Argues for postcoloniality as a model for philosophical practice. In this ambitious book, Namita Goswami draws on continental philosophy, postcolonial criticism, critical race theory, and African American and postcolonial feminisms to offer postcoloniality as a model for philosophical practice. Moving among and between texts, traditions, and frameworks, including the work of Gayatri Spivak, Theodor Adorno, Barbara Christian, Paul Gilroy, Neil Lazarus, and Hortense Spillers, among others, she charts a journey that takes us beyond Eurocentrism by understanding postcoloniality as the (...) pursuit of heterogeneity, that is, of a non-antagonistic understanding of difference. Recognizing that philosophy, feminism, and postcolonial theory share a common concern with the concept of heterogeneity, Goswami shows how postcoloniality empowers us to engage more productively the relationships between these disciplines. Subjects That Matter confronts the ways Eurocentrism, an identity politics that considers difference as inherently oppositional, relegates minority traditions to a diagnostic and/or corrective standpoint to prevent their general implications from playing a critical and transformative role in how we understand subjectivity and agency. Through unexpected, often surprising, and thought-provoking analytic connections and continuities, this book’s interdisciplinary approach reveals a postcolonial pluralism that expands philosophical resources, confounds and limits our habitual disciplinary lexicons, and opens up new areas of inquiry. “This is a groundbreaking contribution to a number of distinct but intersecting fields.” — Amy Allen, author of The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. (shrink)

This essay challenges the reduction of Gayatri Spivak's critique of postcolonial reason to functional and derivative identity politics. Such a reading neutralizes the philosophical nature of Spivak's conceptual contributions. Because Spivak is derided as preaching about subaltern victimhood, this essay discerns what is philosophical about the concept of the subaltern. I focus on Spivak's attempt at a space-clearing gesture that can create the possibility for breaking the frame of Eurocentrism. I argue that for this philosopher of the future, the concept (...) of the subaltern is vital for making history and all its victims real. Rather than reiterating the dialectic of “Western philosopher” and “postcolonial critic,” our philosopher of the future knows how most philosophy begins with the commonplace of sorrow. In postcolonialism, she prays to be haunted by the ghosts of (our) history's victims. In other words, our philosopher of the future learns how we make (our) ghosts—as (this) history happens to us (right now). Because we are serious about philosophy, and not preserving our over-determined parts in The Great Game, this essay reads Spivak's critique of postcolonial reason to show how she prefigures “colonialism to come” in Euro-US epistemological training. (shrink)

This article examines how skilled middle-class Tamil women—an Indian regional group—negotiate with gender to strategize immigration to and settlement in the United States by drawing on life-history interviews with 33 first-generation professional women, most of whom entered the United States as family migrants. I find that the women negotiate with gender to configure Tamil Brahminical relations of subordination, thereby asserting their subjectivity through “strident embedded agency” in immigration. In this way, they realize gender non-normative desires for immigration, engage in gender (...) non-normative actions, and perform normative actions in reconstituted ways. Even as their strident embedded agency facilitates their embodiment of configured Tamil womanhood, it produces Tamil Brahmin relations of subordination. This article delineates the complexity of women’s subjectivities and agency and Tamil women’s agential strategizing of immigration as emergent from their gendered and caste/classed social locations. (shrink)

On ancient Indian education with reference to Brahmanical and Buddhist education system.

Spivak refers to “originary queerness” as a concept she cannot yet theorize. If concepts convey and uphold heterogeneous lived experience, then the paradoxical missing-ness of a corresponding “what...

Paul Gilroy's subtle use of Theodor Adorno in Postcolonial Melancholia misses the opportunity to forge for the postcolonial world a sense of responsibility for the colonial cultures that this postcolonial world helped to create. Gilroy rightly emphasizes the naïveté often associated with attempts to “dwell convivially with difference”. His negatively dialectical reading of the deterministic logics of racial difference brings into view an already present demotic multiculturalism. He neglects, however, how Adorno's conception of negative dialectics can be understood as postcolonial (...) in its understanding of difference. In other words, both Adorno and Gilroy focus on recuperating a conception of non-antagonistic difference, that is, an understanding of difference as heterogeneity. Yet, Gilroy maintains an a priori sense of cultural difference from Adorno in spite of Postcolonial Melancholia's trajectory of positing a negative dialectics of conviviality. This conviviality is the “fragile, emergent substance of vital planetary humanism” that refuses to render postcoloniality synonymous with the maintenance of nation-state boundaries. Thus, Gilroy forfeits the prospect of conducting a radical postcolonial reading of Adorno, which would demonstrate precisely how colonial history provides “an opening onto the multicultural promise of the postcolonial world”. (shrink)

This essay responds to the polyphonic and prismatic reflections stemming from Subjects That Matter: Philosophy, Feminism, and Postcolonial Theory (2019), especially as the connective and creative works included in this forum seek holistic, profoundly interdisciplinary, and transcontinental discussions on intersectionality and philosophical practice. I seek vibrant, productive connections between diverse projects by attempting to engage a few salient aspects of these contributions as they intersect with the book’s overall stated aims, primarily because my interlocutors’s work leads out of the book (...) rather than burrows into it. This is precisely the forum’s aspirational trajectory, for it showcases multiplicity, discontinuity, divergence, plurality, and profusion, not to dubiously claim the mantle of radicalism, but to move toward systemic change through the precarious, difficult, and essentially historical task of building coalitions. My hope remains that through these lovingly orchestrated moments of exegetical exchange, which confound and limit rather than insulate our habitual disciplinary lexicons, we may roil Eurocentric identity politics and its impoverished understanding of difference. (shrink)

Intersectionality, the attempt to bring theories on race, gender, disability and sexuality together, has existed for decades as a theoretical framework. The essays in this volume explore how intersectionality can be applied to modern philosophy, as well as looking at other disciplines.

This essay conducts a comparative reading of Gayatri Spivak’s discussion of the Hindu epic Mahabharata and Mahasweta Devi’s story “Draupadi.” While scholars have examined Devi’s tribal protagonist Draupadi in conjunction with the high Hindu goddess Draupadi of the epic, I suggest that the former’s viswarupadarshana should be read in contrast to the role of the Mahabharata’s Hindu God Krishna. This comparison shows the feminist and postcolonial import of Devi’s story, as it demonstrates the continuity of caste-based tribal exploitation from antiquity (...) to globalization. Along with this critique of tribal women’s subalternity in the national imaginary, Devi’s story stages a terrifying singularity that disrupts the sociopolitical logic of gender. Draupadi occupies the position of the subject of knowledge to invert the Indo-Aryan ontograph. By unraveling the “she” that must be perpetually murdered for historicity to take root, Draupadi pours into an encounter between agent and subaltern the affectivity ideologically excised for an illusion to be seen as truth and, hence, as history. (shrink)

The volume critically analyses the primary drawbacks of the Indian education system-non-enrolment, dropouts, irregular attendance, and inadequate learning. It establishes the need to strongly encourage parents to recognize the importance of education for their children's future. Arguing that supply-side strategies-free education, midday meals, opening more schools-have not proved effective since the problem of inadequate demand is much larger, the authors delineate the measures that are required to boost the demand for education in India.

Decades of tobacco control initiatives have turned public opinion against cigarette smoking. Smokers, once considered glamorous, are now stigmatized in domains including the workplace. Extant literature lacks scrutiny of smoker stigmatization and devaluation within the job selection process, and mechanisms that lead to such outcomes. Using an experimental design, we empirically examine initial reactions to job applicants’ smoking behaviors within two samples. We show that initial impressions are significantly worse when job applicants smoke versus do not in a store-based context. (...) Moreover, this effect occurs indirectly through perceived likelihood of engaging in counterproductive work behaviors, and is conditional upon respondents’ own attitudes towards smoking. These relationships—similar for customer service and inventory management jobs—are indicative of potential biases within the hiring process. Implications of these findings, and the moral dilemmas they raise around the treatment of smokers, are discussed from the ethical perspective of human resource management. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Going Polyphonic I: With Namita Goswami et al.Alyson Cole and Kyoo LeeThis time around, we go polyphonic.The articles in the next two issues, Vol. 13 and Vol. 14, explore critical questions, paradigm-shifting idseas, and fresh connections arising from the intimately networked fields of intersectional, decolonial, and trans studies today. “Polyphonia,” a term we borrowed from music, is meant to characterize ways in which each piece as in a (...) “note” remains distinctly their own while dialogically and dynamically connected to an evolving ecosystem of ideas and visions in the making. As an umbrella term, it is meant to shelter resonances from each article that speaks directly not only of, but to, theory today by doing it in their own way.In this issue, we are presenting “A Forum on Namita Goswami’s Subjects That Matter.” It consists of seven responses to Goswami’s pioneering work on intersectionality as exemplified by her recent book, Subjects That Matter: Philosophy, Feminism, and Postcolonial Theory (SUNY Press, 2019) as well as the earlier co-edited volume, Why Race and Gender Still Matter: An Intersectional Approach (Routledge, 2014, co-edited by Maeve M. O’Donovan, Namita Goswami, and Lisa Yount). What is polyphonic about this assemblage is its interlocutory structure and orientation: each scholar—Al Frankowski, Falguni Sheth, Jennifer Scuro, Lauren Guilmette, Luce deLire, Russell Ford, and Tyler M. Williams, all coming from different angles, perspectives, and positions—discusses their reading of Goswami on intersectionality while showing how and where their own scholarship meets hers. Goswami, in turn, responds to each response while providing a synthesized account of what she gleans from this choral interaction, what she finds inspiring, as well as challenging. The articles in the next issue, [End Page 1] Vol. 14, following the forum, will virtually continue the music, although not in direct response to Goswami’s work.We hope you will join us in this somewhat experimental virtual symposium that is not even on Zoom. We hope you will join us in thinking that this more literalized model of a “scholarly conversation,” actual and virtual, vitally embodies the very spirit of interdisciplinary, intergenerational, intercontinental intersectionality as a conversation, ongoing intellectual encounters among many of us in various “sub-fields,” for the lack of a better word, that, again literally, cannot be neatly contained in any disciplinary terms, boxes, or territories.The tranScripts section in this issue consists of two entries, the first of which is the fourth installment of Mieke Bal’s Moments of Meaning-Making, J–L. Then we have Margaret Carson’s translation of Juliana González on Remedios Varo.Again, this issue has been a labor of collective love. We would like to thank all the brilliant authors and extraordinarily generous and helpful peer reviewers for this issue, not to mention the ever so resourceful and skillful editorial staff at the press we constantly rely on for expert guidance and feedback, all of whom have been inspirations for us editors. [End Page 2]Copyright © 2024 State University of New York... (shrink)

The subject of this article is Hatice Gormez's book which is improved version of the master's thesis titled "Aisha's Tafsīr Rivāyahs". In the work, ʿĀʾisha bt. Abī Bakr's life and scientific personality, her method of understanding and interpreting the Qur'ān, her rivāyahs on ʿulūm al-Qurʾān, her rivāyahs on ʿulūm al-Qurʾān, her istidraqs and fatwās related to tafsir, the narrations of fezâil and hasaisu'n-nebi, her narratives evaluated in the different sources of tafsīr, and compelled and fabricated tafsīr rivāyahs attributed to ʿĀʾisha (...) were discussed. The author, who uses both a literary and scientific style in his work, touched upon controversial issues such as ʿĀʾisha 's age and the amr al-ifk and presented her point of view on these issues. While discussing these claims, ignoring some rivāyahs and some historical information is one of the critics for the work. In addition, the work deserves praise for successfully presenting ʿĀʾisha's scientific side and especially her exegesis with many rivāyahs. (shrink)

Namita Goswami’s book, Subjects That Matter: Philosophy, Feminism, and Postcolonial Theory, challenges its reader not only to attend to how one philosophizes about difference but also how one might philosophize differently. It is concerned with how we, now, practice philosophy as well as what we philosophize about. In this response, I raise a series of questions meant to challenge and expand Goswami’s work from the standpoint of someone rooted in the dominant framework of the Anglo-European academic discourse on difference. (...) In raising these questions, I take myself to be attempting the very twisting free of conventional philosophizing that Subjects That Matter invites. Some of the most powerful discussions in Goswami’s book concern the issues of metaphysics, dialectics, and history. The questions raised here predominantly concern whether specifically “dialectical” non-identity is faithful to Goswami’s conception of a non-antagonistic understanding of difference. Relatedly, does the past-facing metaphysical concept of the Whole insinuate itself in philosophy in such a way as to preclude thinking in ways that go against the grain of the Eurocentric tradition? From this concern for the conceptual commitments of dialectics and its associated metaphysics arises the further concern of whether even a negative dialectics allows for sufficiently differential genealogies. (shrink)

Following Namita Goswami’s call for a “non-antagonistic understanding of difference” in Subjects That Matter: Philosophy, Feminism, and Postcolonial Theory (2019), I want to challenge the canon of white feminism that still lingers in the emerging discourses on trauma care and trauma recovery, specifically utilizing concepts from Critical Disability Theory and, to some degree, Critical Trauma Studies. As Joy DeGruy asks in Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome [PTSS]: “debilitating beliefs and assumptions are... part of the legacy of trauma.... How are such (...) effects of trauma transmitted through generations?” and in the spirit of Spivak’s aesthetic education as Goswami cites her, I make an effort here to “bring to crisis” the meaning of trauma, beyond its psychotherapeutic connotations, especially as it may be rooted in the collective, as well as to demonstrate the connections between the inherited trauma of anti-black oppression to the legacy of slavery. This challenge begs the following questions: whose trauma matters? And to what end? (shrink)

German translation by Namita Herzl and Juri Wald of ‘The Young Marx and an African Ethic: Two Views of Self-realization’.

In Subjects That Matter, Namita Goswami attends to philosophy’s institutional and disciplinary failures to reconcile its identitarian claims to universality and reason with the feminist and postcolonial modes of thinking it traditionally keeps at bay. This essay places Goswami’s critique within a context of “the thought from outside,” which, beginning with Foucault’s reading of Blanchot, continuing through the geopolitics of Dussel’s philosophy of liberation, and prominent in Catherine Malabou’s conceptualization of plasticity, demonstrates how political critiques of philosophical hegemony contain (...) an implicit theorization of “literature.” If “literature” gives voice to the thought from outside, does it in turn “decolonize” philosophy? If so, what itinerary of thought ought to follow the relationship between this literary decolonization of philosophy and its imbrication within the fold of philosophical thought? How to conceptualize the plastic relation between inside and outside, between center and periphery, without subordinating the latter to the hegemony of the former? This essay argues for a coherence between Goswami’s and Malabou’s materialist understandings of difference and a conceptualization of literature as an “outside” to philosophy that operates “excentrically” “inside” philosophy. (shrink)

Divine revelation (waḥy), as a Qur'anic and religious concept in exegetical sources, isusually mentioned together with the institution of Prophethood (nubuwwa). Revelation came to itsend with the end of Prophethood. Therefore, although some have evaluated inspiration (ilhām) andtrue dream (ruʾyā sādiqa) within the this context of revelation, according to most of Islamic scholars,it is not permissible to refer to the recevings of the divinely saints as revelation. Revelation, for whichthe holy Qur'an designates three pattern of descension, is discussed also in (...) three categoriesthroughout the history of Islamic intellectual thought. Scholars of tafsir and theologians,philosophers, and mystics, all hold and bolster different views on the nature of revelation. Claims inSufi literature that inspiration can descend to divinely saints -beyond immediate delivery to theheart- through direct or indirect divine communication from behind a veil and through angles can beevaluated as an effort to create a conception of revelation that corresponds to the three modes ofrevelation, adressed in Qur’an, peculiar to prophets. With regard to the issue of continuity of divine revelation, a thorough examination of the Sufiliterature leads to the conclusion that revelation continues to decsend in its verbal form asinspiration but also, according to some Sufi authorities, in its noun forms unaniously considered aspeculiar to the prophets. Therefore, especially since the period of Sufism’s intermingling withphilosophy, the issues of accommdating sainthood (walāya) within the framework of generalprophethood (nubuwwa ʿāmme), the distinction between revelation and inspiration and itscontinuity appear as a very complex, unframed and unlimited field. This can be observed in theinstances addressed in this study. (shrink)

This essay draws upon Namita Goswami’s 2019 book Subjects That Matter: Philosophy, Feminism, and Postcolonial Theory for the insights she brings to an ethics of archival encounters, particularly regarding the files of those whose only record is their judgment and/or objectification by existing dominant institutions. First, I briefly summarize some key insights, with attention to Goswami’s careful exegesis of Spivak. In the next section, I consider these postcolonial feminist questions about infamous women in conjunction with Saidiya Hartman’s 2008 essay (...) “Venus in Two Acts,” and in the third section, I explore the resonances of Goswami’s book with Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments, a text also published in 2019 that shares Goswami’s commitment to the heterogeneous complexity of lives that overflow their often-dismissive records. In conclusion, I suggest some alternative formulations of subjectivity and agency suggested by this line of inquiry between Goswami and Hartman. (shrink)

In the verse (2:31) of the Qur’ān, it is mentioned that all names were taught to Adam (PBUH). This verse indicates that revelation is decisively the source of language. On the other hand, it is a common fact that people have been constantly producing symbols to express new ideas and concepts. This situation makes it necessary to associate the utterance (muṭlaq) and static with the relative (al-muqayyah) and dynamic between language and reality in religious thought. In the historical process, Mutakallims (...) have undertaken the responsibility of understanding and interpretation between the transcendent dimension of the religion (ad-Dīn) indicated in the Qur’ān and the innovative and dynamic dimension of life. The Mutakallims’ responsibility continues today. However, to establish the relationship among language, thought, and existence in today’s kalâm, it is necessary to identify the roots of this subject in kalām’s classical sources. In our study designed for this purpose, the truth and value of naming divine meanings in the context of ta‘līm al-asmā’ are examined. On the other hand, since dealing with such a large subject in a limited study is not possible, it is just focused on the research of linguistic theories, the relationship between language and thought, and the issue of whether the names used in the main sources to indicate the meanings are divinely determined (tawqīfī). In fact, it has been determined that the subject of ta'līm al-asmā’ is overshadowed by the vehement debates over the createdness of the Qur’ān (Khalq al-Qur’ān) and the relationship between Allāh’s essence and His attributes, although it is a Qur’ān-centered issue. As can be seen in the study, the approach of the Mutakallims to the issue of ta‘līm al-asmā’ is parallel to their understanding of Allāh’s essence and His attributes. As stated in this research, if the divine names were determined by Allāh, then Allāh’s names will be eternal. Besides, if the names expressed in human languages are the same as the essence of Allāh, this will lead to the problem of eternality. If it is said that the names are separated and unrelated from Allāh’s essence, there will be also more than one independent and eternal being. The idea of multiple eternal beings is against the principle of tawḥīd. However, in cases where the distinction between attributes and essence of Allāh is separated from each other in the mind, it causes attributes to be considered as something existing independently of the essence of Allāh. Therefore, as stated in the study, Mu‘tazilite theologians, who were very sensitive about this issue, attached great importance to the concept of eternity (qadīm) while transcending the essence of Allāh from the attributes of the created. As they appealed to tanzīh by which they transcend Him from all the originated things in time, they were focused on His eternality (qidam). In this regard, all His actions concerning the universe are regarded as temporal, in other words, originated in time (ḥādith). From this point of view, according to them, Allāh’s names specified in the Qur’ān are created just like the Qur’ān itself. Although their meanings are within the boundaries of the Divine Knowledge, their wordings (lafiẓ) belong to humans. Therefore, these names (asmâ’) that people use to describe Allāh in their speech, as Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī argues, are determined by the convention of the human. It has been determined by people via consensus, like other words of the language, to indicate the essence and attributes of Allāh in a language because of communication. Then, Allāh has sent down His message to people with these words. The conclusion that Mu‘tazilite theologians have regarded the connection of names with the meanings in Allāh’s knowledge as a linguistic use, while Sunnī theologians have addressed this issue based on the creative act (Khalq) of Allāh. There is another explanation which is known as the theory of faculty or habitus as an alternative way. Some Ash‘arî and Māturīdī theologians supported this theory. Today, the importance of this new perspective is clear, which appears another association of both ideas. In this context, it has been determined that the views of Māturīdī, who attributes the content (or meaning) of revelation (waḥy) to Allāh while arguing that its wordings belong to humans, are more appropriate to the theory of the faculty (malakah). (shrink)

al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273) was a scholar of tafsīr, ḥadīth and fiqh. He experienced both Western and Eastern civilizations in the geography of Andalusia and Egypt, respectively. In his famous Tafsīr called al-Jâmi li-Aḥkâm al-Qur’ān, al-Qurṭubī comparatively explained and interpreted all legal verses. Also, in addition to exploring the spesific legal rulings denoted in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, al-Qurṭubī has largely interpreted the legal norms regarding the issues of jurisprudence. By doing this, al-Qurṭubī contributed to the formation and development of (...) a civil codification activity under a kazuistic format. The casuistic structure of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān is anlaysed in terms of the form and content in the sample of al-Jâmi. Therefore, neither the similarity or similarity of the schools of the legal exegesis of Qur’ān and of the legal schools nor the disciplines of positive law, but their kazuistic structures, which systems they built and which interpretation methods and techniques they operated on this basis, were evaluated in terms of their original structure. In this direction, the article emphasizes that the casuistic structure of the legal exegesis of Qur’ān is established on and by the Prophet’s sayings and practices. Although, it has been observed that it is a unique tradition, both as form and content, and that the interpretation means are identified with its own unique structure, it has been concluded that the casuistic method is not one of the fundamental elements of both this tradition and Islamic legal thought. This means that the casuistic method is always a tool that can be changed and transformed according to the conditions of time and space.Summary: As it is stated in al-Isrāʾ 17/106: “And (it is) a Qur’ān which we have separated (by intervals) that you might recite it to the people over a prolonged period. And we have sent it down progressive.”, the Qur’ān is revelaed in about twenty-three years by taking into consideration the sociocultural positions of its interlocutors. The Prophet Muḥammad explained the Qur’ān by the virtue of the ayah: “(We sent them) with clear proofs and written ordinances. And We revealed to you the message (i.e. that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them and that they might give thought.” (an-Naḥl 16/44). Of course, there is no subject integrity in this Qurānic chronology-which also reflects life. As a matter of fact, the issues related to individual and society have been independently analyzed by a casuistic/case-based method and ruled in accordance with the intention of Allāh. It can be seen that the ayahs “They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, ‘In them is great sin and (yet, some) benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit.’ And they ask you what they should spend. Say, ‘The excess (beyond needs).’ Thus Allāh makes clear to you the verses (of revelation) that you might give thought.” (al-Baqara 2/219) and other ayahs such as (al-Baqara 2/186; al-Nisāʾ 4/176; al-Anfāl 8/1) reflect the casuistic method in terms of form and content. This can also be exemplified by the Sunna. For example, when the question “Is it permissible to perform ablutions with sea water?” was posed to Messenger of Allāh. He said that “It’s water is clean and his dead (fish) are lawful “(Abū Dāwūd, “Ṭaḥāra”, 41). By this answer, the Prophet Muḥammad indeed ruled and established a general rule.It can be said that this early example table formed the basis of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān in terms of origin, source and application, and that its shape and content are often immanent in the examples it contains. In this article, based on the prophetic period, the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān and casuistic structure has been studied with an analytical and critical approach. Again, because the casuistic method is one of the universal concepts of east-west science and cultural life, an interdisciplinary approach was exhibited in this study. The roots of the casuistic method date back to 5000 BC and the legal systems of the society and states of antiquity are examined from this method. This method is chosen and used in the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān. However, this study does not analyse the sameness or the similarity of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān and the legal schools nor the positive law disciplines, but the casuistic structures used by these, the systems they have built on this basis and the interpretation methods and techniques they have been used and analyzed in terms of their originality.In effect, the article embodies the Qur’ānic exegesis called al-Jâmi li-Aḥkâm al-Qur’ān by al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273), a scholar of tafsīr, ḥadīth and fiqh. In addition to the works of the aḥkām al-Qur’āns, which deal with the interpretation of the ayahs related to the subjects of ʿibādāt, muʿāmalāt ve ʿuḳūbāt, many other works have been used in parallel with the development of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān. al-Qurṭubī, who comparingly explained the legal verses in his tafsīr, investigated the aspects of the Qur’ān and Sunna that indicate the aḥkām, generally interpreted the existing legal norms within the framework of evidence and introduced his own opinions and etasblished his ijtihād. Thus, he benefited from the tafsīr accumulation and contributed to the formation and development of a civil legalization activity with casuistic format. As a matter of fact, the casuistic/case-based method has been used as a codification/tadwīn technique by Western and Eastern legal disciplines and systems. The casuistic method covers both concrete event and abstract ruling methods. In the casuistic method, which is fact-based event, the laws are organized according to all possible events that can be experienced. On the other hand, the abstract method, which is defined as the abstract ruling method, aims to organize the laws in a general and abstract framework. In the article, it is stated that the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān contains both concrete and abstract dimensions in its own way. It has been emphasized that the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān is based on divine revelation (waḥy) and that it is separated from human law as its origin and source, and that this feature is its most faithful characteristic. On this basis, the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān is a separate scholarly tradition and has its own definition, subject and purpose. Its original structure and function have been noted. As a matter of fact, the subject and purpose of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān always require the tafsīr and taʾwīl of the legal verses having regard to the Qur’ān and Sunna. It is also necessary for the purpose of investigating the ways in which nuṣūṣ (an explicit statement upon which a ruling is based) can refer to the provisions and to resolve the issues related to individuals and society. As a matter of fact, the legal verses function as a guide for humanity until the day of judgment as the inspiration for religious-legal matters; they contain the content and provisions that offer happiness in the two worlds. (shrink)

The seal of Prophethood (Khātamu al-nubuwwa) Sīra, Shamā’il, Khasā’is, Dalā’il, genres have been used and utilized within Islamic historical sources as testaments to the prophethood of Muḥammad. The Seal of the Prophethood as a sign has also been mentioned within the religious sources of the People of the Book. According to some narrative traditions, a number of the People of the Book have sought out this sign and consequently embraced Islam. There are Muslim traditions that mention the Seal of the (...) Prophet and also mention that it was seen by some of the Companions. These traditions can be found in Islamic historical sources, such as the works of Ibn Sa‘d, Ibn Isḥāq, and Ṭabarī, and within the topics that cover the birth of the Prophet, shaqq al-ṣadr (the splitting of the Prophet’s chest), bad’ al-waḥy (the beginning of revelation), Isrā’ wa Mi‘rāj (the Nocturnal Journey and Ascendence), and in the ḥadīth of Asmā b. Umays in the context of Prophet’s death. There have been those who have seen it as a hairy spot with a mole as well as those who attributed it miraculous properties. Even though there have been varying interpretations on the nature of the phenomenon of this Seal within the Muslim intellectual traditon, it ought to be taken as a distinctive feature of our Prophet and a distinctive physical sign of his prophethood; and the expectations of the People of the Book and the profusion of tradtions within various sources about the Seal of Prophethood have led us to conclude as such. (shrink)

Prophethood (nubuwwah) is a divine institution that teaches the healthy progression of relations between Allah and humans, as well as between humans and the universe. However, from another perspective, it is also considered a human institution. Some opponents of religion, lacking strong evidence to challenge the existence of Allah, direct their objections towards prophethood, which is seen as a manifestation of Allah’s attribute of speech (kalām). To counter the rejection of prophethood, scholars of theology (kalām), hadith, and Prophetic biography (sīrah) (...) have compiled a body of literature known as Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah (Proofs of Prophethood). Their aim has been to collect proofs supporting prophethood as a response to these refutations and to dispel doubts regarding it. All extraordinary events occurring from before the birth until the death of Prophet Muhammad are considered evidence.During the fifth century, a notable figure in this tradition was the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Māwardī, who defended prophethood in his book Aʿlām al-nubuwwah (The Signs of Prophethood). Aʿlām al-nubuwwah has inspired subsequent works in this field due to its clarity and robust proofs. It became known by both names, Aʿlām al-nubuwwah and Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah, as it encompassed methods of narration and debate. Within his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barāhimah, Dahriyyah, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. According to him, Barāhimah, of Indian origin is a sect that denies prophethood despite accepting the unity of Allah. Dahriyyah is a denialist sect attributing eternity to the universe and creativity to nature. Al-Māwardī considers these philosophers as infidels due to their comments on prophethood rather than outright denial. The basis of these movements' idea of denying prophethood lies in their efforts to portray reason (ʿaql) as an alternative to revelation (waḥy). Jews and Christians, on the other hand, are portrayed as groups that accept the concept of prophethood, however they reject Muḥammad’s. prophecy. Their objection stems from the fear of their religions being superseded. Al-Māwardī counters those rejecting prophethood by addressing the public interest (maṣlaḥah) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He illustrates that prophet charged with the duty of prophethood proves it through spectacular events orchestrated by Allah but carried out through his own hand. The prophet serves the public interest by conveying matters beyond human intellect and presenting them in a comprehensible manner, thereby ensuring the worldly and eternal felicity of humanity. Furthermore, he provides evidence for the Prophet Muḥammad’s prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. The biography of Prophet Muhammad’s begins before his birth, and the method of proof is used to demonstrate his prophethood. In essence, al-Māwardī’s method of proving prophethood in Aʿlām al-nubuwwah can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology and hadith. One prominent figure in this tradition during the fifth century was the Shafi'i scholar al-Māwardī who defended prophethood through his book " ʿA'lām al-Nubuwwa" (The Signs of Prophethood). In his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barahima, Dahriyya, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. While the Jews and Christians accept the concept of prophethood, they reject the prophecy of Muhammad (P.B.U.H). These groups attempt to present logic as an alternative to divine revelation (Wahy), as their objection stems from their concern that their religions may be abrogated. Al-Māwardī responds to those who reject the institution of prophethood by addressing the public interest (maslaha) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He also provides evidence for Muhammad's (P.B.U.H) prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. In short, al-Māwardī's method of proving prophethood in "A'lām al-Nubuwwa " can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology (Kalam) and hadith. (shrink)

The subject “rule”, which is one of the most fundamental issues of the Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), has been in the center of methodological debates. There is one important term in this regard, which should be studied very carefully: Khiṭāb(speech) of the God. It is because that, especially since the first period of Islam, it has been taken with some significant terms in the field of Kalāmsuch as Husn (pretty; good), Qubh (ugly; evil), and the quality of God’s talk. (...) Yet, adopting this term in the description of the “rule” shows that Fiqh is based on divine inspiration, and it also emphasizes that even though there are some differences in details, wisdom of human being is not ignored when adjudicating. Moreover, it suggests that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling case is related to the connection through the term speech or divine inspiration. In this regard, Kalāmdimension of the term and its affect to legal theoretical discussions are very important in terms of historical process of the definition of the “rule” in Islamic law. In this study, I tried to examine whether or not the term “khiṭābof the God” which is used in the definition of the “rule” formed a limitation for consideration of legal evidence in Islamic law and if there is any limitation for the legal evidence regarding being only in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah due to this definition.SummaryThe “hukm (rule, arbritation, judgment, God’s will)”-as the backbone notion in usūl al-fiqhis one of the significant key notions discussed in the legal theory. Specifically, the term “khitabullah” mentioned in the definition of hukmis noteworthy to investigate. Since the early formation period of Islamic law, the term khitabullahhas been embraced along with the theological subjects: “husnand qubuh(the good and evil) and kalām(the attribute of speech to Allah)”. The term “khitabullah” in the definition of hukmemphasizes that indeed the source of fiqhis the revelation (wahy) and also emphasizes that the function of reason (‘aql) is not ignored in the process of adjudication- even if there are some nuances in details.Additionally, it presents that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling a case is connected to the term speech (khitāb), or in other words to revelation (wahy).On the whole, in the legal theory, the rule of Sharī‘ah is defined as God’s khitab(the communication of God), which means the demand of God relating to the acts of those who are subject of law or the effect of the khitābon the acts of those persons. Although, in the early formative period various explanations were made about what the rule is, it can be understood that the present definition of hukmbegan to evolve towards the end of the 5thcentury (A. H.). It is clear that al-Ghazālī had an impact on the formation of this definition. It is because al-Ghazālī defined the rule of Sharī‘ahas “the communication from God relating to an act of the person who is the subject of law”. After al-Ghazālī, al-Rādī and al-Baydāwī added to al-Ghazālī’s definition the words “iqtidā and takhyīr” and Ibn Hājib added “wad‘an”. Whereas in the Mutakallimun(theologians) tradition, Ibn Hacib's definition was preferred, Fuqaha(jurists) tradition chose two definitions-resembling each other: “Those coming to exist with the khitāb” and “the effect of God’s khitāb”.Along with al-Ghazālī’s definition, the concept of khitābcarved out a niche for itself in it and became the main element of the definition. It is understood that some discussions in the field of theology, such as husn-qubhand God’s attribute of speech have been effective on the interpretation of the concept of khitāb. The Ash‘arilegal theorists argue that the good and evil are not attributes of the self / the acts, whereas the Maturidi legal theorists argue that the exploration and determination of these attributes is rational and thus, the verdict reached via this rationale is lawful. The Maturidi legal theorists initiated the concept of being subject of law with the concept Sharī‘ah and in the line with this opinion; they defined hukmon the basis of khitāb. On the other hand, the Mutazilites’ claiming the attribute of good and evil are inherent feature of the act, did not define hukmon the basis of the khitābaccording to their theological understanding. The word of khitābassessed with God’s eternal speech (al-kalām al-azalī) has been approached from various aspects: for instance, whether the presence of the addressee is mandatory. The early Asharites scholars (mutaqaddimun), in particular Imam Asharī, did not entitle the eternal speech as khitāb. They consider that the presence of the interlocutor is necessary in the conversion of Kalāminto khitāb. The mutaakhirunAsharites (successors of the early Asharites scholars) did not consider the presence of the interlocutor necessary, thus they viewed the eternal speech as khitāb. The former identification of the hukmwith khitābby the early Ashari legal theorists caused to the problem of whether hukmis adventitious or not. Therefore, this approach was criticised by the Mutazilites. On the other hand, the Maturidi and Mutezilite legal theorists accept that hukmis adventitious; hence they do not consider as a problem naming the eternal speech of God as khitāb.When the historical course is examined, it can be said that one of the important aspects of the development of hukm’s definition is the use of khitāb. Khitābin some cases is used without possessive construction, in other cases it is used with possessive construction with God, or in possessive construction with shar’ or Shāri’. The most important one within these possessive constructions is the notion “khitaballah”. Therefore, it is necessary for khitaballahto be approached from the angle of the legal theory. In comparison to other terms, this notion narrowed the scope of the rule down. In the meanwhile, it raised the question: how the rule deduced via legal evidences can be incorporated in khitāb? As a consequence of this question, some legal theorists, such as Tūfī, proposed another definition by adducing this question.Although it is commonly accepted that the rules deduced via other evidences are within the context of the khitāb, there are also different descriptions about the concept of khitaballah. The rule is not limited to khitaballahin the conception of traditional interpretation accepting the khitābas eternal speech or literal speech (al-kalām al-lafzī). Because either all evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the eternal speech or other evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the literal speech. Thus, each result coming to exist with the other evidences is part of the Islamic law. But not all of these rules are considered equal to each other. Because each rule which is deduced from indisputable origin (qatii al-thubut) and is deduced from completely explicit sources (qatii al-dalala) are accepted as the word of God or the Prophet. On the other hand, other rules deduced via jurisprudence- in other words by jurist’s own value of judgment is viewed as the virtual rule (al-hukm al-zāhir). Such rules do not express absolute certainty. It is unacceptable for these rules to be described as the word of God or the Prophet. In this way, it is clearly understood that the concept of khitaballahmentioned in the description do not introduce restriction to the evidences ofSharī‘ah.We do not see a contradiction when the indefinite rules of Islamic law included in the context of khitāb. Because ijtihāddoes not aim to produce a new rule, on the contrary it functions in order to find out the already existing rules. The legitimacy of the rule obtained through ijtihādemerges from the way that this rule is deduced from the khitāb,which directly or indirectly represents the divine will. In addition, according to us, this legitimacy is not merely limited to versification and conception of the khitāb, but it also includes the function of the reason in (reasonable of the) khitāb. As a matter of fact, trying to solve unlimited cases with limited texts is difficult- in fact this is impossible. The majority of the legal theorists also share this opinion. Then, there is no obstacle in accepting that each rule obtained by authentic source and methodology can be considered part of Islamic law by implicating the rule in the context of khitāb(which represents the divine will) - although it may contain error and presumption. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on intersections between colonial violence, aesthetics, and ecological crises as reflections of a crisis of the political imagination. I engage Namita Goswami’s Subjects That Matter and argue that the ways in which her text pursues forms of questioning racialized and gendered colonial violences provides a context for approaching variations of colonial violence collectively. By engaging Goswami’s text, I propose a postcolonial aesthetics as a way of rethinking our planetary bonds, aesthetically. I further argue that (...) postcolonial aesthetics runs contrary to our contemporary political imagination, and that it makes the crisis of this imaginary apparent. (shrink)

Can the Transsexual speak? I investigate this question through the case of Ella Nik Bayan who self-immolated in Berlin (Germany) on September 14, 2021. I first argue that this self-immolation is unreadable within the current frameworks of Western democracies. The case, however, paradigmatically demonstrates that emancipation within the confines of neoliberal capitalism can only be read under the pretense of a toxic protection. I then move on to claim that Ella Nik Bayan’s self-immolation calls for a completely different political order (...) from the one we currently inhabit, which, with Namita Goswami, I call “ heterogeneous.” I argue that heterogeneous politics is a politics of radical hospitality that opposes institutions of private property in particular. Unlearning private property means to pre-enact a world without the kind of racist, transmisogynist, and antisemitic violence that killed Ella Nik Bayan. Anti-capitalist hospitality sets out to create the social and cultural resources that enable a world beyond (such) violence. (shrink)

In this article, I explore Namita Goswami’s Subjects That Matter. Goswami has laid out an extensive excavation of the variety, depth, and breadth of antagonistic encounters between the Western world and subaltern subjects. I am interested in Goswami’s take on the production of the unknowable women of color who are constructed either as good wives, animate objects without wills of their own, or transgressors of the genre of producing women of color as oppressed. I argue that the question of (...) heterogeneity already assumes the very thing that is under question: to presuppose heterogeneity is already to presuppose its limit conditions—to already understand what difference looks like, which could preempt the possibility of infinite, or indefinite iterations. The irony is that we run the risk of assuming the very thing that we are trying not to presuppose, anticipate, or cordon off. Moreover, I question whether it is possible to encounter deep radical differences in any way other than antagonistically, since the unknown, from experience, is assumed to threaten. (shrink)

The thought system of Qâdî ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, who is a productive intellectual worker in the Mu‘tazilî school, is established on the contingency (imkân) of obligation (taklîf) of the God upon people. In other words he has a universe and order of thought which is built around the term obligation. Therefore, the content of Qâdî’s aforementioned thought which has a very significant place in Mu‘tazilî thought is constituted of responsbilities of human beings. These responsibilities of the human beings are gathered under (...) the title of rational ones (aqliyyât) in terms of being held responsible by reason and the title sem‘iyyât which covers the things that fall under the category of responsibilities that can be only known by revelation (wahy) due to the imposibility of being assigned by the sole reason. In short, aqliyyât corrresponds to the rational field of obligation whereas se‘miyyât corresponds to the legal (shar’i) field of responsibility. The responsibilites under the title aqliyyât are such as tawhîd, justice, and other non-primary premises that serve as instruments for comrehending these two terms. The content of sem‘iyyât, on the other hand, is constituted of the issues that fall outside of the rational obligation (taklîf al-aqlî) and can only be known by means of sam‘ (revelation) such as the knowledge that adultry leads to moral corruption or the knowledge of juristic worships. We can observe that Qâdî ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, did make use of three different kinds of proofs in order to prove, found, and justify the aforementioned issues which lay the foundations for his thought. These are rational (aqlî), revelational (sam‘î) and linguistic (lugawi) proofs, respectively. For each of these kinds of proofs there is an idiosyncratic domain of coverage on which that kind of proof is considered as the unique authority. This research aims to elaborate the domain the only authority of which is the linguistic proofs and also aims to render it comprehensive. So to speak, the motivating factor of this research is to clarify the question of to what extent the language plays a role in Qâdî’s thought and its domain of influence in the simplest way. (shrink)

In the Qurʾān, the night which encompass half of human life, is expressed by various concepts. From sunset to sunrise (night), various moments of the time frame are also named with different words and concepts. On the other hand, besides sleep and rest, some worship and actions that are asked to be done at night are also mentioned in the Qur’ānic verses. Also sleep at night and the night itself is mentioned as a proof of Allah and an important blessing (...) for us. When we say “night”, people first think of sleep and rest. However, as it is understood from the Qur’ānic verses, the night should not be seen only as a sleep time and rest time. Such that one of the first commandments to the Prophet Muḥammad was to wake up at night and perform various worship and deeds. Also, it is emphasized in the Qurʾān that night worship and actions influence and leave permanent impacts on human being. In this context, in this study, we tried to identify the concepts and expressions stated in the Qurʾān expressing the night-time or the time slices in it by taking into account the references in the Qur’ānic verses. Moreover, we have also examined worship and actions performed or recommended to do at night. Again, we have researched how the worship and actions performed in the calm and darkness of the night will contribute to human being. Thus, we tried to determine how the Qurʾān addresses the "night" which is the preparation time for the next day and the assessment time of the previous day.Summary: One lives half of his life during the day and the other half at night. However, he plans his daily tasks mostly according to daytime, and spends his nights mostly for sleep and rest. On the other hand, sparing the night completely for sleep and rest means that a long period of life passes passively by. That is why we have decided to do a night-time study that expresses an important time frame for human being. Although there are some ḥadīth about the importance of night worship in the sources, we tried to conduct our research within the framework of the Qur’ānic verses about the night. To determine the meaning and the importance attributed to the night by the Qurʾān, we have examined the Qur’ānic verses referring to night-time, night events and worship and actions that are desired to be done during these times. We concluded our research by making use of the main sources of tafsīr and relevant copyrighted works, articles, papers and encyclopedia articles.During the research we saw that the Qurʾān refers to the night and some time periods in it with different names. In this context, we see that concepts such as leyl (ليل), beyāt (بيات), fajr (فجر), seḥar (سحر), ğāsik (غاسق), ʿashiyy (عشيّ) and asīl (أصيل) are used in the āya. In many Qur’ānic verses, phrases reffering an entire day with specific composition such as day-night and morning-evening are used. In the composition of day and night, night is always mentioned first. In the compositions in the form of morning-evening, we see that sometimes the morning is mentioned first, and sometimes the evening. In addition to these, there are expressions such as before the sunrise, sunset, stay until evening that evokes night-time in the Qurʾān.Another point that draws attention in the research is that there are vows on the night or on certain times in the night in the Qurʾān. We can say that the vows in question are an indication of the importance that Allah gives to the night and some time in it. In fact, Allah points to the night, the functions of the night and its relationship with the day as a āyah (proof) of his existence, might and uniqueness.On the other hand, there are many good and bad historical events that happened during the night in the Qurʾān. First of all, it should be noted that the beginning of the waḥy (devine revalation), which is one of the biggest historical events, took place at night. The Qurʾān describes this night, which is mentioned as Laylat al-Qadr, as better than a thousand months. Again, it is mentioned in the Qurʾānic verses that Prophet Moses and Lūṭ left their countries by taking advantage of the darkness of the night with the believers to get rid of the evil of the oppressors. Also, deniers sometimes chose especially the night-time to carry out cheats and traps for the prophets and believers, and even attempts to assassinate. The fact that the night is dark, quiet and calm obsufucates such negative actions. For this reason, the Qurʾān recommended to take refuge in the Lord of the daybreak from the evil of the darkness.The research demonstrates that the Qurʾān asks people to perform various worships and actions in certain time periods of the night. In fact, even in the early days of waḥy, the Prophet was commanded to wake up at night and perform some worship and actions. In this context, he was asked to pray at night, read the Qurʾān by contemplating and understanding, and chant the name of his Lord. Actually, the Prophet is prepared for the heavy responsibility he took spiritually with such actions that he performed at night. Because a strong spirit and mind are necessary for facing up to what will happen during the next day. It is already stated in the Qurʾān that getting up at night has effective and permanent effects on people. Again, during the prophethood, The Prophet has advised to perform some actions such as sajdah (prostration), qiyām, tasbīḥ and tahajjud ṣalāt (night prayer) -as a special night prayer- during the night.In the Qurʾānic verses examined, some prayers and actions are asked to do at night and day regardless of time. Especially three of the farḍ of prayer (ṣalāt), namely evening, ʿišāʾ and fajr prayer (ṣalāt), are performed during the time defined as night. In addition, some aspects such as duʿāʾ (prayer), istighfār (ask for forgiveness), ṣadaqa and daʿwah (call) are mentioned in the Qurʾānic verses. It is an order or recommendation that all this be done at night as well as during the day. Especially for istighfār which means to ask for forgiveness, it is mentioned the time of dawning.As a result, we can say that there are some special features that make the night different from daytime. For instance, it prepares a suitable environment to sleep and rest for one who is tired mentally, spiritually and physically after the daytime; as the night has features such as darkness, silence and tranquility that man needs to rest and be calm. On the other hand, Allah does not want the night, which means half of human life, to be spent entirely with sleep and rest. As, one rests not only his body but also his mind and soul in the quiet and calm atmosphere of the night, Hereby, human-being starts the next day with a more vigorous mind, spirit and body. At night-time, while making an evaluation of the previous day's deeds and actions, people are also prepared spiritually and mentally for the next day's works.We can say that worship and deeds performed at night are more sincere than those performed during daytime, because man stays alone with his nafs and his Lord at night, away from the eyes. This can keep people away from riyā (pretension) and vanity that invalidates their deeds. Man's waking up and worshiping his Lord at a time when everyone is asleep shows his ikhlāṣ and sincerity. All these indicate that the time of responsibility for man is not limited to daytime. For this reason, people should think day and night together within the framework of his responsibilities and do their work accordingly. (shrink)

Allah’ın ilk insanı, ilk peygamber yapmak suretiyle, insanoğlu ile iletişim kurmayı ve ona hitap eden vahiyler göndermeyi amaçladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Söz gelimi Tevrât’ı İbranice, İncîl’i Süryanice ve Kur’ân’ı Arapça göndermek suretiyle insanlar tarafından anlaşılmak istemiştir. Bununla birlikte onun İbranice kelâmı, Süryanice sözünden ve Arapça kelâmı da diğer dillerdeki sözünden farklı bir tabiata sahiptir. Bu gerçeklikten hareketle İslâm düşünce-fikir tarihine bakıldığında ilim adamlarının ilâhî kelâmın mâhiyetini, tabiatını anlamak ve bunu anlamlandırmak konusunda bir çabanın içerisine girdikleri görülmektedir. Esasen Allah’ın nasıl bir kelâma sahip (...) olduğunu anlamak ve kavramak, cismanî/fizik âleminden gayrı cismanî/fizikötesine doğru bir bakış çabasıdır. Buna rağmen hakikatin yılmaz arayıcısı insan, bu konuda söyleyecek bir söz bulabilme çabası içindedir. “İlâhî kelâmı”, Allah’ın bir sıfatı olarak değerlendirenler olduğu gibi bunu “ilâhî bir fiil” olarak telakki edenler de bulunmaktadır. İlâhî kelâm sıfatının veya fiilinin tecellîsinin Kur’ân olduğu da ehlince müsellemdir. Kur’ân lafızlarının aidiyeti konusunda başlıca üç görüş ortaya konulmuştur. Bu görüşler içerisinde hâkim ve râcih bakış açısına göre Kur’ân metni, lafız ve mana itibariyle Allah’a aittir. Buna göre Hz. Muhammed’e nâzil olan Kur’ân vahyi hem lafız hem de manadan oluşmaktadır. Bu telakkîyi savunan müelliflere göre vahyin oluşumu ve iletimi konusunda ne Cebrâil’in ne de Hz. Muhammed’in herhangi bir müdahale veya katkısı olmuştur. Dolayısıyla peygamberin vahiy nüzûl sürecinde rolünün tamamen pasif olduğu söylenebilir. Cibrîl, Kur’ân’ı önceden yazılı olarak bulunan bir mekândan, yani levh-i mahfûzdan ezberleyerek veya Allah’tan işiterek ya da Allah’ın lafızları ona vahyetmesiyle Hz. Peygamber’e indirmiştir. İkinci yaklaşıma göre Kur’ân metninin manası Allah’a, lafızları Hz. Peygamber’e aittir. Bu yaklaşıma göre Cebrâil, sadece manaları Hz. Peygamber’e indirmiştir. Hz. Peygamber de kendisine bildirilen manaları kavramış ve onları Arapça ifade kalıplarında söylemiştir. Üçüncü yaklaşıma göre ise Kur’ân’ın manası Allah’a, lafızları Cebrâil’e ait olmaktadır. Yani Cebrâil’e yalnız mana ilkâ edildi ve o lafızları oluşturdu. Bu çalışmada İslâm düşünce tarihinde ilim adamlarının kelâmullâhın tabiatını anlamak ve bunu anlamlandırmak konusunda lafızların aidiyeti konusunda ortaya koydukları söz konusu yaklaşımlar öncelikle deskriptif (tasvîrî/betimleyici) bir üslupla incelenmektedir. Akabinde bu doğrultuda serdedilen yaklaşımlar Kur’ân’ın bütünlüğü ve klasik dönem tefsir merviyyâtı açısından analitik (tahlîlî/istidlâlî) bir bakış açısıyla irdelenmektedir. Denilebilir ki Kur’ân’ın mana yönüyle Allah’a aidiyeti konusunda ilim ehli arasında herhangi bir ihtilâf yoktur. Temel ihtilâf Kur’ân lafızlarının Allah’a mı Cebrâil’e mi yoksa Hz. Muhammed’e mi ait olduğu hususudur. Kur’ân’ın bütünlüğü ve vahyin nüzûl keyfiyetine dair klasik dönem tefsir rivayetleri dikkate alındığında hâkim görüşün diğer iki görüşe göre daha tutarlı olduğu kanaatine ulaşılmaktadır. (shrink)