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  1. Event Horizon of the Mind: Wittgenstein, Black Holes, and the Limits of Determinism in Neuroscience.Harrison Alpert - manuscript
    This paper identifies and explores a structural parallel between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private language argument and Stephen Hawking’s black hole information paradox, focusing specifically on their shared implications for determinism through the concept of one-to-many mapping. Determinism fundamentally relies upon unique reconstructability—one-to-one mapping between initial states and observable outcomes. Thus, any scenario exhibiting structural one-to-many mapping inherently undermines deterministic coherence. Wittgenstein shows that concepts like meaning something and intending are context-dependent, governed by shared normative practices (“forms of life”) rather than fixed (...)
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  2. Can Science Explain consciousness? Toward a solution to the 'hard problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  3. A Proof of ‘1st/3rd Person Relativism’ and its Consequences to the Mind-Body Problem.João Fonseca - manuscript
    The suggestion of something akin to a ‘relativist solution to the Mind-Body problem’ has recently been held by some scientists and philosophers; either explicitly (Galadí, 2023; Lahav & Neemeh, 2022; Ludwig, 2015) or in more implicit terms (Solms, 2018; Velmans, 2002, 2008). In this paper I provide an argument in favor of a relativist approach to the Mind-Body problem, more specifically, an argument for ‘1st/3rd person relativism’, the claim that ‘The truth value of some sentences or propositions is relative to (...)
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  4. Trialistic panqualityism.Tal Hendel - manuscript
    Panqualityism is a form of panpsychism that distinguishes between conscious subjects (i.e., minds) and phenomenal qualities. Like panpsychism, it holds that the universe's physical ultimates are phenomenally qualitied. Unlike panpsychism, however, it argues that these phenomenally qualitied ultimates are not microsubjects and are therefore not experienced. By rejecting the idea that phenomenally qualitied ultimates are microsubjects, panqualityism escapes the subject combination problem. However, this creates a new challenge: explaining how conscious macrosubjects arise from non-experiential microqualities. Here I address this challenge (...)
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  5. The first-personal argument against physicalism.Christian List - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a seemingly straightforward argument against physicalism which, despite being implicit in much of the philosophical debate about consciousness, has not received the attention it deserves (compared to other, better-known “epistemic”, “modal”, and “conceivability” arguments). This is the argument from the non-supervenience of the first-personal (and indexical) facts on the third-personal (and non-indexical) ones. This non-supervenience, together with the assumption that the physical facts (as conventionally understood) are third-personal, entails that some facts – (...)
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  6. A Parsimonious Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Complexity and Narrative.Maxson J. McDowell - manuscript
    Three decades after Chalmers named it, the ‘hard problem’ remains. I suggest a parsimonious solution. Biological dynamic systems interact according to simple rules (while the environment provides simple constraints) and thus self-organize to become a new, more complex dynamic system at the next level. This spiral repeats several times generating a hierarchy of levels. A leap to the next level is frequently creative and surprising. From ants, themselves self-organized according to physical/chemical laws, may emerge an ant colony self-organized according to (...)
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  7. Descenting into Realness: Intelligence, Embodiment, and the Ethics of Subtraction.Madhu Prabakaran - manuscript
    This paper rethinks intelligence not as a computational or representational faculty, but as an ecological, embodied, and ethical unfolding. Drawing from Friston’s predictive coding, Fields’ processual epistemology, Kastrup’s ontological idealism, Rancière’s aesthetic dissensus, Weil’s moral attention, and Buddhist prajñā traditions, it reframes intelligence as a subtractive and relational field. Rather than an intrinsic property of discrete agents, intelligence emerges as an incorporeal coherence manifesting through corporeal forms. The paper introduces “descenting into realness” as a deconditioning process that reveals intelligence not (...)
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  8. Indexical Knowledge and Phenomenal Knowledge.Cara Spencer - manuscript
    A familiar story about phenomenal knowledge likens it to indexical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about oneself typically expressed with sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. The popularity of this sort of story owes in part to its promise of resolving some longstanding puzzles about phenomenal knowledge. One such puzzle arises from the compelling arguments that we can have full objective knowledge of the world while lacking some phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the widespread optimism about the indexical account on this score is (...)
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  9. Pains You Can’t Ignore: Attentional Demand and the Problem of Intensity.Peter Burgess - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Much of the focus on pain in the literature is the nature of pain’s badness. This paper addresses the relatively overlooked problem of intensity. I construe intensity as the degree to which pains demand involuntary attention, the degree to which a pain can’t be ignored. I use a global workspace framework to explain intensity, a view that is uniquely situated to explain the relevant empirical evidence. I construe intensity theoretically via a pain’s mode of representation, how pain is represented rather (...)
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  10. The View From Somewhere - Investigations Pertaining to the Implications of the Impurity of the Third- and the First-Person-Perspective.John Haglund - forthcoming - Continental Philosophy Review.
    The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position entails (...)
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  11. Creating a World in the Head: The Conscious Apprehension of Neural Content Originating from Internal Sources.Stan Klein & Judith Loftus - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.
    Klein, Nguyen, & Zhang (in press) argued that the evolutionary transition from respondent to agent during the Cambrian Explosion would be a promising vantage point from which to gain insight into the evolution of organic sentience. They focused on how increased competition for resources -- in consequence of the proliferation of new, neurally sophisticated life-forms -- made awareness of the external world (in the service of agentic acts) an adaptive priority. The explanatory scope of Klein et al (in press) was (...)
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  12. What is it Like to be Nagel?'.Gregory R. Mulhauser - forthcoming - Philosopher: Journal of the Philosophical Society of England.
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  13. What Is Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness an Awareness Of? An Argument for the Egological View.Alberto Barbieri - 2025 - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    The nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness—viz., the putative non-inferential self-consciousness involved in unreflective experiences, has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first-personally given to its subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre-reflective self-consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This ‘egological view’ is opposed to the ‘non-egological (...)
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  14. Recall the Memory Argument for Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - 2025 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-21.
    An intuition about consciousness known as the 'Awareness Principle' states: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S has an 'inner awareness' of M. Some have recently defended this principle by revising the 'memory argument' first offered by the sixth-century Buddhist philosopher Dignāga: from the fact that an experience can be episodically remembered, it should follow that a subject must have been aware of that experience. In response, I argue that defenders of the (...)
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  15. Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness.Shao-Pu Kang - 2025 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 16 (1):47-64.
    When you have a conscious experience—such as feeling pain, watching the sunset, or thinking about your loved ones—are you aware of the experience as your own, even when you do not reflect on, think about, or attend to it? Let us say that an experience has “mineness” just in case its subject is aware of it as her own while she undergoes it. And let us call the view that all ordinary experiences have mineness “typicalism.” Recently, Guillot has offered a (...)
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  16. Going Out of My Head: An Evolutionary Proposal Concerning the “Why” of Sentience.Stan Klein, Bill N. Nguyen & Blossom M. Zhang - 2025 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 12 (1):131–141.
    The explanatory challenge of sentience is known as the “hard problem of consciousness”: How does subjective experience arise from physical objects and their relations? Despite some optimistic claims, the perennial struggle with this question shows little evidence of imminent resolution. In this article I focus on the “why” rather than on the “how” of sentience. Specifically, why did sentience evolve in organic lifeforms? From an evolutionary perspective this question can be framed: “What adaptive problem(s) did organisms face in their evolutionary (...)
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  17. Auto-afección y animación en la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl.Jhon Acuña - 2024 - Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Centro editorial FCH.
    Due to the reflective character of phenomenological approach (because consciousness inquires for itself as an object) the question related to the most basic self-experience that precedes any reflection and makes it possible acquires main importance to the phenomenology. The search of this experience throws us to a terrain to transit and with visible importance to Husserl: The passive dimension of consciousness. In that encounter, appears the phenomenon of self-affection as a sphere of experience worthy of been explored and described. This (...)
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  18. Can AI Lie? Chatbot Technologies, the Subject, and the Importance of Lying.Jack Black - 2024 - Social Science Computer Review (xx):xx.
    This article poses a simple question: can AI lie? In response to this question, the article examines, as its point of inquiry, popular AI chatbots, such as, ChatGPT. In doing so, an examination of the psychoanalytic, philosophical, and technological significance of AI and its complexities are located in relation to the dynamics of truth, falsity, and deception. That is, by critically exploring the chatbot’s capacity to engage in natural language conversations and deliver contextually relevant responses, it is argued that what (...)
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  19. Knowing What It Is Like.Yuri Cath - 2024 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite™, be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the (...)
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  20. (1 other version)Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness.Anna Giustina - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4.
    Most recent philosophical theories of consciousness account for it in terms of representation, the bulk of the debate revolving around whether (suitably) representing something is sufficient for consciousness (as per first-order representationalism) or some further (meta-)representation is needed (as per higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism). In this paper, I explore an alternative theory of consciousness, one that aims to explain consciousness not in terms of representation but in terms of the epistemically and metaphysically direct relation of acquaintance. I call this the (...)
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  21. What if We Seem to Seem and Not Seem? Estimating the Unreasonable Price of Illusionism.Biplab Karak - 2024 - Problemos 105:180-195.
    With its strategic consideration of phenomenal consciousness illusorily seeming to us, illusionism claims to deny phenomenality and thereby obviate the hard problem of consciousness. The problem with illusionism, however, is that, although its thesis appears persuasively simple, it strikes as absurd insofar as the phenomenal illusions themselves also seem as much as phenomenality, keeping no fundamental differences between the two. In short, it reinforces the same phenomenon/issue, i.e., phenomenality, that it claims to deny/avoid. This single absurdity is reflective of its (...)
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  22. Objective Phenomenology.Andrew Y. Lee - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1197–1216.
    This paper examines the idea of "objective phenomenology," or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...)
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  23. Compliant and Impetuous: The Phenomenology of Existence in Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels.King-Ho Leung & Rebecca Walker - 2024 - Textual Practice 38 (5):789-807.
    This article offers a philosophical reading of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels by bringing the tetralogy into conversation with Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological ontology. In addition to highlighting the striking similarities between Ferrante’s notion of smarginatura (‘dissolving margins’) and Sartre’s depiction of the existential sensation of nausea, this article argues that the two main characters of Ferrante’s tetralogy, Lila Cerullo and Elena Greco, respectively exemplify Sartre’s ontological categories of ‘being-for-oneself’ and ‘being-for-others’ in his phenomenological account of human existence. However, Ferrante—like Simone de (...)
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  24. Phenomenal Properties and the Intuition of Distinctness: the View from the Inside.Andrew Melnyk - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We experience the intuition of distinctness when, for example, we attend introspectively to the phenomenal redness of a current visual sensation and it seems to us that that very property could not literally be a physical property of neural activity in a certain tiny region of our brain. The book begins by arguing that the intuition of distinctness underlies certain otherwise puzzling attitudes manifested in debates both inside and outside philosophy about whether physicalism (or materialism) can accommodate phenomenal properties (or (...)
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  25. Subjectivity and the Politics of Self-Cultivation: A Comparative Study of Fichte and Nietzsche.James S. Pearson - 2024 - Nietzsche Studien 53 (1):182-202.
    At first glance, Fichte and Nietzsche might strike us as intellectual contraries. This impression is reinforced by Nietzsche’s disparaging remarks about Fichte. The dearth of critical literature comparing the two thinkers also could easily lead us to believe that they are, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant to one another. In this paper, however, I argue that their theories of subjectivity are in many respects remarkably similar and worthy of comparison. But I further explain how, despite this convergence, their normative (...)
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  26. Can AI be a subject like us? A Hegelian speculative-philosophical approach.Ermylos Plevrakis - 2024 - Discover Computing 27 (46).
    Recent breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked a wide public debate on the potentialities of AI, including the prospect to evolve into a subject comparable to humans. While scientists typically avoid directly addressing this question, philosophers usually tend to largely dismiss such a possibility. This article begins by examining the historical and systematic context favoring this inclination. However, it argues that the speculative philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel offers a different perspective. Through an exploration of (...)
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  27. Editorial: Rethinking research with methodologies of art practice.Claudia Westermann - 2024 - Technoetic Arts 22 (1):3-7.
    This issue of Technoetic Arts: A Journal of Speculative Research (TA) encompasses eight articles by artists and scholars from around the globe who engage with methodologies of art practice within research that reflects on technological and ecological change, contributing to the discourse on the inclusion of subjective experience in research. The articles by authors Dulmini Perera, Kate Doyle, Nora S. Vaage, Merete Lie, Nikita Peresin Meden, Kristina Pranjić, Peter Purg, Nicolaas H. Jacobs, Marth Munro, Chris Broodryk, Semi Ryu, Rahul Mahata, (...)
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  28. Living present: a temporal approach of consciousness.Yi Zhao - 2024 - Tusson, France: Du Lérot éditeur.
    The principal objective of this book is to explain consciousness in terms of time. This temporal approach is encapsulated under the term ‘living present’ (lebendige Gegenwart), a concept that originally appeared in the late works of Husserlian phenomenology. By using this single concept to characterize the way in which both time and consciousness are experienced, Husserl innovatively reveals the close connection between the two. Our temporal approach to consciousness is in line with this reasoning. The essential characteristics of the experience (...)
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  29. El mito del yo y la experiencia consciente.Enrique Aramendia - 2023 - Revista de Filosofía Fundamental 4:19-53.
    In Consciousness Studies it is common to distinguish between subjective character and qualitative character. It is also non unusual to maintain that both can be analyzed independently. This is called the “division of conceptual labor”. This idea, however, does not match with our intuitive insight that subjective character is multiple. Here I identify the idea of the division of conceptual labor as a version of the myth of the self, and I push forward two arguments against it. After that, I (...)
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  30. Taking Phenomenology at Face Value: The Priority of State Consciousness in Light of the For-me-ness of Experience.Alberto Barbieri - 2023 - Argumenta.
    An important distinction lies between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, (creature consciousness) and consciousness attributed to mental states (state consciousness). Most contemporary theories of consciousness aim at explaining what makes a mental state conscious, paying scant attention to the problem of creature consciousness. This attitude relies on a deeper, and generally overlooked, assumption that once an explanation of state consciousness is provided, one has also explained all the relevant features of creature consciousness. I call this the priority of state (...)
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  31. The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza (as published in Dogma Revue).James H. Cumming - 2023 - Paris and Lyon: Dogma - Revue de Philosophie et de Sciences Humaines.
    This single pdf includes ALL SEVEN of my Dogma Revue articles, which together comprise the entirety of my book The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza (the full book in manuscript form is also posted on this site). The book compares Hindu nondual philosophy to that of Baruch Spinoza, demonstrating the similarity of Spinoza’s ideas to Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. The book is well researched, but it is written in an informal style suitable for both scholars and the educated (...)
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  32. Phänomenale Begriffe.Martina Fürst - 2023 - In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb, Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler. pp. 1-11..
    Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich (...)
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  33. Subjectivity, nature, existence: Foundational issues for enactive phenomenology.Thomas Netland - 2023 - Dissertation, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
    This thesis explores and discusses foundational issues concerning the relationship between phenomenological philosophy and the enactive approach to cognitive science, with the aim of clarifying, developing, and promoting the project of enactive phenomenology. This project is framed by three general ideas: 1) that the sciences of mind need a phenomenological grounding, 2) that the enactive approach is the currently most promising attempt to provide mind science with such a grounding, and 3) that this attempt involves both a naturalization of phenomenology (...)
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  34. Das Metameta-Paradox.Andrej Poleev - 2023 - Enzymes 21.
    Das Metameta-Paradox ist darauf zurückzuführen, daß man die Eigenständigkeit jeder Realität annimmt, während es in Wirklichkeit nur eine Realität gibt, zu deren Beschreibung eine Sprache genutzt wird, die jedoch keine Metasprache im Verhältnis zu sich selbst sein kann, weil sie aus Elementen besteht, die zu gleicher Klasse angehören. Daher ist jede Beschreibung der Realität der Realität untergeordnet, und ihre Beschreibung sowie die Beschreibung ihrer Beschreibung u.s.w. dürfen nicht als eigenständige Klassen im Sinne der Gruppentheorie eingestuft werden.
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  35. Subjectology • Субъектология.Andrej Poleev - 2023 - Enzymes 21.
    Subjectology (from Latin subject and logos) studies the internal states of living and nonliving systems capable of symbolic representation of any real content, i.e. to display sensory perceptible information and to transform it into world pictures, the elements of which are symbols whose meaning or sense is determined in the context of the symbolic representation. Субъектология (от лат. subject и logos) изучает внутренние состояния живых и неживых систем, способных к символической репрезентации какого–либо реального содержания, т.е. к отображению чувственно воспринимаемой информации (...)
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  36. Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: A Meta-Causal Approach.John A. Barnden - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):397-425.
    I present considerations surrounding pre-reflective self-consciousness, arising in work I am conducting on a new physicalist, process-based account of [phenomenal] consciousness. The account is called the meta-causal account because it identifies consciousness with a certain type of arrangement of meta-causation. Meta-causation is causation where a cause or effect is itself an instance of causation. The proposed type of arrangement involves a sort of time-spanning, internal reflexivity of the overall meta-causation. I argue that, as a result of the account, any conscious (...)
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  37. Modelling Subjective Consciousness: A Guide for the Perplexed.Peter Burgess - 2022 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (7-8):32-56.
    This paper challenges the conventional methodological tendencies of current monistic treatments of subjective consciousness (SC). I argue that it is highly unlikely that any one position will ‘solve’ the SC problem, as monism supposes. Instead, I argue for treating theories of SC akin to scientific models, that (like models) theories only apply under certain empirical conditions, where each simply explains a necessary aspect of SC. Hence, a pluralistic, rather than monistic, approach is preferable to the literature as a whole. In (...)
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  38. Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (9):3240-3279.
    Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of attention as the activity of structuring consciousness into (...)
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  39. Consciousness, content, and cognitive attenuation: A neurophenomenological perspective.Christian Coseru - 2022 - In Rick Repetti, Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Meditation. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 354–367.
    This paper pursues two lines of inquiry. First, drawing on evidence from clinical literature on borderline states of consciousness, I propose a new categorical framework for liminal states of consciousness associated with certain forms of meditative attainment; second, I argue for dissociating phenomenal character from phenomenal content in accounting for the etiology of nonconceptual states of awareness. My central argument is that while the idea of nonconceptual awareness remains problematic for Buddhist philosophy of mind, our linguistic and categorizing practices cannot (...)
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  40. The evolution and development of consciousness: the subject-object emergence hypothesis.John E. Stewart - 2022 - Biosystems 217.
    A strategy for investigating consciousness that has proven very productive has focused on comparing brain processes that are accompanied by consciousness with processes that are not. But comparatively little attention has been given to a related strategy that promises to be even more fertile. This strategy exploits the fact that as individuals develop, new classes of brain processes can transition from operating ‘in the dark’ to becoming conscious. It has been suggested that these transitions occur when a new class of (...)
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  41. “Shifts, reconnections, flowing movements” – Strindberg and the “mechanics” of the self.Lukas Lehner - 2022 - Norsk Litteraturvitenskapelig Tidsskrift 25 (1):23-39.
    This article investigates how the self is thematized in August Strindberg’s naturalist works from the 1880s and 1890s, as well as in A Dream Play after the turn of the century. Focusing on the play The Father and the short stories “Samvetskval” and “Silverträsket”, and in dialogue with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s machinistic conception of the self, this article explores how Strindberg depicts a “mechanics of the self” marked by the interplay of external social regulations and internal psychological pressures (...)
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  42. Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.Janko Nešić - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):243-259.
    Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the (...)
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  43. Beyond the search for the subject: An anti-essentialist ontology for liberal democracy.Samuel Bagg - 2021 - European Journal of Political Theory 20 (2):208-231.
    Reading Foucault’s work on power and subjectivity alongside “developmentalist” approaches to evolutionary biology, this article endorses poststructuralist critiques of political ideals grounded in the value of subjective agency. Many political theorists embrace such critiques, of course, but those who do are often skeptical of liberal democracy, and even of normative theory itself. By contrast, those who are left to theorize liberal democracy tend to reject or ignore poststructuralist insights, and have continued to employ dubious ontological assumptions regarding human agents. Against (...)
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  44. The Debate on the Problem of For-me-ness: A Proposed Taxonomy.Alberto Barbieri - 2021 - Argumenta.
    Several philosophers claim that a mental state is phenomenally conscious only if it exhibits so-called for-me-ness, or subjective character, i.e., the fact that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state not just for everyone but only for the subject who undergoes it. Consequently, they stress, a proper explanation of consciousness requires to address the question of what the nature of for-me-ness is. This question forms what I call the problem of for-me-ness. Although the debate on (...)
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  45. O sujeito anímico e o sujeito espiritual em Ideias II.Nathalie de la Cadena - 2021 - Revista de Abordagem Gestáltica 27 (3):339-347.
    Neste artigo pretendo evidenciar como a relação entre sujeito anímico e sujeito espiritual é fundamental para a compreensão da intersubjetividade e do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt). Em Ideias II, Husserl explica como, a partir do eu, sujeito e objeto são constituídos no mundo: natureza, alma e espírito. Estes três estratos do sendo são conhecidos a partir da atitude teorética e da atitude espiritual e, no processo, se dá a explicitação do eu. Numa atitude teorética, temos constituição da natureza, para o (...)
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  46. Consciousness and the Fallacy of Misplaced Objectivity.Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan Lang, Andrew Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly & Giulio Tononi - 2021 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 7 (2):1-12.
    Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical (...)
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  47. Theory and Practice of Self-Reflection. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory and Psychoanalytical Thought.Popp Judith-Frederike - 2021 - In Samir Gandesha, Johan Hartle & Stefano Marino, The “aging” of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. Fifty Years Later. Mimesis International. pp. 191-215.
  48. Controversa „Ignorabimus” în România secolului al XIX-lea: Conștiința ca limită a cunoașterii științifice.Mona Mamulea - 2021 - Studii de Istorie a Filosofiei Românești 17:87-103.
    Du Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus could have been a game changer in the last decades of 19th century, but it wasn’t. The sound argument of the German physiologist concerning the limits of natural science, although it was indeed taken seriously and confronted by all means, was in fact so severely distorted by opponents that one could hardly recognize it in the straw men generated in the process. By scrutinizing three less known approaches dug up from 19th century Romanian literature, the present paper (...)
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  49. Phenomenal transparency and the transparency of subjecthood.Kevin Morris - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):39-45.
    According to phenomenal transparency, phenomenal concepts are transparent where a transparent concept is one that reveals the nature of that to which it refers. What is the connection between phenomenal transparency and our concept of a subject of experience? This paper focuses on a recent argument, due to Philip Goff, for thinking that phenomenal transparency entails transparency about subjecthood. The argument is premissed on the idea that subjecthood is related to specific phenomenal properties as a determinable of more specific determinates. (...)
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  50. Against phenomenal bonding.S. Siddharth - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(D1)5-16.
    Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is possessed by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important challenge in the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of microphysical entities combine or give rise to the experiences of macrophysical entities such as human beings? An especially troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-summing argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) have proposed the phenomenal bonding (...)
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