Many in the human rights community have expressed concern about the illiberal religious political system found in Iran today. However, Iran is not unique in its illiberal religious nationalism. Some contemporary liberal democracies in the West also have a history of illiberal religious nationalism. The English and later the British discriminated against Catholics in various ways. The Irish also have a history of discrimination against Protestants and inequality towards women which was based on a deep seated illiberal Catholic nationalism. In (...) all of these cases moderation and liberalization occurred over time. An interesting question is whether moderation over time might be repeated outside of Europe, especially in religiously based nations in the Middle East.When looking especially at the evolution of Ireland we notice that: economic prosperity spread throughout the population, the perception of a threat from the United Kingdom declined, European norms were spread within Ireland, and there were scandals within the Catholic Church. All these factors diminished the power of Irish illiberal Catholicism over time. If the external threats to Iran were removed and economic prosperity was to spread, as corruption and scandals came to light, we might expect that Iran may begin to moderate its political system.The goal of this essay is to analyze what conditions are conducive for the gradual transformation from an illiberal, religiously defined nation-state to a more moderate, democratic one by examining Iran and Ireland. This article suggests that the evolution of religiously based political systems can lead to more democratic political systems which are more cooperative with other countries and are less supportive of violence and terrorism. (shrink)

This paper examines the Obama Administration’s approach to democracy promotion in Egypt. After a brief discussion of the motivation for promoting democracy, this essay compares the Obama Administration to its predecessor and analyzes the changes that were spurred by the Arab Awakening. Did the Obama Administration, during and after the 2011 Revolution, fully support democratic change in Egypt not only with rhetoric but also with the financial and programmatic support necessary to help a transitioning country? Did the Obama Administration offer (...) a consistent message on the importance of democratic policies? Or did the administration allow other policy objectives to trump democratic efforts? This paper explores the language, policies, and funding employed by the Obama Administration in Egypt to see what the impact has been. (shrink)

" -- "New Scientist" Intended for anyone attempting to find their way through the large and confusingly interwoven philosophical literature on consciousness, ..

The need for professionals to volunteer their time in crisis situations and to reach across time and culture in the service of humanitarian interventions will likely not abate in the near future. This article provides readers with multiple venues for considering the ethical dimensions present in crisis and humanitarian interventions. Core ethical concerns common to helping situations are magnified in crisis work. In addition, issues unique to the nature of volunteer and crisis work must also be considered. Using hypothetical case (...) examples, bioethical principles, and ethical decision-making models, helping professionals are encouraged to go beyond their particular ethical codes in contemplating ethically and clinically sensitive volunteering. (shrink)

Disagreement on law’s relationship to morality has long been driven by disagreement about our ordinary concept. Until recently, however, there had been no systematic investigation of lay intuitions. In this paper, we advance this nascent effort. Across two studies (N = 697), our findings reveal that most people consider law to be more than a matter of political circumstance alone. Contrary to the expectations of most contemporary philosophers, morality (both substantive and procedural) emerges as a key influence on judgments of (...) legal validity: many people say that conduct prohibited by immoral statutes is not truly illegal, and that immoral conduct which was never explicitly prohibited is truly illegal. This suggests that people often treat law as a dual character concept that, like the concepts of scientist or of artist, features autonomous concrete and abstract dimensions. (shrink)

Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, “Mencian Moral Modularity,” which claims four (...) innate modules, and “Social Intuitionist Modularity,” which claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of the “is-ought” problem. We explain in a new way what this problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not involve the logic of “ought,” but rather the plasticity of human nature and the realistic options to “grow” and “do” human nature in multifarious legitimate ways. (shrink)

Contemporary Western moral philosophy in harmony with classical Chinese philosophy, especially Buddhism.

In the fifteen years between publication of Insight and Method in Theology, Lonergan's thought underwent some remarkable developments, especially in his understanding of theology. To appreciate these developments, it is first necessary to understand how Lonergan transformed traditional philosophy from a metaphysical psychology to its reverse -a psychological metaphysics grounded in the knower's own self-appropriation and intellectual conversion. During his posf-Insight period, Lonergan gradually extended this new philosophical framework into theology making religious conversion the new foundation for theological reflection. Traditionally, (...) theology had been conceived as a critical reflection on God and His relation to the world, but in Lonergan's new context, theology became reflection on religion and the mediation of religion into a cultural community. With this new approach to the study of religion, Lonergan was able to establish a new basis for interreligious dialogue. /// Nos quinze anos que mediaram entre a publicação de Insight e Method in Theology, o pensamento de Lonergan sofreu alguns desenvolvimentos muito significativos, especialmente no que se refere à sua compreensão do que é a Teologia. Para se apreciarem estes desenvolvimentos, é necessário, antes de mais, compreender de que modo Lonergan transformou a filosofia tradicional centrada numa psicologia metafísica no seu reverso–uma metafísica psicológica fundada no processo de auto-apro-priação do sujeito cognoscente e na conversão intelectual. No período posterior a Insight, Lonergan foi alargando gradualmente este novo esquema filosófico ao campo da teologia, transformando a conversão religiosa no novo fundamento para a reflexão teológica. Tradicionalmente, a teologia era concebida como uma reflexão crítica sobre Deus e a Sua relação com o mundo, mas no novo contexto lonerganiano, a teologia transformou-se numa reflexão sobre a religião e o papel de mediação que esta tem numa comunidade de cultura. Graças a esta nova abordagem do estudo da religião, Lonergan pôde estabelecer uma nova base para o diálogo interreligioso. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Should Clinicians’ Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM?Elizabeth H. Flanagan (bio) and Roger K. Blashfield (bio)Keywordsclinicians, DSM, values, psychopathology, scienceThe relationship between clinicians and the DSM is complex. Clinicians are the primary intended audience of the DSM. However, as Widiger (2007) pointed out in his commentary, there is a tension associated with trying to meet the clinical goals of the DSM and also trying to optimize the (...) scientific goals of the DSM. Most commentators would agree that the recent editions of the DSM (from the DSM-III onward) have favored scientific values (e.g., Sadler 2005). Some commentators have taken sides and aligned themselves with either clinicians or with the science of classification. For instance, Garb (2005) has argued that clinicians should receive incentives to align themselves more closely with the science of the DSM. In contrast, Westen and Shedler (1999) have favored a clinician-based approach to the DSM and have argued that an ideal classification should be based on the prototypes that clinicians use to conceptualize diagnostic categories. Perhaps an extreme suggestion on how to deal with this tension between the values of clinicians and the values of scientists is to adopt the ICD-10 solution and create two versions of the next DSM. One version would be written for clinicians and another for researchers (Phillips et al. 2003).Widiger (2007) wondered whether the two of us as authors are on the fence about how the views of clinicians should affect the DSM. As clinical psychologists who are both clinicians and researchers, we understand his comment, especially in light of our attempt in our article not to overgeneralize from the time-consuming, labor-intensive, yet methodologically limited study we reported in our major paper.Nonetheless, our answer to the question asked in the title of this response, “Should clinicians’ views of mental illness influence the diagnostic manual?” is a clear and unequivocal yes. In our view, too much of the research literature stimulated by the recent DSMs has primarily used the diagnostic criteria in these DSMs to specify patient samples and then perform various experiments to study the DSM categories. We favor a different approach to research which is consistent with a comment once made by the philosopher of science, Karl Popper: “scientific theories originate from myths, and... a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories” (1963, 39). We believe that clinicians, with their years [End Page 285] of experience dealing with the ambiguities, the emotionality, and the chaos of psychopathology, have formed complex conceptual systems to try to understand the mysteries of abnormal behavior. We strongly support increased research attempts that will use clinicians as subjects and that will attempt to understand how clinicians use diagnostic concepts to understand patients.Although research on clinicians has not attracted a large amount of attention in the field, there is a long history of such research studies. For instance, in the 1970s, Overall used multivariate techniques to create graphical maps of how clinicians represented relationships among diagnoses (Overall et al. 1977). Widiger has used a similar strategy in some of his research (Widiger et al. 1987). In the early 1980s, a view of concept formation from cognitive psychology was used by Cantor et al. (1980) to look at psychiatric diagnoses as representing prototypes. Horowitz and colleagues extended this research. Blashfield and his colleagues had a grant to use the prototype model to study personality disorders and performed research investigating both case histories (Blashfield et al. 1985) and analyses of diagnostic criteria (Blashfield and Breen 1989; Davis, Blashfield, and McElroy 1993). Westen and colleagues have attempted to reconceptualize DSM personality disorder categories using the prototype model (Westen and Shedler 1999). Ahn and her colleagues (Ahn et al. 2006; Kim and Ahn 2002) have taken more recent applications of ideas from cognitive psychology to study how clinicians use and understand diagnostic categories. Finally, Flanagan and colleagues (Flanagan and Blashfield 2006; Flanagan, Keeley, and Blashfield, in press; Flanagan, Miller, and Davidson, submitted) have used qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques to try to understand the diagnostic concepts held by experienced clinicians.Besides empirical studies of how clinicians use diagnostic concepts, we also support the increased interest in... (shrink)

Using methods from anthropology and cognitive psychology, this study investigated the relationship between clinicians’ folk taxonomies of mental disorder and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Expert and novice psychologists were given sixty-seven DSM-IV diagnoses, asked to discard unfamiliar diagnoses, put the remaining diagnoses into groups that had “similar treatments” using hierarchical (making more inclusive and less inclusive groups) and dimensional (placing groups in a two-dimensional space) methodologies, and give names to the groups in their taxonomies. Clinicians (...) were familiar with a substantially smaller number of diagnoses than are in the DSM. Cultural consensus analysis and follow-up residual agreement analysis revealed similarities across clinicians’ folk taxonomies. Correlations between folk taxonomies and the DSM were moderate. Cluster analysis showed that clinicians preserved DSM higher order categories (e.g., mood disorders) but not the Axis I–Axis II distinction. This study suggests important differences between the way clinicians conceptualize mental disorders and the organization of the DSM-IV. (shrink)

In this article, we examine conceptual and practical issues pertaining to relationship boundaries within the helping profession. Although our focus is primarily on relationships between mental health professionals and clients, there are considerable implications for a new approach to ethically structuring and understanding the construct of "required distance" in many human-interactive professions, such as teaching, religious leadership, public administration, and others. We define the concept of boundary as applied to human relationships, provide examples of boundary breaks, and raise questions regarding (...) how to evaluate the significance and morality issues raised by specific boundary breaks. Questions and dilemmas are presented regarding boundary setting and accidental or deliberate boundary breaking. Representative dangers present in boundary breaks are identified, and examples are provided. Possible beneficial outcomes are also discussed. Finally, a suggested protocol for assessing a proposed boundary break is provided, much of which is drawn from the work and thinking of Laura Brown, applied more generally in this article, with additions from our perspectives. (shrink)

Ontology is currently perceived as the solution of first resort for all problems related to biomedical terminology, and the use of description logics is seen as a minimal requirement on adequate ontology-based systems. Contrary to common conceptions, however, description logics alone are not able to prevent incorrect representations; this is because they do not come with a theory indicating what is computed by using them, just as classical arithmetic does not tell us anything about the entities that are added or (...) subtracted. In this paper we shall show that ontology is indeed an essential part of any solution to the problems of medical terminology – but only if it is understood in the right sort of way. Ontological engineering, we shall argue, should in every case go hand in hand with a sound ontological theory. (shrink)

Neuroexistentialism brings together some of the world's leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.

Owen Flanagan argues that we are on the way to understanding consciousness and its place in the natural order.

Existentialism is a concern about the foundation of meaning, morals, and purpose. Existentialisms arise when some foundation for these elements of being is under assault. In the past, first-wave existentialism concerned the increasingly apparent inability of religion, and religious tradition, to provide such a foundation, as typified in the writings of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. Second-wave existentialism, personified philosophically by Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, developed in response to the inability of an overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of reason and the (...) common good to provide such a foundation. There is a third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism, developing in response to advances in the neurosciences that threaten the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self. With the increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and some responses to it. It brings together some of the world’s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose. (shrink)

The digital humanities have developed in concert with online systems that increase the accessibility and speed of learning. Whereas previously students were immersed in the fluidity of campus life, they have become suspended and drawn-into various streams and currents of digital pedagogy, which articulate new forms of epistemological movement, often operating at speeds outside the lived time and rhythm of human thought. When assessing learning technologies, we have to consider the degree to which they complement the rhythms immanent to human (...) thought, knowledge, investigation, and experimentation.In this paper, we examine learning from a humanities perspective, arguing that reading, writing, and thinking are ways of learning underscored by various genres of movement that segue with or diverge from the movements inherent to digital technologies, especially those deployed in learning systems. Using the work of thinkers such as John Dewey and Michel Serres, we examine the importance of movement in dialogue, where to truly learn involves embedding oneself in the flow of thought, accepting the flexibility of concepts, and aligning oneself with a community of thinkers. (shrink)

A response to comments by William Casebeer, Peter Railton, and Michael Ruse on "Naturalizing Ethics" (2007).

Consciousness emerges as the key topic in this second edition of Owen Flanagan's popular introduction to cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology....

Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such "moral saints" as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Shindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures.

The idea that the self is inextricably intertwined with the rest of the world—the “oneness hypothesis”—can be found in many of the world’s philosophical and religious traditions. Oneness provides ways to imagine and achieve a more expansive conception of the self as fundamentally connected with other people, creatures, and things. Such views present profound challenges to Western hyperindividualism and its excessive concern with self-interest and tendency toward self-centered behavior. This anthology presents a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary exploration of the nature and implications (...) of the oneness hypothesis. While fundamentally inspired by East and South Asian traditions, in which such a view often is critical to philosophical approach, this collection draws upon religion, psychology, and Western philosophy, as well as sociology, evolutionary theory, and cognitive neuroscience. Contributors trace the oneness hypothesis through the works of East Asian and Western thinkers and traditions, including Confucianism. Mohism, Daoism, Buddhism, Platonism, Zhuangzi, Kant, James, and Dewey. They intervene in debates over ethics, cultural difference, identity, group solidarity, and the positive and negative implications of metaphors of organic unity. Challenging dominant traditional views that presume the proper scope of the mind stops at the boundaries of the skin and skull, The Oneness Hypothesis shows that a more relational conception of the self is not only consistent with contemporary science but has the potential to lead to greater happiness and well-being for both individuals and the larger wholes of which they are parts. (shrink)

Recent advances in brain imaging methods as well as increased sophistication in neuroscientific modeling of the brain’s reward systems have facilitated the study of neural mechanisms associated with addiction such as processes associated with motivation, decision-making, pleasure seeking, and inhibitory control. These scientific activities have increased optimism that the neurological underpinnings of addiction will be delineated, and that pharmaceuticals that target and change these mechanisms will by themselves facilitate early intervention and even full recovery. In this paper, we argue that (...) it is misguided to construe addiction as just or primarily a brain chemistry problem, which can be adequately treated by pharmaceutical interventions alone. (shrink)

Owen Flanagan is a highly prolific writer and speaker whose work brings together results of research in several empirical disciplines overlapping with philosophy, particularly neuroscience and other areas of psychology. This book of thirteen essays, most of them revisions of work published elsewhere, exhibits both his intellectual and his stylistic range. Many of the essays are light and chatty, others analytical and slower-going.