The use of evidence in medicine is something we should continuously seek to improve. This book seeks to develop our understanding of evidence of mechanism in evaluating evidence in medicine, public health, and social care; and also offers tools to help implement improved assessment of evidence of mechanism in practice. In this way, the book offers a bridge between more theoretical and conceptual insights and worries about evidence of mechanism and practical means to fit the results into evidence assessment procedures.

The challenge that confronts corporate decision-makers in connection with global labor conditions is often in identifying the standardsby which they should govern themselves. In an effort to provide greater direction in the face of possible global cultural conflicts, ethicistsThomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee draw on social contract theory to develop a method for identifying basic human rights: Integrated Social Contract Theory (ISCT). In this paper, we apply ISCT to the challenge of global labor standards, attempting to identify labor rights that (...) could serve as guides for corporations producing or outsourcing outside of their home country. In addition to identifying areas of universal agreement, we also examine whether ISCT is, in fact, a sufficient basis for determining worker rights; we seek to define the parameters of the “sweatshop” problem; we include the application and results of our ISCT analysis as applied to labor standards: the global labor rights hypernorms; and conclude that ISCT is sufficient only for rights that are universal. We also discuss whether market-driven decisions can identify the boundaries of labor rights, or at least assure that market outcomes are compatible with maintaining labor rights, in order to respond to the shortcomings of ISCT. We conclude with some comments on directions of analysis for labor rights determination. (shrink)

The authors argue that corporate philanthropy is far too important as a social instrument for good to depend on ethical egoism for its support. They claim that rule utilitarianism provides a more compelling, though not exclusive, moral foundation. The authors cite empirical and legal evidence as additional support for their claim.

Virtues are habits of character that advance excellence in all of ones endeavors. In the Aristotelian formulation, training in the virtuesis driven by a sense of the “good,” that is, by a widely shared agreement on the components of a good society and on the roles (and appropriate virtues or excellencies) of the “social animals” that energize that society. In the modern era, however, a strong sense of community has been much diminished. Freedom from the restraints of the Church and (...) other social institutions and an emphasis on individual autonomy has fostered a different ethical perspective, a perspective in which the market enters importantly into one’s conception of the good. Does the market generate virtues which in turn sustain it? What guides the development of virtue in market economies that are entering the “information superhighway,” and a new millennium as well? (shrink)

The notion of rationality underlying contemporary business and business ethics, or the “rational actor” model of moral decision-making in business, links a roughly utilitarian notion of the good to a contractarian notion of human agency. The “C-Umodel” provides inadequate means for explaining how business people do or ought to behave or think about their behavior, because the notion of rationality upon which it relies is far too narrow a picture of business people’s character. An alternative to these assumptions and to (...) the Contractarian-Utilitarian model, is offered in an ethics of virtue. Despite the traditional apparent conflict between these divergent models, the C-U model, if founded in a notion of rationality consistent with Aristotelian ethics, is recognized as a useful instrument in business ethics and business decision-making. Hence, a reconciliation is effected between the C-U model and virtue ethics. (shrink)

This article examines the various pedagogic models suggested by widely used texts and finds them to be predominately rule-based or rule directed. These approaches to the subject matter of business ethics are quite valuable ones, but we find them to leave no room for the study of the virtues. We intend to articulate our reasons for supporting a central if not exclusive role for virtue ethics.

Professor Thomas Mulligan undertakes to discredit Milton Friedman's thesis that The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. He attempts to do this by moving from Friedman's paradigm characterizing a socially responsible executive as willful and disloyal to a different paradigm, i.e., one emphasizing the consultative and consensus-building role of a socially responsible executive. Mulligan's critique misses the point, first, because even consensus-building executives act contrary to the will of minority shareholders, but even more importantly, because he assumes (...) that the mandate of a shareholder majority brings legitimacy to efforts of corporate managers to utilize corporate wealth in solving social problems. It is the role of our democratic institutions to deal with national agenda issues such as inflation, unemployment, and pollution, not that of the private sector. Corporations and private individuals do have a role to play in enhancing the quality of the human environment, however, and the author suggests a coherent means of developing that role in an effort rescue corporate social responsibility from Mulligan no less than from Friedman. (shrink)

This paper argues that the desirable features of postmodernism identified by Ronald Green are not exclusive to postmodernism; that to the extent these features are postmodern, they are not necessarily features of business ethics; that, with qualification, these are desirable features to include in business ethics; that the best way to accomplish this inclusion is by appealing to an Aristotelian model; and that post-modernism has implications for the legal environment of business.

In his “Why be Moral? A Different Rationale for Managers,” , La Rue Tone Hosmer argues that managers should be moral because “acting in ways that can be considered to be ‘right’ and ‘just’ and ‘fair’ is absolutely essential to the long-term competitive success of the firm.” According to Hosmer, moral behavior generates trust among stakeholders, which leads to stakeholder commitment, which leads to increased stakeholder effort, which ultimately leads to corporate success. Though we agree with Hosmer’s causal reasoning, we (...) are concerned about an ancient loophole, namely, cases where the mere appearance of morality will generate the same trust, and commitment, and so on, and will thus enable managers to reap the material benefits of morality while nevertheless engaging in immoral practices. We conclude that a virtue ethics perspective will strengthen Hosmer’s model so as to cover such cases. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent decades poverty has been defined as a relative rather than absolute notion. Those in poverty have been seen as poor relative to a level of income, or social condition, accepted as average or normal for a society. Poverty has been redefined as ‘relative deprivation’. This paper argues, first, that the redefinition of poverty as relative to social norms is a radical departure from the traditional notion of poverty. Secondly, it considers whether such a redefinition gives support to (...) the view that the claims of those in poverty (relative) may be considered as morally equivalent to the claims of those in poverty (absolute). The paper concludes by arguing that the notion of relative poverty is advanced to give support to social and economic policies whose primary aim is equality rather than the relief of poverty. (shrink)

The University of Pittsburgh policy for procuring organs from non-heart-beating cadaver donors recognizes the potential for conflicts of interest between caring for a "hopelessly ill" patient who has forgone life-sustaining treatment and caring for a potential organ donor. The policy calls for a separation between those medical personnel who care for the gravely ill patient and those involved with the care of transplant recipients. While such a separation is possible in theory, it is difficult or impossible to attain in practice. (...) However, such a separation of duties would be unnecessary if an arbitrator were appointed to monitor the proceedings as they take place on a case-by-case basis. In this way, the biases—real or potential—of the individuals involved could be identified, and the harmful effects of the unavoidable conflicts of interest could be minimized. (shrink)

InThe Moral Dimension, Amitai Etzioni critiques the neoclassical economic paradigm (NEP), a model built upon ethical egoism and which equates rationality (the logical/empirical domain) with the maximization of preferences by self-interested economic units. Etzioni finds the NEP’s exclusion of the moral/affective domain to be a glaring failure and, because of this omission, he claims that the economic model is not capable of achieving its design functions: prediction and explanation. Etzioni introduces a socio-economic model, the I & We paradigm, in which (...) the moral/affective encapsulates the logical/empirical. Further elaboration and testing of this model remains to be undertaken. We find it to hold more promise than its neoclassical economic rival, and we explicate its value for the modern manager. (shrink)

Beverley Shaw; Procrustes and Private Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 131–135, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

Professor Ian Maitland advances a version of utilitarianism, constrained by Robert Nozick’s minimal state, that finds no connectionbetween the pervasiveness of “market values,” which he gamely pursues, and the kind of problems that dominate our social scene. Inhis judgment, the prevailing tendency towards community or communitarian ends needlessly obstructs freedom, the overriding value of the libertarian-minimal state. When coupled with wrongheaded and perverse policies, communitarianism shackles the free market with crippling inefficiencies. This paper will interrogate Maitland’s characterization of communitarianism, challenge (...) his view that traditional values can be instrumentalized without harming community, and paint a more plausible and complex picture of thecommunitarian tendency. (shrink)

InThe Moral Dimension, Amitai Etzioni critiques the neoclassical economic paradigm (NEP), a model built upon ethical egoism and which equates rationality (the logical/empirical domain) with the maximization of preferences by self-interested economic units. Etzioni finds the NEP’s exclusion of the moral/affective domain to be a glaring failure and, because of this omission, he claims that the economic model is not capable of achieving its design functions: prediction and explanation. Etzioni introduces a socio-economic model, the I & We paradigm, in which (...) the moral/affective encapsulates the logical/empirical. Further elaboration and testing of this model remains to be undertaken. We find it to hold more promise than its neoclassical economic rival, and we explicate its value for the modern manager. (shrink)

I examine “The Land Ethic” by Aldo Leopold from a virtue ethics perspective. Following Leopold, I posit the “good” as the “integrity, stability, and beauty” of biotic communities and then develop “land virtues” that foster this good. I recommend and defend three land virtues: respect, prudence, and practical judgment.

This article examines the legal, economic, and ethical arguments supporting and opposing comparable worth. The co- authors advance opposing views on the wisdom of adopting comparable worth as a public policy, and those views are not reconciled within the limits of this essay.

B Shaw; Sex Discrimination in Education: theory and practice, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 33–40, https://doi.org/.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Global Empires and The Roman ImperiumBrent D. ShawP. Fibiger Bang, C. A. Bayly, and W. Scheidel, eds. The Oxford World History of Empire. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021; xxviii + 552 pp.; xxxiv + 1,318 pp.The volumes under review are an impressive if unequal diptych. The first, the slimmer of the two, entitled "The Imperial Experience," comprises a series of analytical studies on the creation, management, and (...) ideologies of empires, and forms of resistance to them. The second, "The History of Empires," is a forbidding tome of forty-four specific studies of individual empires and imperial ventures, from Ur III and Middle Kingdom Egypt to the Mongols and the British, ending, naturally, with America's "global imperium." In the analytics, the usual suspects, including Michael Doyle, Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, are on display; and the conceptual approaches of Michael Mann and Ernest Gellner are favorite points d'appui. For premodern empires, the ideas of the Maghribi thinker Ibn Khaldūn provide a different focus, so it is heartening to see Bang and others applying them more consistently (e.g., 1:13, 40, 326–9; 2:162, 246–8, 253). Especially for premodern empires, these volumes can be seen as an extension of earlier handbooks devoted to the state, one devoted to the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean state and another on ancient empires.1 As an aspect of world history, the endeavor is the culmination of a decades-long project on the history of empires fronted by Peter Bang.2 He has usefully produced detailed historical introductions not only to both volumes, but also to the subsections in each of them. Perhaps not surprisingly, empire turns out to be a virile enterprise. As Ian Morris notes, "the story of empire... is so strongly gendered that it [End Page 505] seems reasonable to call rulers and commanders 'he' throughout" (1:162 n. 14). The muscular subject is mirrored by its principal actors and by its students. All the editors are men. Reflecting the same balance, out of the forty-five authors of individual studies in the large history of empires volume, there are five (lonely) female voices. In both volumes, women as subjects of empire are, for all intents and purposes, absent.3From the perspective of an historian who has actually worked on the history of an empire, it must be plainly stated that almost all of the theories, adequately reviewed by Bang (1:20–48), are worth about as much as the paper or pixilated screens on which they have been written. Obvious and serious exceptions to every one of the definitions and hypotheticals abound. In fact, a fair number of the exemplary histories in the second volume do not obey the strictures of most of the theories advanced in the first. So it is with a sense of relief that one turns from theory to the hard quantities offered by Walter Scheidel (1:chap. 2). To a considerable degree, his analysis depends on the well-known measurements made by Rein Taagepera. Rather alarmingly, Taagepera counted as an empire "any large sovereign political entity whose components are not sovereign," say, like the well-known empires of Algeria, Finland, or Canada.4 What an analysis of these global entities confirms is that size or orders of magnitude mattered, and that the first entities to count as empires emerged in the 7th to 5th centuries bce in southwestern Asia (1:53; 2:161, 245). The neo-Assyrian empire was the first super-large territorial state and its successor, the Achaemenid empire, was the first "hyper-power without rival" (1:172; 2:83, 111, 161). Subsequent premodern empires were able to reach higher levels of millions of square kilometers of territory and larger populations of dozens of millions of subjects nominally under their aegis. The magnitudes reached by a given generation of super-states set base-lines above which a successor might be able to reach greater sophistication of rule, numbers of subjects, and extent of territory. In some cases, being able to piggy-back on existing empires, they were able to skip early developmental stages and to advance quickly to imperial status, as a succession... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article considers various arguments put forward, on the subject of ‘sexual justice’, by Janet Radcliffe Richards in her book, The Sceptical Feminist: a Philosophical Enquiry. These arguments rest upon a version of ‘the difference principle’, and owe much to the exposition of this principle by John Rawls. It is argued that Radcliffe Richards fails to support her argument for sexual justice by reference to the difference principle. Indeed, it is argued that reliance by Radcliffe Richards upon this principle (...) vitiates her advocacy of sexual justice. The article concludes by putting forward an obvious alternative to the difference principle; and with a suggestion as to why Radcliffe Richards fails to acknowledge the strength of this alternative. (shrink)

This review article examines the late agnostic New Testament scholar Maurice Casey’s criticisms of the so-called mythicist position, which argues that Jesus did not exist. Casey’s volume Jesus: Evidence and Argument or Mythicist Myths? is viewed along with Bart Ehrman’s critique of similar ideas in his text Did Jesus Exist? We will highlight important objections raised by these agnostic scholars against those in the mythicist movement, including topics such as various idiosyncrasies leading to historically deficient methods, egregiously latedating the canonical (...) Gospels, claiming inspiration from earlier mystery religions, and positing textual interpolations. (shrink)

Background: Lower limb spasticity after stroke is common that can affect the balance, increase the risk of falling, and reduces the quality of life.Objective: First, evaluate the effects of spasticity severity of ankle plantar flexors on balance of patients after stroke. Second, to determine the relationship between the spasticity severity with ankle proprioception, passive ankle dorsiflexion range of motion, and balance confidence.Methods: Twenty-eight patients with stroke based on the Modified Modified Ashworth Scale were divided into two groups: High Spasticity Group (...) or a Low Spasticity Group. The MMAS scores, Activities-Specific Balance Confidence Questionnaire, postural sway of both affected and non-affected limbs under the eyes open and eyes closed conditions, timed up and go test, passive ankle dorsiflexion ROM, and ankle joint proprioception were measured.Results: The ankle joint proprioception was significantly better in the LSG compared to the HSG. No significant differences were found between the LSG and HSG on all other outcome measures. There were no significant relationships between the spasticity severity and passive ankle dorsiflexion ROM, and balance confidence.Conclusion: The severity of ankle plantar flexor spasticity had no effects on balance of patients with stroke. However, the ankle joint proprioception was better in patients with low spasticity. Our findings suggest that the balance is affected regardless of the severity of the ankle plantar flexor spasticity in this group of participants with stroke. (shrink)

This paper examines judge Richard A. Posner’s “The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law,” as well as arestatement of that position in The Problems of Jurisprudence, and argues that Judge Posner has mistakenly claimed Aristotle’s notion of corrective justice as a significant component of the economic theory of law.

The United States has a population of three hundred million, according to latest Census Bureau estimates. Forty-seven million, including many non-citizens, are uninsured. That is, 16% of the total United States population has no health insurance. Millions more have inadequate coverage and are in danger of losing that. Private, corporatized medical coverage, structured by the insurance industry, is the basis for the current system. This article is an attempt to lay out the principal health care issues, to look at the (...) alternatives and the cost of those alternatives, and to try to determine whether there is a particular regime that, despite its imperfections, is the best available to us now. (shrink)

According to Leo Strauss, one of the primary purposes of the esotericism practiced by philosophers is the defense against persecution. This defense entails communicating the truth only to philosophers and concealing it from non-philosophers. For many commentators, this conception of esotericism has inegalitarian implications—for example, that the philosophers, who constitute a minority of people, are naturally capable of being told the truth, while the non-philosophers, who constitute a majority, are not. In this article, I argue that Strauss gives another account (...) of esotericism that does not have inegalitarian implications. He gives this account in his discussion of Farabi’s esotericism in the “Introduction” to Persecution and the Art of Writing. I also argue that Strauss presents this account esoterically. The “Introduction” reproduces text from an earlier article by Strauss, “Farabi’s Plato,” and Strauss makes certain changes, which point towards this other account. Finally, I explain why Strauss presents this other account esoterically. (shrink)

Such a moral theology not only provides us with a convincing certainty of God's being, but it also has the great advantage that it leads us to religion, since it joins the thought of God firmly to our morality, and in this way it even makes better men of us. Kant, Lectures on Philosophical TheologyThis philosophy too, which takes up the thought of confederation in the concept of communicative, historically situated reason, will be able to provide no assurance (keine Zuversicht); (...) it stands in the sign of a transcendence from within and must content itself with the justified encouragement of a skeptical but non-defeatist “resistance to the gods and demons of a world contemptuous of man.” Habermas, “Israel oder Athen: Wem gehoert die anamnetische Vernunft?”. (shrink)

Beverley Shaw; Mixed Ability Grouping: some philosophical considerations, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 133–138, ht.

Here we interact critically with the volume The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified by University of Wisconsin philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, who contends that even if miracles occur, proper epistemological justification is unattainable. In addition, he argues that the historical evidence for Jesus’s resurrection is deeply problematic. We engage Shapiro’s philosophical and historical arguments by raising several significant issues within his own arguments, while also briefly providing some positive reasons to think that if a (...) miracle did occur, one may be epistemologically justified in believing it. (shrink)

This article offers a new account of Leo Strauss’s interpretation of Maimonides’ esoteric teaching in the Guide for the Perplexed, which Strauss offers in his seminal essay ‘The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed.’ According to the generally-accepted view, for Strauss, Maimonides’ esoteric teaching is the identity of the secrets of the Torah with Aristotelian philosophy, and—since that philosophy contradicts the foundational beliefs of the Torah—that the Torah has the merely instrumental function of bringing about political well-being. By (...) contrast, I argue that, for Strauss, Maimonides’ esoteric teaching is the necessity of breaking the laws of the Torah for the sake of restoring Israel’s sovereignty. Additionally, I claim that Strauss’s interpretation depends on Carl Schmitt’s ‘decisionism.’. (shrink)

Paul Celan’s “Tenebrae” is a scandalous poem: it describes how “unity with the dying Jesus” is achieved by means of the Jewish experience of the concentration camps. In this paper, I provide a new interpretation of “Tenebrae” that breaks from the two traditional ways in which the poem has been viewed—on the one hand, as a Christian poem that suggests that Jesus, insofar as he suffers just like Jewish concentration camp victims do, can provide “hope and redemption for the faithful”, (...) and, on the other hand, as an ironic criticism of this Christian idea. Rather, I suggest that “Tenebrae” is a modification of Christianity: preserving Christian belief about Jesus’s death, it destroys that belief, and does so for the sake of the defense against Christian persecution. Finally, I suggest that this view reveals the peculiar poetic form of “Tenebrae”—what I call “political form.”. (shrink)

Beverley Shaw; Sameness and Equality: a rejoinder to John Colbeck, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 283–285, https://d.

This paper is an elaboration of Paul de Man’s critique, in “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin,” of Martin Heidegger’s commentary on Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem, “As when on a holiday…” I show that de Man’s critique can be expanded into a critique of a type of testimony that Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin’s poem. Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin’s poem what I call “infinite testimony,” but, thereby, suppresses in the poem another type of testimony—what I call “finite testimony. This suppression is most in evidence (...) in Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s reference to the myth of Semele, as well as in Heidegger’s excision, in the version of the poem that he printed in the commentary, of the concluding lines of the poem. Additionally, I discuss the political implications of Heidegger’s suppression of the finite testimony depicted in “As when on a holiday...”. (shrink)

Beverley Shaw; Sexual Discrimination and the Equal Opportunities Commission: ought schools to eradicate sex stereotyping?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, V.