In our essay we discuss the significance of the words aliquo modo (en quelque façon) in Leibniz's famous definition of truth. We show that the addition of those words does not indicate a lack of clarity on Leibniz's side or a variety of meaning in his definition of truth but that its aim is to guarantee this truth-definition's universal validity. We therefore give an overview of Leibniz's theory of individual substance and show that the expression aliquo modo derives from the (...) question whether knowledge of individual substances is possible or not. (shrink)

The paper explores the question of the relationship between science and religion today in light of its modern origin in the Galileo affair. After first presenting Ian Barbour’s four standard models for the possible relationships between science and religion, it then draws on the work of Richard Blackwell and Ernan McMullin to consider the Augustinian principles at work in Galileo’s understanding of science and religion. In light of this the paper proposes a fifth, hybrid model, “dialogical convergence,” as a more (...) adequate model of the relationship in-between science and religion because it is epistemically just in its coherence with the last fifty years of philosophy of science by which it affords more than the mere tolerance of an independence view which leaves no space for the possibility of a theological understanding of nature. (shrink)

The paper explores the question of the relationship between science and religion today in light of its modern origin in the Galileo affair. After first presenting Ian Barbour’s four standard models for the possible relationships between science and religion, it then draws on the work of Richard Blackwell and Ernan McMullin to consider the Augustinian principles at work in Galileo’s understanding of science and religion. In light of this the paper proposes a fifth, hybrid model, “dialogical convergence,” as a more (...) adequate model of the relationship in-between science and religion because it is epistemically just in its coherence with the last fifty years of philosophy of science by which it affords more than the mere tolerance of an independence view which leaves no space for the possibility of a theological understanding of nature. (shrink)

Patrick Madigan's book explores the modern philosophical struggle, from its inception in Descartes to its "apotheosis" in Nietzsche, to come to grips with the essential tension between two of its most fundamental concepts--reason and freedom. Rather than a straightforward historical survey, the work offers the reader, who is somewhat familiar with the moderns, a very useful, thoughtful reflection woven out of a single threading theme: that Descartes' project to defeat the sceptic initiates a relentless pursuit of reason-as-rigor, wherein this reason (...) impregnated with the seeds of suspicion increasingly threatens the very freedom that launched the "modern project to rigor." What is especially praiseworthy is the author's success in displaying, with broad brush strokes, accented by occasional detail, a vital lineage between Descartes and Nietzsche. (shrink)

Much of Western metaphysics has been shaped by the Parmenidian problem of being, as differentiated into the problem of the one and the many and its correlated problem of change; or more precisely, the problem of making sense of any change from not-being to being. The epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem may well be posed as that of how to make sense of any change from not-knowing to knowing. Plato recognized this as an orienting problem for philosophy and posed (...) it as a famous dilemma in the Meno: how can anyone inquire into that which one does not know? A long-standing modern move for handling this problem is to make a basic distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Armed with this distinction, one delimits the proper domain of epistemology to issues of justification and simply skirts the epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem by relegating questions of the discovery or genesis of knowledge to psychology, history, or other social sciences. In this approach, epistemology, like ethics, presupposes an is/ought distinction, and any attempt to include questions of the genesis of knowledge, even partially, in the context of justification commits a genetic fallacy. And though Karl Popper acknowledged the problem of the growth of knowledge as being at the heart of epistemology’s task, he still insisted on the justification/ discovery distinction. Notwithstanding Popper, the work of W. V. O. Quine, N. R. Hanson, and most notably Thomas Kuhn has seriously undermined the distinction, and renewed the challenge of the Meno for epistemology and for philosophy of science in particular. (shrink)

Much of Western metaphysics has been shaped by the Parmenidian problem of being, as differentiated into the problem of the one and the many and its correlated problem of change; or more precisely, the problem of making sense of any change from not-being to being. The epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem may well be posed as that of how to make sense of any change from not-knowing to knowing. Plato recognized this as an orienting problem for philosophy and posed (...) it as a famous dilemma in the Meno: how can anyone inquire into that which one does not know? A long-standing modern move for handling this problem is to make a basic distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Armed with this distinction, one delimits the proper domain of epistemology to issues of justification and simply skirts the epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem by relegating questions of the discovery or genesis of knowledge to psychology, history, or other social sciences. In this approach, epistemology, like ethics, presupposes an is/ought distinction, and any attempt to include questions of the genesis of knowledge, even partially, in the context of justification commits a genetic fallacy. And though Karl Popper acknowledged the problem of the growth of knowledge as being at the heart of epistemology’s task, he still insisted on the justification/ discovery distinction. Notwithstanding Popper, the work of W. V. O. Quine, N. R. Hanson, and most notably Thomas Kuhn has seriously undermined the distinction, and renewed the challenge of the Meno for epistemology and for philosophy of science in particular. (shrink)

Much of Western metaphysics has been shaped by the Parmenidian problem of being, as differentiated into the problem of the one and the many and its correlated problem of change; or more precisely, the problem of making sense of any change from not-being to being. The epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem may well be posed as that of how to make sense of any change from not-knowing to knowing. Plato recognized this as an orienting problem for philosophy and posed (...) it as a famous dilemma in the Meno: how can anyone inquire into that which one does not know? A long-standing modern move for handling this problem is to make a basic distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Armed with this distinction, one delimits the proper domain of epistemology to issues of justification and simply skirts the epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem by relegating questions of the discovery or genesis of knowledge to psychology, history, or other social sciences. In this approach, epistemology, like ethics, presupposes an is/ought distinction, and any attempt to include questions of the genesis of knowledge, even partially, in the context of justification commits a genetic fallacy. And though Karl Popper acknowledged the problem of the growth of knowledge as being at the heart of epistemology’s task, he still insisted on the justification/ discovery distinction. Notwithstanding Popper, the work of W. V. O. Quine, N. R. Hanson, and most notably Thomas Kuhn has seriously undermined the distinction, and renewed the challenge of the Meno for epistemology and for philosophy of science in particular. (shrink)

This book consists in a collection of studies composed by different researchers; every study focuses on an author or on some authors of the history of philosophy who has/have analysed, endorsed or criticized the concept of substance. Both positions for and against the ontology of substance are presented in the book.