Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of antiblackness and intersectionality and the concept of viral visibility, this essay attends to the considerable archive of research about endemic Kaposi’s sarcoma in sub-Saharan Africa accrued during the mid-20th century. This body of data was inexplicably overlooked in Western research into KS during the first decade of the AIDS epidemic, during which period European and Mediterranean KS cases were most often cited as precedents despite the volume of African data available. This paper (...) returns to the research on KS conducted in Africa during the colonial and postcolonial period to consider visibility, racial erasure, and discourses of global epidemiology, suggesting that the dynamics of medical research on HIV/AIDS have proceeded according to a tacit paradigm of antiblackness manifest in multiple exclusions of Africa from global health agendas—most recently the exclusion of the region from antiretroviral drug therapy during the first decades of the treatment’s availability. During that decade KS all but disappeared among people with access to ARV therapy while KS became even more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, escalating along with HIV. (shrink)

In 1882, Tommaso de Amicis, dermatologist and venereologist at the University of Naples, Italy, published a description of twelve cases of Kaposi's sarcoma. This article is the second report about the above-mentioned disease after the first description of five cases by Moritz Kaposi ten years earlier. The publication by De Amicis was organized as a collection of case reports followed by a section containing general considerations about the etiopathogenesis, pathology, diagnosis and therapy of Kaposi's sarcoma. Ten cases are (...) typical of the so-called 'classic' form of the disease, that has a peculiar indolent chronic course, while two out of the twelve cases strongly resemble the clinical form of Kaposi's sarcoma currently recognized as that associated with the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The nature of Kaposi's sarcoma is still being debated, but current evidence suggests that it is a viral-associated, if not viral-induced, tumor and its relationship with AIDS is that of an opportunistic disease. Thus, the presence of the clinical form of AIDS-related Kaposi's sarcoma can be used as a marker of the presence of sporadic cases of AIDS much earlier than its pandemic diffusion. (shrink)

People should be allowed to decide how and where they wish to be tested for HIV without there being a formal requirement for pretest counsellingIn his paper, Ethics of HIV testing in general practice without informed consent, Fraser argues that pretest counselling and informed consent are pillars of the ethical conduct of HIV testing. In my response I want to look critically at these contentions. While I will agree with Fraser that it is always necessary to get informed consent from (...) a patient for an HIV test I will argue that an emphasis on pretest counselling as a prerequisite for testing can actually undermine a patient’s autonomy, the very principle that informed consent seeks to promote.This response will start with an analysis of Case Two as this highlights the fundamental importance of informed consent. It will then go on to look at Case One and show how the special application of informed consent in the field of HIV testing can, in certain circumstances, lead to a reduction in patient autonomy.CASE TWOIn Fraser’s second case a 43 year old married clergyman presented with a recurrent infection of his little toe and the preliminary lab reports queried Kaposi’s sarcoma. The general practitioner thought that because of the patient’s lifestyle there was little risk of HIV infection, “suggesting the possibility of HIV, when it is unexpected and the risk low, can in itself cause anxiety and distress”. On these grounds the GP did not call the patient in for an HIV test.Some might argue that the GP should have tested the clergyman. This could have been done in one of two ways: by seeking his explicit consent for an HIV test, or by getting blanket consent for a range of tests, including HIV, without HIV being explicitly mentioned. …. (shrink)

Chris Kaposy's article “The Supposed Obligation to Change One's Beliefs About Ethics Because of Discoveries in Neuroscience” (2010) targets a common “inference” among neuroscientists and ethicists....

Sequenom Inc., a developer of medical diagnostic products, recently made their noninvasive test for Down syndrome available for clinical practice.1 The DNA-based test—given the name “MaterniT21”—requires only a simple maternal blood sample as early as 10 weeks of gestation. In recent clinical trials involving thousands of pregnant women, the MaterniT21 test identified 99.1% of cases of Down syndrome, and gave the correct result in 99.9% of cases when the fetus did not have Down syndrome. Sequenom’s test is thought to be (...) an improvement on previous prenatal testing techniques because of its. (shrink)

The paper unpacks the far-reaching theoretical and practical issues that underlay the classical debate between cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser and discursive social psychologists Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter on Watergate witness John Dean's memory. Accounting for their disagreements, Neisser claimed the mantle of the cognitive-ecological approach to memory and emphasized the psychologist's ultimate priority of truth over discourse, while Edwards and Potter claimed that of discursive/rhetorical psychology and focused exclusively on discourse over truth. As such, the debate at the time (...) ended in mutual misunderstanding and the shadow of theoretical incommensurability. However, a rhetorical analysis of the arguments suggests that Neisser was right about truth when he intuitively sensed the importance of discourse, and Edwards and Potter were right about discourse when they did not lose sight of truth. Therefore, beyond the impasse there has remained a promise inherent in the debate: it demonstrated an imaginative attempt to undermine the absolute dichotomy of truth and rhetoric and demonstrate their mutual inter-dependence. As will be argued, such integration of traditional concerns of the psychologist entails the re-conceptualization of the discipline as political and moral science. (shrink)

Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral (...) blame, or of recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest suggestions that neuroscience’s conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves. (shrink)

This paper seeks to apply some of the tools of analytic philosophy to a text written by a 'continental' philosopher, in order to evaluate the quality of its arguments. In 'On Forgiveness', Jacques Derrida seems to be making two different claims about forgiveness. First, he claims that an act of forgiveness is only truly meaningful as forgiveness when one is forgiving the unforgivable. Second, he is also recommending that we change our understanding of the concept of forgiveness for ethical reasons. (...) I examine three lines of argument used in the essay to support the first claim. I find each of these lines of argument problematic. Since these arguments are unconvincing, I argue that this leaves only the second claim for Derrida to defend. (shrink)

A letter to the editor from Françoise Baylis and Chris Kaposy concerning the recent commentary by Toby Schonfeld and colleagues , which was written in response to Baylis and Kaposy’s article.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Proof and Persuasion in the Philosophical Debate about AbortionChris KaposyPhilosophers involved in debating the abortion issue often assume that the arguments they provide can offer decisive resolution.1 Arguments on the prolife side of the debate, for example, usually imply that it is rationally mandatory to view the fetus as having a right to life, or full moral standing.2 Such an account assumes that philosophical argument can compel the reader (...) to see the fetus in a certain way and that dissent risks irrationality.I wish to question this image of the use of philosophical argument in the abortion debate. I focus on the question of fetal moral standing, which is one of the subproblems in the debate. I am especially concerned with prolife arguments for fetal moral standing, since the prolife side must argue for a position that is compulsory. The prochoice side, in contrast, typically holds that people are entitled to believe what they want about the fetus’s moral standing.My position is that philosophical arguments should be understood as tools for persuasion in the abortion debate rather than as a method for discovering decisive proofs about the morality of abortion. I argue that because any one position on the moral standing of fetuses cannot be established decisively, law and policy should favour the prochoice position. In support of these conclusions, I present two common argumentative strategies used to suggest that the prolife view of the fetus is rationally [End Page 139] mandatory, and I illustrate why arguments involving these strategies do not compel us to view the fetus as having full moral standing.Framing the IssueIn order to show that abortion is wrong (in cases in which it is considered wrong), one must first establish that fetuses have full moral standing.3 It is a serious moral wrong to take the life of someone with full moral standing—this is part of what it means to have this status. The possessor of full moral standing is entitled to have his or her life protected. If abortion is wrong, then the fetus must have full moral standing, because without such standing, killing a fetus could be justified by the pregnant woman’s strong interest in ending an unwanted pregnancy. Those arguing against the moral permissibility of abortion must show that it is mandatory (in some way) to view the fetus as having full moral standing. There are a range of positions one could take with regard to the fetus’s status, from viewing the fetus as an incipient organism with no moral standing to seeing the fetus as gaining moral standing as the pregnancy progresses. But if it is mandatory to view the fetus as having full moral standing, all other positions must then be mistaken, incorrect, or somehow unjustified.This paper analyzes why philosophers opposed to abortion think it is mandatory to attribute full moral standing to fetuses. There are two popular argumentative strategies offering different accounts of the source of this obligation. The first strategy suggests that fetal full moral standing derives from morally relevant facts about the fetus. According to this line of argument, we are rationally obligated to view the fetus as having full moral standing because we cannot deny (without courting irrationality) that there are properties, characteristics, or attributes of the fetus that entitle it to this status.The second strategy is to claim that the fetus has full moral standing because this position is most consistent with our intuitions in cases unrelated to abortion. Philosophers taking this approach are fond of analogies comparing fetuses to comatose adults or to people at the end of life, for example. This strategy of appealing to your interlocutor’s sense of consistency I call the “shared-value” strategy.The two strategies map very well onto the distinction some have made between argumentum ad rem and argumentum ad hominem. The philosopher of rhetoric Henry Johnstone Jr. draws this distinction in very clear terms, and others in the history of philosophy make note of the difference [End Page 140] between these two types of arguments as well.4 The appeal to the facts (or argumentum ad rem) seeks to establish the truth of its... (shrink)

Philosophical debate about the ethics of abortion has reached stalemate on two key issues. First, the claim that foetuses have moral standing that entitles them to protections for their lives has been neither convincingly established nor refuted. Second, the question of a pregnant woman's obligation to allow the gestating foetus the use of her body has not been resolved. Both issues are deadlocked because philosophers addressing them invariably rely on intuitions and analogies, and such arguments have weaknesses that make them (...) unfit for resolving the abortion issue. Analogical arguments work by building a kind of consensus, and such a consensus is virtually unimaginable because (1) intuitions are revisable, and in the abortion debate there is great motive to revise them, (2) one's position on abortion influences judgments about other issues, making it difficult to leverage intuitions about other ethical questions into changing peoples' minds about abortion, and (3) the extent of shared values in the abortion debate is overstated. Arguments by analogy rely on an assumption of the commensurability of moral worldviews. But the abortion debate is currently unfolding in a context of genuinely incommensurable moral worldviews. The article ends by arguing that the default position must be to permit abortion as a consequence of the freedom of conscience protected in liberal societies. (shrink)

In a pandemic situation, resources in intensive care units may be stretched to the breaking point, and critical care triage may become necessary. In such a situation, I argue that a patient’s combined vulnerability to illness and social disadvantage should be a justification for giving that patient some priority for critical care. In this article I present an example of a critical care triage protocol that recognizes the moral relevance of vulnerability to illness and social disadvantage, from the Canadian province (...) of Newfoundland and Labrador. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Proof and Persuasion in the Philosophical Debate about AbortionChris KaposyPhilosophers involved in debating the abortion issue often assume that the arguments they provide can offer decisive resolution.1 Arguments on the prolife side of the debate, for example, usually imply that it is rationally mandatory to view the fetus as having a right to life, or full moral standing.2 Such an account assumes that philosophical argument can compel the reader (...) to see the fetus in a certain way and that dissent risks irrationality.I wish to question this image of the use of philosophical argument in the abortion debate. I focus on the question of fetal moral standing, which is one of the subproblems in the debate. I am especially concerned with prolife arguments for fetal moral standing, since the prolife side must argue for a position that is compulsory. The prochoice side, in contrast, typically holds that people are entitled to believe what they want about the fetus’s moral standing.My position is that philosophical arguments should be understood as tools for persuasion in the abortion debate rather than as a method for discovering decisive proofs about the morality of abortion. I argue that because any one position on the moral standing of fetuses cannot be established decisively, law and policy should favour the prochoice position. In support of these conclusions, I present two common argumentative strategies used to suggest that the prolife view of the fetus is rationally [End Page 139] mandatory, and I illustrate why arguments involving these strategies do not compel us to view the fetus as having full moral standing.Framing the IssueIn order to show that abortion is wrong (in cases in which it is considered wrong), one must first establish that fetuses have full moral standing.3 It is a serious moral wrong to take the life of someone with full moral standing—this is part of what it means to have this status. The possessor of full moral standing is entitled to have his or her life protected. If abortion is wrong, then the fetus must have full moral standing, because without such standing, killing a fetus could be justified by the pregnant woman’s strong interest in ending an unwanted pregnancy. Those arguing against the moral permissibility of abortion must show that it is mandatory (in some way) to view the fetus as having full moral standing. There are a range of positions one could take with regard to the fetus’s status, from viewing the fetus as an incipient organism with no moral standing to seeing the fetus as gaining moral standing as the pregnancy progresses. But if it is mandatory to view the fetus as having full moral standing, all other positions must then be mistaken, incorrect, or somehow unjustified.This paper analyzes why philosophers opposed to abortion think it is mandatory to attribute full moral standing to fetuses. There are two popular argumentative strategies offering different accounts of the source of this obligation. The first strategy suggests that fetal full moral standing derives from morally relevant facts about the fetus. According to this line of argument, we are rationally obligated to view the fetus as having full moral standing because we cannot deny (without courting irrationality) that there are properties, characteristics, or attributes of the fetus that entitle it to this status.The second strategy is to claim that the fetus has full moral standing because this position is most consistent with our intuitions in cases unrelated to abortion. Philosophers taking this approach are fond of analogies comparing fetuses to comatose adults or to people at the end of life, for example. This strategy of appealing to your interlocutor’s sense of consistency I call the “shared-value” strategy.The two strategies map very well onto the distinction some have made between argumentum ad rem and argumentum ad hominem. The philosopher of rhetoric Henry Johnstone Jr. draws this distinction in very clear terms, and others in the history of philosophy make note of the difference [End Page 140] between these two types of arguments as well.4 The appeal to the facts (or argumentum ad rem) seeks to establish the truth of its... (shrink)

The philosophers Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan hold variations of the view that infant interests in continued life are suspect because infants lack the cognitive complexity to anticipate the future. Since infants cannot see themselves as having a future, Singer argues that the future cannot have value for them, and McMahan argues that the future can only have minimal value for an infant. This paper critically analyzes these arguments and defends the view that infants can have interests in continuing to (...) live. Even though infants themselves lack a strong psychological connection to the future, others who are involved in an infant’s life can anticipate, on an infant’s behalf, the kind of future that awaits the infant, and on the basis of this insight judge that continuing to live would be in the infant’s interests. After defending this position, I argue that this position on the interests of infants in continued life does not commit one to opposing abortion, and it does not commit one to the view that our ethical obligations to protect the lives of sentient animals are the same as our ethical obligations to protect infant lives. (shrink)

The institutional review board at the University of Nebraska Medical Center has a policy on contraceptive use in research that aims to balance the protection of potential fetuses from potential harm resulting from drug exposure in research against respect for the autonomy of women research participants. The policy draws on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Use-in-Pregnancy categories in an innovative way. These categories are meant to help prevent the exposure of fetuses to harmful drugs when used for therapy by (...) pregnant women. The UNMC IRB policy applies the FDA categories as a guideline for mandating contraceptive use among research participants. Clinical trials of drugs in the different FDA categories require different levels of contraceptive protection under the UNMC IRB policy. Though we agree with the insight that contraceptive requirements in research could helpfully be guided by the current and future FDA Use-in-Pregnancy guidelines, we argue that in several places, the UNMC IRB policy unjustifiably prioritizes the protection of potential fetuses from potential harm at the expense of respecting the autonomy and well-being of women research participants. In response to the deficiencies we identify in the UNMC IRB policy, we formulate an alternative, ideal policy on contraceptive use in research. (shrink)

Kaposy (2010) argues that contemporary neuroscience cannot provide rational reasons for abandoning folk psychological concepts like self, personhood, or free will because these concepts are necessa...

This paper tells the story of a recent laboratory medicine controversy in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador. During the controversy, a DAKOAutostainer machine was blamed for inaccurate breast cancer test results that led to the suboptimal treatment of many patients. In truth, the machine was not at fault. Using concepts developed by Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, we document the changing nature of the DAKO machine’s agency before, during, and after the controversy, and we make the ethical argument (...) that treating the machine as a scapegoat was harmful to patients. The mistreatment of patients was directly tied to a misrepresentation of the DAKO machine. The way to avoid both forms of mistreatment would have been to include all humans and nonhumans affected by the controversy in the network of decision-making. (shrink)

This paper tells the story of a recent laboratory medicine controversy in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador. During the controversy, a DAKOAutostainer machine was blamed for inaccurate breast cancer test results that led to the suboptimal treatment of many patients. In truth, the machine was not at fault. Using concepts developed by Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, we document the changing nature of the DAKO machine’s agency before, during, and after the controversy, and we make the ethical argument (...) that treating the machine as a scapegoat was harmful to patients. The mistreatment of patients was directly tied to a misrepresentation of the DAKO machine. The way to avoid both forms of mistreatment would have been to include all humans and nonhumans affected by the controversy in the network of decision-making. (shrink)

This article concerns itself with the reception of Rous’ 1911 discovery of what later came to be known as the Rous Sarcoma Virus. Rous made his discovery at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research which had been primarily established to conduct research into infectious diseases. Rous’ chance discovery of a chicken tumor led him to a series of conjectures about cancer causation and about whether cancer could have an extrinsic cause. Rous’ finding was received with some scepticism by the (...) scientific community that held that cancer was not infectious and favored explanations which located the origins of cancer in the inner mechanism of the cell. After 4 years of unsuccessful effort to isolate and further determine the virus Rous felt compelled to discontinue his work on cancer viruses. When 55 years later, the significance of Rous’s discovery was attested by the award of the Nobel Prize, it opened up debates about the issues of delayed recognition and scientific reputation. This article also considers why Rous’ hypothesis of a viral origin of cancer could not be incorporated into the existing body of knowledge about cancer before the 1950s. (shrink)

This article concerns itself with the reception of Rous' 1911 discovery of what later came to be known as the Rous Sarcoma Virus (RSV). Rous made his discovery at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research which had been primarily established to conduct research into infectious diseases. Rous' chance discovery of a chicken tumor led him to a series of conjectures about cancer causation and about whether cancer could have an extrinsic cause. Rous' finding was received with some scepticism by (...) the scientific community that held that cancer was not infectious and favored explanations which located the origins of cancer in the inner mechanism of the cell. After 4 years of unsuccessful effort to isolate and further determine the virus Rous felt compelled to discontinue his work on cancer viruses. When 55 years later, the significance of Rous's discovery was attested by the award of the Nobel Prize, it opened up debates about the issues of delayed recognition and scientific reputation. This article also considers why Rous' hypothesis of a viral origin of cancer could not be incorporated into the existing body of knowledge about cancer before the 1950s. (shrink)

During the 1960s, Howard M. Temin (1934-1994), dared to advocate a "heretical" hypothesis that appeared to be at variance with the central dogma of molecular biology, understood by many to imply that information transfer in nature occurred only from DNA to RNA. Temin's provirus hypothesis offered a simple explanation of both virus replication and viral-induced cancer and stated that Rous sarcoma virus, an RNA virus, is replicated via a DNA intermediate. Popular accounts of this scientific episode, written after the (...) discovery of an RNA-directed DNA polymerase in 1970, tend to describe the reaction to his proposition as ardent opposition. Typically these accounts use a 'molecular biology' standpoint emphasizing the central dogma's part in its rejection. In this article, however, this episode will be examined from a joint perspective of virology and experimental cancer research. From this perspective it is clear that Temin's work was well within the epistemological and methodological boundaries of virology and cancer research. Still, scientists did have reasons to doubt the provirus hypothesis, but these do not seem to be good enough to either justify an account that portrays Temin as a renegade or his ideas as heretical. (shrink)

Chris Kaposy raises an important point about possible interpretations of advances in neuroscience. Specifically, he argues that certain advances may pose a problem for the folk conception of the mind, and he explains that this has crucial implications for our views of what makes a person rational, free, or responsible. In this commentary, I press Kaposy’s position from an eliminativist perspective. Although he may be correct in believing that advances in neuroscience may be difficult to square with our common or (...) folk views, his arguments fall far short of convincing us that these sort of advancements are somehow impossible to adopt, or somehow inconsistent with the possibility of something like epistemic normativity. In fact, I will argue that the most rational course of action may involve adopting radical views about neuroscientific advances. (shrink)

Interpretation of Hetvābhāsasāmānyanirukti of Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent., treatise on Nyaya philosophy; based on other classical commentaries.

ch. 1. Istorii︠a︡ sot︠s︡iologicheskikh ucheniĭ -- ch. 2. Nauchnai︠a︡ teorii︠a︡ obshchestva.

Hegel’s idealism is generally perceived as a system of rational sublation (Aufhebung) of all empirical contingencies: nothing resists notional mediation which, in a movement of negation of negation, establishes a rational totality. Already Schelling opposed to this complete sublation an “indivisible remainder” of empirical contingency. However, a close reading of Hegel makes it clear that the concluding moment of a dialectical movement of sublation is an empirical remainder which totalizes it, like the body of Christ in Christianity. And the same (...) goes for the process of “negation of negation”: it concludes with a failure of negation, and its ultimate form is a failed suicide where the subject survives as a living dead. Such a reading of Hegel makes him a thinker of our time which is the time of a failed negation: most of us live as survivors of our death, with life dragging on in depressive apathy. (shrink)

_This paper discusses the concept of compassion fatigue in light of the importance that political decisions, especially the application of the concept of public spirit, have had on care and nursing in a Danish hospital context during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper is based on recent research literature in the field as well as the author’s own participatory observation study. The paper suggests that nurses already show a sense of public spirit due to their authorization and professional ethics, but at (...) the same time they must balance the ambiguity of nursing care. A linguistic-philosophical study of public spirit shows that the concept can have a discursive, double-binding and interpellative effect on nurses, who may therefore have an experience of inadequacy and compassion fatigue. In this context, compassion fatigue must be understood as the fact that nurses cannot provide the care they want or that is expected of them. Public spirit can be said to have had a renaissance and linguistic and moral supremacy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper views the concept of __waywardness 1 as a possible response for how to prevent or completely avoid compassion fatigue, so that nurses instead have an experience of compassion / self-compassion. This could in the end be important for encouraging more nursing students and nurses who have the desire and opportunity to stay in the profession._ _Keywords_: Nursing care, compassion fatigue, public spirit, compassion, COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

“Gerçekten Öyle mi Olmuş?” kitabında, tarih disiplininin nasıl bir süreçten geçtiğine kısaca değinilerek küresel gelişmeler ışığında hangi yönlere evirildiği konu edildi. Çalışma, bir anlamda tarihin ve tarih eğitiminin varlık-amaç işlevlerinin belirlenmesinin temelinde yatan nedenleri, geçmiş-gelecek diyalektiği çerçevesinde sorgulamaya dayandı. Bu bağlamda geçmişin çağrışımının siyasetle ilişkisi, günümüz bilgi teknolojilerindeki değişim, dördüncü sanayi devrimiyle dönüşecek toplumsal yapının dinamikleri ve en nihayetinde toplumun geçmiş ve gelecek algısı ile bu algının post-truth (gerçek ötesi) dönemdeki yansımaları örneklerle ele alındı. Post-truth olarak adlandırılan bu yeni dönemde, (...) tarihçilik açısından problematik görünen üç ana konu incelendi. Bunlardan ilki, tarihin ve tarihçiliğin geleceğine ilişkin riskler ve tehditler. Diğeri, ilkiyle bağlantılı olarak tarihin öteden beri siyasiler tarafından bir meşruiyet aracı olarak kullanılıyor olmasının günümüzdeki durumu ve suistimaller. Son olarak da yeni medyada üretilen tarihsel bilginin gerçekliğinin denetlenememesiyle ortaya çıkan ve toplumsal kutuplaşmalara yol açan bilgi kirliliği. Böylelikle, post-truth çağında gerçeğin peşinden koşan tarihçilerin ve tarih severlerin, yeni medya ve onun uzantılarıyla nasıl yüz yüze kalacağı konusunda bir resim sunulmaya çalışıldı. Amacımız, bu üç soruna çözümler getirerek konu sonlandırmak olmayıp konunun özellikle akademisyenler tarafından tartışılmasını sağlayacak bir gündemin oluşturulmasıdır. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the search for the nature of the ontology of an art work on the example of a literary work. Tradition viewed a work of art as the discovery of a higher truth. Analytical philosophy deprived literature of the status of truth in general, and thereby deprived it of any ontological dimension. Heidegger’s attempt to return this dimension to literature through its relationship with being did not find continuation in philosophy. The author proposes to consider a (...) literary work as a model of the world, primarily the social world. This approach makes liken a literary work to a mathematical theory. A mathematical theory is built as a correlation of simple elements; in a literary work such elements are characters (sometimes things). A mathematical theory is built on clearly defined axioms, a literary work is also built on axioms, but they do not have an explicit expression within the work and cannot always be perceived intuitively. The author shows that the mathematical theory never fully meets the specified conditions, and the mathematicians themselves note that in the future they will largely lose their strength. Thus, a literary work is of the same nature as a mathematical theory, only it presents a more complex case. The problem of truth serves as the way to find the ontological dimension. Analysis shows that in mathematics it is solved not by reducing a hypothesis to axioms, but by recognizing a theory through its effectiveness or applicability. For a work of art, such a criterion is its perception by its readers. In both cases, the ontological dimension is in the mind of the reader. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bringing Cancer Care to Those who Don't Have ItLawrence N. ShulmanI have been treating cancer patients in the Harvard Medical School hospitals since 1977, and in those 35 years we have made tremendous progress. Though work still needs to be done, and far too many patients still die of cancer, many are cured. In particular, children and young adults have a high rate of cure from such diseases as (...) Hodgkin's lymphoma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, acute lymphoblastic leukemia, and childhood sarcoma. Patients with breast cancer in the US have a greater than 80% chance for long-term survival. The death rate from cervical cancer in the US is very low. These results have been achieved by making diagnoses earlier, in many cases surgical excision, and often systemic therapies such as chemotherapy, hormonal therapy, radiation therapy, and more recently by using so-called "targeted" therapies—those directed at particular molecular characteristics of the cancer cells.Princess Dina Mired has said that the opportunity to survive cancer should not be an accident of geography. In cases where we already have effective and inexpensive tools to cure cancer, these treatments should be considered a basic human right, a life-saving medical service.I met Patty, a young woman living in the U.S. during November of her senior year in high school, after she discovered a small lump above her left collar bone. Though she felt entirely well, she called her primary care doctor who saw her the next day, felt the enlarged lymph node, and referred her to a surgeon, who did a biopsy later that week. Her primary care doctor also called me, and we scheduled a visit when the pathology results were available. The following week the pathologist notified Patty's pediatrician that the biopsy showed Hodgkin's lymphoma. When I met Patty, she was a bright and focused young woman, waiting to hear about her college applications and enjoying her senior year. Her cancer diagnosis was completely out of context with her life as she planned it, but with the support of her family and boyfriend, she seemed prepared to take things one step at a time. A PET CT scan demonstrated a modest mass in the mediastinum (chest), but no other disease. She was in an early stage of the disease with an excellent prognosis. We recommended and administered six months of chemotherapy with doxorubicin, bleomycin, vinblastine, and dacarbazine—four chemotherapy agents that are off-patent, and relatively inexpensive. She lost her hair, not a trivial issue for her, but otherwise felt reasonably well during the treatment. She was determined to graduate with her classmates, and was able continue to attend school and keep up with her work. In June, seven months into her cancer diagnosis and treatment, she graduated with honors, and was on track to enroll in college in September.Like other 18-year-old women with Hodgkin's lymphoma, Patty had an over 80% chance for cure with the potential for a long and productive life ahead of her because we could perform a biopsy, make a diagnosis, and safely and effectively treat her with four inexpensive, off-patent, chemotherapy drugs. She had nearly the same likelihood of living a long and fruitful life as her classmates, and had the same chances for childbearing. In my line of work, with the knowledge we now possess, to allow someone like Patty to die without a chance of curative care is simply unacceptable. Treatment of curable cancers should be considered on par with the right to clean water, adequate nutrition, treatment for infectious disease, and access to maternal and child healthcare services.But in many places in the world, people with cancers we could easily eradicate in Boston have no access to cancer services, and do die unnecessarily. The local healthcare infrastructure has no [End Page E10] capacity to evaluate a patient, perform or process a biopsy, make a diagnosis, or treat the patient with potentially curative surgery, chemotherapy and radiation. I have rounded on the wards of hospitals in developing countries, stopping to talk with numerous patients like Patty: young women, some of whom might have had Hodgkin's lymphoma, but no... (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Contributors ix -- Foreword by Douglas A. Boyd andJoseph D. Straubhaar xiii -- Preface byMariaHenson xv -- Acknowledgments xvii -- Part I. Introduction 1 -- Chapter 1. Journalism as a Mission: Ethics and Purpose -- from an International Perspective -- by Joseph B. Atkins 3 -- Chapter 2. Chaos and Order: Sacrificing the Individual for the -- Sake of Social Harmony -- by John C. Merrill 17 -- Part II. In the United States and Latin America (...) 37 -- Chapter 3. Ways of a Muckraker -- by Jerry Mitchell 39 -- Chapter 4. A Sinister Zone of Likeness: Journalists as Heroes and -- Villains in the U.S. South and in Central and Eastern -- Europe -- by Joseph B. Atkins 45 -- Chapter 5. From Collusion to Independence: The Press, The Ruling -- Party, and Democratization in Mexico -- byMichaelSnodgrass 55 -- Chapter 6. The Outspoken Journalist Is an Expression, a Symbol -- of Colombia -- by Stephen E Jackson 69 -- Part III. In Europe 77 -- Chapter 7. The Stranger: Minorities and Their Treatment -- in the German Media -- by Georg Ruhrmann 79 -- Chapter 8. Between State Control and the Bottom Line: -- Journalism and Journalism Ethics in Hungary -- by Ildiko Kaposi and Eva Vajda 91 -- Chapter 9. SITA: Slovakia's First Independent News Service and -- Its Battles with the Huey Long of the Danube -- byPavol Mudry 101 -- Chapter 10. Holding Politicians' Feet to the Fire in Slovenia -- by Bernard Nezmah 111 -- Part IV. In the Middle East and Africa 121 -- Chapter 11. Lebanese Television: Caught Between the -- Government and the Private Sector -- by Nabil Dajani 123 -- Chapter 12. Press Freedom and the Crisis of Ethical Journalism -- in Southern Africa -- by Regina Jere-Malanda 143 -- Chapter 13. Nigerian Press Ethics and the Politics of Pluralism -- by Minabere Ibelema 153 -- Part V. In South and East Asia 169 -- Chapter 14. The Indian Press: Covering an Enigma -- byJayanti Ram-Chandran 171 -- Chapter 15. Palace Intrigue in Katmandu and the Press in Nepal -- byAkhilesh Upadhyay 181 -- Chapter 16. The Press in Japan: Job Security versus -- Journalistic Mission -- by Takehiko Nomura 187 -- Part VI. Three Journalists and Their Missions 201 -- Chapter 17. A Journey in Journalism: From Idealism -- to Bankruptcy -- by Neil White III 203 -- Chapter 18. Reclaiming Responsibility: A Journalist and Artist -- in the Catholic Worker Movement -- by Chuck Trapkus 211 -- Chapter 19. Ryszard Kapuscinski: The Empathetic Existentialist -- by Joseph B. Atkins and Bernard Nezmah 217 -- Postscript The White Rose: On the Martyrdom of Student Pamphleteers in -- Nazi Germany and Their Legacy -- by Joseph B. Atkins 227 -- References 233 -- Index 243. (shrink)

Study of Pañcadaśi of Mādhava, d. 1386, compendium on Advaita philosophy.

A close observation on the rapid change in the mind of young cohort has been made. Our Surveillance is before and after pandemic periods compels us to re-write some pre-occupied conceptions in the core of Philosophy and Psychology. We have worked on mind-body & mind-soul relationship from three angles that are Medical Science, Psychology and Philosophy. It is seen that the level of confidence is gradually diminishing among the youth due to different impetus and as a result many powerful strengths (...) are going out. Proclamation of human values in a new way must be declared so that we can save a thankful number of creative lives. Discussions have been made on thoughts, distress, medical causes of suicide or suicidal attempts, personality disorders, neuropsychology to open up a new world before the present generation. Each and every characteristics of life has positive impact and here we have tried to establish this fact. Physical and metaphysical aspects are reciprocating our lives and this should be injected in the mind of present generation and an approach can be taken to incorporate the matter in the curriculum right now. We have the intention to explain metaphysical love and its high, intelligent values proclaimed strength of mind of youth to infuse our dear world with great moral values. It may also save the earth from natural decay with their surprising discoveries. (shrink)