The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode and the dative (...) mode, respectively. Taking Locke as a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with regard to some contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories and self-representational theories. I then move on to enquire, can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience? While interesting connections are drawn in relation to affective neuroscience and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue (...) that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomi... (shrink)

This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: (...) prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. The central claim is that some instances of affective we-consciousness mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment. The first part of the paper gives an account of this claim, while second part places the account in the broader discussion on collective affective intentionality. (shrink)

This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The bulk of the text consists of an argument in favor of the conclusion that cosmopsychism suffers from no insurmountable individuation problem. I argue that the widespread tendency to view IND as a mirror-image of micropsychism’s combination problem is mistaken. In particular, what renders CP insolvable, namely, the commitment to the coupling of phenomenal constitution with phenomenal inclusion, is, from the standpoint of cosmopsychism, an entirely nonmandatory assumption. I proceed to (...) show that severing this unhappy coupling is the key for defending cosmopsychism against the charge of theoretical incoherence. Moreover, I argue that successful defense against such accusation could be mounted regardless of whether or not we assume cosmic consciousness to be perspectival in nature. In addition, the paper touches upon another foundational issue: cautioning against the popular tendency to identify cosmopsychism’s monism with a mereological unity-in-diversity, and motivating an alternative conception which I call generative monism. Finally, as befitting this volume, I pause to reflect upon the question of which schools of Hindu philosophy might tally best, and connect most fruitfully, with cosmopsychism as I understand it. (shrink)

Erarbeitet von Dominik Balg, Anne Burkard, Henning Franzen, Aenna Frottier, David Lanius, David Löwenstein, Hanna Lucks, Kirsten Meyer, Donata Romizi, Katharina Schulz, Stefanie Thiele und Annett Wienmeister. -/- Die Entwicklung argumentativer Fähigkeiten ist ein zentrales Ziel des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts, ja überhaupt ein zentrales Bildungsziel. Wie aber kann das gelingen? In vielen verfügbaren Unterrichtsmaterialien werden argumentative Fähigkeiten eher vorausgesetzt als systematisch gefördert. Auch curriculare Vorgaben bleiben zumeist sehr unspezifisch. Lehrpersonen werden so weitgehend allein gelassen mit der Aufgabe, Lernende beim Erwerb (...) argumentativer Fähigkeiten zu fördern. Die vorliegende Aufgabensammlung soll dazu beitragen, diese Lücke zu schließen. Sie bietet Lehrpersonen reichhaltige Materialien für die spiralcurricular angelegte, systematische Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeit anhand exemplarischer Inhalte. Orientiert an klaren fachlichen Standards finden sich hier Aufgaben auf vier Niveaustufen, jeweils in Verbindung mit übersichtlichen Merkblättern. Die Aufgaben der beiden unteren Niveaustufen lassen sich bereits für jüngere Lernende der Sekundarstufe einsetzen, Aufgaben der obersten Niveaustufe richten sich an Lernende von Abschlussklassen oder der Studieneingangsphase. Für die Hand der Lehrpersonen werden die Aufgaben und Merkblätter durch fachliche und didaktische Kommentare sowie Lösungshinweise ergänzt. (shrink)

In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism (PQ) occupies an interesting position. It is a distinct variant of neutral monism, as well as of protophenomenalism, and as such it strives to carve out a conceptual niche midway between physicalism and mentalism. It is also a brand of Russellian monism, advocated by its supporters as a less costly and less extravagant alternative to panpsychism. Being clearly articulated and relatively well-developed it constitutes an intriguing view. Nonetheless, (...) the present paper takes a decisively critical stance towards PQ. In particular, it challenges it on two principal grounds. First, I argue that PQ's analysis of experience, and of the qualities tasked with constituting the phenomenal character of experience, is fundamentally flawed. Second, I argue that PQ's attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness as a function of reflective awareness is equally misguided. Along the way, the paper also points the shortcomings of previously established critiques of PQ. All in all, the discussion identifies some difficulties that are likely to generalize beyond PQ's specific circumstances, raising concerns regarding the viability of a "middle of the road" solution to the mind–body problem. (shrink)

We provide a new criterion for embedding.

This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of critical education. While contemporary education tends to stress the conveying of knowledge and skills needed to succeed in present-day information society, the present article turns to the work of Theodor W. Adorno to develop alternative thinking about education, thinking, and the political significance of education for thinking. Adorno touched upon educational questions throughout his writings, with growing interest in the last ten years of his life. Education, he argues following (...) Kant, must enable students to think for themselves and to break free of the authority of teachers, parents and other adults. Nevertheless, in his discussions of education Adorno says little about the nature of thinking, and the secondary literature on his educational theory addresses this question only cursorily. Important claims on the nature of thinking do appear elsewhere in Adorno's work. From his early writings up to Negative Dialectics, Adorno is preoccupied with thinking, sketching the outlines of critical-dialectical thought. Still, these reflections rarely touch upon educational questions, and the Adorno scholarship has yet to establish this link. Unlike studies which read Adorno's educational thought against the backdrop of the history of education and the German Bildung tradition, or in relation to art and aesthetics, the present article brings together Adorno's ideas on education and thinking in an attempt to contribute both to the Adorno scholarship and to the growing field of education for thinking. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, our purpose is to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically informed variant of cosmopsychism, namely, the view that the experiences of ordinary subjects are ultimately grounded in an all-pervading cosmic consciousness. Second, we will demonstrate that this approach generates promising avenues for addressing familiar problems of phenomenal constitution. We use stochastic electrodynamics (SED) as the physical bedrock of our approach, supplementing it with key insights about the nature of consciousness long emphasized (...) in eastern philosophy and other wisdom traditions. We proceed to show that our approach substantiates an intriguing way of thinking about the dynamical emergence of ordinary consciousness from cosmic consciousness, identifying the latter with the vacuum state of quantum field theory. Finally, we argue that the present approach is well suited to address problems of phenomenal constitution, in particular as they pertain to the qualities and structure of experience and to the generation of subjects. (shrink)

This special issue aims to explore and investigate a new subfield, namely experimental philosophy of medicine. Whereas experimental philosophy is relatively new on the philosophical block, some of its takes and findings have already shaped central debates in ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Interestingly, the approach of this program was for a long time almost wholly ignored within bioethics and philosophy of medicine—although this seems to have changed somewhat recently. In this introduction, we briefly sketch the (...) program of experimental philosophy and how it can be used to shed philosophical light on issues in the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

We show that every sufficiently iterable countable mouse has a unique iteration strategy whose associated iteration maps are lexicographically minimal. This enables us to extend the results of [3] on the good behavior of the standard parameter from tame mice to arbitrary mice.

The tree property at κ+ states that there are no Aronszajn trees on κ+, or, equivalently, that every κ+ tree has a cofinal branch. For singular strong limit cardinals κ, there is tension between the tree property at κ+ and failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis at κ; the former is typically the result of the presence of strongly compact cardinals in the background, and the latter is impossible above strongly compacts. In this paper, we reconcile the two. We prove (...) from large cardinals that the tree property at κ+ is consistent with failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis at κ. (shrink)

We present two ways in which the model L(R) is canonical assuming the existence of large cardinals. We show that the theory of this model, with ordinal parameters, cannot be changed by small forcing; we show further that a set of ordinals in V cannot be added to L(R) by small forcing. The large cardinal needed corresponds to the consistency strength of AD L (R); roughly ω Woodin cardinals.

Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. Much of the debate concerning the viability of panpsychism is centered on the combination problem. Intriguingly, the literature analyzing this problem displays two competing interpretations which differ in their modal force. According to the first, which we call the ‘no-necessitation view', CP consists in the absence of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we label the (...) ‘incoherence charge’, goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences cannot combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism. We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley. (shrink)

This open access collection brings together a team of leading scholars and rising stars to consider what experimental philosophy of medicine is and can be. While experimental philosophy of science is an established field, attempts to tackle issues in philosophy of medicine from an experimental angle are still surprisingly scarce. A team of interdisciplinary scholars demonstrate how we can make progress by integrating a variety of methods from experimental philosophy, including experiments, sociological surveys, simulations, as well as history and philosophy (...) of science, in order to yield meaningful results about the core questions in medicine. They focus on concepts central to philosophy of medicine and medical practice, such as death, pain, disease and disorder, advance directives, medical explanation, disability and informed consent. Presenting empirical findings and providing a crucial foundation for future work in this dynamic field, this collection explores new ways for philosophers to cooperate with scientists and reveals the value of these collaborations for both philosophy and medicine. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections[dot]com. Open access was funded by the European Research Council Starting Grant. (shrink)

We present an approach to forcing with finite sequences of models that uses models of two types. This approach builds on earlier work of Friedman and Mitchell on forcing to add clubs in cardinals larger than $\aleph_{1}$, with finite conditions. We use the two-type approach to give a new proof of the consistency of the proper forcing axiom. The new proof uses a finite support forcing, as opposed to the countable support iteration in the standard proof. The distinction is important (...) since a proof using finite supports is more amenable to generalizations to cardinals greater than $\aleph_{1}$. (shrink)

This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world—a conclusion which follows from a theory (...) I develop in “Synergic Coordination: an argument for cognitive process externalism.” Yet, in contradistinction with radical externalism, and in agreement with the internalist orthodoxy, MAE defends the view that mental states are situated invariably inside our heads. This is done, inter alia, by developing a novel hypothesis regarding the vehicles of content (in “Extended cognition without externalized mental states”, and by criticizing arguments in support of mental states externalism (in “Reflections and objections”). The result, I believe, is a coherent theoretical alternative worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

This paper outlines a theory of radical democratic education by addressing a key concept in Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: articulation. Through their concept of articulation, Laclau and Mouffe attempt to liberate Gramsci’s theory of hegemony from Marxist economism, and adapt it to a political sphere inhabited by a plurality of struggles and agents none of which is predominant. However, while for Gramsci the political process of hegemony formation has an explicit educational dimension, Laclau and Mouffe ignore this (...) dimension altogether. My discussion starts with elaborating the concept of articulation and analysing it in terms of three dimensions: performance, connection and transformation. I then address the role of education in Gramsci’s politics, in which the figure of the intellectual is central, and argue that radical democratic education requires renouncing that figure. In the final section, I offer a theory of such education, in which both teacher and students articulate their political differences and identities. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, one of the most important roles of education is the nurturing of common sense. In this article I turn to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of sense to develop a contrary view of education—one that views education as a radical challenge to common sense. The discussion will centre on the relation of sense and common sense to thinking. Although adherents of common sense refer to it as the basis of all thought and appeal to critical thinking as (...) instrumental in eliminating its occasional errors, I shall argue, following Deleuze, that common sense education in fact thwarts thinking, while only education which revolves around making sense may provoke thinking that goes beyond the self-evident. I demonstrate how making sense can become an educational encounter that breaks hierarchies and generates thinking independently of the thinker’s knowledge and place in the sociopolitical order. The present article attempts, therefore, to put some sense into Deleuzian education for thinking, and thereby shed new light on its radical-political, counter-commonsensical power. (shrink)

Methods Young healthy heterosexual couples underwent sleep-lab-based polysomnography of two sleeping arrangements: individual sleep and co-sleep. Individual and dyadic sleep parameters (i.e., synchronization of sleep stages) were collected. The latter were assessed using cross-recurrence quantification analysis. Additionally, subjective sleep quality, relationship characteristics, and chronotype were monitored. Data were analyzed comparing co-sleep vs. individual sleep. Interaction effects of the sleeping arrangement with gender, chronotype, or relationship characteristics were moreover tested. Results As compared to sleeping individually, co-sleeping was associated with about 10% (...) more REM sleep, less fragmented REM sleep (p = 0.008), longer undisturbed REM fragments (p = 0.0006), and more limb movements (p = 0.007). None of the other sleep stages was significantly altered. Social support interacted with sleeping arrangement in a way that individuals with suboptimal social support showed the biggest impact of the sleeping arrangement on REM sleep. Sleep architectures were more synchronized between partners during co-sleep (p = 0.005) even if wake phases were excluded (p = 0.022). Moreover, sleep architectures are significantly coupled across a lag of ± 5min. Depth of relationship represented an additional significant main effect regarding synchronization, reflecting a positive association between the two. Neither REM sleep nor synchronization was influenced by gender, chronotype, or other relationship characteristics. Conclusion Depending on the sleeping arrangement, couple's sleep architecture and synchronization show alterations that are modified by relationship characteristics. We discuss that these alterations could be part of a self-enhancing feedback loop of REM sleep and sociality and a mechanism through which sociality prevents mental illness. (shrink)

Post-critical pedagogy, which offers a significant alternative to the dominant trends in contemporary philosophy of education, objects to seeing education as instrumental to other ends: it attempts to conceive of education as autotelic, namely as having intrinsic value. While there are good reasons for accepting the post-critical reservations with the instrumentalization of education, I argue that its autonomy is equally problematic, as it risks turning the philosophy of education—perhaps education itself—into a privileged activity, out of touch with the most important (...) issues in the contemporary world. In this paper I offer post-critical pedagogy a way out of this dilemma, by drawing on Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility”. After presenting the thesis concerning the autonomy of art held by Benjamin’s Frankfurt School friends, and pointing to the similarity between their view and that of post-critical pedagogy, I articulate six Benjaminian theses on post-critical pedagogy. Following Benjamin’s claim that the technological reproducibility of art changes the way it is perceived as well as its political function, I argue that school is an educational technology that reproduces the world to the masses without an “aura”, in a way that allows for political critique that does not reduce education to politics. Next, I highlight the importance of the school to post-critical pedagogy, and contribute to developing the critical-political aspect that remains essential to post-critical pedagogy. Finally, the Benjaminian perspective also makes it possible to reflect on the relation of digital technologies of reproduction to post-critical pedagogy. (shrink)

We continue [2], developing simplicity in the framework of compact abstract theories. Due to the generality of the context we need to introduce definitions which differ somewhat from the ones use in first order theories. With these modified tools we obtain more or less classical behaviour: simplicity is characterized by the existence of a certain notion of independence, stability is characterized by simplicity and bounded multiplicity, and hyperimaginary canonical bases exist.

We put in print a classical result that states that for most purposes, there is no harm in assuming the existence of saturated models in model theory. The presentation is aimed for model theorists with only basic knowledge of axiomatic set theory.

In this paper I shall present a method for proving determinacy from large cardinals which, in many cases, seems to yield optimal results. One of the main applications extends theorems of Martin, Steel and Woodin about determinacy within the projective hierarchy. The method can also be used to give a new proof of Woodin's theorem about determinacy in L.The reason we look for optimal determinacy proofs is not only vanity. Such proofs serve to tighten the connection between large cardinals and (...) descriptive set theory, letting us bring our knowledge of one subject to bear on the other, and thus increasing our understanding of both. A classic example of this is the Harrington-Martin proof that -determinacy implies -determinacy. This is an example of a transfer theorem, which assumes a certain determinacy hypothesis and proves a stronger one. While the statement of the theorem makes no mention of large cardinals, its proof goes through 0#, first proving that-determinacy ⇒ 0# exists,and then that0# exists ⇒ -determinacyMore recent examples of the connection between large cardinals and descriptive set theory include Steel's proof thatADL ⇒ HODL ⊨ GCH,see [9], and several results of Woodin about models of AD+, a strengthening of the axiom of determinacy AD which Woodin has introduced. These proofs not only use large cardinals, but also reveal a deep, structural connection between descriptive set theoretic notions and notions related to large cardinals. (shrink)

The notion of a complete type can be generalized in a natural manner to allow assigning a value in an arbitrary Boolean algebra $\mathcal {B}$ to each formula. We show some basic results regarding the effect of the properties of $\mathcal {B}$ on the behavior of such types, and show they are particularity well behaved in the case of NIP theories. In particular, we generalize the third author’s result about counting types, as well as the notion of a smooth type (...) and extending a type to a smooth one. We then show that Keisler measures are tied to certain Boolean types and show that some of the results can thus be transferred to measures—in particular, giving an alternative proof of the fact that every measure in a dependent theory can be extended to a smooth one. We also study the stable case. We consider this paper as an invitation for more research into the topic of Boolean types. (shrink)

We prove that in $\operatorname {NTP}_{\operatorname {2}}$ theories the dp-rank of a type can be witnessed by indiscernible sequences of tuples satisfying that type. If the type has dp-rank infinity, then this can be witnessed by singletons.

Arendt's concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant's common sense, either as an espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense.This article argues that (...) Arendt has one complex concept of common sense, used more or less consistently throughout her writings. Rather than understanding Arendt's common sense in light of Kant's, as most readers do, I demonstrate its links to Aristotle and to the eighteenth‐century Scottish school of common sense. By doing so I turn attention to a difficulty that has thus far not been adequately treated, namely the fact that Arendt presents two, allegedly contradictory pictures of the relation between common sense on the one hand and science and philosophy on the other: a picture in which science and philosophy depend upon common sense, versus one in which they find themselves in a conflict that eventually leads to the loss or demise of common sense. The last part of the article suggests a way to settle the tension between these two pictures, by understanding the political significance Arendt ascribes to them as two distinct yet complementary ways of approaching the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism. (shrink)

We extend the construction of Mitchell and Steel to produce iterable fine structure models which may contain Woodin limits of Woodin cardinals, and more. The precise level reached is that of a cardinal which is both a Woodin cardinal and a limit of cardinals strong past it.

A theory [Formula: see text] is said to have exact saturation at a singular cardinal [Formula: see text] if it has a [Formula: see text]-saturated model which is not [Formula: see text]-saturated. We show, under some set-theoretic assumptions, that any simple theory has exact saturation. Also, an NIP theory has exact saturation if and only if it is not distal. This gives a new characterization of distality.

Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying (...) on the central idea that the universe is imbued with a ubiquitous field of consciousness (UFC). This field is understood as a foundational dual-aspect component of the cosmos, the extrinsic appearance of which is physical in nature and the intrinsic manifestation of which is phenomenological in nature. We argue that this approach brings a new perspective into play, according to which the organizational characteristics of the NCC are indicative of the brain’s interaction with and modulation of the UFC. Key insights from modern physics suggest that the modulation mechanism is identical with the fundamental mechanism underlying quantum systems, resulting in the conclusion that a coherently oscillating neural cell assembly acquires phenomenal properties by tapping into the universal pool of phenomenal nuances predetermined by the UFC, or more specifically, by entering into a temporary liaison with the UFC and extracting a subset of phenomenal tones from the phenomenal color palette inherent in the basic structure of the UFC. This hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence. (shrink)

The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already (...) yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit’s recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit’s republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational theories, but also make civic republican education a viable alternative to current educational approaches. (shrink)

Jullien's indecomposability theorem states that if a scattered countable linear order is indecomposable, then it is either indecomposable to the left, or indecomposable to the right. The theorem was shown by Montalbán to be a theorem of hyperarithmetic analysis. We identify the strength of the theorem relative to standard reverse mathematics markers. We show that it lies strictly between weak [Formula: see text] choice and [Formula: see text] comprehension.

We prove that in theories without the tree property of the second kind (which include dependent and simple theories) forking and dividing over models are the same, and in fact over any extension base. As an application we show that dependence is equivalent to bounded non-forking assuming NTP 2.

We introduce the class of unshreddable theories, which contains the simple and NIP theories, and prove that such theories have exactly saturated models in singular cardinals, satisfying certain set-theoretic hypotheses. We also give criteria for a theory to have singular compactness.

We present two applications of forcing with finite sequences of models as side conditions, adding objects of size \. The first involves adding a \ sequence and variants of such sequences. The second involves adding partial weak specializing functions for trees of height \.

Nothingness addresses one of the most puzzling problems of physics and philosophy: Does empty space have an existence independent of the matter within it? Is "empty space" really empty, or is it an ocean seething with the creation and destruction of virtual matter? With crystal-clear prose and more than 100 cleverly rendered illustrations, physicist Henning Genz takes the reader from the metaphysical speculations of the ancient Greek philosophers, through the theories of Newton and the early experiments of his contemporaries, right (...) up to the current theories of quantum physics and cosmology to give us the story of one of the most fundamental and puzzling areas of modern physics and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a novel analysis of Quine's indeterminacy puzzle and an unorthodox approach to its resolution. It is argued that the ultimate roots of indeterminacy lie not in behaviorism per se, but rather in Quine's commitment to a fundamental assumption about the nature of perceptual input, namely, the assumption that sensory information is strictly extensional. Calling this assumption the 'principle of input extensionalism' (PIE) I first demonstrate the fundamental role that it plays in generating Quine's argument for (...) the indeterminacy of translation. It is then argued that a tacit acceptance of PIE is prevalent among contemporary theories of cognition and representation, making Quine's puzzle a living challenge for cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. A standard way of responding to the challenge consists of the idea that the indeterminacy generated at the perceptual level is canceled out courtesy of the contribution of higher cognitive processes. However, I argue that such a top-down solution leaves much to be desired. As an alternative, I offer a bottom-up solution, which consists of a systematic rejection of PIE in favor of an intensional view of perceptual input rooted in contemporary action-based theories of perception, and in particular in the notion of perceptual invariants. (shrink)

We present equiconsistency results at the level of subcompact cardinals. Assuming SBHδ, a special case of the Strategic Branches Hypothesis, we prove that if δ is a Woodin cardinal and both □ and □δ fail, then δ is subcompact in a class inner model. If in addition □ fails, we prove that δ is Π12\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi_1^2}$$\end{document} subcompact in a class inner model. These results are optimal, and lead to equiconsistencies. As a corollary (...) we also see that assuming the existence of a Woodin cardinal δ so that SBHδ holds, the Proper Forcing Axiom implies the existence of a class inner model with a Π12\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi_1^2}$$\end{document} subcompact cardinal. Our methods generalize to higher levels of the large cardinal hierarchy, that involve long extenders, and large cardinal axioms up to δ is δ+ supercompact for all n < ω. We state some results at this level, and indicate how they are proved. (shrink)