This article takes its point of departure from the second (embodied) linguistic turn represented by the enactivist notion of humans as linguistic bodies, using resources from Hans Georg Gadamer in order to propose a view of the relation between art and everyday experience as one of symbolic transformation. Conceiving art as a form of linguistic phenomenon wherein one can engage in original situations of communication, this view rejects both autonomist and direct continuity views of the art-everyday relation. We start by (...) situating the idea of linguistic bodies within the enactive approach, spelling out relevant aspects concerning the significance of language for human life and perception (Sect. 2). Then we embark on a discussion of aspects of Shaun Gallagher’s and Alva Noë’s enactivist perspectives on art experience, highlighting places where their views align with and depart from ours (Sect. 3). The last two sections aim to lay out the transformative view in more detail, proposing a pluralistic understanding of art media and a view of art and art experience as modes of ideational, embodied thought (Sects. 4 and 5). (shrink)

'Principles Of Mental Imagery' offers a broad, balanced, and up-to-date introduction to the major findings of this research and identifies five general principles that can account for most of them. It considers the development of experimental techniques that have solved many of the challenging methodological problems inherent in imagery research and includes recent experimental findings not covered in other imagery books..

Recent advances in the field of creative cognition have helped to reveal the cognitive structures and processes that are involved in creative thinking and imagination. This article begins by reviewing recent studies of creative imagery that have explored the emergent properties of mental images. The geneplore model of creative cognition, which describes how preinventive structures such as creative mental images are generated and interpreted, is then discussed. In discussing this model and its implications, a distinction is made between aspects of (...) creative imagery that reflect conscious, deliberate control and those that reflect the absence of such control, as illustrated particularly by the emergence of unanticipated structures in imagined forms. The intentional, structured qualities of creative thinking are then contrasted with its spontaneous, unstructured qualities. The article concludes by discussing the recent topics of chaotic cognition and creative realism and how they bear on the general issue of balancing structured and unstructured processes in creative endeavors. (shrink)

This article takes issue with the formalism problem arguably pertaining to Habermas's conception of communicative rationality and discursive justification. Beginning with the Hegelian premises of Habermas's theory of mutual understanding and communicative rationality, the article proceeds to make Kant's doctrine of reflective judgement fruitful for a critique of Habermas's restriction of reasons to discursively articulated endorsements, the 'force of the better reasons'. The argument consists in showing that discursive justification must rely upon endorsements of particulars exhibited in right judgements, and (...) that such endorsements must be expressed or articulated to yield public manifestations of discursive orientations and commitments, constituting what is referred to as 'communicative experience'. On the account presented here, the rational significance of particulars is revealed in the expressive attitude that allows or admits non-discursive constraints to the conception of rational justification. The promise of such an account - as premised upon Kant's insights in his third Critique - consists in its capability to avoid the one-sided formalism of discursive rationality, incorporating ethical, expressive and aesthetic dimensions to our rational self-conception. Key Words: aesthetic experience • communicative experience • concrete other • discourse-ethics • ethical life • feminism • Habermas • Hegel • Kant • morality • rational justification • reflective judgement • world-disclosure. (shrink)

One use of the noun ‘pain’ is exemplified in sentences like ‘There is a pain in my foot’. According to the Experiential Theory, ‘pain’ in this context refers to an experience located in the mind or brain. According to the Bodily Theory, it refers to an extra-cranial bodily occurrence located in a body part. In this paper, I defend the Bodily Theory. Specifically, I argue that pains are proximal activations of nociceptors that cause experiences of pain. This view is preferable (...) to the Experiential Theory, because it accords better with common sense and offers a better interpretation or semantics of ordinary pain reports. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Abhandlung ist die erste systematische Darstellung einer wissenschaftstheoretischen Konzeption, die ich in den Jahren 1976-1978 an der Fakultat fur Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaft der Universitat Biele­ feld entwickelt habe. Zweck dieser Arbeit war es, die Konstruktionsphase einer empirischen Theorie der Literatur, und damit einer empirischen Wis­ senschaft liber Literatur, von einer Reihe von Inadaquatheiten, Vorurteilen und Irrationalismen zu befreien, die nach meiner Ansicht den bekannten Grundlagenstreit der Literaturwissenschaftler belasten, aber auch in man­ chen Arbeiten zur konzeptionellen Innovation der Literaturwissenschaft (...) zu finden sind. Ich wlirde es als Erfolg ansehen, wenn es mir gelungen ware zu zeigen, daB die Entwicklung des empirischen Paradigmas der Literatur­ wissenschaft tatsachlich mit jenem "Gestalt-Switch" einhergeht, den Thomas Kuhn fur die Struktur einer die normalen Pfade wissenschaftlicher Ent­ wicklung verlassenden Forschung beschrieben hat. Das Maa an wissenschaft­ licher Toleranz, das dabei der Mehrheit der Literaturwissenschaftler abver­ langt wird, ist ohne Zweifel ganz erheblich. Der zentrale Gedanke dieser Abhandlung ist der, daB die wissenschaftstheo­ retische Rationalitat nirgends so gebraucht wird wie in den fruhen, vorpara­ digmatischen Phasen der Entwicklung einer neuen Konzeption, und daa die libliche Wissenschaftstheorie nirgends so versagt wie gerade dort. Ich ver­ suche daher, die Grundlagen einer Konzeption zu umreiBen, die ich einen "Konstruktiven Funktionalismus" nenne, und ihre Brauchbarkeit als eine intradisziplinare Wissenschaftstheorie der empirischen Literaturwissen­ schaft zu demonstrieren. Das Bild der Literaturwissenschaft, das durch die Brille dieser Konzeption sichtbar wird, ist das einer nicht unwesentlich veranderten Disziplin. (shrink)

Review of the following books: -/- Michael Ruoff: Foucault-Lexikon, München 2007. Fink/UTB. -/- Clemens Kammler, Rolf Parr und Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Hrsg.): Foucault-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung, Stuttgart 2008. Metzler. -/- Paul Veyne: Foucault. Der Philosoph als Samurai, Stuttgart 2009. Reclam. -/- Thomas Lemke: Gouvernementalität und Biopolitik, Wiesbaden 2007. VS Verlag. -/- Patricia Purtschert, Katrin Meyer und Yves Winter (Hrsg.): Gouvernementalität und Sicherheit. Zeitdiagnostische Beiträge im Anschluss an Foucault, Bielefeld 2008. Transcript. -/- Daniel Hechler und Axel Philipps (Hrsg.): (...) Widerstand denken. Michel Foucault und die Grenzen der Macht, Bielefeld 2008. Transcript. -/- Jeffrey T. Nealon: Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifi cations since 1984, Stanford 2008. Stanford University Press. -/- Amy Allen: The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory, New York 2008. Columbia University Press. -/- Wendy Brown: Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton 2006. Princeton University Press. -/- Giorgio Agamben: Was ist ein Dispositiv?, Zürich-Berlin 2008. Diaphanes. -/- Philipp Sarasin: Darwin und Foucault. Genealogie und Geschichte im Zeitalter der Biologie, Frankfurt/M. 2008. Suhrkamp. (shrink)

_“Religious Freedom: Social-Scientific Approaches”_ offers original research on religious freedom from around the globe. The volume addresses the issues related to defining and understanding the concept of religious freedom with interdisciplinary methods and by incorporating sociological thinking as a constituent part of this analysis.

It is common in cognitive science to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. to assert that the brain sees, feels, thinks, etc. This has prompted philosophical debate. According to the Nonsense View, the relevant locutions of cognitive scientists are nonsensical or false (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2007). According to the Literal View, they are literal truths and report the psychological properties of brains (Dennett 2007; Crane 2015; Figdor 2018). In this paper, I propose the Synecdoche View, according to which (...) cognitive scientists’ locutions are figurative, with ‘brain’ referring to the human being, such that ‘the brain thinks’ reports the thinking of the human being, not the thinking of the brain. I compare this view to the dominant views in the literature and argue that it is a plausible alternative. One consequence of this is that there is no reason to believe that the locutions of cognitive scientists indicate empirical support for the claim that brains possess psychological properties. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in _On Certainty,_ and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also (...) understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights properly. (shrink)

This volume takes on both issues and examines the relationship between organisms and artifacts from the perspective of functionality.

Review of the following books (in German): -/- Michael Ruoff: Foucault-Lexikon, München 2007. Fink/UTB. -/- Clemens Kammler, Rolf Parr und Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Hrsg.): Foucault-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung, Stuttgart 2008. Metzler. -/- Paul Veyne: Foucault. Der Philosoph als Samurai, Stuttgart 2009. Reclam. -/- Thomas Lemke: Gouvernementalität und Biopolitik, Wiesbaden 2007. VS Verlag. -/- Patricia Purtschert, Katrin Meyer und Yves Winter (Hrsg.): Gouvernementalität und Sicherheit. Zeitdiagnostische Beiträge im Anschluss an Foucault, Bielefeld 2008. Transcript. -/- Daniel Hechler und Axel (...) Philipps (Hrsg.): Widerstand denken. Michel Foucault und die Grenzen der Macht, Bielefeld 2008. Transcript. -/- Jeffrey T. Nealon: Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifi cations since 1984, Stanford 2008. Stanford University Press. -/- Amy Allen: The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory, New York 2008. Columbia University Press. -/- Wendy Brown: Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton 2006. Princeton University Press. -/- Giorgio Agamben: Was ist ein Dispositiv?, Zürich-Berlin 2008. Diaphanes. -/- Philipp Sarasin: Darwin und Foucault. Genealogie und Geschichte im Zeitalter der Biologie, Frankfurt/M. 2008. Suhrkamp. (shrink)

Since the Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series (KSMS) was first published in 1997, it has served as the authoritative book series in the field. Starting from 2011 the Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series will intensify the peer-review process with a new editorial and advisory board. KSMS is published on behalf of the S ren Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen. KSMS publishes outstanding monographs in all fields of Kierkegaard research. This includes Ph.D. dissertations, Habilitation theses, conference proceedings and single author (...) works by senior scholars. The goal of KSMS is to advance Kierkegaard studies by encouraging top-level scholarship in the field. The editorial and advisory boards are deeply committed to creating a genuinely international forum for publication which integrates the many different traditions of Kierkegaard studies and brings them into a constructive and fruitful dialogue. To this end the series publishes monographs in English and German. Potential authors should consult the Submission guidelines. All submissions will be blindly refereed by established scholars in the field. Only high-quality manuscripts will be accepted for publication. Potential authors should be prepared to make changes to their texts based on the comments received by the referees. (shrink)

Systems biology is largely tributary to genomics and other “omic” disciplines that generate vast amounts of structural data. “Omics”, however, lack a theoretical framework that would allow using these data sets as such (rather than just tiny bits that are extracted by advanced data-mining techniques) to build explanatory models that help understand physiological processes. Systems biology provides such a framework by adding a dynamic dimension to merely structural “omics”. It makes use of bottom-up and top-down models. The former are based (...) on data about systems components, the latter on systems-level data. We trace back both modeling strategies (which are often used to delineate two branches of the field) to the modeling of metabolic and signaling pathways in the bottom-up case, and to biological cybernetics and systems theory in the top-down case. We then argue that three roots of systems biology must be discerned to account adequately for the structure of the field: pathway modeling, biological cybernetics, and “omics”. We regard systems biology as merging modeling strategies (supplemented by new mathematical procedures) from data-poor fields with data supply from a field that is quite deficient in explanatory modeling. After characterizing the structure of the field, we address some epistemological and ontological issues regarding concepts on which the top-down approach relies and that seem to us to require clarification. This includes the consequences of identifying modules in large networks without relying on functional considerations, the question of the “holism” of systems biology, and the epistemic value of the “systeome” project that aspires to become the cutting edge of the field. (shrink)

Looking for an adequate explication of the concept of a biological function, several authors have proposed to link function to design. Unfortunately, known explications of biological design in turn refer to functions. The concept of general design I will introduce here breaks up this circle. I specify design with respect to its ontogenetic role. This allows function to be based on design without making reference to the history of the design, or to the phylogeny of an organism, while retaining the (...) normative aspect of function ascriptions. The concept is applicable to the function and design of technical artifacts as well. Several problems well known with other definitions can be overcome by this approach. (shrink)

Disneyland is work disguised as play; school disguised as vacation. While Walt Disney’s curriculum deploys across all of its products, it literally engulfs the approximately 50 million ‘guests’ who visit the Disney Parks each year. Drawing on Sarah Ahmed’s phenomenological reading of orientation in Queer phenomenology, this article investigates the ways in which Disney’s didacticism is made material through practices and procedures designed to orient the park’s visitors, to ensure that those visitors always know where they are and who they (...) are, as a means of educating ‘good’ citizens. The argument focuses not on Disneyland’s narrative curriculum but on its corporeal one: visitors are enticed to make affective investments, to construct or reconstruct their identities to comply with the Disney version of the ideal American worker and consumer, as the park attempts to reorient those who resist those roles. (shrink)

Book reviews: Adorno, Theodor W., Metaphysik. Begriff und Probleme (reviewed by Ståle R.S. Finke).

Philosophy in the Islamic world is a comprehensive and unprecedented four-volume reference work devoted to the history of philosophy in the realms of Islam, from its beginnings in the eighth century AD down to modern times. In the period covered by this second volume (eleventh and twelfth centuries). Both major and minor figures of the period are covered, giving details of biography and doctrine, as well as detailed lists and summaries of each author’s works. This is the English version of (...) the relevant volume of the Ueberweg, the most authoritative German reference work on the history of philosophy ( Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt Band II: 11.–12. Jahrhundert. Zentrale und östliche Gebiete, Basel: Schwabe, 2021). (shrink)

In [15], [16] G. Kreisel introduced the no-counterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated ε-substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of first-order Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals Φ A of order type 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A H of A. Subsequently more perspicuous proofs of this fact via functional interpretation (combined with normalization) and cut-elimination were found. These proofs however do (...) not carry out the no-counterexample interpretation as a local proof interpretation and don't respect the modus ponens on the level of the no-counterexample interpretation of formulas A and A → B. Closely related to this phenomenon is the fact that both proofs do not establish the condition (δ) and--at least not constructively-- (γ) which are part of the definition of an 'interpretation of a formal system' as formulated in [15]. In this paper we determine the complexity of the no-counterexample interpretation of the modus ponens rule for (i) PA-provable sentences, (ii) for arbitrary sentences A, B ∈ L(PA) uniformly in functionals satisfying the no-counterexample interpretation of (prenex normal forms of) A and A → B, and (iii) for arbitrary A, B ∈ L(PA) pointwise in given α( 0 ) -recursive functionals satisfying the no-counterexample interpretation of A and A → B. This yields in particular perspicuous proofs of new uniform versions of the conditions (γ), (δ). Finally we discuss a variant of the concept of an interpretation presented in [17] and show that it is incomparable with the concept studied in [15], [16]. In particular we show that the no-counterexample interpretation of PA n by α( n (ω))-recursive functionals (n ≥ 1) is an interpretation in the sense of [17] but not in the sense of [15] since it violates the condition (δ). (shrink)

Stanovich & West analyze individual differences with respect to response output (e.g., participants' numerical estimates). They do not analyze the underlying cognitive processes that led to the outputs; they thereby probably misclassify some non-normative responses as normative. Using base rate neglect and overconfidence as examples, I demonstrate the advantages of analyzing cognitive processes further.

What does it mean to do philosophy historically, and when does the legend of philosophy begin? When Hegel tried to give a logical explanation of philosophy's history, was he doing the same thing as Eduard Zeller in his account of Creek thought, or Kuno Fischer in his narrative of modern philosophy? l do not believe so, and I shall sugges t in the following that we should carefully differentiate between the different activities commonly referred to as the history of philosophy. (...) I will point out the enormous productivity of the 19th century in terms of printed books devoted to the history of philosophy. I will also point to the context in which these were produced and used rather than examining individual works or authors. There is an entirely new context in the 19th century, which is the study of philosophy. A proper culture developed around the historical interest in philosophy, and it is this culture I want to sketch here. (shrink)