Devetnaesti vek za Rusku i Tursku carevinu predstavlja period donosenja reformskih zakona sa ciljem da se drzave modernizuju i, koliko mogu, odgovore duhu vremena. Premda su u Rusiji reforme kocene rezimom arakcejevstine i reakcionarnom politikom Nikolaja I, drzava je nacinila ozbiljan korak u borbi protiv sistemske korupcije donosenjem Krivicnog zakonika 1845. godine. Sa druge strane, Turska je bila pod nesumnjivo vecim stranim pritiskom kada je proces modernizacije bio u pitanju. Period tanzimata oznacava krupno razdoblje u kome se Turska, izmedju ostalog, (...) suocila sa sveprisutnom korupcijom. Krunu turskog reformatorskog rada na ovom polju predstavlja donosenje Krivicnog zakonika 1856. godine. U radu se analiziraju konkretni zakoni kojima je korupcija sankcionisana u ove dve carevine. (shrink)

According to Douglas Walton, the concept of presumption relates to both logical and dialogical components. Logically, a presumption is the conclusion of a presumptive defeasible inference. Dialogically, the function of a presumptions to shift the burden of proof to the respondent in order to move the dialogue forward when the proponent, due to an objective lack of evidence, cannot present a sufficiently persuasive proposition. Presumptive status, assigned only at the argumentation stage of dialogue, is provisional: a particular presumption stands until (...) further counter-indications are found. This paper points out some possible difficulties pertaining to Walton’s dialogical model of presumption. Firstly, once a presumption's typical practical function is made precise, Walton’s idea of presumption starts to lose its conceptual cohesion, thereby becoming applicable in the opening stage of dialogue, as well. Secondly, cohesion is lost also in practical contexts, since Walton's "seat belts" example might indicate that presumptions are not evidentially defeasible if the practical stakes are raised high enough. Most importantly, contextual evaluation may reveal that presumptions do not shift the burden of proof in any specific or genuine way. (shrink)

Over the past 10 years, Cognitive Linguistics has taken a quantitative turn. Yet, concerns have been raised that this preoccupation with quantification and modelling may not bring us any closer to understanding how language works. We show that this objection is unfounded, especially if we rely on modelling techniques based on biologically and psychologically plausible learning algorithms. These make it possible to take a quantitative approach, while generating and testing specific hypotheses that will advance our understanding of how knowledge of (...) language emerges from exposure to usage. (shrink)

Znano je, da so negativne velikosti svojo legitimnost od svojega nastanka dalje dobile skozi to, da so bile interpretirane kot dolg. S pretvorbo matematike v prirodoslovje pa je ta interpretacija postala nezadostna. Kantov spis iz leta 1763 o negativnih velikosti predstavlja poskus, da se po vzoru na Eulerjev argument o neizogibnosti iz dela Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps pokaže realnost negativnih velikosti izhajajoč iz tretjega Newtonovega zakona akcije in reakcije. Kantov pojem realne zoperstavljenosti skuša dotedanjo interpretacijo – dolg, spraviti (...) z novo – silo. V tekstu nas zanima težava, ki pri tem nastopi: potlačitev paradoksa negativnih velikosti, ki ga je lahko interpretativno zadovoljil le dolg. Drugače rečeno, paradoksna lastnost negativnih velikosti, ki jo je lahko za realno naredil dolg kot družbeni objekt, postane glavna prepreka za njihovo fizikalno intepretacijo. (shrink)

This work analyzes the problem of the development of John Locke’s ideas on toleration, in particular the grounds of separation of church and state. The first part examines Locke’s arguments regarding the prerogatives of the magistrate towards ‘indifferent things’ and the religious sphere. I distinguish between three stages in the development of Locke’s view on toleration: a suspicion toward the plea for it (the Two Tracts); an implicit non-verbalized distinction between church and state, and support for toleration (An Essay on (...) Toleration); and toleration as a political right (A Letter Concerning Toleration, the Two Treatises and the later letters). The second part focuses on the definition of ‘commonwealth’ in A Letter Concerning Toleration. I outline two fundamental sets of interdependent arguments that Locke uses for the separation of church and state. The third part is dedicated to the sphere of the church and the dimensions of the duty of toleration. The relation between Locke’s views on toleration and political practice explains the shift between the three stages, and is explored throughout the paper. (shrink)

Forgetting Futures reignites the debate about the crisis of memory and the search to understand the relationship between past and present, remembering and forgetting. In the book Petar Ramadanovic presents an elegant critique of the most significant concepts of memory, from Plato to Nietzsche, as he challenges the prevalent, Aristotelain understanding of memory as mere repeated presentation of the past in the present. Ramadanovic skillfully examines the power of traumatic memory in history. Through an analysis of Cathy Caruth and (...) a ground breaking revisionist interpretation of Toni Morrison's Beloved he shows how the memory of the Holocaust and slavery has shaped American identity. This unique study of memory places trauma, identity, and race under the intellectual microscope resulting in a book of great use for literary and cultural studies scholars, and educated readers seeking to learn more about the relationship between history and memory. (shrink)

This paper explores relationships between environment and education after the Covid-19 pandemic through the lens of philosophy of education in a new key developed by Michael Peters and the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia. The paper is collectively written by 15 authors who responded to the question: Who remembers Greta Thunberg? Their answers are classified into four main themes and corresponding sections. The first section, ‘As we bake the earth, let's try and bake it from scratch’, gathers wider philosophical (...) considerations about the intersection between environment, education, and the pandemic. The second section, ‘Bump in the road or a catalyst for structural change?’, looks more closely into issues pertaining to education. The third section, ‘If you choose to fail us, we will never forgive you’, focuses to Greta Thunberg’s messages and their responses. The last section, ‘Towards a new normal’, explores future scenarios and develops recommendations for critical emancipatory action. The concluding part brings these insights together, showing that resulting synergy between the answers offers much more then the sum of articles’ parts. With its ethos of collectivity, interconnectedness, and solidarity, philosophy of education in a new key is a crucial tool for development of post-pandemic education. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 27 Heft: 4 Seiten: 507-526.

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)

This book challenges the hegemonic view that economic calculation represents the ultimate rationality. The West legitimises its global dominance by the claim to be a rational, democratic, science-based and progressive civilisation. Yet, over the past decades, the dogma of economic rationality has become an ideological black hole whose gravitational pull allows no public debate or policy to escape. Political leaders of all creeds are held in its orbit and public language is saturated by it. This dogma has pervaded all spheres (...) of life, ushering the age of post-rationality, especially in English speaking countries. The authors discuss several aspects of post-rational global capitalism still dominated by the Anglosphere: hyper-competition, hyper-consumption, inequality, volatile global financial markets, environmental degradation and the unforeseen effects of the internet-mediated communication revolution. The book concludes by discussing some utopian and dystopian future scenarios and asking whether the West can transcend its crisis of rationality. (shrink)

In his poems, Paul Celan does not use words such as territory, border, border crossing, and only very rarely the word space. I would like to reconstruct the traces of?Heimat? in Celan, and perhaps try to describe what Heimat might have meant for the young Paul Antschel. That is to say, I would like to understand whether?Heimat? is synonymous with what Celan speaks about, many years after his name change, in the address given on the occasion of the Georg-Buechner-Preis:?Ich suche (...) auch, denn ich bin ja wieder da, wo ich begonnen habe, den Ort meiner eigenen Herkunft.? In the poems written at the time when Antschel is learning Hebrew as well as reading Martin Buber for the first time, I look for some basic figures Celan ties to his life in Bukovina at the time, in the environment of Czernowitzer Judentums. Aside from the works by Israel Chalfen, Else Keren and Elke Guenzel, I would like to make use of a book published some ten years ago, a detailed listing of Celan?s Paris library. I would like to consult this archive in the coming period, since Celan punctuated the margins of many of those books with evocations of his early creative period. (shrink)

Review of Panagiotis Thanassas, Parmenides, Cosmos, and Being: A Philosophical Interpretation, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 2007.

Michael Oakeshott criticises rationalism in politics because it excludes everything that is not grounded in and justified by theory. Theoretical knowledge, according to Oakeshott, isn’t capable of absorbing the given diversity because it operates in different categories than the reality it seeks to grasp. As a consequence, rationalism reduces politics to problem- solving activity. Oakeshott’s formula for the return to autonomous politics is its emancipation in civil association, a framework constituted in terms of common recognition of general rules within which (...) politics in the form of conversation is to be exercised. Corrective to Oakeshott’s utopian project is given by Michel Foucault’s thought where it is best shown how common institutions, norms and laws are a result of very complex power relations. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott upućuje kritiku racionalizmu u politici koji isključuje sve što nije utemeljeno u teoriji, odnosno njome opravdano. Teoretsko znanje, prema Oakeshottu, ne može apsorbirati raznolikost svijeta jer rukuje drugačijim kategorijama od onih koje pripadaju realnom svijetu. Posljedično, racionalizam svodi politiku na djelatnost rješavanja problema. Oakeshottova formula za povratak autonomiji političke djelatnosti jest njezina emancipacija u civilnom udruživanju, okviru koji se temelji na priznavanju općih pravila kao takvih, unutar kojeg politička djelatnost zauzima oblik razgovora. Korektiv Oakeshottovu utopijskom projektu nadaje se (...) u misli Michela Foucaulta gdje je najbolje demonstrirana ovisnost zajedničkih institucija, normi i zakona o vrlo kompleksnim odnosima moći. (shrink)

Once upon a time, there was this pilot. His plane was about to crash and he had to choose whether to steer his plane to a less or a more inhabited area. You'd think his choice would be simple, right? But before you give your response, consider the following situation that is practically the same, only a bit different.A judge faces rioters. The crowd demands that the culprit be found guilty for a certain crime or else they will take revenge (...) on a particular section of the community. Since the real culprit is unknown, the judge realizes that he can prevent bloodshed only by framing some innocent bystander and having him executed to save the lives of many. But should he do it? Can he, like the pilot from the scenario... (shrink)

With articles by Katharina Boele-Woelki and Ronald H. van Ooik, Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen and Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, national reports from Canada, Russia, Belgium and China, reports on court decisions and news from The Hague, Rome and Washington as well as texts, materials and recent developments.

With articles by Eric Clive, Manuel Rui Moura Ramos, William Duncan, national reports from Australia, the United States, Italy, Macao and Brazil and news from The Hague as well as texts, materials and recent developments.

With articles by Symeon Symeonides, Ronald A. Brand, Andrea Bonomi, national reports from Korea, Bulgaria and Slovenia and news from The Hague and Brussels as well as texts, materials and recent developments.

On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous, and likely implausible. (...) As a result, they require qualifications. (shrink)

This paper examines relationships between learning and technological change and argues that we urgently need new ways to approach what it means to learn in the context of a global Fourth Industrial Revolution. It briefly introduces the postdigital perspective, which considers the digital ‘revolution’ as something that has already happened and focuses to its reconfiguration. It claims that what we access, how we access it, what we do with it, and who then accesses what we have done, are important elements (...) of a postdigital world worthy of closer examination. Focusing to recent debates about postdigital collective intelligence, we develop the concept of postdigital we-learn by showing that it might help us, amongst other things, to counter the idea of a lone human accessing education primarily for future individual, economic profit, as prescribed by the neoliberal learning economy. Building on new schools of thought emerging in response to the expansion of non-human agency, we refine the concept of postdigital we-learn as a gathering between humans and machines. The consequences of this gathering are uncomfortable, as they imply unlearning elements of both capitalism and critical pedagogy. However, such unlearning is inherent to ‘a critical pedagogy of becoming’ and positions postdigital we-learn as a suitable framework for understanding and development of emancipatory, critical learning in our postdigital reality. (shrink)

This special issue of Cognitive Linguistics reexamines the notions of uniformity and variability within morphological systems from a cognitive linguistic standpoint. It challenges traditional perspectives that regard morphological variability as mere deviations from the norm, suggesting instead that such variability is systematic and shaped by external influences including language acquisition and processing constraints. The contributions in this issue promote a shift from isolated analysis to a holistic view of paradigms, classes, and systems, advocating for a framework where morphological structures are (...) seen as integral to communicative and functional aspects of language. By accounting for the broad adaptive dynamics of language systems, the complex interplay between uniformity and variability is revealed as an inherent aspect of language usage. (shrink)

One of the main goals of sport psychology is to identify those psychological factors that are relevant for sport performance as well as possibilities of their development. The aim of the study was to determine whether the set of specific psychological characteristics [generalized self-efficacy, time perspective, emotional intelligence, general achievement motivation, and personality dimensions] makes the distinction between athletes based on their -participation in the senior national team, that is, their belonging to the subsample of elite or non-elite athletes depending (...) on this criterion. According to the group centroids it can be said that elite athletes are characterized by a positive high score in self-efficacy, emotionality, present fatalistic time perspective, past positive time perspective, and openness to experience. They are also characterized by low past negative time perspective, emotional competence, and future time perspective. Non-elite athletes have the opposite traits. The results have been discussed in the context of their application in the process of talent selection and development in sport as well as the development of life skills in athletes. (shrink)

We discuss a number of fundamental aspects of modern cosmological concepts, from the phenomenological, observational, theoretical and epistemic points of view. We argue that the modern cosmology, despite a great advent, in particular in the observational sector, is yet to solve important problems, posed already by the classical times. In particular the stress is put on discerning the scientific features of modern cosmological paradigms from the more speculative ones, with the latter immersed in some aspects deeply into mythological world picture. (...) We finally discuss the principal paradigms, which are present in the modern cosmological studies and evaluate their epistemic merits. (shrink)

The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions, and promote different kinds of goals. Accordingly, there are “practical” and “cognitive” presumptions. In this paper, I show that the differences between practical and cognitive presumptions go far beyond contextual considerations. The central aim is to explore Nicholas Rescher’s contention that both types of presumptions (...) have a closely analogous pragmatic function, i.e., that practical and cognitive presumptions are made to avoid greater harm in circumstances of epistemic uncertainty. By comparing schemes of practical and cognitive reasoning, I show that Rescher’s contention requires qualifications. Moreover, not only do practical and cognitive presumptions have distinct pragmatic functions, but they also perform different dialogical functions and, in some circumstances, cannot be defeated by the same kinds of evidence. Hence, I conclude that the two classes of presumptions merit distinct treatment in argumentation theory. (shrink)

The articles intention is to construct a possible minimal response to violence, that is, to describe what would be justified противонасилие. This argument is built on reviving several important philosophical texts in Russian of the first half of the twentieth century as well as on going beyond that historical moment. Starting with the reconstruction of Tolstoys criticism of any use of violence, it is then shown that, paradoxically, resistance to Tolstoys or pseudo-Tolstoys teachings ends up incorporating Tolstoys thematization of counter-violence (...) into various theories, which sought to legitimate the use of force. In particular, Tolstoys discovery of a force, which, on the one hand, is not grounded in violence and, on the other hand, which is capable of countering violence, becomes fundamental in reasoning about the just use of force. The connection is made between Tolstoy and Petar II Petrović Njego, who also thematizes the use of force in Christian perspective. In his view, justice, blessed by the Creators hand, has the capacity to protect from violent force. Any living thing defends itself from what endangers it by means Creator bestowed it with. Living force and protective use of force are conceptually linked in Njegos reasoning. Thus, only protective force can defeat aggressive force. This is shown to be Njegos contribution to the Orthodox Christian discourse on violence. If a force can be counter-violent, the next step in our argument would be to search for a protocol that should have universal validity, that is, it has to be valid for all conflicting sides, The protocol of counter-violence requires that, firstly, it is a response to violence; secondly, it interrupts violence and forestalls any possible future violence ; thirdly, it is subject to verification, it addresses those who are a priori against any response to violence. Finally, it is shown that state power does not create law, but it is being right that makes law or gives life to social order, and thereby can authorize the use of force. This is the innovation in the histories of justification of force, absent in the West. Aggressive violence can necessarily be opposed only in the way that implies the possibility of constituting law and order. (shrink)

On pourrait pointer la difficulté rencontrée face aux archives de Benjamin et aux différentes interprétations de ses fragments simplement en intervertissant certains termes du titre et du sous-titre de ce texte. On aurait ainsi : les figures du « Messie » et du « messianisme » doivent conduire à la victoire. Le mot « victoire » pourra toujours être prioritaire parce qu’il détermine le caractère révolutionnaire du « Messie » chez Benjamin, et inversement, l’emploi du mot « messianisme » impliq...

Chez Rosenzweig, les politiques de l’usage des guillemets – qui sont certainement une conséquence de sa lecture répétée de Hegel, « le maître des guillemets » – peuvent probablement déterminer une possible « éthique de la guerre » (Ethics of War), dont l’importance a été majeure ces dernières années. Mes propres guillemets au syntagme « éthique de la guerre » expriment une hésitation quant aux interprétations rosenzweigiennes de la guerre et du pacifisme et à leur influence sur la théorie de...

Volume 52, Issue 8, July 2020, Page 827-829.

In this article, we consider Derrida’s grasp on counter-institution and outline a peculiar modality of ethics that it engenders. After evoking his counter-institutional public engagements in the introduction, we begin an analysis of the word counter-institution. In the first place, the polysemy of its prefix “counter” is exposed, followed by the claim that in Derrida’s philosophy this term denotes proximity and contact, rather than opposition – thus determining the architecture of the counter-institution. Furthermore, we discuss Derrida’s critique of traditional, sovereign (...) institutions that he saw as unjust and violent, relating it to his theory of decision, and making the claim that counter-institutions are inseparable from justice. In the second part, we conceptualize what is named the counter-ethics of promise and responsibility. By juxtaposing Derrida’s unorthodox views on the notions of promise and responsibility, we seek to formulate a counter-ethical thought that animates the relations in and of the counter-institution and challenges the limits of ethics. Finally, we propose that Derrida’s idea of unfaithful fidelity could be understood as the very condition counter-ethics, and by consequence, of deconstruction. (shrink)

Critical pedagogy is in crisis. To address this crisis, this paper reinvents Paulo Freire’s concept of utopia in and for our age of the Anthropocene. Understood as a system, postdigital critical ut...

By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. (...) There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance. (shrink)