Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie prawdy w literaturze. Punktem wyjścia dla analiz jest koncepcja Romana Ingardena. Odmawia on dziełu literackiemu jako dziełu sztuki prawdziwości w sensie logicznym. Według Ingardena literackie dzieło sztuki jako przedmiot czysto intencjonalny niczego nie orzeka o świecie transcendentnym. Prawdę w dziele literackim można jednakże ujmować jako jej objawianie. -------------- Zgłoszono: 03/09/2020. Zrecenzowano: 22/10/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 10/11/2020.

Plato gradually reaches the concept of the “Good itself” in the most extensive dialogue (apart from The Laws). The dramaturgy of Republic was included in the pedagogical idea. Plato’s own brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, representatives of the aristoia, want to hear from Socrates logically based instruction on what is really good and why, regardless of the prevailing public opinion in Athenian society. They both know that the most valued asset is the wealth and political influence that the use of force (...) provides. Thanks to this, you can effectively appear to be the fairest among citizens, despite the fact that you are extremely unjust. Appearances are highly valued in social life. Only minds exceptionally open to dialectics seek the truth, not content with appearances. Socrates introduces listeners to the knowledge of “the Good itself”, the “form of the Good”, as the most perfect object of knowledge and at the same time the highest principle. The Good, identical with the “One”, “is” above substance (509b). (shrink)

The authors revisit the idea that Enlightenment spearheaded secularization. This book invites all to look at the Enlightenment religiosity as founded on a merger of religious criticism and heterodoxy.

This introduction is divided into two parts. First, drawing on Paul Guyer’s suggestion that we should turn to Kant to reinvestigate the foundations of religious liberty, I outline Kant’s views on the relations between the ethical and the political community, as presented in Part Three of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, focusing in particular on his arguments for separation between religion and the state. Examining critically the idea to employ Kant in contemporary debates, I claim that Kant’s (...) account of pure moral faith and the church as its ‘vehicle’ may pose difficulties for any argument for religious liberty that appeals to his thought. For Kant is better equipped to offer resources to overcome rather than to accommodate the fact of so-called “moral pluralism,” i.e. the condition in which the principle of religious liberty can find its application. In the second part, I summarise the arguments of the authors who contribute to this volume: D. Jakušić, W. Kozyra, S. Lo Re, G.E. Michalson Jr., and S.R. Palmquist. (shrink)

This article contains a review of contexts used in school-didactics of literature. The definition of intertextuality, context and other theoretical problems are considered in the first chapter. Second chapter contains a review of each kind of contexts. At the beginning the author describes the literary contexts related to the analyzed by the means of allusion. He also writes about Bible and mythology. The following part consists of a review of auxiliary contexts, which belong to other sciences: history of literature, history, (...) philosophy, ethics, psychology,’ sociology and geography. The next part covers the texts of culture: aesthetics, theatre, film, music, painting, sculpture, architecture and museum-exhibitions. The last chapter contains suggestions of how to use contexts during Polish language lessons: their place teaching programs as well as presence on various educational stages. The final part of this work contains a description of problems and advantages connected to the usage of contexts in literature didactics. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu jest ważna nie tylko w europejskiej tradycji symbolika związana z górską wspinaczką. Obrazuje ona wewnętrzną „drogę ku górze”, zarówno wysiłki poznawcze, jak i towarzyszące im kształtowanie charakteru. Uzupełnieniem artykułu są wypowiedzi znanych himalaistów związane z ekstremalnymi sytuacjami, jakie przeżywali w górach.

The objective of the article is to recall the European philosophical basis of the philosophical culture, inextricably connected with ancient Greece and its language. Plato’s philosophy is in the very core of the culture and its salient component is the doctrine of anamnesis. The elements of the doctrine are dispersed in numerous dialogues, particularly in Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, therefore they are given more attention. Platonic reflection on anamnesis is related to his view on the soul whose development is associated with (...) the process of cognizing, being essentially tantamount to recalling of what the soul saw before its imprisonment in the body. The role of myth in Plato’s philosophy, as well as in European culture as a whole, has been discussed, along with the main subject. On the background of the Platonic thought, examples of its reception in Polish Renaissance philosophy and in the poetry of the Romantic period has been presented. (shrink)

In recent publications on the Enlightenment, Baruch Spinoza is often associated with the radical “fringe,” advocating against Christianity and giving rise to the incipient process of secularization. In this paper, it is argued that we should look for Spinoza’s influence on the Enlightenment in his ideas inspiring heterodox theologians: radical reformers aiming to “rationalize” revelation but not to dismiss it altogether. Several cases of such thinkers are adduced and shortly discussed: Jarig Jelles, Johan Christian Edelmann, Carl Friedrich Bahrdt and Immanuel (...) Kant. Finally, three ways of conceptualizing the relation between Enlightenment and religion are sketched to address the question whether the sources of secularization can indeed be traced back to the Enlightenment. (shrink)

The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant s conception of intuition and contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content. It is argued that intuition provides the most basic form of intentionality pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.".

The paper focuses on a discussion about McDowell’s "conceptualist" interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience, as one in which all representational content is identified with conceptual content. Both in Mind and WorldM and in his Woodbridge Lectures, McDowell furthers a reading on which the "picture of visual experiences as conceptual shapings of visual consciousness is already deeply Kantian", supporting it with Kant’s famous claim from the A51/ B75 passage of the Critique of Pure Reason, which can be called a Cooperation (...) Thesis. However, much indicates that McDowell’s reading is, if not altogether false, then at least one-sided. In the "Transcendental Aesthetic", as well as in some of the pre-Critical writings , Kant presented a range of arguments for a subjective, non-discursive character of space and time, i.e. the forms of sensible intuition and pure intuitions themselves, underlying all conceptual cognition, and providing a non-conceptual basis for a special kind of synthetic a priori cognition . This allows us to conclude that he would rather take the side of the contemporary “nonconceptualists”, and could be regarded as their predecessor, to use R. Hanna’s formulation. On this reading of the Kantian theory of empirical cognition, intentionality is independent of and prior to any application of concepts to the objects of experience. (shrink)

In Mind and World, John McDowell appeals to Kant’s dictum that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind as encapsulating the idea of conceptualism about the content of perceptual experience. I argue that the appeal is inadequate, and this for a variety of reasons, one of them being that if Kant endorsed conceptualism along the lines of McDowell, he would be committed to returning to positions which he explicitly criticized, i.e. those of rationalist metaphysics; alternatively, he (...) would lapse into an idealism very much akin to Hegel’s. This is because McDowell’s conceptualism ultimately neglects the role of sensibility in mediating the relation between “mind” and “world”, which is crucial to recognizing the limits on cognition which Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism imposes upon subjects. (shrink)

John McDowell claims that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs. Perceptual reasons, according to the author of Mind and World, can be identified with passively “taken in” facts. Concepts figure in the acts of acquiring perceptual reasons, even though the acts themselves do not consist in judgments. Thus, on my reading, McDowell’s account of reasons-acquisition can be likened to Descartes’ account of the acquisition of ideas, rather than to Kant’s theory of judgment as an act by means of which one’s (...) cognition comes to be endowed with objective validity. However, unlike Descartes, McDowell does not acknowledge the skeptical challenge which his conception of reasons-acquisition might face. He contends that perception is factive without arguing for the background assumption on which it rests. Hence, as I suggest in my article, the McDowellian claim that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs is not sufficiently warranted. (shrink)

Review of a book: Matthew C. Altman, Kand and Applied Ethics. The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy , Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2011.

SPINOZA AND KANT ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN MIND In the paper I try to compare the Spinozian and the Kantian accounts of the mind, underlining their relevance to contemporary debates in the area. I also discuss the problem of the nature of consciousness, in particular whether, on the basis of both Spinoza’s and Kant’s theories, one can claim that consciousness, or mentality, can be regarded as specifically distinctive of human beings. My suggestion is that one cannot. Keywords: SPINOZA, KANT, (...) MIND, NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. (shrink)

In Secularism and Freedom of Conscience Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor distinguish two models of a secular state: a republican and a pluralist-liberal one. Whereas the former displays a tendency to relegate religious beliefs from the public sphere for the sake of its postulated neutrality, the latter emphasizes the importance of freedom of conscience and, consequently, the right of individuals to manifest their religious commitments also in public. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s views on religion cannot provide a (...) general framework that would warrant the pluralist-liberal kind of secularism. To that effect, focusing on Kant’s distinction between the private and the public use of reason, introduced in his 1784 essay on enlightenment, I claim that the public sphere construed along the Kantian lines could not provide a space in which a plurality of different, heteronomously grounded beliefs, could coexist with one another. Comparing Kant’s theory with Spinoza’s—particularly with regard to their critique of revelation and the proposal to reinterpret the Scripture in the light of universal moral principles—I also suggest that, as a rationalist about religion, Kant comes close to the secularizing tendency of the ‘radical Enlightenment.’. (shrink)

This brief “Introduction” to the volume discusses the general idea of the special edition of the journal, which is dedicated to the radicalism of the Enlightenment in the context of Jonathan Israel’s recent work on the Enlightenment, and highlights the topics of the articles contained in the edition.

Introductory chapter, 'Comparing Kant and Sartre' (ed. Baiasu).

Foreword from the Guest Editor to the special issue of Diametros – “Enlightenment and Secularism.”.

The article makes an attempt at comparing two perspectives from which philosophical cognition starts – a perspective which can be encountered in Spinoza’s Ethics and a perspective which can be encountered in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In the first case, a finite subject of the philosophical cognition embarks on the cognition of the substance, that is, reality in its comprehensiveness; in the second case, a finite subject of philosophical cognition reflects upon the totality of the field of possible experience, (...) uncovering the conditions of its possibility. Both kinds of cognition consist in a pursuit to comprehend what is necessary and strictly universal. I claim that as much as the source of the cognition at stake is, on Spinoza’s account, provided by the intuitive grasp of the ontological identity of the subject and the whole of the reality, on Kant account, indicating the source or the ground of the transcendental cognition proves more difficult, even though it might be granted that as in Spinoza’s cognition of the substance, also in the cognition which furnishes the judgments of the Critique of Pure Reason, intuition plays the decisive role. (shrink)

The article presents the views of Benedict Bornstein, formulated in his early writings, such as The Pre-established Transcendental Harmony as the Foundation of Kant’s Theory and The Basic Problem of Kant’s Theory of Cognition. These views pertain to the Kantian dualism of concepts and intuitions and they are presented against the background of the contemporary debate about the contents of perceptual experience. Recognizing the rightness of Bornstein’s claim about the non-conceptual character of the Kantian intuitions, I criticize Bornstein’s solution to (...) the problem of dualism, which necessitates an appeal to the conception of transcendental harmony, established by an act of God’s will. (shrink)