A review‐article of Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings, Stanford, University Press Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law, Harvard University Press H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision, Toward a Theory of Legal Justification, Stanford University Press Judith N. Shklar, Legalism, Harvard University Press.

A classic collection of articles in Philosophical analysis.

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need in addition only to (...) posit that individuals obey the social norm when it is costless to do so. When the correlating device has incomplete information, the operation of the social norm requires that individuals have a predisposition to follow the norm even when this is costly. The latter case explains why social norms are associated with other-regarding preferences and provides a basis for analyzing honesty and corruption. (shrink)

Clark highlights a neglected issue in research on language use: the process by which speakers and addressees anchor utterances with respect to individual entities in their common ground. In his review, he identifies the challenges linked to investigations of anchoring, but also displays the pitfalls of evading it.

Social robots serve people as tutors, caretakers, receptionists, companions, and other social agents. People know that the robots are mechanical artifacts, yet they interact with them as if they were actual agents. How is this possible? The proposal here is that people construe social robots not as social agents per se, but as depictions of social agents. They interpret them much as they interpret ventriloquist dummies, hand puppets, virtual assistants, and other interactive depictions of people and animals. Depictions as a (...) class consist of three physical scenes with part-by-part mappings between them: (a) a base scene (the raw physical artifact), (b) the depiction proper (the artifact construed as a depiction), and (c) the scene depicted (the scene people are to imagine). With social robots, evidence shows people form the same three scenes plus mappings: They perceive the raw machinery of a robot, construe it as a depiction of a character, and, using the depiction as a guide, engage in the pretense that they are interacting with the character depicted. With social robots, people also recognize three classes of agents – the characters depicted, the intended recipients of the depictions (those who view or interact with the robots), and the authorities responsible for the robots (the designers, makers, and owners). Construing social robots as depictions, we argue, accounts for many phenomena not covered by alternative models. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to make clear that the widely recognized formulations of the principle of induction do not express the most fundamental rule of induction; that the current view concerning the probability of induction must be revised in terms of a frequency theory of probability; that on this basis the problem of induction in its traditional form is a pseudo-problem; and that the principle of induction must be interpreted as a pragmatic or operational maxim.

In everyday joint activities, people coordinate with each other by means not only of linguistic signals, but also of material signals – signals in which they indicate things by deploying material objects, locations, or actions around them. Material signals fall into two main classes: directing-to and placing-for. In directing-to, people request addressees to direct their attention to objects, events, or themselves. In placing-for, people place objects, actions, or themselves in special sites for addressees to interpret. Both classes have many subtypes. (...) Features of material signals were examined in pairs of people who were videotaped as they assembled TV stands, built Lego models, planned furnishings for a house, played piano duets, or bought coffee at Starbucks. In these activities, the pointing and placements were often sustained, creating three phases of signals – initiation, maintenance, and termination – each with its own interpretation. (shrink)

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY THE history of mankind is to be studied epoch by epoch, nation by nation, but philosophy, science and religion must survey it as a ...

AMONG the many cases of malpractices by solicitors recently brought to light, one is especially striking as seeming at variance with all probability. ...

After a streamlined confrontation of husserl's phenomenology and sartre's existentialism, this paper affirms their compatibility, denies their necessary connection, pleads for their cooperation and criticizes sartre's rejection of husserl's phenomenology of the pure ego.

Inspired both in the biblical witness of God's call to persons throughout salvation history and in St. Ignatius Loyola's own personal experience of God-as-God under God's own pedagogical training and the subsequent transposition of this his personal experience into his book of the Spiritual Exercises , this article aims at drawing on Ignatius as a master pedagogue of genuine spiritual experience, as evidenced in the profound dynamics of his Exercises, to show how, in the light of Spiritual Theology, such a (...) genuine experience of God-as-God can be an effective channel of God's Spirit for interreligious dialogue. (shrink)