The use of other animals for human purposes is as contentious an issue as one is likely to find in ethics. And this is so not only because there are both passionate defenders and opponents of such use, but also because even among the latter there are adamant and diametric differences about the bases of their opposition. In both disputes, the approach taken tends to be that of applied ethics, by which a position on the issue is derived from a (...) fundamental moral commitment. This commitment in turn depends on normative ethics, which investigates the various moral theories for the best fit to our moral intuitions. Thus it is that the use of animals in biomedical research is typically defended by appeal to a utilitarian theory, which legitimates harm to some for the greater good of others; while the opposition condemns that use either by appeal to the same theory, but disagreeing about the actual efficacy of animal experimentation, or by appeal to an alternative theory, such as the right of all sentient beings not to be exploited. Unfortunately, the normative issue seems likely never to be resolved, hence leaving the applied issue in limbo. The present essay seeks to circumvent this impasse by dispensing altogether with any moral claim or argument, thereby cutting the Gordian knot of animal ethics with a meta-ethical sword. The alternative schema defended is simply to advance relevant considerations, whereupon “there is nothing left but to feel.” In a word, motivation replaces justification. (shrink)

Bob Fischer has written a reply to my article ‘Animal Abolitionism and ‘Racism without Racists’’. In this article, Fischer contends that my arguments whereby animal abolitionism engages in acts of racism without racists are mistaken. I wish to reply to Fischer’s objections in this article, through four sets of contentions: Fischer’s arguments reveal some misunderstandings in terms of the concept of racism and, particularly, of ‘racism without racists’; his arguments also underestimate the burdens suffered by individuals (...) who wish to become vegan; Fischer’s views on infantilisation lead to counter-intuitive conclusions; and Fischer’s counter-argument against my neo-colonial critique of abolitionism misunderstands the points made in my previous article. (shrink)

Abolitionism is an animal rights' philosophy and social movement which has recently begun to grow. It has been largely contested but the criticisms directed at it have usually been articulated outside academia. In this article, I wish to contend that one of the criticisms directed at abolitionism—that it contains racist implications—is correct. I do this by defending the idea that abolitionism engages in what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva classifies as ‘racism without racists’—an unintentional and subtle form of racism. (...) I present three ways in which abolitionism may be considered racist and then address some possible objections to my view. (shrink)

In a recent article, Joel Marks presents the amoralist argument against vivisection, or animal laboratory experimentation. He argues that ethical theories that seek to uncover some universal morality are in fact useless and unnecessary for ethical deliberations meant to determine what constitutes an appropriate action in a specific circumstance. I agree with Marks’ conclusion. I too believe that vivisection is indefensible, both from a scientific and philosophical perspective. I also believe that we should become vegan (unfortunately, like the two (...) philosophers mentioned by Marks, I too am still struggling to reduce my meat and dairy consumption). However, I am in the dark as to Marks’ vision of normative deliberations in the spirit of amoralism and desirism. (shrink)

Applying critical sociological theory, this book explores the shortcomings of popular tactics in animal liberation efforts. Building a case for a scientifically-grounded grassroots approach, it is argued that professionalized advocacy that works in the service of theistic, capitalist, patriarchal institutions will find difficulty achieving success.

Political theorists advocating the abolition of instrumental uses of groups of animals are divided with respect to how they evaluate welfare reforms. Radical abolitionists maintain that welfare reforms are only dubiously described as moral improvements while pragmatic abolitionists maintain that welfare reforms are moral improvements, even if the conditions they permit are unjust. This article examines Wyckoff’s interest model against the case of a Cincinnati coalition’s efforts to reform the local food chain. This article argues that the coalition’s program of (...) choice is a welfare reform and that the interest model must evaluate the program as a moral improvement. This article concludes that if the interest model is the most appropriate political theory of animal rights, pragmatic abolitionism is philosophically more appropriate than radical abolitionism. (shrink)

Gary Francione is an abolitionist: he maintains that we ought to abolish the institutions and practices that support the exploitation of animals. He also believes that veganism is the “moral baseline” — that is, he thinks it’s morally required of nearly everyone in the developed world, and many beyond it. Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues claims that abolitionism is guilty of racism, albeit “racism without racists.” I contend that his arguments for this conclusion aren’t successful.

Jasper and Poulsen have long argued that moral shocks are critical for recruitment in the nonhuman animal rights movement. Building on this, Decoux argues that the abolitionist faction of the nonhuman animal rights movement fails to recruit members because it does not effectively utilize descriptions of suffering. However, the effectiveness of moral shocks and subsequent emotional reactions has been questioned. This article reviews the literature surrounding the use of moral shocks in social movements. Based on this review, it (...) is suggested that the exploitation of emotional reactions to depictions of suffering can sometimes prove beneficial to recruitment, but successful use is contextually rooted in preexisting frameworks, ideology, and identity. It is concluded that a reliance on images and narratives might be misconstrued in a society dominated by nonhuman animal welfare ideology. (shrink)

Do non-human animals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up this important yet largely neglected quest ion. He argues that animal freedom is not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instrumental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our relationships with animals. Drawing (...) on recent work on the value of freedom, it will be argued that freedom is non-specifically instrumentally valuable. Accordingly, freedom is a means to other goods, but often it is not possible to identify those goods in advance or aim for them directly. Some of the reasons that make freedom non-specifically valuable for human relationships, it will be argued, also apply to relationships between humans and animals. Amongst other implications, it will be shown how this argument provides a response to those who fear that stricter animal protection policies might undermine people’s freedom: A concern for freedom actually requires stricter protection policies rather than speak against them. (shrink)

A prominent and respected philosopher of animal rights law and ethical theory, Gary L. Francione is known for his criticism of animal welfare laws and regulations, his abolitionist theory of animal rights, and his promotion of veganism and nonviolence as the baseline principles of the abolitionist movement. In this collection, Francione advances the most radical theory of animal rights to date. Unlike Peter Singer, Francione maintains that we cannot morally justify using animals under any circumstances, and (...) unlike Tom Regan, Francione's theory applies to all sentient beings, not only to those who have more sophisticated cognitive abilities. (shrink)

A prominent and respected philosopher of animal rights law and ethical theory, Gary L. Francione is known for his criticism of animal welfare laws and regulations, his abolitionist theory of animal rights, and his promotion of veganism and nonviolence as the baseline principles of the abolitionist movement. In this collection, Francione advances the most radical theory of animal rights to date. Unlike Peter Singer, Francione maintains that we cannot morally justify using animals under any circumstances, and (...) unlike Tom Regan, Francione's theory applies to all sentient beings, not only to those who have more sophisticated cognitive abilities. (shrink)

Abstract In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” ( Nanoethics 2: 305-36, 2008) Thompson argued that technological attempts to reduce or eliminate selected non-human animals’ capabilities (animal disenhancements) in order to solve or mitigate animal welfare problems in animals’ use pose a philosophical conundrum, because there is a contradiction between rational arguments in favor of these technological interventions and intuitions against them. In her response “Animal Disenhancement and the Non-Identity Problem: (...) A Response to Thompson” ( Nanoethics 5:43–48, 2011), Palmer maintained that the philosophical conundrum is even deeper if we introduce the non-identity problem into the discussion. In my brief response, I claim that in order to avoid the pitfalls of speculative ethics, empirical facts related to the technologies involved as well as costs for the non-human animals have to be taken into account. Depending on which changes we are referring to, ethical problems can be seen very differently. Widening the consideration to the socio-economic context in which non-human animals are currently used by humans, I challenge the idea of genuine philosophical conundrums from an antispeciesist and abolitionist perspective. Only in a context of exploitation, in which non-human animals are deprived of basic rights and their existence is totally dependent on human exploitation, the contradictions between improvement of welfare and disenhancement of capabilities make sense. Content Type Journal Article Category Critical Discussion Notes Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0139-1 Authors Arianna Ferrari, KIT/ITAS (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology/Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis), Karlsruhe, Germany Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757. (shrink)

Engaging and passionate, this contemporary work provokes new ways of thinking about animal-human interaction. A cutting-edge volume of original essays, Critical Animal Studies examines our exploitation and commodification of non-human animals. By inquiring into the contradictions that have shaped our understanding of animals, the contributors of this collection have set out to question the systemic oppression inherent in our treatment of animals. The collection closes with a thoughtful consideration of some of the complexities of activism, as well as (...) a discussion of how to further the progress of animal rights. Analyzing economic, ethical, historical, and sociological aspects of human-animal relations, this interdisciplinary volume is a must-read for all upper-level students in animal studies, critical animal studies, animals and society, and anthrozoology courses. Features: draws together contributions from some of the most active and committed individuals advancing the field of critical animal studies takes a revolutionary approach to mainstream animal studies by advocating for justice from a politically progressive, abolitionist perspective supports curricular objectives of animal studies courses by encouraging students to critically analyze the shifting roles of animals in contemporary Western society and their consequences. (shrink)

This innovative book is the first to couch the debate about animals in the language of justice, and the first to develop both ideal and nonideal theories of justice for animals. It rejects the abolitionist animal rights position in favor of a revised version of animal rights centering on sentience.

Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a right to legal self-ownership. (...) Nonetheless, a concern for animal option-freedom means that humans do have a pro tanto duty of non-interference. Arguments familiar from the liberal tradition moreover imply that such a duty speaks for drastic reforms of existing animal law. But it does not imply wholesale abolitionism: it neither rules out positive duties towards animals nor means that we should abandon all interactions with animals. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 26 Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply (...) a right to legal self-ownership. Nonetheless, a concern for animal option-freedom means that humans do have a _pro tanto_ duty of non-interference. Arguments familiar from the liberal tradition moreover imply that such a duty speaks for drastic reforms of existing animal law. But it does not imply wholesale abolitionism: it neither rules out positive duties towards animals nor means that we should abandon all interactions with animals. (shrink)

Alternative food systems have arisen to address societal concerns with the treatment of Nonhuman Animals in food production. This paper presents an abolitionist Nonhuman Animal rights approach and critiques these alternative systems as problematic in regards to goals of considering the rights or welfare of Nonhuman Animals. It is proposed that the trend in social movement professionalization within the structure of a non-profit industrial complex will ultimately favor compromises like “humane” products over more radical abolitionist solutions to the detriment (...) of Nonhuman Animals. This paper also discusses potential compromises for alternative food systems that acknowledge equal consideration for Nonhuman Animals, focusing on grassroots veganism as a necessary component for consistency and effectiveness. (shrink)

Maxim Fetissenko (2011) argues that the animal rights movement needs a new rhetorical strategy focusing on human health benefits and environmental preservation rather than on moral argumentation. Against this, I claim that the movement has not overused but rather has downplayed moral argumentation. Instead of promoting its real agenda, the movement has often diminished the issue of animal oppression and implicated itself in the reproduction of speciesism. If our goal is to abolish speciesist oppression, we should work consistently (...) to make alternative identities and values available to people rather than opting for illusory shortcuts that do not disturb the speciesist social order. (shrink)

The use of animals for the purpose of scientific research is an emotive subject. The moral arguments often exhibit polarised positions: the scientific demand for absolute freedom of research, and the abolitionist demand for a total ban on all animal experiments. At one extreme are those who argue that research on animals is essential in the battle against disease, and on the other extreme it is argued that the cost in terms of animal suffering is too high and (...) that if experiments were prohibited medical researchers would find some other means of ensuring scientific progress. The rhetoric employed is also suggestive of a polarity: experimenters are accused of cruelty and indifference, whereas campaigners on behalf of animals are accused of irresponsibility and insensitivity towards the wellbeing of humans. Yet to ask …. (shrink)

IntroductionThe observation that animals may respond to emotional states of conspecific or even hetero-specific individuals is not new. Darwin broached the question by underlying the ability of animals to express sympathy, i.e. the response to non-self-emotional status, and this across species barriers. More importantly, he tried to find the evolutionary origin of this animal trait, suggesting that it evolved from the selective advantages of kinship behaviour in the struggle for life (Darwin, 1872). Such a behaviour corresponds, for instance, to (...) alloparental care relatively common in mammals and birds, and now also characterized in fishes and insects (Josi, Taborsky, & Frommen, 2019; Wu, Walser, Sun, & Kölliker, 2020). After more than one century, the need of defining what exactly non-human animals are able to feel, and from this starting point, rethink the legal status and place of animals in human societies, suddenly arises. This can mainly be considered as an indirect consequence of people awareness of human-driven dramatic impacts on global climate, biodiversity, but also on a more daily basis on animal life and welfare. However, because assessable currencies are required to establish laws, animals were classified into categories based on ecological (e.g. invasive species, pest, wild, domestic), biological (e.g. vertebrates and invertebrates) or cognitive (e.g. primates, cephalopods) traits. This should help lawyers to define ethical rules of animal use by humans and t... (shrink)

This paper explores how, at the 1875 Royal Commission on Vivisection, the anaesthetised animal was construed as a boundary object around which “cooperation without consensus” Computer supported cooperative work: cooperation or conflict? Springer, London, 1993) could form, serving the interests of both scientists and animals. Advocates of anaesthesia presented it as benevolently intervening between the scientific agent and animal patient. Such articulations of ‘ethical’ vivisection through anaesthesia were then mandated in the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, and thus (...) have had significant downstream effects on the regulation of laboratory animals in Britain and beyond. Constructing this ‘consensus’ around the anaesthetised animal, however, required first excluding abolitionists and inhumane scientists, and secondly limiting the interests of experimental animals to the avoidance of pain through anaesthesia and euthanasia, thereby circumventing the issue of their possible interest in future life. This consensus also served to secure the interests of vivisecting scientists and to limit the influence of public opinion in the laboratory to administrative procedure and scheduled inspection. The focus on anaesthesia was connected with discussions of what supporting infrastructures were required to ensure proper ethical procedure was carried out by scientists. In contrast to the much studied polarisation in British society between pro- and antivivisectionists after 1876, we understand the 1875 Commission as a conflict amongst scientists themselves, while also being an intra-class conflict amongst the ruling class. (shrink)

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing so, (...) it will be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in ‘Western’ bioethics. (shrink)

Much of the public debate over laboratory animal use has focused on either the scientist's demand for absolute freedom of inquiry, or the abolitionist's demand for an end to animal use in science. Yet many recent proposals for reform seek instead to balance the interests of laboratory animals in avoiding harm against the interests of research beneficiaries in continued animal use. This essay is an analysis of the intermediate reform positions and their underlying ethical principles. Keywords: (...) class='Hi'>animal research, animal experimentation, ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The use of animals for the purpose of scientific research is an emotive subject. The moral arguments often exhibit polarised positions: the scientific demand for absolute freedom of research, and the abolitionist demand for a total ban on all animal experiments. At one extreme are those who argue that research on animals is essential in the battle against disease, and on the other extreme it is argued that the cost in terms of animal suffering is too high and (...) that if experiments were prohibited medical researchers would find some other means of ensuring scientific progress. The rhetoric employed is also suggestive of a polarity: experimenters are accused of cruelty and indifference, whereas campaigners on behalf of animals are accused of irresponsibility and insensitivity towards the wellbeing of humans. Yet to ask …. (shrink)

One of the issues with introducing animal rights law is whether the problem is quantitative or qualitative, whether it can be achieved by working within existing legal paradigms or whether it requires a new set of paradigms. The answer is fundamental: a quantitative problem can be solved by applying more of the same solutions, while a qualitative problem requires completely different solutions. The qualitative camp can be represented by, say, Professor Gary Francione, demanding not only rights for animals but (...) that they have personhood and are no longer considered “property.” The quantitative approach can be finely represented by Professor David Favre, who has argued for many years that we can make progress by developing existing legal principles to give some rights to some animals, and he does so eloquently in his new book. He is clear in his view that progress is, and can continue to be, made with a series of steps, as he puts it, “climbing the slippery slope toward personhood” (p. viii).His case is supported by looking backward—progress made in establishing the rules governing humans in their relationships with animals—as well as forward to developments that will support continuing improvement in the lives of animals, not least the potential for technology (for example, through cell- and plant-based meat). At the same time, he also rightly rejects the concepts of animal welfare and animal rights being at odds, let alone either of them being a panacea for better lives for animals.One aspect of animal law that Favre believes does need to change is that of property status. As he says, the status of animals as personal property is “critical to the future of animal law” (p. 25). In general, the solutions have been largely binary—that animals simply cannot be property for them to have meaningful rights or that animals can be property and still have rights. The former makes intuitive good sense (and is consistent with the objectives of the human abolitionist movements) but would have enormous effects on economic activity throughout the world. The latter is appealing because it does not change the current paradigm, so can be developed more easily.Favre's premise is that we are moving toward rights for animals, so we need to find a way of integrating animals into the current legal system rather than having to destroy and reconstruct the legal system. His ingenious solution is to propose a fourth category of property, alongside real, personal, and intellectual property: “living property.”Within this category, he envisages using the common law concept of the trust to provide equitable “self-ownership,” where an animal has equitable “ownership” while a human retains legal “ownership.” He then connects this concept to adaptations in other aspects of law that start to recognize the selfhood of animals, creating a platform onto which broader and deeper rights for animals can develop, such as the status of “animalhood” (p. 72) and the corresponding legal right of consideration before decisions are made by the state affecting an animal's fundamental interests (such as continuing to be alive). By putting animals in a separate class—rather than uncomfortably leaving them in personal property—he creates a possible route for animal rights that seems less paradigm-busting than removing them from being property altogether.Drawing on evidence from criminal law, tort law, equity (trusts), property law, and family law, he shows how in many places—with a focus on states in the United States—existing laws are being adapted (“green shoots” p. 81) to recognize that animals are more than personal property, in ways that cannot be explained simply through the growth of regulations. For example, family law is starting to recognize that in the division of matrimonial assets, companion animals cannot be treated simply like any other personal property such as a table or a car based on who paid for them. Because animals are “living property,” the courts should take account of other aspects, such as who cared for the animals and who looked after them. Similarly, the concept of extending trust law so that an animal can be the beneficiary of a trust—in the same way as a human can be but inanimate personal property cannot—shows that the law can understand that companion animals can play a large emotional role in our lives (as well as we in theirs), such that we want to ensure proper care for them after we die.The book raises important issues. First, it is intentionally about domestic animals, with their close links with humans, so the potential for laws to engage is much easier than with, say, farmed animals. The danger with solutions that focus on domestic or charismatic animals (e.g., dogs, chimpanzees, elephants) is that the arguments may be pertinent essentially only to those species and therefore hard to apply to animals of less charismatic species, say in a factory farm (but who are present in much greater numbers and generally badly treated in comparison). He “leaves for another day” (p. 32) the discussion about other animals. Hopefully that day will come, as it would be interesting to see how Favre could extend his concept to animals for whom the public has less affection and less appreciation of their capacities (and for whom the prospect of death is much more real and imminent).Secondly, public support for these ideas about living property may simply not be present. If there is not a sufficient groundswell of support for changing the status of animals, then whether one proposes changing it to not-property or “self-owned” property doesn't matter (if someone doesn't like needles, it doesn't matter whether the needle you propose to use is big or small). This may be too pessimistic, of course (people can be helped to overcome a fear of needles, and one way to start is with small needles). Perhaps the law should start with small changes to recognize at least a few animals—their sentience, their capacities for pleasure and pain, their emotions and preferences, their potential for autonomy—and build public support from there.There is also the underlying and more radical point about whether these ideas—the trust for a beloved companion set up by the human, the divorce settlement that doesn't just give the companion to the party who paid for them—are actually bringing about changes for animals as such or are simply adapting laws to help humans, recognizing human needs, and do not actually change the status of animals. The ends are still humans, and the means are still animals.This is not intended to paint a bleak picture: The more bluntand uncompromising part of the animal rights movement that has been focused on the qualitative problem has hardly been successful at getting animal rights laws passed anywhere in the world, so everything that moves us closer to a better, richer, more thoughtful view of animals will help. Favre's approach has ingenuity, shows good sense, and has the potential to bring about real animal rights. The themes and cases in this book that show how courts and legislatures are becoming more aware of the sentience of at least some animals, as well as proposing a middle path in the debate about animals as property, are important in the journey toward recognition of animal rights. Even more important, they may actually work. (shrink)

In recent decades, the demand for ethically acceptable treatment of animals – especially in case of livestock animals – has increased significantly in western societies and can thus have a significant impact on the consumption of animal products. Therefore, it is of great importance to understand the influence and the mode of action of animal-ethical values. In consumer research, the consumer value-attitude system consisting of global values, domain-specific values and attitudes is essential in many studies. However, there have (...) been no attempts so far to operationalise domain-specific values in the context of human-animal relationship empirically. This means that an essential component for the analysis of animal product consumption behaviour is missing. Therefore, the present study includes animal ethics into the consumer value-attitude system as domain-specific values. The aim is, to analyse the influence of animal-ethical values on consumer behaviour concerning animal products. As a concrete example, the consumption of game meat is chosen in this study, because the consumption of game meat is often judged in a contradictory way in terms of animal welfare. This offers the possibility to cover the entire spectrum of societal animal-ethical values. The study is based on a virtually representative online survey with 523 German participants. A structural equation model is used for analysis. It was found, that animal ethics can be perfectly integrated into the value system as domain-specific values. Furthermore, the results show that especially the two extreme positions in animal ethics, original anthropocentrism and abolitionism, have a significant influence on consumer behaviour – in this case on the consumption of game meat. Overall, this first study on domain-specific values in the context of human-animal relationship contributes to a deeper understanding of which animal-ethical values affect the behaviour of consumers. This is of great importance for marketing and consumer theory concerning animal products. (shrink)

The institution of owning pets has been subjected to compelling criticism on moral grounds. Yet advocates of a reformed, guardian/dependent model may yet face an abolitionist conclusion. We argue that treating companion animals as dependents entails an indefensible moral priority for them in the face of their guardians’ competing moral demands. An abolitionist dilemma arises as a result: if the property and reformed models fail, a morally acceptable characterization of the moral relationship between humans and their companion animals has yet (...) to be articulated. We close by inviting others to develop plausible alternatives to the ownership and reformed models. (shrink)

The challenge: the most difficult battle ever fought -- The universal crime -- Slave owners for abolition -- We are all nazis and if i quit eating meat, i'll have to admit -- That to myself -- The crown of creation and the acme of evolution -- Follow the money -- Optimism of the will -- The environment: a dark age was about to begin -- It ain't what you do, it's the time that you do it -- The empire (...) strikes back -- The madness of more -- Creating a universal rights movement -- We're not in kansas anymore -- The response: the prize and the plow -- Agitators and politicians -- In the beginning -- The movement turns to politics -- Abolitionism: the agitation-only approach to animal rights -- How welfare reforms promote liberation -- The proof of the pudding -- Suffering matters -- Public policy and private morality -- Why violence can't change the game for animals. (shrink)

Bovine tuberculosis is an important and controversial animal health policy issue in England, which impacts humans, cattle and badgers. The government policy of badger culling has led to widespread opposition, in part due to the conclusions of a large field trial recommending against culling, and in part because badgers are a cherished wildlife species. Animal rights theorists argue that sentient nonhumans should be accorded fundamental rights against killing and suffering. In bovine TB policy, however, pro-culling actors claim that (...) badgers must be culled to avoid the slaughter of cattle. The first part of the paper compares AR theories of Regan, Francione, Cochrane, Garner and Donaldson and Kymlicka in the context of wildlife species. The second part of the paper applies these AR theories to bovine TB and badger control. AR theories are applied to badger control policy options of do nothing, badger culling, and badger vaccination. We conclude that AR theories are strongly opposed to badger culling. In general, culling is prohibited due to a badger’s right to life and its rights against suffering. The AR theories support a do-nothing, i.e. non-culling, non-vaccination approach to badger control. In the case of the AR theories of Regan and Francione, this is based on abolitionist positions with respect to farming. For Cochrane, Garner, and Donaldson and Kymlicka, the do-nothing policy option is preferred because badger vaccination causes a degree of suffering which generally is not for the individual’s benefit. (shrink)

Book Panel on Zoopolis including articles by Clare Palmer, Dinesh Wadiwel and Laura Janara and a reply by Donaldson and Kymlicka.

Bertrand Cassegrain | : Les injustices dont sont victimes aujourd’hui les animaux domestiques ont mené certains partisans des droits des animaux à défendre l’idée selon laquelle la relation entre humains et animaux domestiques était intrinsèquement injuste et qu’il ne fallait pas permettre à ces derniers de se reproduire. Tout en s’inscrivant dans une théorie des droits des animaux « abolitionniste », cet article entend montrer que, sous réserve du respect de certaines conditions, il n’est pas nécessairement condamnable sur le plan (...) moral d’autoriser la perpétuation des animaux domestiques – en particulier des animaux de compagnie. Ainsi, je tenterai de montrer que s’il est vrai, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, qu’il est moralement acceptable de mettre au monde des enfants sur la base d’un désir égoïste, alors il l’est aussi de laisser venir au monde des animaux de compagnie pour une raison semblable. Le fait d’avoir un enfant ou un animal de compagnie ne mobilisent pas nécessairement les mêmes enjeux éthiques. Je ferai valoir que malgré certaines contraintes, la vie des animaux de compagnie peut tout à fait être enviable. Enfin, j’indiquerai en quoi le premier argument fournit des pistes pour penser le statut légal des animaux de compagnie. | : Because of the injustices domestic animals suffer today, some animal rights theorists claim that the relationship between humans and domestic animals is intrinsically unjust, and that therefore we should not allow domestic animals to breed. I try to show in this paper that, provided that some specific conditions are respected, it is possible to allow the perpetuation of domestic animals—especially pets—while being consistent with an “abolitionist” animal rights theory. Thus, I will try to show that if, all other things being equal, it is morally acceptable to have a child based on a selfish desire, then it is morally acceptable to have a pet for the same reason. Having a child does not lead to the same ethical issues as having a pet. I will show that, despite some constraints, a pet’s life can be perfectly enjoyable. Finally, I will show how the first argument can help us to think about the legal status of pets. (shrink)

This article discusses critical comparisons between the human and nonhuman abolitionist movements in the United States. The modern nonhuman abolitionist movement is, in some ways, an extension of the anti-slavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the ongoing human Civil Rights movement. As such, there is considerable overlap between the two movements, specifically in the need to simultaneously address property status and oppressive ideology. Despite intentional appropriation of terminology and numerous similarities in mobilization efforts, there has been disappointingly (...) little academic discussion on this relationship. There are significant contentions regarding mobilization and goal attainment in the human abolitionist movement that speak to modern collective action on behalf of other animals. This article will explore the human abolitionist movement and discuss possible applications of movement organization, tactical repertoires, and goal attainment to the current nonhuman animal rights movement. Specifically, the utility of violence and legislative activism in the antislavery movement are discussed as potentially problematic approaches to abolishing nonhuman animal exploitation. Alternatively, the nonhuman animal rights focus on consumer resistance and nonviolence represent an important divergence in abolitionist mobilization. (shrink)

This article addresses a countermovement to the animal liberation movement and its campaigns against vivisection, factory farming, and recreational hunting in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. As moderate welfarists, pragmatic animal liberationists , and radical abolitionists who advocate animal rights, animal protectionists campaign for animals. The countermovement defends acts that animal protectionists decry. Meanwhile, sociologists accord little study to interplay between the movements . In Buechler's and Cylke's collection of 34 papers on (...) social movements , only one paper focused on countermovements, describing the connection between social movement and countermovement as "a continuous dialect of social change" . Although extensive writings exist on the main campaigns of the animal liberation movement, little scholarly material exists on the defenses mounted by the countermovement. This article examines key elements of a values war, a struggle over moral capital waged by animal protectionists and their countermovement opponents. (shrink)

Let us call the deliberate modification of an individual’s genome to improve it or its progeny intentional genetic enhancement. Governments are almost certain to require that any proposed intentional genetic enhancement of a human (IGEH) be tested first on (what researchers call) animal “models.” Intentional genetic enhancement of animals (IGEA), then, is an ambiguous concept because it could mean one of two very different things: an enhancement made for the sake of the animal’s own welfare, or an enhancement (...) made for the sake of satisfying a human desire. In either case, experimental procedures are likely to entail substantial risks to the experimental animals. What rules should govern IGEA? I criticize the abolitionist conclusions of animal rightists—that no IGEA should be permitted—and I criticize the permissive conclusions of speciesists—that all IGEA should be permitted. Both views are unsatisfying. I suggest instead that current animal welfare law provides a defensible platform on which to begin building ethically justifiable policy in this area. (shrink)

A few years ago I set out to canvass the literature on Charles Darwin. I thought it would be a manageable task, but I soon realized what a naïve idea this was. I do not know how many books have been written about him, but there seem to be thousands, and each year more appear.1 Why are there so many? Part of the answer is, of course, that he was a tremendously important figure in the history of human thought. But (...) as I read the books- or, at least, as many of them as I could- it gradually dawned on me that all this attention is also due to Darwin’s personal qualities. He was an immensely likeable man, modest and humane, with a personality that continues to draw people to him even today. Reflecting on his father’s character, Darwin’s son Francis wrote that ‘The two subjects which moved my father perhaps more strongly than any others were cruelty to animals and slavery. His detestation of both was intense, and his indignation was overpowering in case of any levity or want of feeling on these matters.’2 Darwin’s strong feelings about slavery are expressed in many of his writings, most notably in the Journal of Researches, in which he recorded his adventures on the Beagle voyage. His comments there are among the most moving in abolitionist literature. But it was his feelings about animals that impressed his contemporaries most vividly. Numerous anecdotes show him remonstrating with cab-drivers who whipped their horses too smartly, solicitously caring for his own animals and forbidding the discussion of vivisection in his home.3 At the height of his fame he wrote an article for a popular magazine condemning the infamous leg-hold trap in terms that would not seem out of place in an animal-rights magazine today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Against Ethical CriticismRichard A. PosnerOscar Wilde famously remarked that “there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all.” He was echoed by Auden, who said in his poem in memory of William Butler Yeats that poetry makes nothing happen (though the poem as a whole qualifies this overstatement), by Croce, and by formalist critics such as (...) Cleanth Brooks, a doyen of the New Critics, who insisted that edification was the function of religion but not of poetry. 1 George Orwell, though himself a didactic novelist, was of this view as well, 2 and it is one that most critics adopt when the issue is censorship. I accept Wilde’s thesis—the creed of aestheticism, of art for art’s sake—if understood to mean that the moral content and consequences of a work of literature are irrelevant to its value as literature; or as the critic Helen Vendler has put it, that “treating fictions as moral pep-pills or moral emetics is repugnant to anyone who realizes the complex psychological and moral motives of a work of art.” 3 This is not to deny that reading can have consequences, including moral and political ones. Information affects people’s outlook and behavior, and reading is a source of information. Imaginative literature conveys ideas, opinions, and information, often with great power. Think of the role that novels by Turgenev (Fathers and Sons), Dostoevsky (The Possessed), Conrad (The Secret Agent, Under Western Eyes), Koestler (Darkness at Noon), Orwell (Animal Farm, Nineteen Eighty-Four), and, of course, Solzhenitsyn played in exposing the horrors of anarchism and communism. Of A Passage to India it has been said that “as an account of the social conditions of British India it was powerful enough to have influenced events.” 4 Upton Sinclair’s novel The Jungle is thought to have incited federal regulation of food processing; and few doubt the effect of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) on the abolitionist cause. [End Page 1]At the core of the aesthetic tradition, which I shall be defending in this essay particularly against its opponents in the “law and literature” movement, are three theses. First, immersion in literature does not make us better citizens or better people. One might be able to pick out some works of literature that would have such an effect because of the information they convey or the emotional state they induce, but they would constitute a skewed sample of literary works. Second, we should not be put off by morally offensive views encountered in literature even when the author appears to share them. A work of literature is not to be considered maimed or even marred by expressing unacceptable moral views; by the same token, a mediocre work of literature is not redeemed by expressing moral views of which we approve. The proper criteria for evaluating literature are aesthetic rather than ethical. Third, authors’ moral qualities or opinions should not affect our valuations of their works.The insistence, in short, is on the separation of the moral from the aesthetic—but with two qualifications. Some literature has little interest or value apart from the didactic and for it the proper criticism is didactic. And the separation of moral from aesthetic values is not a rejection of the former. The aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook, one that stresses the values of openness, detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the cultivation of the self, and the preservation of a private sphere—in short, the values of liberal individualism.The counter tradition in literary criticism to the aesthetic originates with Plato and insists upon the importance, in some versions to the near or even total exclusion of anything else, of the ethical or political content and effects of works of literature, and less commonly of the author’s own morality. Martha Nussbaum, for example, deems Greek tragedies and Anglo-American realistic novels a part of moral philosophy. 5 Reading novels, she argues, “develops moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however excellent.” 6 Wayne Booth, disagreeing with his illustrious... (shrink)

_Against Capital Punishment_ offers an innovative proceduralist argument against the death penalty. Worries about procedural injustice animate many popular and scholarly objections to capital punishment. Philosophers and legal theorists are attracted to procedural abolitionism because it sidesteps controversies over whether murderers deserve death, holding out a promise of gaining rational purchase among death penalty retentionists. Following in this path, the book remains agnostic on the substantive immorality of execution; in fact, it takes pains to reconstruct the best arguments for (...) capital punishment and presumes the appropriateness of execution in limited cases. At the same time, the book contends that the possibility of irrevocable mistakes precludes the just administration of the death penalty. The heart of _Against Capital Punishment_ is a philosophical defense of the well-known irrevocability argument, which analyzes the argument’s premises, establishes their validity, and vindicates them against objections. The central claim is that execution violates the principle of remedy, which requires legal institutions to remedy their mistakes and to compensate those who suffer from wrongful sanctions. The death penalty is repellent to the principle of remedy by dint of its irrevocability. The incompatibility of remedy and execution is the crux of the irrevocability argument: because the wrongly executed cannot enjoy the obligatory remedial measures, execution is impermissible. _Against Capital Punishment_ also reveals itself to be free from two serious defects plaguing other versions of proceduralism: the retributivist challenge and the problem of controversial consequences. (shrink)

If militarism violates the ideals of liberty and justice in one way, and rapidly increasing social stratification violates them in another, then American democracy is in crisis. A culture of democratic accountability will survive only if citizens revive the concerns that animated the great reform movements of the past, from abolitionism to civil rights. It is crucial, when reasoning about practical matters, not only to admit how grave one's situation is, but also to resist despair. Therefore, the fate of (...) democracy depends, to some significant degree, on how we choose to describe the crisis. Saying that we have already entered the new dark ages or a post-democratic era may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, because anyone who accepts this message is apt to give up on the hard work of organizing and contestation that is needed to hold political representatives accountable to the people. This paper asks how one might strike the right balance between accuracy and hope in describing the democracy's current troubles. After saying what I mean by democracy and what I think the current threats to it are, I respond to Romand Coles's criticisms of reservations I have expressed before about rhetorical excess in the works of Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty. This leads to a discussion of several points raised against me by Hauerwas. A digression offers some of my reasons for doubting that John Howard Yoder's biblical scholarship vindicates Hauerwas's version of pacifism. The paper concludes by arguing that Sheldon Wolin's work on the evisceration of democracy, though admirably accurate in its treatment of the dangers posed by empire and capital, abandons the project of democratic accountability too quickly in favor of the romance of the fugitive. (shrink)

To what extent did the debate on the orangutan contribute to the global Enlightenment? This article focuses on the first 150 years of the introduction, dissection, and public exposition of the so-called ‘orangutan’ in Europe, between the 1630s, when the first specimens arrived in the Netherlands, and the 1770s, when the British debate about slavery and abolitionism reframed the boundaries between the human and animal kingdoms. Physicians, natural historians, antiquarians, philosophers, geographers, lawyers, and merchants all contributed to the (...) knowledge of the orangutan, while also reshaping the boundaries of humanity: when the human/animal divide narrowed, the divide between ‘savage’ and ‘civilized’ peoples crystallized, becoming wider than in any previous period. (shrink)

This article sets out a few key questions, themes, and problems animating an Azanian social and political philosophy, with specific reference to the radical promise of undoing South African disciplinary knowledges. The article is made up of two parts: The first part discusses the epistemic and political forces arrayed against black radical thought in South Africa and beyond. A few current trends of anti-black thinking – liberal racism, Left Eurocentrism, and postcolonial post-racialism – which pose challenges for the legibility of (...) Azanian critique are outlined. Part two constructs an exposition and synthesis of key tenets of Azanian thinking elaborated upon under three signs: ‘South Africa’, ‘race and racism’, and ‘Africa’. The aim of the discussion is to illustrate the critical, emancipatory potential of Azanian thought and its radical incommensurability with dominant strands of scholarship in the human and social sciences today. The article ultimately defends the reassertion of black radical thought in the South African academy today and underscores in particular the abolitionist drive of Azanian political thought. (shrink)

A growing trend within feminist animal studies is to eschew the abolitionism/welfarism binary in favor of attending carefully to the politics of existing interspecies relationships in context. This literature maintains that domestication produces special interspecies relationships which generate ongoing responsibilities for human companions and communities. With the goal of clarifying how tending to these ongoing responsibilities to domesticated animals can qualify as enduring forms of interspecies justice, this paper unpacks the politics of these special relationships and obligations in (...) context, specifically, that of fancy rat breeders’ attempts to eliminate aganglionic megacolon. Contrasting fanciers’ efforts with those of laboratory breeders and researchers, I argue that what sets the fancy apart is its shared code of ethics and the loving, principled form of life from which it emerges. Furthermore, the knowledge that rats are worth loving not only enables fanciers to attend to the injustice of megacolon but facilitates transformative justice for domestic rats more broadly. (shrink)

In light of Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s call that abolition means to “change everything,” how might we understand an abolitionist literary method? An abolitionist literary method dials into the language of critiquing prisons. This essay contends that recent developments in U.S. discourse concerning prison reform and prison abolition rely on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy. As rhetorical tropes, metaphor and metonymy both operate by means of figurative language. Metaphor creates a parallel formation between terms, popular in prison reformist language (i.e. (...) “prison as labor,” “prison as slavery,” “schools as prisons,” or “black holes as prisons”), while metonymy demonstrates a network between materially related sites, persons, and objects (as in “flesh,” “black holes,” or “the Prison Industrial Complex”) more central to the rhetoric of prison abolition. Following Emily Apter’s critique of Fredric Jameson’s “carceral metaphors,” I demonstrate these distinctions between metaphor-reform and metonymy-abolition through textual analysis of a Black feminist archive by considering the work of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Hortense Spillers, Saidiya Hartman, George Jackson, Evelynn Hammonds, and Assata Shakur. These different thinkers employ metonymy to illuminate theoretical possibilities for abolition through economics, flesh, motherhood, intimacy, sexuality, and physics over a period of thirty years. That being said, none of these writers define their work by the principal status given to metonymy, and this essay seeks to bring together their interventions through this rhetorical trope. I propose that abolition’s stretch through metonymy is central to an abolitionist literary method, provoking the animated reconsideration of language-use by scholars and activists. While not eliding metaphor entirely, this historical materialist work demonstrates that the careful elaboration of words and phrases becomes more robustly anti-carceral when one indexes where, how, and why metaphor and metonymy contract or extend imaginative political possibility. (shrink)

Frauke Albersmeier | : In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka dismiss the abolitionist, or extinctionist approach in animal rights theory as insufficient in its theoretical foundation and disproportional regarding the means it promotes to prevent domesticated animals from suffering abuse by humans. Among the consequences of their counterproposal—granting domesticated animals citizenship—is an increased pressure to justify any interference with domesticated animals’ reproductive activities. This paper attempts to give such justification with reference to domesticated animals’ specific state of vulnerability, but also (...) takes into account the interest of the mixed society to prevent overly demanding obligations. Even while recognizing existing domesticated animals as citizens, humans might be unable to fully meet their obligation to protect the most dependent of them, and therefore might be justified in conditionally subscribing to “extinctionism” and limiting these animals’ reproduction to the point of their ultimate extinction. Therefore, rather than upholding a strict opposition between extinctionism in any form and a political framework for animal rights, out of reasonable concern for the well-being of domesticated animals in the societies they have been placed in, a qualified extinctionist approach should be incorporated into the political framework developed in Zoopolis. | : Dans Zoopolis, Donaldson et Kymlicka rejettent l’approche abolitionniste, ou extinctionniste, de la théorie du droit des animaux. Ils estiment que ses fondements théoriques sont insuffisants et que les mesures qu’elle promeut pour protéger les animaux domestiques des abus des humains sont disproportionnées. Leur contre-proposition – qui accorde la citoyenneté aux animaux domestiques – a plusieurs conséquences, parmi lesquelles un renforcement de la justification de toutes les formes d’ingérence dans la reproduction des animaux domestiques. Cet article tente de justifier pareille ingérence en raison de l’état particulier de vulnérabilité des animaux domestiques, mais tient également compte du fait que la société mixte a intérêt à éviter l’établissement d’obligations trop exigeantes. Cependant, les humains peuvent accorder aux animaux domestiques existant un statut de citoyen tout en s’avérant incapables de remplir pleinement leur obligation de protéger les plus dépendants d’entre eux. Ils pourraient par conséquent être justifiés de souscrire de manière conditionnelle à « l’extinctionnisme » et limiter la reproduction de ces animaux jusqu’à leur extinction. C’est pourquoi, au lieu de maintenir une opposition stricte entre l’extinctionnisme sous toutes ses formes et l’élaboration d’un cadre politique pour le droit des animaux, l’on devrait, par souci du bien-être des animaux domestiques dans les sociétés dans lesquelles ils vivent, insérer une approche extinctionniste conditionnelle dans le cadre politique élaboré dans Zoopolis. (shrink)

Desmond and Moore point out that the key to understanding Darwin’s The Descent of Man is his abolitionist motivation and his advocacy that races constitute subspecies. Roberta Millstein raises some doubts about the importance of this motivation. She points out that the inclusion of the extensive section devoted to non-human animals is not justified by Darwin’s treatment of humans per se, because his explanation of the origin of races is peculiar. In this sense, she argues that Darwin’s specific explanation of (...) the origin of races does not confirm the central importance that Desmond and Moore give to Darwin’s abolitionism. In this paper I have two different aims. On the one hand, to show that the human case actually is based on the treatment of nonhuman animals, and consequently, Darwin’s argument is not as poor as Millstein believes. My second goal, taking Millstein’s challenge seriously, is to show that Darwin’s explanation of the origin of races does confirm the Desmond and Moore thesis in a deeper sense than the one they propose themselves. For the anti-slavery motivation could not only explain the fact that Darwin sees all humans as forming the same species, but the specific explanation he gives for the origin of races. (shrink)

Human attitudes to various nonhuman animals have varied considerably\nacross cultures and throughout time. While some of our responses are\nundoubtedly instinctive and universal-a visceral fear of large\ncarnivores or the feeling of spontaneous warmth for creatures exhibiting\nhigh degrees of neoteny-it is clear that our attitude toward specific\nspecies is largely shaped by our innate anthropomorphism: that is, when\nwe think about animals, we are also thinking about ourselves. There are\nfew better examples of this than the shifting attitudes toward whales\nand dolphins throughout the 20th century, (...) particularly among citizens of\nWestern democracies. This article narrates the cultural history of this\ndevelopment and demonstrates how the current enchantment with whales and\ndolphins is primarily the result of two broad-and related-cultural\ndevelopments: the modern entertainment complex, particularly cinema,\ntelevision, and aquatic theme parks; and the 1960s counterculture, with\nits potent blend of holistic ecology, speculative neuroscience, and\nmysticism. The result was the creation of what we might think of as the\n``metaphysical whale,{''} a creature who has inspired the abolitionist\nstance toward whaling. (shrink)

Few sectors are more ethically contentious than dairy, with debates tending to be polarised between “intensification” and “abolitionist” narratives which often drown out alternative voices operating in-between. This paper examines the marginal spaces occupied by a group of farmers in the United Kingdom who are attempting to move towards what they see as “more ethical” dairying. Drawing on findings from ethnographic research on five farms which have adopted “cow-calf contact rearing”—which focuses on keeping calves with their mothers longer, in opposition (...) to conventional practices of removing them shortly after birth—it asks what values underpin this alternative approach, and how and why “ethical” dairies seek to dairy ethically. To do this, it draws on a feminist epistemology and methodology that sees ethics as situated and contextual, and finds an “ethics of care” to be central to changing entanglements between humans and nonhuman animals. Instead of casting dairy as either “good” or “bad”, it explores the activities of farms which are trying to move towards what they perceive to be “better”, and draws three conclusions: (a) “ethical” dairying demonstrates a heterogeneity of dairy practices which are grounded in “care” and are happening between narrative extremes of intensification versus abolition; (b) although this practice may be, and could be, commodified, farmers are primarily guided by strong ideological principles and influenced by affective and empathetic “entanglements” with cows and calves, the agency of bovines themselves, and their social and ecological environment; and (c) “cow-calf contact rearing” represents a significant shift from a focus on the broader welfare environment towards centring the quality of individual cows’ lives. Ultimately, the paper argues that we should pay greater attention to alternative economies built on an “ethics of care” when envisaging new sustainable food and agricultural systems. (shrink)