopédica, minuciosa, como la que uno esperaría encontrar en un diccionario o un manual del Nominalismo naciente. (shrink)

The paper attempts to bridge a gap between two prevalent conceptions of forgiveness that are widely thought to be in opposition. On one side of things, forgiveness is often characterized as a gift. The image is an ever-present one, enduring in popular culture no less than in the sober prose of analytic philosophy. But we also talk of forgiveness as a moral imperative, an important, even vital aspect of our moral life. I argue that, contrary to what may at first (...) appear, the two sides are not in tension, and each gets at something important about the nature of forgiveness. Forgiveness is indeed a gift but, much like actual gifts, it is one we are sometimes required to give. (shrink)

Many people appear to attach great value to sad music. But why? One way to gain insight into this question is to turn away from music and look instead at why people value sad conversations. In the case of conversations, the answer seems to be that expressing sadness creates a sense of genuine connection. We propose that sad music can also have this type of value. Listening to a sad song can give one a sense of genuine connection. We then (...) explore the nature of this value in two experimental studies. The results suggest a striking relationship between music and conversation. People see something distinctively musical in works that express precisely those emotions that they think most create connection within conversation. (shrink)

Feasting on a plethora of social media platforms, news aggregators, and online marketplaces, recommender systems (RSs) are spreading pervasively throughout our daily online activities. Over the years, a host of ethical issues have been associated with the diffusion of RSs and the tracking and monitoring of users’ data. Here, we focus on the impact RSs may have on personal autonomy as the most elusive among the often-cited sources of grievance and public outcry. On the grounds of a philosophically nuanced notion (...) of autonomy, we illustrate three specific reasons why RSs may limit or compromise it: the threat of manipulation and deception associated with RSs; the RSs’ power to reshape users’ personal identity; the impact of RSs on knowledge and critical thinking. In our view, however, notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, RSs may effectively help users to navigate an otherwise overwhelming landscape. Our perspective, therefore, is not to be intended as a bulwark to protect the _status quo_ but as an invitation to carefully weigh these aspects in the design of ethically oriented RSs. (shrink)

We present a fully relational definition of inertial systems based in the No Arbitrariness Principle, that eliminates the need for absolute inertial frames of reference or distinguished reference systems as the ``fixed stars'' in order to formulate Newtonian mechanics. The historical roots of this approach to mechanics are discussed as well. The work is based in part in the constructivist perspective of space advanced by Piaget. We argue that inertial systems admit approximations and that what is of practical use are (...) precisely such approximations. We finally discuss a slightly larger class of systems that we call ``relatively inertial'' which are the fundamental systems in a relational view of mechanics. (shrink)

: Usually, when studying schematism we devote almost exclusive attention to the study of the modifications that the categories suffer when combined with time. Instead, we have focused our attention on the determinations that time receives when combined with the categories. Departing from the definition of the transcendental schemata as “determinations of time”, an attempt is made to establish the various determinations that time receives from each one of the categories, as these perform the determination of time in schematism. The (...) categories of quantity allow us to think of time as a series of homogeneous unities; the categories of quality show each instant of time as a receptacle able to receive the different intensities of the real; the categories of relation establish a rule-dependent order on the flow of time; finally, the categories of modality determine the whole of time forming a collective unity that gathers or embraces each one of the instants of time preserving its specificity. (shrink)

Scholarship on embedding values in AI is growing. In what follows, we distinguish two concepts of AI and argue that neither is amenable to values being ‘embedded’. If we think of AI as computational artifacts, then values and AI cannot be added together because they are ontologically distinct. If we think of AI as sociotechnical systems, then components of values and AI are in the same ontologic category—they are both social. However, even here thinking about the relationship as one of (...) ‘embedding’ is a mischaracterization. The relationship between values and AI is best understood as a dimension of the relationship between technology and society, a relationship that can be theorized in multiple ways. The literature in this area is consistent in showing that technology and society are co-productive. Within the co-production framework, the relationship between values and AI is shown to be generative of new meaning. This stands in stark contrast to the framework of ‘embedding’ values which frames values as fixed things that can be inserted into technological artifacts. (shrink)

In 1890, the famous Jena Glass Works of Carl Zeiss released the Anastigmat photographic lens to great fanfare. The nearly faultless realism it generated seemed to conclude a chapter in optical technology that had progressed in a predetermined manner since photography’s origins. But why exactly had Zeiss developed its expensive mechanism, and what drove photographers to buy it? This article proposes that the consistent focus and varied depth of field that the Anastigmat provided were not in and of themselves the (...) desired goals of the new corrected lens, but that they were instead visible signals of a pictorial model that makers and consumers had been circling since the public introduction of photography in 1839. The goal was a strict verisimilitude that remained stubbornly external to the medium, an illusionistic standard that had largely been mediated by painting and was now apparently possible in photography as well. But this history of pictorial perfection and the Anagstimat was not inevitable. Other lenses developed around the same time answered to dramatically different technological and aesthetic imperatives. They tell an alternative story of photography’s identity that is less tethered to mimetic fidelity and the idealized human vision with which photography was increasingly associated. (shrink)

L’interview retrace la carrière universitaire de l’historien Mario Kessler, né en RDA. Il a étudié l’histoire à Iéna et à Leipzig, a rédigé ses thèses de doctorat et de post-doctorat alors qu’il se trouvait encore en RDA, mais a dû trouver sa voie dans un système universitaire entièrement nouveau en 1990. Il y est parvenu sans changer sa position politique de socialiste critique. Grâce à la formation universitaire de sa famille et à sa connaissance de la littérature occidentale, il (...) disposait déjà avant 1989 d’une avance en matière de connaissances, qu’il a pu mettre à profit, par exemple lors de ses nombreux postes de professeur invité et de ses séjours de recherche aux États-Unis. Il n’a jamais oublié ce qu’il devait à ses professeurs et compagnons universitaires de l’Est et de l’Ouest. (shrink)

Criticisms à la Laudan can block the “no miracles” argument for the (approximate) truth of whole theories. Realists have thus retrenched, arguing that at least the individual claims deployed in the derivation of novel predictions should be considered (approximately) true. But for Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to this weaker “deployment” realism: he lists a number of novel predictions supposedly derived from (radically) false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by Lyons’ “modest surrealism” or (...) other surrogates to realism. In fact, I argue, some of those predictions were an easy guess, or independently probable in the light of available evidence; hence, they are no counterexamples to deployment realism, for the no miracles argument wouldn’t apply to them. In other instances, pace Lyon, the prediction was actually false, and could be reinterpreted as true only by interpreting as true also the claim from which it was derived; or again, a false claim was employed in the derivation of a true prediction, but inessentially, the essential role being played by a weaker true claim. But as soon as the paradoxical air of such historical cases is explained away in any of these manners, they cease to represent counterexamples to deployment realism. If, as I suggest, all of them can be dealt with by these strategies, a theoretical claim can still be assumed to be true if it is crucial in deriving an improbable novel prediction. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reject what I call the entitlement model of directed obligation: the view that we can conclude from X is obligated to Y that therefore Y has an entitlement against X. I argue that rejecting the model clears up many otherwise puzzling aspects of ordinary moral interaction. The main goal is not to offer a new theory of obligation and entitlement. It is rather to show that, contrary to what most philosophers have assumed, directed (...) obligation and entitlement are not the same normative concept seen from two different perspectives. They are two very different concepts, and much is gained by keeping them distinct. (shrink)

Durante los años 1853 y 1854 surgió una ola de huelgas en varios distritos industriales de Inglaterra, especialmente en los sectores textiles de Lancashire y Manchester. Este ciclo de luchas, que pugnaba principalmente por un aumento de los salarios, fue visto por Ernest Jones y el movimiento Cartista como una oportunidad para organizar una asociación obrera a escala nacional. Karl Marx, que compartía la visión de los cartistas, analizó el movimiento desde el New York Tribune, brindando apoyo a la iniciativa (...) a la que dio lugar: el Parlamento Obrero. A continuación, se ofrece la traducción de cuatro textos periodísticos que Marx publicó en apoyo a la institución obrera –la mayoría inéditos en español–, seguidos de «Las luchas por la organización obrera en la época victoriana (1853-1854)», un estudio crítico sobre el ciclo de huelgas y las expectativas de organización obrera durante aquellos años, donde se defiende que este fallido intento de organización constituye un precedente de la sección británica de la Asociación Internacional de Trabajadores. La traducción y edición de los textos de Marx, y el estudio crítico que los acompaña, han sido realizados por Mario Espinoza Pino (Universidad de Granada). (shrink)

Los instrumentos curriculares suelen ser objeto de luchas políticas; están atravesados por opciones, renuncias y escogencias. No son nunca neutros. Estas páginas quieren ser una contribución a la urgente tarea de revisión curricular desde una perspectiva intercultural. En este artículo se presenta el currículo como “un camino” en el que las personas ‘aprendientes’ pueden encontrarse, dialogar y aprender gracias a su diversidad, y en el que es posible promover el diálogo de saberes y culturas. No se trata solamente de prestar (...) atención a la diversidad cultural (lo cual sería ya un paso importante), sino de convertir los procesos educativos en un espacio para la convivencia en la diversidad y para la justicia cultural. (shrink)

Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones. Elsewhere I criticized (...) his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism, but helps to detail it better. In a more explicit formulation, the realist IBE concludes not only to the truth of theories, but also to the reliability of scientists and scientific method, the order and simplicity of nature, and the approximate truth of background theories. (shrink)

Slightly revised version of the author's habilitation--Universitèat Gèottingen, 2014.

The cognitive basis of geometry is still poorly understood, even the ‘simpler’ issue of what kind of representation of geometric objects we have. In this work, we set forward a tentative model of the neural representation of geometric objects for the case of the pure geometry of Euclid. To arrive at a coherent model, we found it necessary to consider earlier forms of geometry. We start by developing models of the neural representation of the geometric figures of ancient Greek practical (...) geometry. Then, we propose a related model for the earliest form of pure geometry – that of Hippocrates of Chios. Finally, we develop the model of the neural representation of the geometric objects of Euclidean geometry. The models are based on the hub-and-spoke theory. In our view, the existence of specific models opens the possibility of addressing the relationship between geometric figures and geometric objects, in a novel way, in terms of their neural representation. (shrink)

With special relativity, we seem to be facing a conundrum. It is a very well-tested theory; in this way, the Minkowski spacetime must be “capturing” essential features of space and time. However, its geometry seems to be incompatible with any sort of global notion of time. We might only have local notions of now (present moment) and time flow, at best. In this note, we will explore the possibility that a pretty much global notion of now (and time flow) might (...) be hiding in plain sight in the geometry of the Minkowski spacetime. (shrink)

The currently most plausible version of scientific realism is probably “deployment” realism, based on various contributions in the recent literature, and worked out as a unitary account in Psillos. According to it we can believe in the at least partial truth of theories, because that is the best explanation of their predictive success, and discarded theories which had novel predictive success had nonetheless some true parts, those necessary to derive their novel predictions. According to Doppelt this account cannot withstand the (...) antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones. Here I argue that Doppelt has not shown that deployment realism as it stands cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and a realism confined to current theories is implausible, and actually the easiest prey to the pessimistic meta-induction argument. (shrink)

The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and theoretical virtues allow to choose among empirically equivalent theories. Moreover, I argue that the theories selected in this way are not just pragmatically or aesthetically better, but more probably true. At present in quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues allow to choose among many competing theories and interpretations, (...) but this is because none of them possess those virtues to a sufficient degree. However, first, we can hope for some future advancement. Second, even if no further progress came forth, all the most credited competitors agree on a substantial core of theoretical assumptions. Therefore underdetermination does not show that we cannot be realist on unobservable entities in general, but at most that in particular fields our inquiry may encounter some de facto limits. (shrink)

The objective of this research was to determine the relationship between educational marketing and student satisfaction in Higher Education Institutions in the Tacna region, in order to analyse the characteristics that are related to the study variables. The methodology was carried out under a quantitative approach, with a correlational and transversal research design; sample was composed of 249 students. Pearson's statistical test was applied, showing that the educational marketing variable is significantly related to student satisfaction in higher education institutions. Finally, (...) it was demonstrated that the students evidenced effective characteristics of their respective institutions that differentiate them from others. (shrink)

"CAMINOS DEL PENSAR DE NUESTRA AMÉRICA se integra con 27 ensayos, cuyos autores escriben en torno a siete materias principales: Eticidad y educación; Circunstancialidad y liberación; Literatura y expresión; Movimientos sociales ¿antiguos y modernos?; Epistemologías actuales en América Latina; Tecnología ecología y ciencia, y cierra con Temas en el tintero en América Latina, todos ellos con un objetivo común: la historia de las ideas. Gracias al trabajo metodológico y guía del doctor Mario Magallón Anaya fue posible conjuntar temas diversos (...) entrelazando ideas; este libro es resultado de sesiones de análisis en las que distintas generaciones convergieron desde sus disciplinas para pensar a nuestro mundo en estas primeras dos décadas del siglo XXI."--Back cover. (shrink)

The Henry’s exigency of one absolute manifest of the fundament takes him from his first big work L’essence de la manifestation (1963) to subordinate the ontology to the phenomenology. A phenomenology that has to abandon the Greek phainomenon –inevitable limited and determined by the environment i..

Con el ego cogito sum, Descartes ha buscado ofrecer un suelo seguro para la edificación del conocimiento científico. Sin embargo, la problemática así instaurada ha olvidado totalmente, como señala Heidegger, elucidar el sentido de ser de ese sum. Puede decirse que toda la obra de Michel Henry constituye una tentativa profundamente original de plantear la cuestión del ego sum sobre un contexto verdaderamente ontológico. Es en esta medida que su meditación sobre la obra y el proyecto cartesiano ocupa un lugar (...) central y permanente. Henry nos descubre en L´essence de la Manifestation (1964) y en Phénoménologie du Corps un Descartes cuyo proyecto, basado irreflexivamente sobre un procedimiento intuicionista identifica verdad con evidencia y predetermina así su investigación como una imposible tentativa de exhibir el fundamento bajo la luz. Imposible, pues el fundamento, afirma Henry, el ser del ego, es invisible. Esto es lo que ha comprendido el Descartes al que nos abre Henry en su "Généalogie de la Psychanalyse" (1985): el ser del sum no es un "qué" susceptible de ser dado por un ver sino un "como" que se revela sin mediación a sí mismo como pathos: el aparecerse a si de la vida en la inmanencia de su afectividad. With the cogito ergo sum, Descartes has intended to offer a safe ground for the construction of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, the problematic thus posed has totally forgotten, as Heidegger points out, to elucidate the sense of the being of this sum. It can be said that the whole work of Michel Henry constitutes a deeply original attempt to raise the question of the ego sum on a truthfully ontological context. Hence, his meditation on Descartes work and project takes up a central and permanent place in his work. Henry discovers to us in L´essence de la Manifestation (1964) and in Phénoménologie du Corps (1965) a Descartes whose project, based unreflectively on an intuitionist procedure, identifies truth with evidence and thus predetermines his investigation as an impossible attempt to exhibit the grounding under light, which is impossible, given that the grounding, the being of the ego - Henry states-, is invisible. This is what Descartes has understood, according to Henry's "Généalogie de la Psychanalyse" (1985): the being of the sum is not a "that" which may be given by a vision but a "how" that reveals itself without any mediation as pathos: the appearing of life to itself in the immanence of its affectivity. (shrink)

This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot solve (...) the problem of change, for he cannot account for how some properties are possessed by objects in time. However, I argue that this strategy fails, for if by saying that objects in time can have properties ‘timelessly’ we mean “at no particular time” and “tenselessly”, only objects outside time can have properties in that way; but if we mean “for all the time they exist”, or “essentially”, perdurantists can account for this. Finally, I argue that actually perdurantism cannot solve the problem, but for different reasons: for either it sweeps the problem under the carpet, denying change, and in general subverting our conceptual scheme in a dangerous way, or it becomes equivalent to the endurantist picture that properties are had at times. Nor perdurantism is justified by the Relativity Theory or the B-theory of time, because while endurantism is certainly comfortable with presentism, it need not be committed to it; and even if it were, presentism need not be refuted by the Relativity Theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of bureaucratization within public research bodies and its relationship to scientific performance, focusing on an Italian case-study. The main finding is that the bureaucratization of the research sector has two dimensions: public research labs have academic bureaucratization since researchers spend an increasing part of their time in administrative matters (i.e., preparing grant applications, managing grants/projects, and so on); whereas universities mainly have administrative bureaucratization generated by the increase over time of (...) administrative staff in comparison with researchers and faculty. In addition, I show that research units with higher bureaucratization have lower scientific performance. (shrink)

A discussion of Wolfgang's Stegmüller's ideas on the structuralist conception of theories, especially as presented in his book The Structure and Dynamics of Theories (Springer, 1976).

Also known as the "Portuguese Aristotle", Pedro da Fonseca S. J. (1527-1599) was a prominent figure in early modern Scholasticism and particularly in the history of the Society of Jesus. He took part in the writing of the Society's Ratio Studiorum and laid the groundwork for the publication of the famous Cursus Conimbricensis (1592-1606). Furthermore, he was the author of an influential handbook of logic and dialectics (the Institutionum Dialecticarum, 1564), in addition to being one of the most important and (...) recognized commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics in the sixteenth century (by his unfinished Commentaria, 1577-1612). This volume is the first collection of essays in English devoted to Fonseca, to his intellectual production, and his thought. The book gathers nine essays from scholars worldwide, among which are some of the most important current specialists in early modern Scholasticism, in Portuguese Aristotelianism, and the history of the Society of Jesus. So the volume presents, for the first time, a reliable portrait of the institutional role and the thought of Fonseca about many important questions of Western Metaphysics, as well as the reception of his work in the early modern age. (shrink)

This introduction outlines the threefold contribution that this Focus section on research film offers. First, it introduces the vast collection of films from the former Institute for Scientific Film (Institut für den Wissenschaftlichen Film [IWF]), arguably the most ambitious endeavor ever undertaken to manage the distribution, production, and archiving of research films. At the same time, the institute’s questionable roots in the National Socialist education system and in war research are addressed. Second, the introduction points out that the Focus section (...) enters largely uncharted terrain in the history of research films. Third, it argues that a focus on the multiple reuses of research films, as this section attempts, not only suits the medium specificity of film but helps us to map the aesthetic, intermedial, and cultural-political practices of disseminating knowledge. In this vein, the organizers asked established scholars working on film and science to share with us a short story of a reused research film. Scott Curtis, Vinzenz Hediger, Anja Laukötter, and Hanna Rose Shell responded. Their contributions can be found in the supplementary materials to the online edition. (shrink)

This paper analyses the right to repair (R2R) movement through the lens of radical democracy, elucidating the opportunities and limitations for advancing a democratic repair ethics against a backdrop of power imbalances and vested interests. We commence our analysis by exploring broader political-economic trends, demonstrating that Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are increasingly shifting towards asset-based repair strategies. In this landscape, hegemony is preserved not solely through deterrence tactics like planned obsolescence but also by conceding repairability while monopolizing repair and maintenance (...) services. We further argue that the R2R serves as an ‘empty signifier’, whose content is shaped by four counter-hegemonic frames used by the R2R movement: consumer advocacy, environmental sustainability, communitarian values, and creative tinkering. These frames, when viewed through Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of radical democracy, reveal different potentials for sustaining dissent and confronting OEMs' hegemony in the field of repair. Analysed in this way, an emerging business ethics of repair can be understood as driven by _the politics of repair beyond repair._ This notion foregrounds the centrality of non-violent conflict and antagonism for bringing radical democratic principles to repair debates, looking beyond narrow instrumentalist conversations, where repairability is treated as an apolitical arena solely defined by concerns for eco-efficiency and resource productivity. (shrink)

Many philosophers have shown great interest in the recent anti-realist turn in Hilary Putnam's thought, whereby he rejects "meta-physical realism" in favor of "internal realism". However, many have also found it difficult to gain an exact understanding, and hence a correct assessment of Putnam's ideas. This work strives for some progress on both of these accounts. ;Part one explicates what Putnam understands by "metaphysical realism" and considers to what extent Putnam himself formerly adhered to it. It reconstructs Putnam's arguments for (...) the indeterminacy of reference and for the rejection of reference and of truth as correspondence, and it shows how such arguments hinge both on considerations in the theory of reference and in metaphysics. It suggests that commentators have often missed the actual structure of Putnam's argumentation, e.g. by simply identifying it with the so called "model-theoretic" argument. Finally, Part One examines Putnam's "internal realism", stressing its ties to such authors as Kant, Goodman and Dummett, and explaining in what senses it is really a strong kind of anti-realism. Basically, Putnam does not deny that a mind-independent world exists, but he denies that we may refer to it, and claims that the world we know is thoroughly mind-dependent. ;Part two criticizes Putnam's arguments for indeterminacy along with some similar indeterminacy arguments such as Goodman's argument on confirmation, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein argument on rules. This is done by vindicating the notion of objective similarity, and by relying on it to fix reference. Putnam's claim that we have no theory showing how reference could possibly be determinate is countered by sketching a possible account of reference--distinctly owing to functionalism--which might answer such question. Putnam's notorious "brains in the vat" argument is also discussed and criticized. ;Putnam's metaphysical picture, by which the mind-independent world is not sorted out into objects or properties, is granted. But it is argued that nonetheless we may refer to the mind-independent world, and have beliefs which are true of it. (shrink)

Evandro Agazzi’s volume Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts is here introduced. First, the genesis and the content of the book are outlined. Secondly, an overview of Agazzi’s philosophy of science is provided. Its main roots are epistemological realism in the Aristotelian/scholastic tradition, and contemporary science-oriented epistemology, especially in Logical Empiricism. As a result, Agazzi’s thought is nicely balanced between empiricism and rationalism, it avoids gnoseologistic dualism by stressing the intentionality of knowledge, and it insists on the operational and referential character (...) of science. Finally, an account is given of Agazzi’s view of the origin and nature of scientific objects, which allows to understand how his sophisticated and “perspectival” realism differs both from naïve realism and constructivism. (shrink)

The contributions to this book touch the different aspects of Popper's philosophy of science.

Strong predictivism, the idea that novel predictions per se confirm theories more than accommodations, is based on a “no miracle” argument from novel predictions to the truth of theories (NMAT). Eric Barnes rejects both: he reconstructs the NMAT as seeking an explanation for the entailment relation between a theory and its novel consequences, and argues that it involves a fallacious application of Occam’s razor. However, he accepts a no miracle argument for the truth of background beliefs (NMABB): scientists endorsed a (...) successful theory because they were guided by largely true background beliefs. This in turn raises the probability that the theory is true; so Barnes embraces a form of weak predictivism, according to which predictions are only indirectly relevant to confirmation. To Barnes I reply that we should also explain how the successful theory was constructed, not just endorsed; background beliefs are not enough to explain success, scientific method must also be considered; Barnes can account for some measure of confirmation of our theories, but not for the practical certainty conferred to them by some astonishing predictions; true background beliefs and reliability by themselves cannot explain novel success, the truth of theories is also required. Hence, the NMAT is sound, and strong predictivism is right. In fact, Barnes misinterprets the NMAT, which does not involve Occam’s razor, takes as explanandum the building of a theory which turned out to predict surprising facts, and successfully concludes that the theory is true. This accounts for the practically certain confirmation of our most successful theories, in accordance with strong predictivism. (shrink)