The translocation of tRNAs through the ribosome proceeds through numerous small steps in which tRNAs gradually shift their positions on the small and large ribosomal subunits. The most urgent questions are: (i) whether these intermediates are important; (ii) how the ribosomal translocase, the GTPase elongation factor G (EF‐G), promotes directed movement; and (iii) how the energy of GTP hydrolysis is coupled to movement. In the light of recent advances in biophysical and structural studies, we argue that intermediate states of translocation (...) are snapshots of dynamic fluctuations that guide the movement. In contrast to current models of stepwise translocation, kinetic evidence shows that the tRNAs move synchronously on the two ribosomal subunits in a rapid reaction orchestrated by EF‐G and GTP hydrolysis. EF‐G combines the energy regimes of a GTPase and a motor protein and facilitates tRNA movement by a combination of directed Brownian ratchet and power stroke mechanisms. (shrink)

Die thematisch breit gefächerte Reihe umfasst Schriften zur Kunst- und Bildwissenschaft, Kulturgeschichte und Philosophie.

Probability theory, epistemically interpreted, provides an excellent, if not the best available account of inductive reasoning. This is so because there are general and definite rules for the change of subjective probabilities through information or experience; induction and belief change are one and same topic, after all. The most basic of these rules is simply to conditionalize with respect to the information received; and there are similar and more general rules. 1 Hence, a fundamental reason for the epistemological success of (...) probability theory is that there at all exists a well-behaved concept of conditional probability. Still, people have, and have reasons for, various concerns over probability theory. One of these is my starting point: Intuitively, we have the notion of plain belief; we believe propositions2 to be true (or to be false or neither). Probability theory, however, offers no formal counterpart to this notion. Believing A is not the same as having probability 1 for A, because probability 1 is incorrigible3; but plain belief is clearly corrigible. And believing A is not the same as giving A a probability larger than some 1 - c, because believing A and believing B is usually taken to be equivalent to believing A & B.4 Thus, it seems that the formal representation of plain belief has to take a non-probabilistic route. Indeed, representing plain belief seems easy enough: simply represent an epistemic state by the set of all propositions believed true in it or, since I make the common assumption that plain belief is deductively closed, by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it. But this does not yet provide a theory of induction, i.e. an answer to the question how epistemic states so represented are changed tbrough information or experience. There is a convincing partial answer: if the new information is compatible with the old epistemic state, then the new epistemic state is simply represented by the conjunction of the new information and the old beliefs. This answer is partial because it does not cover the quite common case where the new information is incompatible with the old beliefs. It is, however, important to complete the answer and to cover this case, too; otherwise, we would not represent plain belief as conigible. The crucial problem is that there is no good completion. When epistemic states are represented simply by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it, the answer cannot be completed; and though there is a lot of fruitful work, no other representation of epistemic states has been proposed, as far as I know, which provides a complete solution to this problem. In this paper, I want to suggest such a solution. In [4], I have more fully argued that this is the only solution, if certain plausible desiderata are to be satisfied. Here, in section 2, I will be content with formally defining and intuitively explaining my proposal. I will compare my proposal with probability theory in section 3. It will turn out that the theory I am proposing is structurally homomorphic to probability theory in important respects and that it is thus equally easily implementable, but moreover computationally simpler. Section 4 contains a very brief comparison with various kinds of logics, in particular conditional logic, with Shackle's functions of potential surprise and related theories, and with the Dempster - Shafer theory of belief functions. (shrink)

The intervention of the divine in human history, more precisely the transition from fiction to incarnation that is peculiar to the origins of Christianity, marks a turning-point in our understanding of the genealogical principle. With a Son of Man who is also Son of God and his Mother's Father, there is no paternity and, more generally, no genealogy that is not reversible. To this questioning of elementary kinship structures we should add the contesting of the hitherto accepted distribution of genders (...) and sexes. The superimposition of the Holy Family and the Trinity created an uncertain sex whose effect is to uncouple sex from its functions, in particular procreation. Hence a circulation and instability of sex. It is from this viewpoint that we should see the notion of an androgynous Christ and the Church Fathers' thinking on the resurrected body. (shrink)

One of the main controversies of the Logic Schools of the 12th century centered on the question: What follows from the impossible? In this paper arguments for two diametrically opposed positions are examined. The author of the ‘Avranches Text’ who probably belonged to the school of the Parvipontani defended the view that from an impossible proposition everything follows (‘Ex impossibili quodlibet’). In particular he developed a proof to show that by means of so-called ‘disjunctive syllogism’ any arbitrary proposition B can (...) be logically derived from a pair of contradictory propositions A and Not-A. The author of the Ars Meliduna instead argued that nothing follows from an impossible proposition (‘ex falso nihil sequitur’). This view is supported by various counterexamples which aimed to show that the admission of impossible premises would give rise to inconsistent conclusions. Upon closer analysis these inconsistencies do not, however, have the formal structure of a real contradiction like A and Not-A, but rather the structure of two rivalling conditionals like ‘If B then A’ and ‘If B then Not-A’. Hence these counterexamples rather have to be considered as refutations of the basic principles of ‘connexive logic’. (shrink)

SummaryA simple and precise definition is offered of “term t of theory T being T‐theoretical” which can be applied to any formalized theory. The definition is in line with and emends traditional accounts of theoreticity. Its adequacy is demonstrated by application to three examples: exchange economics, classical mechanics and collision mechanics.

Hermann Grassmann is known to be the founder of modern vector and tensor calculus. Having as a theologian no formal education in mathematics at a university he got his basic ideas for this mathematical innovation at least to some extent from listening to Schleiermacher’s lectures on Dialectics and, together with his brother Robert, reading its publication in 1839. The paper shows how the idea of unity and various levels of reality first formulated in Schleiermacher’s talks about religion in 1799 were (...) transformed by him into a philosophical system in his dialectics and then were picked up by Grassmann and operationalized in his philosophical-mathematical treatise on the extension theory in 1844. (shrink)

This is the first volume in the trilogy "Many Peaces" on transrational peace and elicitive conflict transformation. It proposes an innovative analysis of peace interpretations in global history and contemporary cultures of peace, the so-called five families of energetic, moral, modern, post-modern, and transrational.

Literatur ist nicht nur vieldeutig und rätselhaft, wie dies das leitende literaturtheoretische Paradigma behauptet. Literatur wird noch immer, unbeschadet ihrer Vieldeutigkeit, als sinnhaft und bedeutsam erfahren, weil sie bestimmt, ästhetisch herausgehoben und geregelt ist. In dieser Hinsicht läßt sie sich als eine dem Ritual analoge, ja als selbst rituelle Handlung beschreiben. Denn das Ritual ist eine ästhetisch ausgezeichnete, symbolische Wiederholungshandlung, die für das menschliche Leben bis heute elementare Bedeutung hat.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGEs werden aus der Theologiegeschichte vier Typen von Willensfreiheit erhoben: der Typus liberum arbitrium , der Typus des nominalistischen Willensbegriffs , der Typus des mystischen Willensbegriffs und der Typus der Rechtfertigungslehre. Die ersten drei Typen werden psychologisch interpretiert im Sinne der Ichentwicklung als präautonom, autonom und transautonom. Nach der Darstellung und Diskussion der gegenwärtigen neurowissenschaftlichen Debatte um die Willensfreiheit wird ein systemisch verstandener Personbegriff als Brückenkonzept vorgeschlagen.SUMMARYFour types of free will are identified from the history of theology: The type of (...) the liberum arbitrium, the type of nominalism, the type of mysticism and the type of justification. For the first three types a psychological interpretation in terms of pre-autonomy, autonomy, and trans-autonomy is offered, based on self-transcendence as a religious feature. Two basically opposing interpretations of the same empirical data favoring free will and favoring a non-free will are discussed and compared with the theological tradition. A new notion of the person, based on the system theory, is suggested as a bridging concept to link the theological and neuro-scientific ideas of free will. (shrink)

In the last decade, we have observed a continuous increase of interest in eye movement research. According to a recent investigation, eye movements are discussed in over one million publications. The number of publications with eye movement in the title or abstract has been steadily increasing over the years, with over 1,200 papers published alone in 2013. The last decade has also witnessed the emergence of many new sub-disciplines in the field of neuroscience and cognition - one of them is (...) neuroaesthetics, which refers to the [neuro-]science of aesthetic perception of art.The title and contents of our book have been inspired by a very influential research article. It is one of the most cited scientific papers of all time, published in 1959 by a team of neurophysiologists and engineers, Lettvin, McCulloch and Pitts who are considered to be the founders of modern cybernetics. Their article, "What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain," refers to the role of internal cortical models in the communication or interfacing of the information in the outside world with the practical contextual task of the viewer. It shows how eye movements are the modality of this communication. The same duality between eye movements and internal models plays a fundamental role in humans. When we look, for example, at art, it explains those neurological processes involved in neuroaesthetics. Our book undertakes this innovative approach to neuroaesthetics. It explains this duality and discusses the communication between the artist and the viewer's aesthetic perception. It is structured into five chapters.Chapter One discusses the neurology of aesthetics, the idea of art as a form of communication, and explains perception as an active matching between a "top" (the viewer's mind) and a "down" (the viewer's sensorial machinery). It goes deep into the philosophical quandary of what beauty is in terms of art. Chapter Two is about eye movements and the scanpath theory of vision perception. It discusses the role of visual attention for controlling active vision, the meaning of mental binding and the analysis of eye movements as the key to understanding aesthetic processes. Chapter Three introduces Claude Shannon's information theory using it as a matrix into which to embed the top down active vision scanpath theory. The authors explain the main concept of neuroaesthetics as a form of communication mediated by the sequence of eye fixations. Chapter Four discusses art critique: The role of the viewer's training and expectation, the dilemma of the aesthetics of art versus non-art and how all of this affects the viewing mode. Finally, Chapter Five treats the intimacy of the artistic process, showing the unique implementation of the communicative experience between the artist and the viewer - the relation between a pictorial representation defined by the artist and modes of AWE generated in the viewer during active looking. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is a characterization of the $\Sigma_1$ -definable set functions of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity and a uniform version of axiom of choice: $KP\omega+(uniform\;AC)$ . This class of functions is shown to coincide with the collection of set functionals of type 1 primitive recursive in a given choice functional and $x\mapsto\omega$ . This goal is achieved by a Gödel Dialectica-style functional interpretation of $KP\omega+(uniform\;AC)$ and a computability proof for the involved functionals.

In this paper two theories of defeasible reasoning, Pollock's account and my theory of ranking functions, are compared, on a strategic level, since a strictly formal comparison would have been unfeasible. A brief summary of the accounts shows their basic difference: Pollock's is a strictly computational one, whereas ranking functions provide a regulative theory. Consequently, I argue that Pollock's theory is normatively defective, unable to provide a theoretical justification for its basic inference rules and thus an independent notion of admissible (...) rules. Conversely, I explain how quite a number of achievements of Pollock's account can be adequately duplicated within ranking theory. The main purpose of the paper, though, is not to settle a dispute with formal epistemology, but rather to emphasize the importance of formal methods to the whole of epistemology. (shrink)

We investigate certain statements about factors of unary functions which have connections with weak forms of the axiom of choice. We discuss more extensively the fine structure of Howard and Rubin's Form 314 from [4]. Some of our set-theoretic results have also interesting recursive versions.

in spite of koyré's conclusions, there are sufficient reasons to claim that galileo, and with him the beginnings of classical mechanics in early modern times, was closely related to practical mechanics. it is, however, not completely clear how, and to what extent, practitioners and engineers could have had a part in shaping the modern sciences. by comparing the beginnings of modern dynamics with the beginnings of statics in antiquity, and in particular with archimedes — whose rediscovery in the sixteenth century (...) was of great consequence — i will focus on the question of which devices played a comparable role in dynamics to that of the lever and balance in statics. i will also examine where these devices came from. in this way, i will show that the entire world of mechanics of that time — “high” and “low,” practical and theoretical — was of significance for shaping classical mechanics and that a specific relationship between art and science was and is constitutive for modern sciences. (shrink)

Teleology can be defined as goal seeking behaviour with production of negentropy, i.e. with generation of an state improbable under the given conditions. Contrary to an opinion often hold, the production of negentropy does not mean an decrease of entropy. That permits a physical and non-teleological explanation for the origin of the negentropy of the univers in its present state.

Wolfgang Rudzio ist als Politikwissenschaftler bekannt, der eines der wichtigsten und erfolgreichsten Lehrbücher zur Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geschrieben hat. In seinen Erinnerungen gibt er uns einen spannenden Einblick in sein wissenschaftliches, politisches und privates Leben, seine Kindheit in Ostpreußen und seine Familie. Es waren Flucht, Nachkriegszeit, Studentenbewegung, eigenes linkes Polit-Engagement und die Herausforderung des Kommunismus, die das Leben des Autors prägten. Zeitweilig für bekannte Politiker wie Carlo Schmid und Hans Matthöfer arbeitend, entschied er sich nach Mathematik-Examen und (...) Promotion in Geschichte nicht für Politik, sondern Politikwissenschaft. Manche seiner Forschungen knüpften an Lebenserfahrungen an. (shrink)