This essay asks what the terms mokṣa and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mokṣadharma, which provides the title for the Śāntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mokṣadharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of Śuka, the Nārāyaṇīya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhiṣṭhira’s philosophical (...) inquiries of Bhīṣma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anuśāsanaparvan’sDānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mokṣa in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mokṣa to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts. Usages of mokṣadharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term nivṛittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāyaṇīya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions. (shrink)

Annotated translation of the final chapter of the Tattvārthasūtra with commentary by Umāsvāti, the foremost philosophical text in Jainism on the topic of mokṣa or liberation from rebirth. (Master’s thesis, University of Utrecht.).

Abstract:Subject As Freedom (1930) is correctly regarded as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's magnum opus. But this text relies on a set of ideas and develops from a set of concerns that KCB develops more explicitly in essays written both before and after that text, which might be regarded as its intellectual bookends. These ideas are important and fascinating in their own right. They also illuminate KCB's engagement with Kant and with the Vedānta tradition as well as his understanding of freedom itself, including (...) its soteriological dimension. These two essays are "Sankara's Doctrine of Māyā" (1930) and "The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance" (1936). We explore KCB's conception of philosophy and its relation to spiritual practice through a close reading of these two essays. (shrink)

The three major schools of Vedanta— a kara's Advaita, R m nuja's Viśi dvaita, and Madhva's Dvaita—all claim to be based on the Upanishads, but they have evolved very different views of Brahman, or the Supreme Reality, and the soul's relation to that Reality once it is liberated from rebirth, when mok a or eternal life commences. Advaita teaches that liberated souls merge into the seamless blissful Brahman, the only Reality, and finally escape their earth dreams of sin and suffering, (...) even to the point of forfeiting individuality. Both Viśi dvaita and Dvaita are resolutely realist systems and see essential differences between Brahman and souls that are never transcended, even in the world of the liberated, visualized in these systems as a glorious paradise where God (Vishnu) reigns in splendor over blissful souls devoted to Him everlastingly. But whereas Madhva sees innate differences in souls, each with a greater or lesser capacity for bliss, R m nuja sees a universal sameness in the quality and degree of bliss, even to the point of equating it with the bliss of God Himself. The author points out these and other contrasts between the three views of mok a , critiques each, then develops a view of the liberated state more satisfactory (in his view) than any of the three in a marriage of East and West. (shrink)

This paper identifies the different normative ethical arguments stated and suggested by Arjuna and Krishna in the Gītā , analyzes those arguments, examines the interrelations between those arguments, and demonstrates that, contrary to a common view, both Arjuna and Krishna advance ethical theories of a broad consequentialist nature. It is shown that Krishna’s ethical theory, in particular, is a distinctive kind of rule-consequentialism that takes as intrinsically valuable the twin consequences of mokṣa and lokasaṃgraha . It is also argued that (...) Krishna’s teachings in the Gītā gain in depth, coherence, and critical relevance what they lose in simplicity when the ethical theory underlying those teachings is understood as a consequentialism of this kind rather than as a deontology. (shrink)

Partiendo de la distinción entre śivaísmo pre-tántrico y śivaísmo tántrico proponemos una introducción al śivaísmo no dualista de Cachemira, especialmente de las escuelas que componen el sistema Trika y de una de sus principales figuras, tanto místicas como intelectuales: Abhinavagupta (ss. X-XI d.n.e.). Conocida como el «darśana de la reconciliación», la filosofía tántrica de Cachemira se caracteriza por conjugar liberación (mokṣa) y placer (bhoga) en una actitud vital y filosófica diferente y, en ocasiones, incluso opuesta al resto de darśanas propias (...) del conservadurismo brahmánico. Finalmente, describiremos las tres vías de liberación principales y la no-vía siguiendo el célebre tratado de Abhinavagupta, el Tantrāloka. (shrink)

Because of the widespread feminine priority that makes it the receptacle of śakti, India is definitely “one of the last bastions of the Mother,” as is pointed out in a recent book. If in fact there is a “maternalistic” culture it is certainly that of India, in spite of the legal regime, in which the element of affectionate magic characterizing all life and all organic intimacy is affirmed through the warm symbiosis of mother-child love. A miracle of that absolute love (...) incarnated with a natural serenity by millions of mothers dispensing a felicitous affectionate security, instilled in the Indian soul throughout its entire life. The traits of the Hindu personality and the principle content of its culture are organized and ordered around this center, characterized by an extraordinary coherence. Since its construction begins with this “dual unity” the Hindu personality has necessarily the popolarity of fusion-separation as a pivot. This is the central theme of S. Kakar, who, basing his conclusions on results of clinical psychoanalyses of Hindu individuals as well as on contributions from the collective imagination (folklore and myths) claims to discern the ontogenetic source of the supreme ideal of deliverance (mokṣa) in early childhood and, more specifically, in the strong unconscious desire to find again the benevolent presence of the “good mother”. (shrink)

Recent work has clearly established the fundamental place of the siddhis in almost all Indic mokṣa traditions. This paper seeks to excavate a fundamental metaphysical dimension to this phenomenon, by excavating the philosophical logic of these claims from within the contours of Sāṃkhya metaphysics as expressed in the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali. It will set out to provide a coherent explanation of how these siddhis are not only an inherent ingredient of yogic discourse, but a logical and perhaps inevitable corollary (...) of the parameters of this metaphysics. It will thus take the issue further than a mere recognition of the centrality of the siddhis to yogic practice and discourse by laying out the sequential metaphysics underpinning them, and hence arguing that siddhis are not only fundamental and intrinsic to the Sāṃkhya/Yoga tradition, but an essential by-product of its metaphysical presuppositions. (shrink)

Description: Based on primary sources this book presents a survey of development of Moral Philosophy in India and offers an authentic account of Indian ethics from the point of view of Vedas, Upanisads, Mimamsas, Smrtis, the Bhagavad-gita and the Paficaratras, Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-VaiSesika, Buddhism and Jainism. Indian ethics has taken a positive attitude towards life hi its concrete 'and varied aspects as is evident in die discussions of karma, rebirth, nirvana, and moksa. Life has to be lived for harmonious (...) development of our character for a spiritual end. Indian ethics has therefore a positive goal to achieve freedom of the self from its bondage of passions and desire this is the message of India and is the essence of all her moral thought The study will, no doubt, prove invaluable to the scholars and general readers as well. (shrink)

Parmi les 'but de l'homme' (puruṣārtha) qui orientent la vie humaine dans le monde indien, le dharma occupe une position très élevée, au-dessus de 'l'intérêt' (artha) et du 'désir' (kāma), respectivement la sphère du pouvoir (politique, économique, social) et celle de l'amour (y compris les passions et les plaisirs de la vie). Enfin, le dharma englobe le quatrième et ultime but de l'homme, la 'délivrance' (moksa). Le caractère normatif du dharma fixe la place de chacun dans la société, par (...) l'exercice de son devoir spécifique. Mais il ne se décline pas moins selon les dispositions individuelles de chacun, et l'action de l'homme en est la véritable mesure. Par-delà la littérature du dharma, le volume réunit des enquêtes sur cette notion 'en contexte,' de la poésie védique à la grammaire, de l'épopée au théâtre, des traditions religieuses et philosophiques--les premières Écoles bouddhiques, la Mīmāmsā, le tantrisme--à la médecine classique (Āyurveda) et jusqu'à la jurisprudence indienne moderne (du XVIIe au XIXe siècle) avec deux éclairages inédits sur le dharma des femmes. Une telle approche tend à restituer la complexité de quelques visages du dharma ainsi recomposés, non pas 'tel ou tel' aspect mais pour chaque cas le 'tout' d'un système à plusieurs facettes, à l'appui d'une histoire singulière dont les auteurs s'attachent à montrer points forts et limites, situations ambiguës, paradoxes et contradictions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The author of the Yogav sistha Mah r m yana has liberation (moksa) foremost on her or his mind and this focus appears to relegate virtue (dharma) to poor relation status. Yet, R ma's question to Vasistha is, 'How should one live in this world?' This signals a strongly ethical stance and opens another avenue of exploration; the possibility that the teachings on the realisation of liberation are concomitant with the teachings regarding the embodiment of virtue. The aim of (...) this paper is to flesh out the admittedly skeletal frame of virtue by comparing the theories in the Yogav sistha with Aristotle's elaboration of virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that, in spite of fundamental metaphysical differences between the two philosophers, the stages of moral development described in the Yogav sistha harmonise with Aristotle's theories and provide insights into problems that arise in Aristotle's work. (shrink)

If the good is what people desire or strive after, the Indian thinkers very early on developed a theory of hierarchy of goods: these are artha (material wealth), kāma (pleasure), dharma (righteousness), and mokṣa (spiritual freedom). Leaving aside the question about precisely how the first two in this list have to be ranked, one might suggest that the first two are what human beings do strive after, while the last two are what they ought to strive after. Such a distinction (...) between what human beings in fact strive after and what they ought to strive after is indicated in a distinction between the śreya (morally good) and the preya (pleasant) found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, although it may have to be conceded that the is – ought distinction did not come to the forefront of Hindu moral thinking. One may as a matter of fact construct an argument to prove that even mokṣa, the supreme value, is not a mere ought – to‐be. The argument would run as follows: we do want to get rid of pain and enjoy a state of happiness. This natural desire, by implication, may be extended to a complete freedom from pain and enjoyment of an uninterrupted state of bliss (even if no one ordinarily posits this as his or her goal). It is only on reflection, and after reaching the first two goals and finding oneself dissatisfied with them, that one self‐consciously posits the last two goals – the third to begin with and, as a result of experiencing a similar dissatisfaction once it has been reached, subsequently the fourth and highest good, which is not a mere ought‐to‐be but an ideal state of being. If the English phrase “the highest good” translates into niḥśreyasaḥ in Sanskrit, then mokṣa is that state of excellence than which there is nothing greater and which leaves, upon attainment, nothing else to be desired. (shrink)

Dr. George Victor Studies Comprehensively Sankaracarya S Teachings On Vedanta His Views On Scripture, Perception And Inference As Pramanas Or Standards Of Knowledges; His Explanations Of The Relation Between Brahman And Atman, Brahman And Äsvara, Maya And The World; And His Concepts Of Jnana Marga, Karma Marga And Moksa.

This introductory work proposes a fresh take on the ancient Indian concept dharma. By unfolding how, even in its developments as "law" and custom, dharma participates in nuanced and multifarious understandings of the term that play out in India's great spiritual traditions, the book offers insights into the innovative character of both Hindu and Buddhist usages of the concept. Alf Hiltebeitel, in an original approach to early Buddhist usages, explores how the Buddhist canon brought out different meanings of dharma. This (...) is followed by an exposition of the hypothesis that most, if not all, of the Hindu law books flowered after the third-century BC emperor Asoka, a Buddhist, made dharma the guiding principle of an entire realm and culture. A discussion built around the author's expertise on the Sanskrit epics shows how their narratives amplified the new Brahmanical norms and brought out the ethical dilemmas and spiritual teachings that arose from inquiry into dharma. A chapter on the tale of the Life of the Buddha considers the relation between dharma, moksa/nirvana, and bhakti. Here, Hiltebeitel ties together a thread that runs through the entire story, which is the Buddha's tendency to present dharma as a kind of civil discourse. In this sense, dharma challenges people to think critically or at least more creatively about their ethical principles and the foundations of their own spiritual values. A closing chapter on dharma in the twenty-first century explores its new cachet in an era of globalization, its diasporic implications, its openings into American popular culture, some implications for women, and the questions it is still raising for modern India. (shrink)

Indian thought is often said to be concerned with ethics (dharma) that leads to freedom (mokṣa). Either this means that we should treat freedom as the end that justifies the ethical life (Consequentialism), or that the ethical life is the procedure that causes freedom (Proceduralism). The history of Vedānta philosophy—philosophy of the latter part of the Vedas—largely endorses the latter option via the “moral transition argument” (MTA): a dialectic that takes us from teleology to proceduralism. It is motivated by a (...) desire to remove luck from moral theory. But this leaves open the Paradox of Development (Brahman), which posits our moral freedom as a condition of protecting it. I explore the MTA, and Śaṅkara’s, Madhva’s, and Rāmānuja’s response to the Paradox of Development. (shrink)

Vedānta is one of the oldest philosophical systems. While there are many detailed commentaries on Vedānta, there are very few mathematical descriptions of the different concepts developed there. This article shows how ideas from theoretical computer science can be used to explain Vedānta. The standard ideas of transition systems and modal logic are used to develop a formal description for the different ideas in Vedānta. The generality of the formalism is illustrated via a number of examples including saṃsāra, Patañjali’s Yogasūtras, (...) karma, the three avasthās from the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the key difference between advaita and dvaita in relation to mokṣa. (shrink)

This introductory work proposes a fresh take on the ancient Indian concept dharma. By unfolding how, even in its developments as "law" and custom, dharma participates in nuanced and multifarious understandings of the term that play out in India’s great spiritual traditions, the book offers insights into the innovative character of both Hindu and Buddhist usages of the concept. Alf Hiltebeitel, in an original approach to early Buddhist usages, explores how the Buddhist canon brought out different meanings of dharma. This (...) is followed by an exposition of the hypothesis that most, if not all, of the Hindu law books flowered after the third-century BC emperor Asoka, a Buddhist, made dharma the guiding principle of an entire realm and culture. A discussion built around the author’s expertise on the Sanskrit epics shows how their narratives amplified the new Brahmanical norms and brought out the ethical dilemmas and spiritual teachings that arose from inquiry into dharma. A chapter on the tale of the Life of the Buddha considers the relation between dharma, moksa/nirvana, and bhakti. Here, Hiltebeitel ties together a thread that runs through the entire story, which is the Buddha’s tendency to present dharma as a kind of civil discourse. In this sense, dharma challenges people to think critically or at least more creatively about their ethical principles and the foundations of their own spiritual values. A closing chapter on dharma in the twenty-first century explores its new cachet in an era of globalization, its diasporic implications, its openings into American popular culture, some implications for women, and the questions it is still raising for modern India. (shrink)

Deepak Sarma completes the first outline in more than fifty years of India's key philosophical traditions, inventively sourcing seminal texts and clarifying language, positions, and issues. Organized by tradition, the volume covers six schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy: Mimamsa (the study of the earlier Vedas, later incorporated into Vedanta), Vedanta (the study of the later Vedas, including the _Bhagavad Gita_ and the _Upanishads_), Sankhya (a form of self-nature dualism), Yoga (a practical outgrowth of Sankhya), and Nyaya and Vaisesika (two forms (...) of realism). It also discusses Jain philosophy and the Mahayana Buddhist schools of Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Sarma maps theories of knowledge, perception, ontology, religion, and salvation, and he details central concepts, such as the _pramanas_ (means of knowledge), _pratyaksa_ (perception), _drayvas_ (types of being), _moksa_ (liberation), and _nirvana_. Selections and accompanying materials inspire a reassessment of long-held presuppositions and modes of thought, and accessible translations prove the modern relevance of these enduring works. (shrink)

To many Western students of India, svarāj and mokṣa have often seemed to represent two very different ideals of freedom, the former social, political, and modern; the latter individual, spiritual, and traditional. It is not surprising that the Hindu ideal of spiritual freedom is most commonly known by the term mokṣa , for it is this word that is usually listed as the fourth and supreme goal in the famous four ends of man . The first three ends, desire , (...) success , and morality , find their fulfillment within society, while mokṣa , it is generally said, takes one beyond society. It is pertinent to note, as Ingalls and others have pointed out, that mokṣa is a relatively late term, which came to be added to the older, first three goals of man. As a noun, mokṣa does not appear until the latest of the Upanisads, and then only three times, in Śvetāśvatara 6.16 and Maitrī 6.20 and 30. In addition, some orthodox schools did not accept the ideal of mokṣa for several more centuries, the Mīmāṁsā denying it until the eighth century A.D. (shrink)

Roy W. Perrett argues that the Hindu sage, like the western moral saint, seems precluded from pursuing non-moral ends for their own sakes. If he is precluded from pursuing non-moral ends for their own sakes, then he is precluded from pursuing non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes. A life devoid of every such pursuit seems deficient. Hence, the Hindu sage seems to forsake the good life. In response, I adapt a reply that Vanessa Carbonell (...) offers in the context of the moral saint. The Hindu sage might pursue non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes, so long as his motivation to pursue moksa is read de re rather than de dicto. Indeed, this reply is more convincing in the case of the Hindu sage than it is in the case of the moral saint. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

The Bhagavadgītā, part of the sixth book of the Hindu epic The Mahābhārata, offers a practical approach to mokṣa, or liberation, and freedom from saṃsāra, or the cycle of death and rebirth. According to the approach, known as karmayoga, salvation results from attention to duty and the recognition of past acts that inform the present and will direct the future. In the Bhagavadgītā, Kṛṣṇa advocates selfless action as the ideal path to realizing the truth about oneself as well as the (...) ultimate reality. Kṛṣṇa proclaims that humans have rights only to actions and not to their results, whether good or bad. Therefore, humans should not desire any results whatsoever. The prisoner’s dilemma is a fictional story that shows why individuals who seek only their personal benefit meet worse outcomes than those possible by cooperating with others. The dilemma provides an effective, albeit often overlooked, method for studying the Hindu principle of niṣkāmakarma that is arguably the central teaching of the Bhagavadgītā. In the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, a prisoner who wants to uphold niṣkāmakarma may choose one of two decision-making strategies: to be indifferent and leave the decision to chance or to either pursue the common good or the other person’s benefit instead of his or her own. Assuming that followers of niṣkāmakarma can be goal-oriented, the second strategy is more appropriate than the first, as long as one pursues unselfish goals and remains both indifferent and uncommitted to personal benefit. (shrink)

Daya Krishna’s creative criticism of the prevalent traditionalist interpretation of classical Indian philosophy is analytically stated and evaluated. His objections to classifying Indian philosophies into orthodox and heterodox systems, applying to a group of differing philosophies the common labels of vedānta or vedāntic, making these terms multi-referential, inappropriately titling some books as Nyāyasūtra, Sānkhayarikārika, etc., though they discuss a miscellany of themes, etc., are also discussed and assessed. His calling of these terms and some others of their like, or the (...) practice of using them, mythical is examined. It is shown that they may not be accurate but their use has not become disutile. In their prevailing usage, seemingly misleading characters have become sterile and therefore they have ceased to be misleading and continue functioning as convenient classificatory terms. Enjoying his calling of the concept of puruṣārtha and the theory of puruṣārtha too mythical, it has been shown that the concept is not because it means any object of anyone’s and there are many such objects; the theory is not because it is historically an important component of classical Indian value theory. I have also shown that as presented by traditionalist writers, it is not a logical elegant theory, but a fairly workable one can be carved out of the classical theory by linking together some elements of it in newer ways with the logical cement obtainable from modern value theorizing. Something similar has been done with Daya Krishna ’s analysis of the traditionalist claim that Indian philosophy is spiritualist. DK links it with Indian culture through the concept of mokṣa. I have shown that it is the result of linking philosophy too tightly with religion, of course, through the doorway of the concept of mokṣa, by pointing out that mokṣa is a religious, and not an ethical, value. (shrink)

Hinduism is considered one of the most ancient religions in the world. Although the technological innovation of modernization has undermined the reliance on their traditions, Hindus may still rely on Hindu Scripture when making decisions. From their standpoint, contrary to Western medicine, human lives cannot be reduced to statistical and empirical facts. They focus more on preserving the spirit, rather than considering survival as one of the goals of medicine. Consequently, when a preterm infant is born, Hindu parents might struggle (...) to understand the goals of Western neonatologists. This divergence may create misunderstandings when discussing end-of-life decisions. Since they value relational aspects to be of utmost importance, they may accept treatments only in the likelihood of good neurological outcomes. Being able to interact allows Hindus to act virtuously with the aim of purifying their soul toward moksa. When it comes to end-of-life decisions on behalf of newborns, Hindu parents may opt to forgo treatments and let the baby peacefully die, while praying for their soul to have a better rebirth. This paper aims to evaluate quality-of-life assessment in the Hindu tradition in comparison with the Catholic tradition. It draws parallelisms between these two different religions to investigate whether an inter-religious dialogue is possible. This work will help Catholic, and more broadly Western, doctors to have a better understanding of the Hindu end-of-life views. (shrink)

The notion of dharma is one of the most important concepts of Hinduism. This paper deals with the semantics diversity of the term of dharma, which is a Sanskrit word derived from the root of dhṛ that means to support, hold, maintain. In addition, the concept of purushārtha, consisting of the words purusha and artha, is examined by focusing on the different usages of that term. It is criticized why purusarthas are defined as trivarga or çaturvarga and the historical and (...) philosophical significance of the purusarthas is discussed. Besides, the connection of purushārthas with varna and ashramas has been investigated as well as it is mentioned which purushārtha orders should be observed by caste members and which purushārtha should be considered by individuals in the ashrama system.Purushārtha is a key concept in Hinduism and refers to the three/ four proper goals or aims of a human life. The word purushārtha literally means purpose of human being or object of human pursuit. All four purushārthas are important, but in cases of conflict, dharma is considered more important than artha or kama in Hindu philosophy. Moksha is considered the ultimate ideal of human life. It is also criticized that purushārthas are defined as trivarga or çaturvarga; its historical and philosophical significance was discussed. In addition, the connection of purushārthas with varna (brahman, kshatriya, vaisya, sudra) and ashramas (brahmacharya, grihastha, vanaprastha, sanyasa) has been investigated. In the caste system, the knowledge of which purushārtha element that caste members should observe has been mentioned. It was emphasized which purushārtha should highlight in the stages. (shrink)

A syncretic yogic instruction in Carakasanhita : Śārīrasthāna 1.137–155, contained in Book 4 of the Ćarakasaṃhitā, is a short treatise on yoga presented for āyurvedic purposes. In its yogic interpretation, the work comprises the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, some Sāṃkhya’s and Vaiśeṣika’s notions as well as the meditative interpretation present in the Buddhist tradition. The ŚS gives a threefold path leading to mokṣa, the state of supreme brahman with which the conscious being, bhūtātman, becomes one : yoga, smṛti, and sāṃkhya. The (...) path to liberation is based on yoga, which is the reinforcement of the manas in the ātman and the stopping of suffering by breaking the connection between the erroneous identification of ātman with manas and the senses. On the path of yoga, a powerful eight-fold magical power is created through which the yogi is able to overcome external adversities. In the next step, the recognition of the one’s true identity — according to the sāṃkhya — is made through buddhi by the power of jñāna. However, in order for this recognition to be realized, the state of purity of sattva must first appear, induced by the practice of the eight-step smṛti realized by eighteen perfections. (shrink)

A intervenção histórica de Jung constitui, em nossa opinião, uma proposta de revitalização, na modernidade, de uma filosofia soteriológica que se ancora, estrategicamente, no contexto disciplinar de uma “psicologia científica”. Enquanto “clínica da meia-idade” ou “clínica da individuação”, o modelo que mais diretamente inspira a psicologia analítica de Jung é o athanasius pharmakon dos antigos - a “medicina da imortalidade”. Seu arcabouço conceitual, ao invés de uma teoria científica de pretensões universalizantes, consagra-se como linguagem-força que estrutura e sustenta, no Ocidente (...) moderno, uma reflexão dialógica e conversacional analista-analisando, comprometida com a eliminação sistemática dos “invólucros falsos” que encobrem o Si-Mesmo e com a realização de uma verdade existencialmente transformadora que promove, em definitivo, a plenitude existencial. Para sustentar essa linha interpretativa, fazemos recurso à doutrina indiana dos Puruṣārthas, em especial ao processo de transição entre dharma e mokṣa. (shrink)

Compilation of research papers on Jaina philosophy and concept of Moksa; previously published in Kusumāñjali, research magazine.