Pregnant women and their interests have been underrepresented in health research. Little is known about issues relevant to women considering research participation during pregnancy. We performed in-depth interviews with 22 women enrolled in either one of two trials sponsored by the National Institutes of Health to assess the safety and immunogenicity of the H1N1 vaccine during pregnancy. Three themes characterized women’s decisions to participate in research: they valued early access to the vaccine, they perceived a safety advantage when participating in (...) research, and they wanted to help advance scientific knowledge. However, there were also some considerations that would disincline them to participate in research—for instance, a significant risk of maternal or fetal harm, the presence of a placebo arm in a study, or a requirement to significantly change planned therapy or behavior. Pregnant women who participated in the H1N1 vaccine trials viewed research favorably, citing its advantages over standard clinical care. These findings emphasize that access to benefit should guide policy for including pregnant women in research. (shrink)

At no time in recent decades has more attention been paid to ethical issues in pregnancy. Particularly riveting—and alarming, to many—was the passage of Senate Bill 8, a Texas law banning abortion...

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is (...) sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

In this study, we explored the time and space relationship according to two different spatial codings, namely, the left/right extension and the reachability of stimulus along a near/far dimension. Four experiments were carried out in which healthy participants performed the time and spatial bisection tasks in near/far space, before and after short or long tool-use training. Stimuli were prebisected horizontal lines of different temporal durations in which the midpoint was manipulated according to the Muller-Lyer illusion. The perceptual illusory effects emerged (...) in spatial but not temporal judgments. We revealed that temporal and spatial representations dynamically change according to the action potentialities of an individual: temporal duration was perceived as shorter and the perceived line’s midpoint was shifted to the left in far than in near space. Crucially, this dissociation disappeared following a long but not short tool-use training. Finally, we observed age-related differences in spatial attention which may be crucial in building the memory temporal standard to categorize durations. (shrink)

The authors attempt to speculatively reconstruct the concept of the “So­viet computer game”. They propose to consider gaming practices associ­ated with computers as a derivative of the accepted ideological guidelines that accompany the Soviet project of machine modernization. Within this framework, the concept of the Soviet computer game appears as an unre­alized historical alternative to the normative game design that has devel­oped in countries with market economies. Despite the industry — or the electronic entertainment market — not having had the (...) time to be properly established in the USSR, there were a number of discursive attitudes re­garding the game as such, and the gaming function of computing devices in particular. Even early Soviet pedagogical theories assumed that “playing like a Soviet” involves performing activities structurally similar to labor, where the player becomes part of production. Later, cybernetic discourse, through game theory, indicated the possibility of formalizing any prag­matic activity as a game model; with the advancement of programming, the pragmatics of digital gaming as a way of educating and solving utili­tarian tasks was developed. Based on the memoir archive of Soviet cyber­netics, and publications in the late-Soviet press, the authors demonstrate that the Soviet computer game was not seen an entertainment product, but a representative model for solving problems in an algorithmic form. Thus, the article is not about specific games that could be called Soviet, but about the logic that guided and set the tone for the interpretation of certain computer-game phenomena in the USSR. (shrink)

At the risk of proving myself such a caviller, I want to ask a question which I have seldom heard raised, and which I have never seen discussed in anything that I have read about Berkeley. If I am right, it poses a problem for his immaterialism, not only different, but coming from a different direction, from those objections that are commonly levelled against him. If I am wrong, it will show how right Berkeley was to stress the difficulty of (...) using for one purpose our language which has become fashioned for another. At least, I hope that I shall not fail to be the ‘fair and ingenuous reader’for whom he asked. (shrink)

An assessment is made of Rudolf Otto's criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher's claim that religious feeling is to be interpreted as essentially involving a feeling of absolute dependence. Otto's criticisms are divided into two kinds. The first suggest that a feeling a dependence, even an absolute one, is the wrong sort of feeling to locate at the heart of religious consciousness. It is argued that this criticism is based on misinterpretations of Schleiermacher's view, which is in fact much closer to Otto's (...) than the latter appreciated. The second kind of criticism suggests that the feeling of absolute dependence cannot play the foundational role assigned to it by Schleiermacher, since it is itself a secondary response. It is argued not only that Otto provides no justification for this criticism, but that Otto's own position is incoherent unless Schleiermacher's view is accepted. (shrink)

It has frequently been suggested that science and religion are innately in conflict. One example from the history of medicine is the introduction of anaesthesia into obstetrics in 1847, which is commonly said to have stimulated massive religious opposition. Historians have almost unanimously averred that such opposition arose from the belief that obstetric anaesthesia interfered with the primeval curse— ‘In sorrow thou shalt bring forth children’ . Despite considerable opposition to obstetric anaesthesia upon medical, physiological, and general moral grounds, evidence (...) of genuine religious opposition in contemporary sources has proved to be virtually non-existent. On examination, this particular ‘conflict’ appears to be an artifact of historiography based upon a contemporary defence prepared against an attack which never materialized. (shrink)

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

In 1795 the Marquis de Sade published his La Philosophic dans le boudoir, in which he proposed the use of induced abortion for social reasons and as a means of population control. It is from this time that medical and social acceptance of abortion can be dated, although previously the subject had not been discussed in public in modern times. It is suggested that it was largely due to de Sade's writing that induced abortion received the impetus which resulted in (...) its subsequent spread in western society. (shrink)

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

Disjunctivism is the focus of a lively debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present 17 specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them.

Anselm of Canterbury, in his work Proslogion," originated the "ontological argument" for God's existence, famously arguing that "something than which nothing greater can be conceived," which he identifies with God, must actually exist, for otherwise something greater could indeed be conceived. Some commentators have claimed that although Anselm may not have been conscious of the fact, the Proslogion "as well as his Reply to Gaunilo" contains passages that constitute a second independent proof: a "modal ontological argument" that concerns the supposed (...) logical necessity of God's existence. Other commentators disagree, countering that the alleged second argument does not stand on its own but presupposes the conclusion of the first. Anselm's Other Argument "stakes an original claim in this debate, and takes it further. There is" a second a priori" argument in Anselm, A. D. Smith contends, but it is not the modal argument past scholars have identified. This second argument surfaces in a number of forms, though always turning on certain deep, interrelated metaphysical issues. It is this form of argument that in fact underlies several of the passages which have been misconstrued as statements of the modal argument. In a book that combines historical research with rigorous philosophical analysis, Smith discusses this argument in detail, finally defending a modification of it that is implicit in Anselm. This "other argument" bears a striking resemblance to one that Duns Scotus would later employ. (shrink)

This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingentThere are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non‐epistemic’perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’force. (shrink)

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. The second is Fred Dretske’s claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that ‘non-epistemic’ perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’ perception; that the former can occur only partially---i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition’s concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’ force. (shrink)

This paper, which has both a historical and a polemical aspect, investigates the view, dominant throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that the sense of sight is, originally, not phenomenally three-dimensional in character, and that we must come to interpret its properly two-dimensional data by reference to the sense of 'touch'. The principal argument for this claim, due to Berkeley, is examined and found wanting. The supposedly confirming findings concerning 'Molyneux subjects' are also investigated and are shown to be either (...) irrelevant or disconfirming. Recent investigations on infant and neonatal perception are discussed and are also found to be disconfirming. An innatist version of the theory is then considered and is shown to be undermined by the largely 'Gibsonian' character of early space-perception. Finally three recent arguments in favour of the theory - two from psychologists, one from a philosopher - are considered and answered. (shrink)