It has been argued in the literature that the deflationists’ thesis about the dispensability of truth as an explanatory notion forces them to adopt a conservative theory of truth. I suggest that the deflationists’ claim that the notion of truth is akin to a logical notion should be taken more seriously. This claim casts some doubts on the adequacy of the conservativity requirement, while it also calls for further investigation to assess its philosophical plausibility.

Deflationists about truth hold that truth is not a substantial property. But what counts as a substantial property? We shall be interested in the thesis that the following is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-substantiality of truth.

Nous clarifions et critiquons un argument influent opposé au déflationnisme par [Shapiro 1998b] et [Ketland 1999], fondé sur la non-conservativité des extensions des théories formalisées par des principes aléthiques universellement admis. À cette interprétation anti-déflationniste des phénomènes de non-conservativité, nous en opposons une autre, compatible à la fois avec les faits logiques et les thèses déflationnistes.

This is a short introductory paper to the Ramsey-Carnap method, as introduced by Carnap in his "Philosophical foundations of Physics" (1966) to explain the meaning of theoretical terms.

L’interrogation sur la nature de la référence, et plus généralement sur la relation entre notre langage et le monde, doit-elle prendre la forme d’une théorie scientifique, appelée à jouer un rôle central en philosophie? Ou bien, au contraire, ne peut-elle déboucher que sur les paradoxes quiniens de l’indétermination de la traduction et de l’inscrutabilité de la référence? Dans Truth and words (2009), Gary Ebbs rejette la première branche de l’alternative, tout en refusant le scepticisme de Quine. Cette discussion critique vise (...) à présenter cette œuvre exigeante. (shrink)

We can think of functional completeness in systems of propositional logic as a form of expressive completeness: while every logical constant in such system expresses a truth-function of finitely many arguments, functional completeness garantees that every truth-function of finitely many arguments can be expressed with the constants in the system. From this point of view, a functionnaly complete system of propositionnal logic can thus be seen as one where no logical constant is missing. Can a similar question be formulated for (...) quantified first-order logics ? How to make sense of the question whether, e.g., ordinary first-order logic is "functionaly" complete or have no logical constant missing ? In this note, we build on a suggestive proposal made by Bonnay(2006) and shows that it is equivalent to the criterion that a first-order logic L be functionaly complete if and only if every class of structures closed under L-elementary equivalence is L-elementary. Ordinary first-order logic is not complete in this sense. We raise the question whether any logic can be. -/- . (shrink)

Nous clarifions et critiquons un argument influent opposé au déflationnisme par [Shapiro 1998b] et [Ketland 1999], fondé sur la non-conservativité des extensions des théories formalisées par des principes aléthiques universellement admis. À cette interprétation anti-déflationniste des phénomènes de non-conservativité, nous en opposons une autre, compatible à la fois avec les faits logiques et les thèses déflationnistes.

Nous clarifions et critiquons un argument influent opposé au déflationnisme par [Shapiro 1998b] et [Ketland 1999], fondé sur la non-conservativité des extensions des théories formalisées par des principes aléthiques universellement admis. À cette interprétation anti-déflationniste des phénomènes de non-conservativité, nous en opposons une autre, compatible à la fois avec les faits logiques et les thèses déflationnistes.

In ‘The varieties of indispensability arguments’ Marco Panza and Andrea Sereni argue that, for any clear notion of indispensability, either there is no conclusive argument for the thesis that mathematics is indispensable to science, or the notion of indispensability at hand does not support mathematical realism. In this paper, I shall not object to this main thesis directly. I shall instead try to assess in a naturalistic spirit a family of objections the authors make along the way to the use (...) of indispensability premises in indispensability arguments. (shrink)

This anthology of the very latest research on truth features the work of recognized luminaries in the field, put together following a rigorous refereeing process. Along with an introduction outlining the central issues in the field, it provides a unique and unrivaled view of contemporary work on the nature of truth, with papers selected from key conferences in 2011 such as Truth Be Told, Truth at Work, Paradoxes of Truth and Denotation and Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Studying the nature of (...) the concept of ‘truth’ has always been a core role of philosophy, but recent years have been a boom time in the topic. With a wealth of recent conferences examining the subject from various angles, this collection of essays recognizes the pressing need for a volume that brings scholars up to date on the arguments. Offering academics and graduate students alike a much-needed repository of today’s cutting-edge work in this vital topic of philosophy, the volume is required reading for anyone needing to keep abreast of developments, and is certain to act as a catalyst for further innovation and research. (shrink)

A monumental work by an important modern philosopher, Matter and Memory (1896) represents one of the great inquiries into perception and memory, movement and time, matter and mind. Nobel Prize-winner Henri Bergson surveys these independent but related spheres, exploring the connection of mind and body to individual freedom of choice. Bergson’s efforts to reconcile the facts of biology to a theory of consciousness offered a challenge to the mechanistic view of nature, and his original and innovative views exercised a (...) profound influence on other philosophers--including James, Whitehead, and Santayana--as well as novelists such as Dos Passos and Proust. Matter and Memory is essential to an understanding of Bergson’s philosophy and its legacy. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

The final published book by Nobel Prize-winning author and philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941), La pensée et le mouvant (translated here as The Creative Mind), is a masterly autobiography of his philosophical method. Through essays and lectures written between 1903 and 1923, Bergson retraces how and why he became a philosopher, and crafts a fascinating critique of philosophy itself. Until it leaves its false paths, he demonstrates, philosophy will remain only a wordy dialectic that surmounts false problems. With masterful skill (...) and intensity, Bergson shows that metaphysics and science must be rooted in experience for philosophy to become a genuine search for truth. And in the quest for unanswered questions, the spiritual dimension of human life and the importance of intuition must be emphasized. A source of inspiration for physicists as well as philosophers, Bergson's introduction to metaphysics reveals a philosophy that is always on the move, blending man's spiritual drive with his mastery of the material world. (shrink)

The possibility of employing human enhancement interventions to aid in future space missions has been gaining attention lately. These possibilities have included one of the more controversial kinds of enhancements: biomedical moral enhancement. However, the discussion has thus far remained on a rather abstract level. In this paper we further this conversation by looking more closely at what type of interventions with what sort of effects we should expect when we are talking about biomedical moral enhancements. We suggest that a (...) more grounded way to picture moral enhancement, at least in the near term, is to envision a form of cognitive enhancement that also provides some moral benefits by heightening the enhanced person's capability for acting according to their own subjective moral code. While this concept of moral adherence enhancement also has relevance for the moral enhancement discussion more widely, in this paper we apply it specifically in the context of space missions. We argue that there are weighty reasons to consider making biomedical enhancements of the proposed kind a mandatory feature of early-phase long-distance space travel because these missions are high-stakes in nature and take place in an environment where the enhancement could be seen as conferring important advantages while negating many of the traditional arguments weighed against it. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to analyze the measurability and interfirm comparability of sustainability performance through the qualitative content analysis of 12 sustainability reports of mining firms using the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines. The systematic comparison of information disclosed in 92 GRI indicators sheds light on the reasons underlying the impossibility of rigorously measuring and comparing the sustainability performance of firms from the same sector, which are supposed to be strictly following the same reporting guideline. These reasons include qualitative (...) aspects of sustainability, lack of compliance with GRI protocols, indicator contingency, ambiguous or incomplete information, data heterogeneity, and report opacity. The study makes it possible to return to the very notion of sustainability, its meaning, and flexible application by organizations. The results are discussed from three different theoretical perspectives, each of which proposes possible and complementary explanations of the main findings. (shrink)

-- v. 3. From modernity to modernism (towards a metaphilosophy of daily life).

"Dernières pensées" de Henri Poincaré. Mathématicien, physicien et philosophe français (1854-1912).

HENRI BERGSON (1859-1941), philosophe français, professeur au Collège de France de 1900 jusqu´à 1921, récompensé avec le prix Nobel de littérature en 1928. Ses oeuvres majeures, écrites avec un style parfaitement accessible au lecteur non spécialisé, sont : « Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience » (1889), « Matière et mémoire » (1896), « L´évolution créatrice » (1907) et « Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion » (1932). Dans ces études, Bergson élabore une (...) vision philosophique en opposition au matérialisme et positivisme scientifique. Concentrant sa recherche sur les intuitions individuelles, il prône la notion d´élan vital, lequel dirige le procès évolutif vers des états d´organisation de plus en plus complexes, et de là vient l´intérêt de donner prééminence à tout ce qui est spirituel et ouvertement créatif, sur tout ce qui est formel, fixé, fermé. Dans « Le rire : essai sur la signification du comique » (1900), il trouve que le comique est soulevé des que nous percevons dans les actions humaines les automatismes, répétitions ou dysfonctionnements qui contrastent avec l´essentielle spontanéité de la vie réelle. (shrink)

Introduction: Myth and reality, by H. and H. A. Frankfort.--Egypt: The nature of the universe. The function of the state. The values of life. By J. A. Wilson.--Mesopotamia: The cosmos as a state. The function of the state. The good life. By Thorkild Jacobsen.--The Hebrews: God. Man. Man in the world. Nation, society, and politics. By W. A. Irwin. Conclusion: The emancipation of thought from myth, by H. and H. A. Frankfort.

HENRI BERGSON (1859-1941), philosophe français, professeur au Collège de France de 1900 jusqu´à 1921, récompensé avec le prix Nobel de littérature en 1928. Ses oeuvres majeures, écrites avec un style parfaitement accessible au lecteur non spécialisé, sont : « Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience » (1889), « Matière et mémoire » (1896), « L´évolution créatrice » (1907) et « Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion » (1932). Dans ces études, Bergson élabore une (...) vision philosophique en opposition au matérialisme et positivisme scientifique. Concentrant sa recherche sur les intuitions individuelles, il prône la notion d´élan vital, lequel dirige le procès évolutif vers des états d´organisation de plus en plus complexes, et de là vient l´intérêt de donner prééminence à tout ce qui est spirituel et ouvertement créatif, sur tout ce qui est formel, fixé, fermé. Dans « Le rire : essai sur la signification du comique » (1900), il trouve que le comique est soulevé des que nous percevons dans les actions humaines les automatismes, répétitions ou dysfonctionnements qui contrastent avec l´essentielle spontanéité de la vie réelle. (shrink)

This paper assesses the prospects of combining the distinctive strengths of the two major educational research programs of critical thinking and critical pedagogy—or, described more accurately, overcoming their shared limitations—in a new and superior educational objective called criticality. Several recent proposals explore the possibilities of engaging in bridge-building between these camps. The plan is that the distinctive strengths of these paradigms—the logical and epistemological precision of critical thinking together with the socio-political consciousness of critical pedagogy—could complement each other, while the (...) associated adjustments to the overall picture could also help us to address their shared shortcomings. This gives us a new and more grounded educational goal of criticality, as suggested and developed independently by a growing number of thinkers. This article joins the ongoing conversation but provides a more counterreactionary tone by striving to vindicate the traditional mainstream conception of critical thinking. I maintain that despite their admirable ambitions, the various expressions of criticality do not succeed in combining the best parts of critical thinking and critical pedagogy, since on a deep metatheoretical level these two paradigms have irreconcilable core principles. First, I argue that the depiction of the failures of critical thinking used to motivate criticality is to a large degree a straw man: in actuality, the existing conceptualization of critical thinking can already do the desired extra socio-political educational work, so there really is no pressing need for the suggested augmentations. Second, the traditional worries of indoctrination, which have followed critical pedagogy since the inception of this educational movement, still remain unresolved within criticality. The only way to address this concern successfully is to lean on critical thinking as the core of our educational theory, bringing us right back to where we started. (shrink)

Fulfilling consumer expectations of corporate social responsibility can bring strategic advantage to firms. However, research on the topic is fragmented across disparate disciplines, and a comprehensive framework to connect CSR supply and demand is missing. As a result, firms often supply CSR that does not attract demand, as signified by pessimism about ethical consumerism in recent years and the inconclusive link between corporate financial and social performance. In this study, we propose a framework of strategic CSR management to define how (...) a company’s supply of CSR could meet consumer demand for ethical products by aligning managerial and consumer perspectives. We then investigate empirically whether such a strategic approach, which integrates potential demand in CSR management, would influence consumer choice of products with CSR components. Our hybrid choice modeling allows the inclusion of psychological biases caused by social desirability and cynicism to increase result validity. The findings support the explanatory power of the framework and reveal that consumers prefer some CSR elements while others adversely affect choices. This study advances the understanding of strategic CSR management and its impact on consumer choice and helps managers include the right mix of CSR characteristics in their products to satisfy ethical consumers. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage n'est ni un commentaire ni une explication d'obedience historiciste ou deterministe. Par questionnement, lecture et interpretation, l'auteur a voulu produire une semantique philosophique. La doctrine des idees est ainsi reexaminee a la convergence des problemes du langage, de la science et de la cite (logos, episteme, polis). Elle ne peut plus des lors etre interpretee sous l'hypothese de l' idealisme. Elle se manifeste comme une serie de questions de sens ou s'indique une philosophie de la raison. Partout ou (...) le logos nous porte, c'est la qu'il faut aller, tel en serait le mot d'ordre, mais avec la precision qu'a l'articulation du mythique et du theorique, du tragique et du philosohique, et plus profondement de la deraison et du logos, le rationalisme platonicien n'est fait que de raison. (shrink)

RésuméNous introduisons la notion de structure algébrique dynamique, inspirée de l'évaluation dynamique et de la théorie des modèles. Nous montrons comment cette notion constructive permet une relecture de la théorie d'Artin-Schreier, avec la modification capitale que le résultat final est alors établi de manière constructive. Nous pensons que ce que nous avons réalisé ici sur un cas d'école peut être généralisé à des parties significatives de l'algèbre classique, et est donc une contribution à la réalisation du programme de Hilbert pour (...) l'algèbre classique.We introduce the notion of “Dynamic Algebraic Structure” inspired by Dynamic Evaluation and Model Theory. We show that this constructive notion allows a rereading of the Artin-Schreier-Robinson solution for the 17th Hilbert Problem. So, once we know how to reread the proofs, this kind of abstract theory contains an algorithm which computes the concrete result . Our method gives a constructive semantic for certain parts of abstract classical mathematics.The idea is the following: replace the classical algebraic structures “constructed” by Choice and Principle of Third Excluded Middle , by DAS and dynamic evaluations of these DAS. Then TEM is replaced by construction of branching in the trees of dynamic evaluation of the DAS. If Choice is used in the form of Godel completeness theorem, it is not really necessary to use it for obtaining concrete results: in DAS, Choice is simply replaced by … nothing!. This is because the classical proof is by contradiction: “if there were not a sum of squares then some formal theory would admit a pathological model”. The constructive reasoning is more direct: since the pathological theory proves 0 = 1 we know how to construct the sum of squares … and classical models have disappeared in the proof. They are replaced by dynamic evaluations of DAS. We think that we have given, for an academic example, a new method, realizing a kind of Hilbert Program for significant parts of classical algebra. (shrink)

Considers the problem of stylistic change in art, arguing that art is not reducible to external political, social, or economic determinants.

"La Valeur de la Science" de Henri Poincaré. Mathématicien, physicien et philosophe français (1854-1912).

Given a 4-tuple of Boolean variables (a, b, c, d), logical proportions are modeled by a pair of equivalences relating similarity indicators ( \({a \wedge b}\) and \({\overline{a} \wedge \overline{b}}\) ), or dissimilarity indicators ( \({a \wedge \overline{b}}\) and \({\overline{a} \wedge b}\) ) pertaining to the pair (a, b), to the ones associated with the pair (c, d). There are 120 semantically distinct logical proportions. One of them models the analogical proportion which corresponds to a statement of the form “a (...) is to b as c is to d”. The paper inventories the whole set of logical proportions by dividing it into five subfamilies according to what they express, and then identifies the proportions that satisfy noticeable properties such as full identity (the pair of equivalences defining the proportion hold as true for the 4-tuple (a, a, a, a)), symmetry (if the proportion holds for (a, b, c, d), it also holds for (c, d, a, b)), or code independency (if the proportion holds for (a, b, c, d), it also holds for their negations \({{(\overline{a},\overline{b}, \overline{c}, \overline{d})}}\) ). It appears that only four proportions (including analogical proportion) are homogeneous in the sense that they use only one type of indicator (either similarity or dissimilarity) in their definition. Due to their specific patterns, they have a particular cognitive appeal, and as such are studied in greater details. Finally, the paper provides a discussion of the other existing works on analogical proportions. (shrink)

L'auteur n'etudie pas le cartesianisme, rationalisme suspect, aux yeux de certains catholiques, de mettre la foi en danger. Il prend le parti de revenir a Descartes lui-meme, a la genese de son oeuvre, liee aux evenements d'une vie, elle-meme liee a l'histoire de son siecle. Une premiere partie y distingue des periodes comprenant des rencontres decisives, des voyages, des publications (sources de polemiques), des projets. A partir de 1640 le cartesianisme est reconnu par les mondains, les savants, les religieux, et (...) Descartes fait figure de chef d'ecole. Les resultats de cette minutieuse enquete, dans la deuxieme partie de l'ouvrage, de discerner les intentions apologetiques de Descartes, sa vision des rapports de la raison avec la foi. Certes, ecrit Henri Gouhier, Descartes a voulu defendre la cause de Dieu, combattre les athees et les libertins... il accuse la scolastique d'avoir perverti la theologie comme la physique.... Mais le Dieu du philosophe n'est pas celui de la Revelation; si philosophie et theologie sont separees (separation qui protege l'ineffabilite de l'infini divin), il ne peut y avoir aucun conflit entre elles (car elles ont la meme racine: une foi absolue en la Verite). Descartes est reste sereinement attache a la religion de son pays, mais sa philosophie n'est pas religieuse, comme le sera la philosophie chretienne de Malebranche. (shrink)

Barthélemy Baudrand (1701 – 1787) was a Jesuit theologian and writer. One work is often cited and associated with the Abbé: Réflexions sur le tolérantisme, which is in fact an extract from L’Âme affermie dans la foi. In this part of the work, which was distributed separately, the Abbé, like the rest of Catholic apologetics, opposes the emergence of a "system of toleration", i.e. an excessive tolerance, both civil and ecclesiastical, which brings together the "enemies of God" and tends towards (...) the destructive indifference of the Christian religion. Conversely, this leads him to rehabilitate a certain religious and ecclesiastical intolerance. (shrink)

Penser l'homme et la folie : dans ce recueil d'études où s'est condensée, au fil des dernières années, sa réflexion, Henri Maldiney se propose de penser ensemble l'énigme de l'humanité et l'énigme de la " catastrophe " qui survient à certains d'entre nous. Double décentrement de la pensée, qui la met à la fois hors de l'anthropologie, fût-elle philosophique, et de son envers dans les théories psycho-pathologiques. Double décentrement où s'éprouvent donc au mieux la tradition philosophique - et en (...) particulier celle qui est issue de Heidegger - et la tradition de la Daseinsanalyse et de la Schicksalsanalyse, telle qu'elle est représentée par Binswanger, Straus, Minkiwski, Von Weizsäcker et Szondi. Dans une démarche authentiquement phénoménologique, où il s'agit de retourner à la " chose même " de l'humain et de la folie, de penser en va-et-vient de l'énigme à penser à ce qui en a été dit, Henri Maldiney dégage, par sa conception toute nouvelle de la transpossibilité et de la transpassibilité, une " compréhension " globale du phénomène humain qui le rend moins intraitable que par le passé. Le " séisme " de la folie, montre-t-il, vient d'un énigmatique court-circuit de la transpossibilité et de la transpassibilité, qui est seul propre à les mettre véritablement en relief comme la dimension profonde et cachée de notre expérience : celle de l' "événement " ou de l'émergence du nouveau, de la surprise de l'inattendu. La transpassiblité est une " possibilité " qui nous excède, en ce qu'elle fonde toute possibilité pour nous d'exister, parce qu'elle est en deçà de tout projet, transpossiblité de l'accueil - et de l'accueil transpassible -, y compris de l'accueil par nous-mêmes, de nous-mêmes. " Le réel -répète Henri Maldiney comme un leitmotiv qui traverse tout l'ouvrage -, est toujours ce qu'on n'attendait pas". (shrink)

BackgroundSince 2006, the genetic testing company 23andMe has collected biological samples, self-reported information, and consent documents for biobanking and research from more than 1,000,000 individuals, through a direct-to-consumer online genetic-testing service providing a genetic ancestry report and a genetic health report. However, on November 22, 2013, the Food and Drug Administration halted the sale of genetic health testing, on the grounds that 23andMe was not acting in accordance with federal law, by selling tests of undemonstrated reliability as predictive tests for (...) medical risk factors. Consumers could still obtain the genetic ancestry report, but they no longer had access to the genetic health report in the United States. However, this did not prevent the company from continuing its health research, with previously obtained and future samples, provided that consent had been obtained from the consumers concerned, or with health reports for individuals from other countries. Furthermore, 23andMe was granted FDA authorization on February 19, 2015, first to provide reports about Bloom syndrome carrier status, and, more recently, to provide consumers with “carrier status” information for 35 genes known to cause disease.DiscussionIn this Debate, we highlight the likelihood that the primary objective of the company was probably two-fold: promoting itself within the market for predictive testing for human genetic diseases and ancestry at a low cost to consumers, and establishing a high-value database/biobank for research and personal information).SummaryBy dint of this marketing approach, a two-sided market has been established between the consumer and the research laboratories, involving the establishment of a database/DNA biobank for scientific and financial gain. We describe here the profound ethical issues raised by this setup. (shrink)

This edition contains a new introduction by Stefan Kipfer, explaining the book’s contemporary ramifications in the ever-expanding reach of the urban in the ...

A possible relevant meaning of Hilbert’s program is the following one: “give a constructive semantic for classical mathematics”. More precisely, give a systematic interpretation of classical abstract proofs about abstract objects, as constructive proofs about constructive versions of these objects.If this program is fulfilled we are able “at the end of the tale” to extract constructive proofs of concrete results from classical abstract proofs of these results.Dynamical algebraic structures or geometric theories seem to be a good tool for doing this (...) job. In this setting, classical abstract objects are interpreted through incomplete concrete specifications of these objects.The structure of axioms in geometric theories gives rise in a natural way to distributive lattices and pointfree topological spaces. Abstract objects correspond to classical points of these pointfree spaces.We shall insist on the Zariski spectrum of distributive lattices and commutative rings and give a constructive interpretation of the Krull dimension.We underline the fact that many abstract objects in classical mathematics can be viewed as points of spectral spaces corresponding to distributive lattices whose definition is concrete and natural.Two important facts are to be stressed.First, abstract proofs about points of these pointfree spaces can very often be reread as constructive proofs about constructible subsets of these spaces.Second, function spaces on these pointfree spaces are often explicitly used in elegant abstract theories. The structure of these function spaces is fully constructive: indeed by the compactness theorem, “all is finite”. The constructive rereading of the abstract proofs is in this setting is nothing but the simple constatation that abstract proofs use correctly axioms.RésuméUne manière pertinente de revisiter le Programme de Hilbert serait la suivante: « donner une sémantique constructive pour les mathématiques classiques ». Plus précisément donner une interprétation systématique des preuves classiques abstraites au sujet des objets abstraits, en terme de preuves constructives au sujet de contreparties constructives de ces objets abstraits.Si ce programme est rempli, nous sommes capables « à la fin de l’histoire » d’extraire des preuves constructives de résultats concrets à partir des preuves classiques abstraites de ces résultats.Les structures algébriques dynamiques, ou ce qui revient à peu près au même les théories géométriques, semblent être un bon outil pour réaliser ce travail. Dans cette optique, les objets abstraits des mathématiques classiques sont remplacés par des spécifications incomplètes mais concrètes de ces mêmes objets.La structure des théories géométriques donne naissance de manière naturelle à des treillis distributifs et à des espaces topologiques sans points. Les objets abstraits utilisés par les mathématiques classiques correspondent aux points classiques de ces espaces sans points.Dans cet article, nous illustrerons ce phénomène principalement avec le spectre de Zariski des treillis distributifs et celui des anneaux commutatifs, en indiquant notamment un équivalent constructif de la notion de dimension de Krull.Nous insistons sur le caractère extrêmement général de l’interpétation des objets abstraits idéaux des mathématiques classiques comme des points d’espaces spectraux associés à des treillis distributifs qui sont définis de façon naturelle et concrète.Souligons deux faits d’expérience importants.Tout d’abord, les preuves abstraites au sujet des points de ces espaces sans points peuvent en général être relues comme des preuves concernant les parties constructibles de ces espaces.Enfin, les espaces de fonctions continues sur ces espaces sans points sont souvent utilisés dans d’élégantes théories abstraites. Ces espaces de fonctions sont bien définis constructivement. Cela tient au « théorème de compacité » qui nous dit que dans le cadre en question « tout est fini ». La relecture constructive des preuves abstraites n’est alors rien d’autre que la constatation que les axiomes géométriques sont utilisés de manière correcte. (shrink)

Networks for the exchange and/or sharing of genetic data are developing in many countries. We focus here on the situations in the US and France. We highlight some recent and remarkable differences between these two countries concerning the mode of access to, and the storage and use of genetic data, particularly as concerns two-sided markets and dynamic consent or dynamic electronic informed consent. This brief overview suggests that, even though the organization and function of these two-sided markets remain open to (...) criticism, dynamic e-IC should be more widely used, especially in France, if only to determine its real effectiveness. (shrink)