De kennis van de "werkelijkheid", die zich achter den dichten nevel van veelzinnige woorden verbergt, is op het gebied der massa-psychologie wel heel moeilijk toegankelijk. Dit blijkt duidelijk uit de heerschende theorieën, inzonderheid de pessimistische theorieën van de laatste halve eeuw, over den zoogenaamd noodlottigen invloed van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel op het oordeel van de, in zulk een gevoel vereenigde, menschen. De meeste der opvattingen, die thans over de mogelijkheden en de onontbeerlijkheid der politieke propaganda worden verkondigd, passen in hetzelfde kader (...) van onklare, overdreven angstvoorstellingen betreffende de verstandelijke tekortkomingen van den mensch in de massa. Het nuchtere onderzoek, dat op de vaststelling van verifieerbare feiten is gericht, dient zich te hoeden voor de vele fouten, die vooral op het gebied der massa-psychologie plegen te worden gemaakt. Het dient zich voornamelijk bewust te zijn, dat het gevaar eener ongegronde veralgemeening hier bijzonder groot is. We zien "dè massa" niet, zelfs niet, wanneer we menschenmenigten vóór ons zien. We willen immers doordringen tot de onzichtbare gevoelens, waarvan we niet kunnen weten, in hoeverre en in welken graad ze zich van de menschen, die we zien, hebben meester gemaakt! Inderdaad zijn we dan ook niet in staat, de "massa" psychologisch te onderzoeken, maar wel afzonderlijke individuen, zij het dan ook vele individuen. Daarbij komt nog, dat de in dit verband voor de geestelijke processen gebezigde woorden zoo vaag onmogelijk zijn. We kennen bij voorbeeld zeer weinig nauwkeurige bijzonderheden, wanneer we de "meening" van een mensch "vaststellen". Want de "meening" is ook voor den enkelen mensch een min of meer vaag begrip. En voor de "openbare meening" geldt dit in het bijzonder. Voorzichtig te werk gaande, kunnen we evenwel voldoende en betrouwbare waarnemings-resultaten op dit terrein te bereiken, wanneer we door den woordnevel heendringen. Zulke resultaten worden bij voorbeeld verkregen door de waarneming van het gedrag van krantenlezers in verband met pogingen tot beïnvloeding der meening door censuur, door misleiding en andere "propaganda"-middelen. Het gedrag der krantenlezers schijnt ons veelal vol tegenstrijdigheid, maar geeft den deskundige toch een bruikbaar en scherp-omlijnd beeld van onbewuste neigingen en behoeften. Overschat wordt in den regel het aantal menschen, dat tot blinde daden van zoogenaamde massahartstocht wordt opgezweept. Het nuchtere onderzoek van de feiten toont aan, dat de meerderheid slechts de rol van radelooze en hulpelooze toeschouwster speelt, een toeschouwster, die in den grond der zaak vreedzaam en verdraagzaam is. Het gedrag der meerderheid wordt in zulke gevallen bepaald door dwang en intimidatie. De problemen der massa-psychologie, die nog niet zijn onderzocht, liggen dan ook hoofdzakelijk op dit gebied. Voornamelijk dient de werking van dwang en intimidatie -- de "moreele" en de gewelddadige intimidatie -- te worden onderzocht en haar invloed op de achteraf gevormde meening der meerderheden, die zich in radelooze gelatenheid in hun lot hebben geschikt. De door gewelddadige minderheden uitgeoefende dwang en intimidatie zijn altijd en overal de oorzaken van de ontstellende ontaardingsverschijnselen van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel, die op rekening van de "massa" worden gesteld. (shrink)

The central conflicts of the world today are closely related to cultural, traditional, and religious differences between nations. As we move to a globalized world, these differences often become magnified, entrenched, and the cause of bloody conflict. Growing out of a conference of distinguished scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, this volume is a singular contribution to mutual understanding and cooperative efforts on behalf of peace. The term paideia, drawn from Greek philosophy, has to do with (...) responsible education for citizenship as a necessary precondition for effective democracy. (shrink)

Dieser Band ist der erste Teil einer Lekture von Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes, in dem die ersten drei Hauptkapitel - d.h. -Bewusstsein-, -Selbstbewusstsein- und -Vernunft- - von Hegels erstem Hauptwerk umfassend kommentiert werden. Der Text entstand dabei wahrend eines uber viele Jahre laufenden Seminars, welches am Institut fur Philosophie der Universitat Wien unter Leitung von Professor Dr. Friedrich Grimmlinger abgehalten wurde und in dem der Hegelsche Text gemeinsam Satz fur Satz gelesen und ausgelegt wurde.".

Summary The rhetorical uses of discovery and invention stories are legion, but of particular concern in this paper are those that are deployed for economic or commercial reasons, especially in claiming intellectual property rights, usually in the form of patents. The case of stories about Dr Irving Langmuir (1881–1957) of the General Electric Research Laboratory, who won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1932 and was the first industry-based laureate from the United States, is examined. Langmuir won the prize for (...) his ‘outstanding discoveries and inventions within the field of surface chemistry’, which also happened to underlie the virtual monopoly that General Electric gained in the supply of electric light. Langmuir was the inspiration for the stereotypically absent-minded and disinterested character of Dr Felix Hoenikker in Kurt Vonnegut's novel, Cat's Cradle (1963). My case study focuses on this and other representations of Langmuir as a discoverer, especially those generated by the General Electric Company, and explores the utility of these representations for Langmuir himself, and for his employer, in corporate PR, in ongoing struggles over patents, and in the post-war organisation of R&D. It is argued that, while the era of corporate research produced new collective modes of discovery and invention their description in heroic, individualistic terms long continued, and for good reason. (shrink)

This book answers the question of how soft factors such as corporate cultures and individual and corporate values can be transparently steered. With its C4 management tool and reflecting the seven driving forces of corporate culture, the Values Cockpit is a powerful solution designed to steer all dimensions and processes of a company, pursuing a lean approach. The book links strategic approaches on how to steer a company towards excellence with insights into the driving forces of human thoughts and actions. (...) It subsequently introduces the Values Cockpit, which allows individual corporate cultures to be developed and controlled on the basis of a rational approach. "This intriguing book breaks new ground in suggesting that values can be managed quite as systematically as any other centrally important asset" Rebecca Henderson, John and Natty McArthur Professor, Harvard University "... a deeply articulate, profoundly relevant explication of the role played by the culture of commerce... rich with actionable tools, insights and clear examples..." Richard J Hill IV, Founder, Gabriel Consulting Group, LLC "One seldom sees practical advice on HOW strong values can be automatically practiced on a daily basis by all concerned. That is what makes this remarkable book so refreshing... his book is taking the seminal findings of Jim Collins on building great companies a step further..." Julian Clarke, Chartered Accountant and Management Consultant, European Business Ethics Network Ireland "... a brilliant yet succinct guide to teach the significance of values-development in sustainable business management..." Professor Dr. Haifeng Huang, Assistant Dean, Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen, China "He admirably rejects the fatalist interpretation of the immoral might of markets and replaces it with a counter-narrative of why and how companies can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem." Professor Dr. Claus Dierksmeier, Director of the Global Ethic Institute, Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen "The values cockpit gives readers a coherent and comprehensive toolkit to help them prepare their companies for lasting success." Dr. Kurt Schmalz, C.E.O and Managing Partner J. Schmalz GmbH, Glatten, Germany. (shrink)

Das vorliegende Buch ist die uberarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung einer schon Mitte der fiinfziger Jahre angestellten Untersuchung, zu der mich Prof. Dr. Dr. HANS LEISEGANG, der besonders durch seine "Denkformen" bekanntgewordene ehemalige Ordinarius der Philo­ sophie, kurz vor seinem Tode angeregt hatte. Das Ur-Manuskript entstand im Lichte der lebendigen Freundschaft, die mich an Prof. Dr. EDUARD MAy band. Auch er ist viel zu fruh von uns gegangen. Wertvolle Klarungen und Hinweise habe ich dem verstorbenen klassischen Philologen Prof. Dr. ACHILLE VOGLIANO (...) zu danken. Prof. Dr. KURT VON FRITZ, bedeutender Grazist und hervorragender Kenner der griechischen Mathematik, hat sich der Muhe unterzogen, die Erstfassung des Manuskripts kritisch durchzusehen. Ihm sei hier­ fur herzlich gedankt. Besonderer Dank gebuhrt ferner Herrn Oberstudienrat KARL TESMER fur seine wertvolle Hilfe bei der Korrektur der griechischen Texte sowie meinen langjahrigen Mitarbeiterinnen, Frau HELGA STRANZ und Fraulein BRIGITTE PRASTEL, fur technisch-organisatori­ sche Unterstutzung mannigfacher Art. Danken m6chte ich schlieSlich dem Springer-Verlag Wien' New York fur das Verstandnis, das er stets meinen Wunschen entgegen­ gebracht hat, sowie fur die wie immer sorgfaltige Herstellung und ansprechende Gestaltung des Buches. (shrink)

It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason (...) is a distinctive achievement that isn’t exhausted by the mere conjunction of (i) and (ii). Its being an achievement entails that (i) and (ii) are not independent when one believes for a normative reason: minimally, (i) must hold because (ii) holds. Apart from its intrinsic interest, our discussion has important upshots for central issues in epistemology, including the analysis of doxastic justification, the epistemology of perception, and the place of competence in epistemology. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.

Recent writers claim that responsibilist virtue epistemology courts skepticism, owing to the fact that most of us lack the virtues it deems necessary for justified belief and knowledge. A powerful version of this objection is the challenge from situationist social psychology pressed by Alfano (2012, 2013) and Olin and Doris (2014). This paper develops a new version of responsibilism that is immune from this objection, and shows that this view has many advantages over other forms of virtue epistemology. My responsibilism (...) dispenses with the ubiquitous but (I argue) mistaken idea that responsibilist virtue properties must be understood in terms of character traits. My view parallels an often overlooked form of virtue ethics suggested by Thomson (1997) that some situationists (e.g., Harman (2001)) have praised. That form shares with other forms the thought that virtue properties are normatively fundamental, but it adds that act-attaching ones are prior to person-attaching ones, and require no backing by character traits. Far from being an ad hoc retreat position, I argue that this view is independently attractive. (shrink)

Many epistemologists treat rationality and justification as the same thing. Those who don’t lack detailed accounts of the difference, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc attempt to safeguard their theories of justification. In this paper, I offer a new and detailed account of the distinction. The account is inspired by no particular views in epistemology, but rather by insights from the literature on reasons and rationality outside of epistemology. Specifically, it turns on a version (...) of the familiar distinction in meta-ethics between possessing apparent normative reasons (which may be merely apparent) and possessing objective normative reasons. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I discuss the history of indifference to the distinction between rationality and justification in epistemology and the striking contrast with meta-ethics. I introduced the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective reasons in §2 and provide a deeper basis for it in §3. I explain how the ideas extend to epistemology in §4 and explore the upshots for some central issues in §5. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Platon" verfügbar.

Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Internalists can refuse these burdens by accepting a better philosophy of mind. (...) Rather than looking to 17th century rationalists, I look to Kant, and especially his idea that normativity is grounded in the constitution of agency and mind. A Kantian approach can avoid stock objections to internalism, I argue, and can also capture all the alleged benefits of externalism. The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I get back to basics and consider more ways to satisfy the core internalist template than have become standard. I draw attention to rationalist insights about how normativity could be grounded in the constitution of mind, and hypothesize that if internalism respects these insights, some problems disappear. I develop this hypothesis in §3 with a Kantian view. I further defend this view in §4. I conclude in §5 by explaining why Kantian internalism answers the latest challenges to internalism. (shrink)

Resnik’s argument relies upon an undefended and unjustified overvaluation of liberty. First, he overlooks some important arguments in favour of restrictions to liberty, and his consideration of the two he does review is unfair; second his account grossly overestimates the autonomy of our food choices; and lastly his mechanism for balancing liberty against other concerns involves an illicit double counting of the weight of individual liberty.

In early German ecology, the key concept used to refer to a synecological unit was Biozönose. Taken together with the concept of the Biotop, it was also understood as an integrated higher-order unit of life, sometimes called a “Holozön”. These units were often perceived as having properties similar to those of individual organisms, and they informed the mainstream of German ecology until at least the late 1960s. Here I ask how “organismic” these concepts really were and what conceptual problems they (...) entailed. To do so, I focus on some almost forgotten dissident positions, especially those of Friedrich Simon Bodenheimer and Fritz Peus, which I contrast with the mainstream German ecology of the time. In a radical paper published in 1954 that postulated the “dissolution of the concepts of biocoenosis and biotope”, Peus in particular elicited a forceful response from many prominent German ecologists. An analysis of the ensuing debate, including especially a colloquium held in 1959 that was partly inspired by Peus’ paper, is helpful for sifting the various arguments proffered with respect to a quasi-organismic perception of the biocoenosis in German speaking ecology. Although German mainstream ecologists rejected the notion of the biocoenosis as a superorganism, ontological holism was quite common among them. Additionally, the mainstream concept of the biocoenosis was plagued by several methodological problems and much conceptual confusion, to which the “dissidents” rightly pointed. Some of these problems are still pertinent today, e.g. in connection with more modern concepts such as “ecosystem”. (shrink)

Past research has found that mere in‐group/out‐group categorizations are sufficient to elicit biases in face memory. The current research yields novel evidence that mere social categorization is also sufficient to modulate processes underlying face perception, even for faces for which we have strong perceptual expertise: same‐race (SR) faces. Using the composite face paradigm, we find that SR faces categorized as in‐group members (i.e., fellow university students) are processed more holistically than are SR faces categorized as out‐group members (i.e., students at (...) another university). Hence, holding perceptual expertise with faces constant, categorizing an SR target as an out‐group member debilitates the strong holistic processing typically observed for SR faces. (shrink)