Arriaga is an early modern scholastic who recognizes the importance of relations to philosophical discussions. He offers a classification of different kinds of relations, focusing on the distinction between categorial relations and transcendental relations. I suggest that this distinction might be seen as akin to one version of the modern distinction between external and internal relations. Like Suárez, whom he characterizes as a “giant among the scholastics,” Arriaga offers a reductionist account of categorial relations. He criticises Suárez’s account, (...) however, for formally identifying a relation with the foundation in one relatum, something Suárez does in order to preserve a real distinction between converse relations. Arriaga, in contrast, argues that a categorial relation is formally identical to the foundation and terminus. Arriaga gives less attention to transcendental relations, even though he thinks they are real relations, but I offer some suggestions for how he may be thinking about them. (shrink)

This paper considers Rodrigo de Arriaga’s account of the nature of the concept of being, which he construes in terms of univocity in opposition to analogy. I argue that the reason for his preference of univocity follows from his commitment to formal (as opposed to objective) precision. This commitment to formal precision comes at a price, however. Though Arriaga insists on restricting the concept of being to ‘real being’ only, it is not clear how he is able (...) to maintain that restriction in a principled way. Like his contemporary and confrere, Richard Lynch, Arriaga seems to be on a trajectory that will lead to a supertranscendental conception of metaphysical science. (shrink)

An important step in In Pierre Bayle’s defense of religious tolerance is to refute St Augustine’s claim that heretics who refuse to convert to the true faith do so out of ill will. This claim legitimizes, for Augustine and his followers, the application of temporal sanctions to those heretics, in order to offset their wicked inclination and restore their free will. To counter this view, Bayle uses the theological notions of invincible ignorance and dutiful erroneous conscience, elaborated during the Middle (...) Ages. However, these notions had a very restricted scope, which needed to be extended to so-called heretical beliefs. I show how two early modern scholastics, the Jesuits Gabriel Vázquez and Rodrigo Arriaga, have prepared this evolution and have paved the way for Bayle's denunciation any form of coercion in religious matters. (shrink)

In 1632 Rodrigo de Arriaga, an important Baroque scholastic thinker, published a textbook in philosophy, of which the last revised and extended edition was published in 1669. Arriaga develops in it a peculiar theory of beings of reason, drawing on Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, according to which beings of reason are that which is expressed by false judgments. It is a theory quite different from the classical theories held by Francisco Suárez, the Thomists and the majority of (...) Scotists on the one hand, and reductive theories held by Richard Lynch and a growing number of later Baroque authors on the other. In this paper I analyse Arriaga’s theory and deal with the topics of nature, existence, causes, and division of beings of reason. (shrink)

The article analyses the explication of the infinity in the philosophical courses taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy at the 17th and 18th centuries. It examines 12 philosophical courses – since 1645 (the course by Inokentii Gizel) until 1751 (the course by Georgii Konyskyi). It shows how the infinity was defined and in which kinds it was divided in different courses. In general, all the professors, as well as other scholastic philosophers, agree that categorematic infinity exists only in God, but syncategorematic is (...) present in the created world. Regarding the question whether God, being omnipotent, can create a categorematic infinity in the world, the Mogilyans are divided into several camps: (1) Inokentii Gizel, Stefan Yavorskyi, Inokentii Popovskyi, Sylvestr Pinovskyi, Platon Malynovskyi gave a positive answer to the question; (2) Yosyf Volchanskyi, Ilarion Levytskyi, Amvrosii Dubnevych, Sylvestr Kulabka believed that this kind of infinity is in principle impossible, hence God cannot create it; (3) Teofan Prokopovych and Georgii Konyskyi took a sceptical stand and consider that the human mind as such could not solve this problem. The article analyses which arguments were offered by each camp, and gives suggestions what influenced the position of certain Mohylian professors. Most probably, Mohylian philosophers who supported the possibility of actual infinity in the created world were influenced by nominalistically oriented Jesuit philosophers, like Pedro Hurtando de Mendoza and Rodrigo Arriaga. The other Mohylians backed a more traditional idea, supported by Thomas Aquinas, that only one actual infinity can exist and it is God. (shrink)

This article addresses some Late Scholastic accounts (Suárez, Abra de Raçonis, Gamaches, Ysambert, Arriaga), of the “problem of transduction” in angels, as a possible source for the genesis of early modern occasionalism, particularly La Forge’s and Cordemoy’s. Indeed, if the “problem of transduction” is a structural issue of all the Aristotelian gnoseology, the impossibility of interaction between immaterial and material substance concerns, more generally, all spiritual substances, posing the issue about the principle of "transduction" already at the level of (...) angels, entirely immaterial creatures, unable to any relationship with the bodies. In order to answer to this peculiar version of the 'problem of transduction' Late Scholastic elaborate doctrines that are direct antecedents of occasionalist ones, and which likely directly influenced early modern occasionalism. To follow this investigative path, I will intersect three complementary argumentative lines. First, I will focus on Late Scholastic angelology, to point out how the need to solve the 'problem of transduction' in this peculiar context pushes the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Schools to a proto-occasionalist conception of angelic innatism. Secondly, I will identify in the debate on the angelic locutio of the key places for the elaboration of a model that sees God as the only efficient cause and the only guarantor of the mind's communications and contents. Thirdly, I will stress how the Late Scholastic angelological debates could be an important source for early modern dualism and the seventeenth-century occasionalism, notably for La Forge and Cordemoy. -/- . (shrink)

The article analyses the explication of the infinity in the philosophical courses taught at Kyiv- Mohyla Academy at the 17th and 18th centuries. It examines 12 philosophical courses – since 1645 until 1751. In general, all the professors, as well as other scholastic philosophers, agree that categorematic infinity exists only in God, but syncategorematic is present in the created world. Regarding the question of whether God, being omnipotent, can create a categorematic infinity in the world, the Mogilyans are divided into (...) several camps: Inokentii Gizel, Stefan Yavorskyi, Inokentii Popovskyi, Sylvestr Pinovskyi, Platon Malynovskyi gave a positive answer to the question; Yosyf Volchanskyi, Ilarion Levyt-skyi, Amvrosii Dubnevych, Sylvestr Kulabka believed that this kind of infinity is in principle im-possible, hence God cannot create it; Theophan Prokopovych and Georgii Konyskyi took a skeptical stand and considered that the human mind as such could not solve this problem. The article analyses which arguments were offered by each camp, and gives essential suggestion: most probably, Mohylian philosophers who supported the possibility of actual infinity in the created world were influenced by nominalistically oriented Jesuit philosophers, like Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Rodrigo Arriaga. The other Mohylians backed a more traditional idea, supported by Thomas Aquinas, that only one actual infinity can exist and it is God. (shrink)

The article compares selected chapters devoted the problems of mind (anima) from two philosophical courses by Georgii Konyskyi, taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1747-1749 and 1749-1751 academic years. As Konyskyi taught his first course using verbatim Teofan Prokopovych’s philosophical course of 1706-08 academic years, the article compares the doctrines on mind by these two Mohylian authors. It also shows the evolution of Konyskyi’s views. -/- There are common elements between the philosophy of mind of Prokopovych and Konyskyi: their interpretations of (...) Aristotle’s definition of the soul; the scholastic concept of the man as an integral mind-body entity; the problem of the unity and multiplicity of forms. It is shown that Prokopovych and Konsyskyi understood the three-level structure of a human soul in the same way as Francisco Suarez and Rodrigo de Arriaga. -/- However, there are some differences between these two Mohylian professors. They interpreted differently sensitive and intellectual cognition. Prokopovych upholds the scholastic doctrine of species. Konyskyi, in his second course, abandons this doctrine and defends the doctrine of impressiones. They are developed by the phantasmata – not received from objects. The impressions are modifications of animal spirits by direct or indirect impact of objects on senses of a human being or any other animated being. In the doctrine on intellectual powers, Prokopovych upholds the scholastic distinction between active and passive intellect. Konyskyirejects this common for scholastic tradition distinction and considers that passive intellect can do full-scale intellectual activity. The influence of Early Modern philosophy, especially Cartesianism, was the reason why Konyskyi changed his position. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 127-128 [Access article in PDF] Dennis Des Chene. Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 220. Cloth, $45.00. The history of philosophy aims at the recovery and interpretation of past thought, and its reconstructions seek to avoid anachronism. Dennis Des Chene's book is exemplary in this respect. It offers a sophisticated (...) and accurate report on Late Scholastic views and arguments about life and its form and principle, the soul. It is full of subtle and informed discussions of texts from, principally, Francisco Toledo, Pedro Fonseca, the commentators from Coimbra, Francisco Suárez, and Rodrigo de Arriaga.But the aim of the history of philosophy is philosophical and not exclusively historical. Recovery of the past is, for the historian of philosophy, at the service of contemporary understanding. The Late Scholastic authors studied by Des Chene understood this to be so. Suárez, for instance, distinguished between those doctrines and inquiries which are "antiquated (antiquatae) and wholly relegated from philosophy" and those which are not (Metaphysical Disputations, "Copious Index to Aristotle's Metaphysics," Book I, ch. 7). Unfortunately, when judged from this perspective, Des Chene's book is not as successful.In spite of its many comparisons between current debates, Descartes's views, and Late Scholastic doctrines, the book does not succeed in extracting much by way of genuine philosophical insight. Though well-informed and intelligent, for the most part these glosses are mere statements of Late Scholastic views in contemporary terms. But correctly describing alchemical theories from the point of view of modern chemistry does not make them any less archaic.This book is indeed more a contribution to the history of ideas or of science than to the history of philosophy. To be fair, it is true that, first, as such it is a most valuable contribution; second, much of what Late Scholastics had to say about life and the soul is indeed antiquated; third, even if philosophically antiquated, an adequate grasp of Late Aristotelian thought on these matters is necessary to understand Descartes and subsequent developments; and finally, the kind of informed historical recovery that Des Chene has provided here is a necessary condition for whatever philosophical lessons could be gained from these texts.Life's Form is divided into four parts. The first, "Data for the Study of Souls," looks at the phenomena which the Late Aristotelians sought to understand and explain, recovering both their grasp of the place of the living among other substances, and the constraints, [End Page 127] originating both from accumulated experience and from Christian faith, to which they were subject.The second part, "Defining the Soul," first examines the question of how to define life. It then looks at the definition of the soul as "first act of an organic or potentially living physical body"—whether the soul is an accident of the body, an entirely separate substance, or the substantial form of the body. Here one finds addressed the question whether there is a form of the body separate from the soul, or whether strictly the body has only one form, the soul. The issue of cadaveric forms, peculiar forms of corpses arising after death and the departure of the soul, comes up here. In the last section of this part Des Chene examines the definition of the soul as a principle of life and the relation, both epistemological and ontological, between this definition in terms of the operations of the soul, and the earlier one of the soul as form, that is, in terms of its being.Part 3, "Powers and Parts," looks at the vegetative (nutritive, reproductive, and augmentative), animal (sensitive), and spiritual (intellective) powers of the soul. Des Chene examines the criteria for distinguishing between powers, the relation between the one soul and its many powers, and the unity of the soul. "Unity," the fourth part of the book, takes up this last topic. It looks at the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual powers as "parts" of the... (shrink)

In Baroque scholasticism the medieval semantic theory of connotation as a property of terms, originally elaborated by Ockham and others, received an ontological application or re-interpretation in the context of the theory of relations. The main proponent of this ontologized “doctrina de connotatis” seems to have been Suárez. Subsequently, this doctrine was severely criticised by the Jesuits Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Rodrigo de Arriaga, but also by the “princeps Scotistarum” Bartholomeo Mastri; whereas another Scotist, John Punch, adopted (...) a theory of relations close to this doctrine. The fates of the original semantic theory of connotation, the ontologized “doctrina de connotatis” and the broader context of the relevant discussions (especially the new res–modus ontology established around 1600) document the complexity of the history of scholastic ideas, irreducible to any simple paradigm (like that of the realism–nominalism strife). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a neglected debate between Francisco Suárez and Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza about the unity of composite substances. There was a consensus among the Jesuits on the fact that the per se unity of composite substances requires something in addition to matter and form. Like most Jesuits, Suárez and Hurtado further agree on the fact that this additional ingredient is not a full-blown thing, but a “mode of union.” However, while Suárez claims that the union is (...) achieved through a single mode, Hurtado maintains that it is necessary to postulate two distinct modes of union, one modifying form and another modifying matter. I argue that this disagreement actually reflects an important ontological debate about the nature of the items that serve as the cement of things and that it eventually leads later Jesuits like Rodrigo de Arriaga to conceive of union as a polyadic or “straddling” mode. (shrink)

The paper explores the status of the proposition "God exists" in late scholastic debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in some key authors of the era. A proposition is said to be self-evident if its truth is known solely from the meaning of the terms and is not inferred from other propositions. It does not appear to be immediately evident from the terms that God exists, for the concept expressed by "God" is based on the relation to creatures and (...) negation of imperfection and does not reach to the divine essence. Thomas Aquinas maintains that there are two types of self-evident propositions: those self-evident in themselves but not to us and those self-evident in themselves as well as to us. "God exists" is of the fi rst type. For Scotus a self-evident proposition is such that if its terms are conceived by any intellect, the truth of the proposition becomes known from the terms, non-inferentially. In his view there is no distinction between a self-evident proposition in itself and that in relation to us, because any proposition self-evident in itself is known to be such to any intellect, even though it might not be actually known; it would be known, provided that the terms are conceived. So for Scotus the sentence "God exists" expresses diff erent propositions for the blessed in heaven, the angels and God on the one hand and humans on the other. The former is self-evident, the latter is not. While later scholastics accept either the solution of Thomas or that of Scotus, according to which "God exists" is not self-evident for humans, Thomas de Argentina diff ers in that for him "God exists" is self-evident for humans too. The position of Thomas Aquinas was defended by Domingo Ban¯ez, Francisco Zumel and Gregorio de Valentia. In contrast, Johannes Poncius was a famous adherent of Scotus. There is a fair number of scholastics harmonizing the doctrine of Thomas and Scotus: Bernard Sannig, Luis de Molina, Gabriel Vázquez, Rodrigo de Arriaga and Jean Lalemandet. According to these authors, when Thomas says that "God exists" is self-evident in itself, he speaks about the extensional proposition, i.e. the state of affairs being conceptualized, which does not contradict Scotus’s teaching. © FILOSOFIA, 2013. (shrink)

The article compares selected chapters devoted the problems of mind from two phil-osophical courses by Georgii Konyskyi, taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1747-1749 and 1749-1751 academic years. As Konyskyi taught his first course using verbatim Teofan Prokop-ovych’s philosophical course of 1706-08 academic years, the article compares the doctrines on mind by these two Mohylian authors. It also shows the evolution of Konyskyi’s views. There are common elements between the philosophy of mind of Prokopovych and Konyskyi: their interpretations of Aristotle’s definition (...) of the soul; the scholastic concept of the man as an integral mind-body entity; the problem of the unity and multiplicity of forms. It is shown that Prokopovych and Konsyskyi understood the three-level structure of a human soul in the same way as Francisco Suarez and Rodrigo de Arriaga. However, there are some differences between these two Mohylian professors. They inter-preted differently sensitive and intellectual cognition. Prokopovych upholds the scholastic doc-trine of species. Konyskyi, in his second course, abandons this doctrine and defends the doctrine of impressiones. They are developed by the phantasmata – not received from objects. The im-pressions are modifications of animal spirits by direct or indirect impact of objects on senses of a human being or any other animated being. In the doctrine on intellectual powers, Prokopovych upholds the scholastic distinction between active and passive intellect. Konyskyirejects this common for scholastic tradition distinction and considers that passive intellect can do full-scale intellectual activity. The influence of Early Modern philosophy, especially Cartesianism, was the reason why Konyskyi changed his position. (shrink)

The term communion, coming from the Latin translation of the Greek word koinonia is used as the basis for many concepts in Christianity and, more specifically, in the Catholic tradition. This article aims, althoug very briefly, conduct the study of the term, since its Hellenistic origin and its incorporation, with different nuances, in the Christian tradition. Therefore, in addition to resort to the etymology of the word, briefly covers its use in various environments of ancient Greek culture to raise possible (...) changes in the general concept that the word indicates: communion, participation. Still, aims to through the various uses in the New Testament literature and the Patristic period, the contribution of Christianity to the extension of the concept Hellenistic. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos avaliar criticamente algumas das teses de John McDowellsobre a natureza da virtude, tal como expostas em seu artigo “Virtue and Reason” e, ao fazê-lo,expor algumas de suas limitações. Mais especificamente, tratarei o que vejo como problemas emsua apresentação da virtude como uma forma de conhecimento, e sua proposta – corporificada natese da unidade das virtudes – de que as virtudes comumente reconhecidas deveriam ser vistascomo manifestações parciais da virtude enquanto tal. Também enfocarei a assertiva de McDowellde que (...) o conhecimento que constitui a virtude não pode ser visto como tendo um conteúdoproposicional que se preste a uma codificação em princípios de conduta – a tese de nãocodificabilidade– e a relação da postura pessoal de McDowell com a empreitada mais ampla daética de virtudes. (shrink)

In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy (...) have engaged in important controversies around the conjunction fallacy. The goal of this paper is to explore the most important of these controversies, namely, the controversy about the nature of the conjunction fallacy. Is the conjunction fallacy mainly due to a misunderstanding of the problem by participants (misunderstanding hypothesis) or is it mainly due to a genuine reasoning bias (reasoning bias hypothesis)? A substantial portion of research on the topic has been directed to test the misunderstanding hypothesis. I review this literature and argue that a stronger case can be made against the misunderstanding hypothesis. Thus, I indirectly provide support for the reasoning bias hypothesis. (shrink)

This book examines the social relevance of philosophy as this problem is posed in the contemporary Modernism-Postmodernism debate. Manuel P. Arriaga critically investigates the two sides of the debate in their various presuppositions and their equally diverse ramifications in fields ranging from political theory, philosophy of religion, and theory of knowledge, among others.

Since March 14, 2020, Spanish citizens have been confined to their homes due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participating in musical activities has been associated with reduced anxiety and increased subjective wellbeing. The aim of this study is to analyze how Spanish citizens used music during the lockdown period. We also study perceptions of the impact music has in everyday life, in particular examining the respondents’ insights into the effects of listening to music in situations of isolation. The (...) study was conducted using the MUSIVID19 questionnaire administered to a total of 1868 Spanish citizens. The results indicate that during lockdown, respondents perceived an increase in the time they devoted to musical activities such as listening, singing, dancing or playing an instrument. The participants also reported using music to cope with the lockdown, finding that it helped them to relax, escape, raise their mood or keep them company. The findings suggest an improvement in their perception of the value of music in personal and social wellbeing during the lockdown. However, the study reveals significant differences in the use and perceptions of music according to respondents’ personal situations. Age and feelings of vulnerability may lead to more conservative uses of musical practice and to more moderate perceptions of the positive values of music. (shrink)

The influx of new groups into society, such as recently established religious groups whose practices differ from societal norms, may disturb relatively stable communities. This instability is exacerbated if these practices contravene long-held fundamental societal tenets, such as the protection of children. This situation now exists in Mexico, where the country's traditional Catholic and secular values clash with those of a religion introduced from the United States, Jehovah's Witnesses. The focal point for these clashes, as it has been elsewhere, is (...) in the bioethics arena. (shrink)

As in other countries, medical ethics in Mexico has rescued the world of philosophical ethics from oblivion. The needs of clinical medicine gave birth to Mexican bioethics. After the growth of scientific and technologic subjects in medical schools, the humanities, such as medical history, deontology, and medical philosophy, were replaced by such core subjects as radiology, pharmacology, and microbiology. Since the 1950s, graduates from Mexican medical schools have not been exposed to any courses in the medical humanities.

The Escuela Feminista de Teología de Andalucía [the Andalusian School of Feminist Theology], held a conference titled ‘Feminine Mysticism and Counterculture: A Rebellious Genre’ October 15-17, 2009 at the University of Seville. This annual seminar is held thanks to an agreement between the University of Seville and EFETA, with the direct support of the research group ‘Escritoras y Escrituras,’ whose principal researcher is Mercedes Arriaga. The guest of honour at this year’s conference was Lisa Isherwood, who kindly presented EFETA (...) with the opportunity to publish some of the seminar’s papers in Feminist Theology, and who we here in Spain thank wholeheartedly for her contributions. Before presenting the texts that were selected for this edition, we would like to take this opportunity to explain a little about the EFETA project. (shrink)

Our democracies presently face a set of unique challenges. In this article we argue that the current crisis needs to be understood as resulting from the convergence of two historical transformations: the paradigm of boundlessness; and what we term “endividualismo”, a novel mutation of individualism in the context of the financial age. The result is a novel political reality where individual rights are ever-expanding and the opportunities for collective action have shrunk to the point of impossibility. The resulting powerlessness of (...) the polity demands new answers: we need to reconfigure the relationship between citizens and political power. (shrink)

The problem of the reduction of chemistry to physics has been traditionally addressed in terms of classical structural chemistry and standard quantum mechanics. In this work, we will study the problem from the perspective of the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules, proposed by Richard Bader in the nineties. The purpose of this article is to unveil the role of QTAIM in the inter-theoretical relations between chemistry and physics. We argue that, although the QTAIM solves two relevant obstacles to reduction (...) by providing a rigorous definition of chemical bond and of atoms in a molecule, it appeals to concepts that are unacceptable in the quantum–mechanical context. Therefore, the QTAIM fails to provide the desired reduction. On the other hand, we will show that the QTAIM is more similar to Bohmian mechanics and that the basic elements of both theories are closely related. (shrink)

This paper tracks Derrida’s allusion to the “phoenix motif” in the recently published Life Death seminar, showing how it foreshadows and overlaps with the political problematic of “national humanism” made explicit in Geschlecht III. I argue that, be it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, biological life is always in the service of a spiritual life that finds its breath in a certain reappropriation of the German idiom. Following Derrida, I argue that this “philosophy-of-life German” (cet allemand philosophe de la (...) vie) introduces a sinister equivocality between these thinkers and National Socialism, and this in spite of all their prudence to shield their discourses from such a co-option. (shrink)

The paper identifies three recent lines of interpretation of the politics that can be derived from Deleuze and Guattari, all of which share a way of reading the dualisms in their work that can be traced back to how they understand the actual/virtual partition, and to an alleged pre-eminence of the virtual over the actual. It is argued that this reading is not only inaccurate, but obscures the political dimension of Deleuze and Guattari's work. Clarifying the latter requires a reinterpretation (...) of the dualisms involved (as dyads rather than binaries), of the relation between virtual and actual (as a formal distinction where one acts back upon the other), and the drawing of a clear distinction between what Deleuze calls a ‘transcendent exercise’ of thought and sensibility and the properly metaphysical exercise that sets up the distinction between virtual and actual. What then appears is an image of Deleuze's and Guattari's thought that is far more concerned with practical questions and with a situated political practice of intervention. (shrink)

The paper is a critical examination of Rorty’s argument against foundationalism, on which depends his view of the social irrelevance of traditional philosophy. I try to demonstrate the incoherence and speciousness of his reasoning against foundationalism and in the process refute his view that traditional philosophy is a tool which can and should be cast off from the public, and even from the private, sphere of human life and that its universal concepts can therefore be circumvented. This demonstration is accomplished (...) in twocomplementary stages. First, I provide a general justification of my “argumentative” style in engaging Rorty’s position against his objection to this approach, while showing that what he calls his strategy of “re-description” is really nothing but a form of logical argumentation. Second, I attempt to show how, in order to substantiate his rejection of traditional philosophy’s claim of social relevance, Rorty’s “re-description” of the motivation underlying traditional philosophy is no different from the strategy of unmasking that he has called into question as an instance of a radical or foundationalist critique. I show that, despite his protestations to the contrary, “unmasking” is precisely what—at least on a number of occasions—Rorty quite inconsistently does in demonstrating that the claim of social relevance arises from a form of self-deception engaged in by the traditional philosopher. I further show that theanti-foundationalist stance that defines his characteristic manner of extricating himself from such self-reference problems is based on faulty reasoning and lands him in a deeper incoherence. Since his depoliticization of traditional philosophy depends on the cogency ofthis anti-foundationalist view, I conclude that this depoliticizing project fails. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 1 - 28 This paper is an attempt to think through Derrida’s newly discovered _Geschlecht III_, the third and missing installment of Derrida’s four part series on Heidegger and _Geschlecht_. I argue that Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in _Geschlecht III_ needs to be situated within the philosophico-political context of Derrida’s 1984–85 seminar—given under the general title _Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism_—from which _Geschlecht III_ is extracted. In the first part of the paper, I reconstruct (...) Derrida’s general problematic of national-humanism as he lays it out in the opening sessions of the seminar, before arriving at his reading of Heidegger, who will be part of “a sequence of German national-philosophism,” as Derrida calls it. In the second part, the paper turns explicitly to _Geschlecht III_ where, as I show, Derrida’s thoroughgoing denunciation of a national-humanism in Heidegger becomes all the more telling when seen through the theoretical matrix of the seminar. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Charles Babbage began the quest to build an intelligent machine in the nineteenth century. Despite finishing neither the Difference nor the Analytical engine, he was aware that the use of mental language for describing the functioning of such machines was figurative. In order to reverse this cautious stance, Alan Turing postulated two decisive ideas that contributed to give birth to Artificial Intelligence: the Turing machine and the Turing test. Nevertheless, a philosophical problem arises from regarding intelligence simulation and make-believe as (...) sufficient to establish that programmed computers are intelligent and have mental states, especially given the nature of mind and its characteristic first-person viewpoint. The origin of Artificial Intelligence is undoubtedly linked to the accounts that inspired John Searle to coin the term strong AI ―or the view that simply equates computers and minds. Especially emphasising the divergence between algorithmic processes and intentional mental states, the Chinese Room thought experiment shows that, since the mind is embodied and able to realise when linguistic understanding takes place, mental states require material implementation, a point that directly conflicts with the accounts that reduce the mind to the functioning of a programmed computer. The experience of linguistic understanding with its typical quale leads to other important philosophical issues. Searle’s theory of intentionality holds that intentional mental states have conditions of satisfaction and appear in semantic networks; thus people know when they understand and what terms are about. In contrast, a number of philosophers maintain that consciousness is only an illusion and that it plays no substantial biological role. However, consciousness is a built-in feature of the system. Moreover, neurological evidence suggests that conscious mental states, qualia and emotions enhance survival chances and are an important part of the phenomenal side of mental life and its causal underpinnings. This renders an important gap between simulating a mind and replicating the properties that allow having mental states and consciousness. On this score, the Turing test and the evidence it offers clearly overestimate simulation and verisimilar make-believe, since such evidence is insufficient to establish that programmed computers have mental life. In summary, this dissertation criticises views which hold that programmed computers are minds and minds are nothing but computers. Despite the arguments in favour of such an equation, they all fail to properly reduce the mind and its first-person viewpoint. Accordingly, the burden of proof still lies with the advocates of strong AI and with those who are willing to deny fundamental parts of the mind to make room for machine intelligence. (shrink)

We focus on the debate on the external validity of lab results in the area of experimental economics. More specifically, we focus on Colin Camerer’s and John List’s views, who postulate opposite positions on the issue. The problem is that they partially analyze the same empirical evidence and draw from it opposite conclusions. The goal of this work is to analyze such empirical evidence to try to explain the difference in interpretation of results. We argue that the dispute in interpretations (...) can be expressed in terms of difference of criteria used to determine external validity. From our analysis we propose the formulation of different types of external validity. (shrink)

(1982). The future of the Central American and Caribbean region. World Futures: Vol. 18, Alternatives for Humankind: The Role of Latin America, pp. 125-134.

O presente artigo insere-se no contexto das reflexões sobre a prática de ensino em Filosofia e como esta viabiliza a efetivação da identidade da disciplina de Filosofia e do papel do professor na ação educativa. A pesquisa bibliográfica, com levantamento de literatura e aproximações entre teóricos da educação em filosofia, objetivou delinear as relações entre os pressupostos filosóficos da educação no ensino de Filosofia, as implicações da Historicidade da Filosofia no seu ensino, sinalizando o ensino de filosofia como investigação, ou (...) seja, capacitando o discente para investigar a realidade. A pesquisa também apresenta os apontamentos da pedagogia histórico-crítica, como possibilidade para o ensino de filosofia na busca da educação para a emancipação do sujeito. O alcance dos objetivos levou-nos a conclusão da pesquisa, apresentando horizontes para a efetivação da identidade da disciplina de Filosofia na educação básica, visando à emancipação dos sujeitos da prática educativa. (shrink)

This article presents an interpretation of Cyrus’ psychology in Xenophon'sCyropaedia. Its point is that Cyrus’ psychological structure is composed by a set of three desires (philotimía, philanthrōpía, philomátheia) given by nature and a set of virtues (sōphrosúnēandenkráteia) acquired by education. The paper will argue that Cyrus, as an enkratic ruler, does not long for any kind of honours, but is guided by truephilotimía, that is, the desire for true honours—honours freely given by gratitude or admiration.philanthrōpíais the key to achieve these (...) honours, since it naturally prompts a benevolent and generous behaviour. At the same time,philomátheiaprovides the desire of knowledge necessary to acquire the techniques in order to accomplish ambitious and philanthropic deeds. Therefore, confronting those who have posed negative interpretations of Cyrus, the article will argue that the uncommon combination of these psychological predispositions makes Cyrus a virtuous and effective ruler. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper details Heidegger’s phenomenological exam of religious consciousness. In The Phenomenology of Religious Life, the Heideggerian analysis of the Pauline Epistles serves, above all, as a way to demonstrate the proper use of the phenomenological method. In this case, Heidegger clarifes the primordial characteristics of religious life by detailing Paul of Tarsus’s existential stance. Therefore, we explain the Heideggerian methodological stance regarding the study of religion and demonstrate that the phenomenological description of the Christian mystical-religious experience serves as (...) a crucial moment in Heidegger’s philosophy because it precedes that which is found in Being and Time (1927). (shrink)

This paper examines employees’ reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility programs at the attitudinal level. The results presented are drawn from an in-depth study of two Chilean construction firms that have well-established CSR programs. Grounded theory was applied to the data prior to the construction of the conceptual framework. The analysis shows that the implementation of CSR programs generates two types of attitudes in employees: attitudes toward the organization and attitudes toward society. These two broad types of attitudes can then be (...) broken down into four different categories : acceptance of the new role of the organization, identification with the organization, importance attached to the work performed and a sense of social justice. In turn, each of these categories is a grouping of many different concepts, some of which have at first sight little to do with CSR. Finally, the analysis reveals an attitudinal employee typology: the committed worker, the indifferent worker, and the dissident worker. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo, utilizaremos el concepto althusseriano de problemática para repensar al estructuralismo. Nuestra pregunta será: ¿cómo comprender al estructuralismo? ¿Cómo indicar sus límites cuando se trató de un conjunto de propuestas teóricas que atravesó disciplinas, que sufrió cruces con diversas teorías y cuyas premisas nunca fueron establecidas con claridad? A partir del concepto de problemática, desarrollado por Althusser fundamentalmente en La revolución teórica de Marx, se nos abrirá la posibilidad de interrogar al conjunto de propuestas teóricas que lo (...) conformaron, no tanto como un canon aplicable a las más diversas materias sino como un espacio teórico atravesado por contradicciones. Así, nos apoyaremos en la noción de problemática porque la consideramos particularmente fértil para pensar un campo teórico más como un conjunto de problemas y preguntas que como un compendio de respuestas a dificultades teóricas claramente delimitadas.Pretendemos destacar las contradicciones que vertebran al estructuralismo porque nos conducirán a plantear que es posible emplazar una distancia en su interior, distancia que mostrará como una de sus variantes aquella que afirma la imposibilidad de pensar una estructura de estructuras final que las totalice a todas. Este hecho es el que nos pondrá delante cómo las tensiones internas del estructuralismo permiten mostrar el modo en que algunas de sus propuestas balizan el camino del posestructuralismo. (shrink)

Entrevista con la filósofa argentina Silvia Schwarzböck.

Resenha: MELO, Amarildo José de. Jansenismo no Brasil : traços de uma Moral rigorista. Santuário em Aparecida/SP. 2014, 343p.