Simulation software used for modeling has become as ubiquitous as computers themselves. Despite growing reliance on simulation in educational and workplace settings, users encounter frustration in using simulation software programs. The authors conducted a study with 26 engineering students and interviewed them about their experience learning the simulation software Arena for optimization modeling. These students experienced frustration with the process of learning to “think” like the simulation software. Students explained their difficulty with learning the software in a way that implied (...) human dialogue with a machine and negotiation with Arena in an attempt to overcome this frustration. Rather than being gender specific, frustrations were experienced by most male and female students equally, specifically those who held a perception of difference between human and machine “thinking.” The authors contend that communication difficulty with the embedded assumptions of the software is the source of frustration rather than deficiencies of users. (shrink)

Une entité est phénoménalement consciente si et seulement s’il existe quelque chose comme l’effet-que-ça-fait d’être cette entité. À partir de cette définition, aucun test empirique ne peut être fourni pour établir si une entité S est consciente ou pas. S peut croire qu’elle est consciente parce qu’en effet elle l’est, mais pour qu’un sujet W puisse attribuer la conscience à S, une théorie est nécessaire. Cette théorie doit fournir des critères intersubjectifs, basés sur l’observation du comportement, les propriétés physiques ou (...) quelque chose de cette sorte. En bref : (C) Pour qu’un sujet S puisse établir si une autre entité W est consciente, il doit faire appel à une théorie empirique proposant un critère d’un point de vue à la troisième personne pour l’attribution de la conscience. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas prouver non plus que ce ne soit pas le cas. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut, alors que pour l’éliminativiste l’existence de la conscience est une affirmation théorique. J’adhère à une vision réaliste de la conscience, supportée par le fait qu’il me semble vraiment que j’ai des expériences phénoménales, et par l’idée que la dichotomie réalité/ apparence ne s’applique pas aux contenus phénoménaux. Il y a manifestement des corrélations entre les phénomènes physiques et mentaux, qui donnent de bonnes raisons de croire qu’il y a des relations causales entre le monde physique (y compris le corps) et les esprits (conscients). Le dualisme des substances, le dualisme des propriétés, l’épiphénoménalisme et le panpsychisme ne parviennent pas à fournir une explication convaincante de ces corrélations. Une forme de physicalisme apparaît être l’alternative la plus raisonnable, en dépit du fait que l’esprit ne semble pas, d’un point de vue subjectif, être de nature physique. (shrink)

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...) original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”. (shrink)

Kripke [1972] a présenté un argument très influent contre le physicalisme, basé sur l’idée suivante : les énoncés psycho-physiques—ceux qui identifient les phénomènes psychologiques de l’expérience à des phénomènes physiques—sont, s’ils sont vrais, nécessairement vrais. Pourtant, ils semblent être contingents. Par la suite, Levine [1983] a prétendu que l’apparence de contingence était due à un «fossé explicatif » qui se trouve dans ces énoncés : les phénomènes physiques ne semblent pas rendre compte de l’existence et des caractéristiques des phénomènes psychologiques. (...) Je suspecte que l’apparition du fossé explicatif résulte, du moins en partie, du fait que l’on prend la subjectivité de l’expérience comme une condition ontologique alors qu’elle serait épistémologique. Dans ce papier je présente et développe cette idée. (shrink)

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's ‘Context and Logical Form’. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a sub‐sentential expression—where by ‘sub‐sentential expression’ we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truth‐conditional content (...) of speech acts. We hope to achieve this second aim precisely by defending the genuineness of sub‐sentential speech acts. Given our two aims, it is necessary to highlight briefly their connection—which we do in the first part of the Introduction. Following that, we introduce Stanley's novel objections. This is the role of the second part of the Introduction. We offer our rebuttals in Section 2 (against ‘shorthand’) and Section 3 (against syntactic ellipsis, among other things). (shrink)

This is a very poorly written book. It is highly repetitive and verbose. Moreover, despite the repetition, it is fundamentally unclear—both because of unhelpful and unexplained terminology, and because of its distinctively tangled prose. Here is one example of the latter.

Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's 'Context and Logical Form'. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a subsentential expression—where by 'subsentential expression' we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truthconditional content (...) of speech acts. We hope to achieve this second aim precisely by defending the genuineness of subsentential speech acts. Given our two aims, it is necessary to highlight briefly their connection—which we do in the first part of the Introduction. Following that, we introduce Stanley's novel objections. This is the role of the second part of the Introduction. We offer our rebuttals in Section 2 (against 'shorthand') and Section 3 (against syntactic ellipsis, among other things). (shrink)

Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker (...) can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise. (shrink)

Graduates of doctoral programs are expected to be competent at designing and conducting research independently. Given the level of research competence needed to successfully conduct research, it is important that assessors of doctoral programs have a reliable and validated tool for measuring and tracking perceived research competence among their students and graduates. A high level of research competence is expected for all Ph.D. graduates worldwide, in addition to in all disciplines/fields. Moreover, graduates of Ph.D. programs may complete their studies in (...) one country but then obtain a research position in another country, emphasizing the need to ensure that all doctoral programs are fostering similar levels of research competence. Thus, the purpose of this study was to gather additional evidence for validity and reliability of the Research Competence scale. Specifically, we sought to extend the findings of by adapting the scale, translating it to other languages, and applying the tool with a sample of early stage researchers. Our findings provide initial evidence that the adapted PR-Comp is appropriate for use in three languages and across a variety of disciplines/programs of study. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPolitical actors use metaphor in their speeches in order to frame political issues [Charteris-Black, J.. Politicians and rhetoric: The persuasive power of metaphor. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan]. If they succeed in imposing a particular frame, especially when there is no agreement on the definition of certain political issues, this can become the prevailing way for referring to that issue [Semino, E.. Metaphor in discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. In this research, we argue that this was the case for the metaphor of (...) the JOURNEY in the Catalan political conflict during electoral periods. To that end we use Critical Metaphor Analysis [Charteris-Black, J.. Corpus approaches to critical metaphor analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan] to analyse televised campaign ads from the last three elections for the Parliament of Catalonia – from 2010, 2012, and 2015 – in order to identify how political actors’ use metaphors to talk about the Catalan political situation during these years and to verify if JOURNEY metaphor resulted into the dominant narrative. The results show that the political situation has been conceptualized in terms of a ‘process en route,’ although the narratives generated by the political actors that shaped that discourse differ. (shrink)

Je commence par tenter de clarifier le concept de « conscience phénoménale », suivant la notion de « l’effet ça fait » élaborée par Nagel (1974). Deuxièmement, je défends la réalité de la conscience (phénoménale) en opposition avec l'éliminativisme. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas non plus prouver qu’elle n’en est pas un. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut. Troisièmement, j’introduis une notion (...) générale de physicalisme et de survenance [supervenience], et soutiens qu’un monisme physicaliste est la métaphysique la plus raisonnable. Ceci, étant donné l’existence de relations causales entre le corps et l’esprit, et malgré nos intuitions dualistes. Je prétends qu’il existe une propriété X, qui est une propriété physique ou une propriété survenante (sur le physique), telle que être conscient—au sens phénoménal—c’est instancier X. Enfin, je critique le panpsychisme et conclus que la conscience est une propriété de certaines entités physiques complexes. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

resumo O texto aborda algumas noções centrais nos estudos que Merleau-Ponty realizava através de seus cursos nos Collège de Fra nce ent re os anos de 1954 e 1960. Trata da passagem da anima l idade ao corpo hu mano, e tão importante quanto marcar sua diferença, procura mostrar seu Ineinander, um no outro ou pertença comum. A seguir, dá destaque às noções de instituição e de inc o ns c ie nte: com a prime i ra, o filósofo pretende (...) superar os limites da noção de cons c i ê ncia, com a segunda, marca distânc ia da noção em Lévi-Strauss e intensifica o debate com o freudismo. palavras-chaves Fenomenologia; Merleau-Ponty; natureza; corporeidade; inconsciente. (shrink)

En las últimas décadas, el espacio caribeño y la figura del afrocostarricense se han convertido en germen propulsor creativo que bien se podría interpretar como una celebración de los símbolos de un espacio y etnicidad oprimidos. Sin embargo, una lectura detallada muestra que sus propuestas podrían no pasar de lo anecdótico, estereotípico y exótico. Esta supuesta inserción del Caribe y los sujetos afrocostarricenses logran más bien, marginar y eliminar cualquier posibilidad deinserción, así como consolidar los discursos hegemónicos tradicionales, en los (...) que se refuerza un nacionalismo del Valle Central, presentando los otros espacios como ajenos. Bajo esta impronta se inscribe Caribe (2004) de Esteban Ramírez. Este filme muestra al Caribe como un espacio exótico en donde los sujetos que conviven no pasan de ser forasteros, foráneos a cualquier discurso nacional verdadero e inclusivo. El ensayo reflexiona cómo a través de la introducción del Caribe y los sujetos afrocostarricenses, dentro de una problemática que les involucre como parte de la patria y una disyuntiva del Caribe como idilio o barbarie, reconstruye un sentido de exotismo que demuestra una contemporaneidad fragmentada. Es mediante una fetichización de la imagen del Caribe lo que permite que las líneas de la hegemonía relacionadas con el debate de la etnicidad y la identidad nacional sean reposicionadas para crear lo que el crítico Jerome Branche (1999) llama “nuevo consensus o ‘definición’ de la realidad, dirigida en última instancia a mantener el status quo” de la clase dominante. (shrink)

Los valores cristianos son ahora más relevantes debido a que las empresas no se preocupan solo del beneficio. mediante una muestra de 176 empresas de la zona 4 de Ecuador, se ha estudiado la aplicación de los valores de solidaridad, honestidad, humildad y responsabilidad en los procesos productivos y de contratación de personal. El objetivo es averiguar si estos valores son relevantes en la gestión. Como resultado se encontró que existen pocas empresas que tengan en cuenta estos valores declarados como (...) tal. La ausencia de estos valores indica que las empresas deben incorporarlos para tener mayor sostenibilidad y responsabilidad social. (shrink)

La reflexión que se suscita presenta una visión sobre cómo en la experiencia estética la memoria emerge interfiriendo en el presente y alterando el tiempo continuo. Trataremos a través de la memoria desde diferentes visiones en las que, lejos de ser un archivo o catálogo, se plantea como un despliegue emocional de la experiencia. En la práctica artística se produce un ejercicio cognitivo que habilita la impresión de experiencias intensas. La característica que singulariza una obra de arte no solo está (...) asociada al contexto de la misma sino que configura una realidad única ya sea en la recepción como en su participación activa. (shrink)

Este texto nos pone frente a una obra clásica, frente a un maestro de la narración, al mismo tiempo que deja traslucir la fascinación de un lector crítico y apasionado por lo narrado. “Polifonía trágica”, “novela de voces”, “novela de música coral” son invitaciones a abordar de otro modo la novela de Faulkner, Mientras agonizo.

O artigo que se segue formula reflexões acerca de um evento cujo distanciamento e imparcialidade são impossíveis. O caráter ensaístico da escrita é, neste sentido, exigência do próprio evento em análise. Não escrevemos para fornecer respostas, nem com o distanciamento de Heródoto, que evocou de igual forma testemunhos históricos feitos de gregos e troianos; escrevemos para compreender, enfrentar e resistir ao problema. Dessa forma, o presente artigo aborda a pandemia do coronavírus de maneira que possibilite contribuir para uma melhor compreensão (...) do fenômeno que estamos experienciando. Para isso, de início, analisa-se a atual pandemia em suas relações com a modernidade e seu caráter globalizante. Em seguida, adentrando em uma perspectiva que transita entre fatores econômicos e políticos, o artigo destaca as consequências das políticas neoliberais que tornaram o cenário pandêmico uma crise dentro da crise. Para além de uma crise econômica, configura-se como uma crise humanitária. Para tanto, desembocando no dilema que o neoliberalismo impõe à humanidade, o lucro ou as pessoas, expõem-se nitidamente as fissuras do capitalismo. Por fim, analisa-se a atuação da necropolítica na pandemia e discutem-se as medidas de isolamento social a partir de conceitos como "Estado de exceção", e "vigilância". (shrink)

El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of PhenomenalConsciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experienciasubjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.

A general consensus has been reached in health care organizations that the disclosure of medical errors can be a very powerful way to improve patients and physicians well-being and serves as a core component to high quality health care. This practice strongly encourages transparent communication with patients after medical errors or unanticipated outcomes. However, many countries, such as Brazil, do not have a culture of disclosing harmful errors to patients or standards emphasizing the importance of disclosing, taking responsibility, apologizing, and (...) discussing the prevention of recurrences. Medical error is not discussed or approached during medical school. The stigma of error has a strong connection with value judgments, and emotional support for physicians does not exist. This paper suggests that open communication with the patient is essential. Guidance about error disclosure from health care organizations would be helpful for quality and patient safety and for health care professionals in countries like Brazil. (shrink)

Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, suppose that all the physical properties of composed physical systems are metaphysically necessitated by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue against this thesis in order to debate Chalmers’ argument. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR system I try to show that there are good reasons to hold that some composed physical systems have properties which are nomologically necessitated by their fundamental constituents, i.e., which emerge (...) in the sense of the so-called ‘nomological supervenience’ views. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

El artículo intenta explorar el poemario Álbum de Valparaíso de Elvira Hernández, a partir de la confluencia de las propuestas de sujeto “náufrago” y “testigo imposible”. El objetivo de esto, es proponer una descentralización del texto señalado, debido a que se posicionaría como una producción poética tránsfuga que sobrepasa las clasificaciones “generacionales” de los años 90 del siglo XX y del 2000. Por otra parte, el concepto de heterotopíaplanteado por Foucault, nos ayudará a reconocer y problematizar el espacio liminal que (...) se construye en el poemario y desde cual se produce la enunciación del sujeto poético. (shrink)

Psychopathy continues to be a challenge in forensic contexts, and evidence of its association with destructive behaviors, such as aggressive antisocial behaviors, is extensive. However, the potential role of intelligence as moderator of the well-established association between psychopathy and aggressive antisocial behaviors has largely been neglected, despite intelligence having been independently related to both concepts. Increased knowledge of whether intelligence is relevant to this association is needed because of its possible implications on the assessment and treatment of individuals with psychopathic (...) traits and aggressive antisocial behaviors. This study aimed to investigate the association between psychopathic traits, aggressive antisocial behaviors, and intelligence in young violent offenders and to test whether intelligence moderates the relationship between psychopathic traits and aggressive antisocial behaviors. Participants were 269 male violent offenders aged 18 to 25 years, assessed on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), the Life History of Aggression (LHA), and the General Ability Index from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd edition. Associations were tested with Spearman’s rho and moderation analysis was performed through ordinary least squares regressions. The PCL-R four-facet structure was used for the analyses. We found a positive association between psychopathic traits and aggressive antisocial behaviors, and a small, negative association between the Affective PCL-R facet and intelligence. In the moderation analyses, a small yet statistically significant moderation effect of intelligence on the association between the Interpersonal facet and LHA total scores was demonstrated. However, the amount of variance in the LHA total score explained by the model was very small; 2.9%. We suggest that intelligence, however important for rehabilitation strategies and everyday functioning, is not necessarily pertinent to understanding aggressive antisocial behaviors in young offenders with psychopathic traits. (shrink)

En éste artículo de investigación se sustenta que las elaboraciones de Michel Foucault sobre el decir veraz se hallan inscritas en el contexto de sus preocupaciones por el presente. Los análisis del filósofo francés sobre la Antigüedad no buscan formular la teoría de un poder o de un sujeto universal y abstracto, sino mostrar la constitución histórica de las diferentes formas de sujeto en relación con los juegos de verdad, develar el carácter contingente de nuestros fines y de nuestra historia (...) y poner de manifiesto un poder de resistir a los mecanismos de sujeción en Occidente. (shrink)

It has recently become quite fashionable for one to defend a functionalist theory of mental states. However, as with most trends, functionalism has come under fire in certain philosophical quarters. In this paper, I shall not take up the question of whether any version of functionalism is true. I shall instead discuss a particular objection to a specific brand of functionalism.

O tema da visão percorreu a obra de Merleau-Ponty. Desde o princípio, tratou-se de investigar o fenômeno da percepção, e nele descobrir o germe ou a presença de um sentido que a tradição intelectualista sempre tributou a uma operação do pensamento, considerando a sensibilidade apenas ocasião para seu exercício ou índice de realidade. Inscrito inicialmente nos quadros da filosofia da existência , o tema encaminha-se, posteriormente, para uma ontologia do Ser bruto. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar as reflexões estéticas (...) de Merleau-Ponty que marcam essa passagem, e que representam o encontro da sua filosofia com a pintura na tarefa da expressão de uma ontologia. (shrink)

A experiência do corpo próprio desempenha, na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, o papel de subversão das categorias da metafísica clássica entre sujeito e objeto. Mais especificamente, das antinomias cartesianas entre pensamento e extensão . Nesse sentido, existe-se como coisa ou como pensamento e, com isso, toda sorte de dicotomias herdadas dessa metafísica, sobretudo a grande dificuldade em articular o que é pura extensão, relações externas entre partes e processos objetivos do mundo físico, com a consciência, que é "inextensa", que parece não (...) ocupar lugar algum, a despeito de sua articulação e dependência com os processos do mundo físico . O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar, da Fenomenologia da percepção, a análise de três exemplos nos quais Merleau-Ponty procura superar essas dicotomias, ultrapassando a concepção objetivista de corpo a partir da própria fisiologia.In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, the experience of one's own body plays the role of subverting the classical metaphysics categories of subject and object, or more specifically, of the cartesian antinomies between thinking and extension . In this sense, existence is possible as thing or as thought. This generates all sorts of the dichotomies inherited form such a metaphysics, mainly the great difficulty in articulating what is pure extension, external relationships between parts, objective processes of the physical world with consciousness, which is "non extensive", which seems not to occupy any place in spite of its known articulation, or dependence, with the physical world processes . The objective of the present paper is to present an analysis of three examples, included in the "Phenomenology of Perception", in which Merleau-Ponty tries to overcome these dichotomies by going over the objectivistic conception of body, starting from the very Physiology. (shrink)