At Republic 519a-521b, Socrates claims that each guardian must return from his/her contemplation to run Kallipolis. Quite reasonably, Glaucon objects that they would be making the guardian's life worse than it could be. This is sometimes referred to as “the happy philosopher problem”. But rather than answering Glaucon, Socrates admonishes him that their focus is instead on the role of the class of guardians and the happiness of the whole city. It turns out this admonition is the last (...) in a string of similar admonitions that Socrates gives to his interlocutors. This paper examines Socrates' admonition to Glaucon, and its relation to Socrates’ other warnings to focus on the happiness of the city. By examining these admonitions, we can defend Socrates' dismissal of Glaucon's question and the happy philosopher question at 519d. The paper concludes by examining a few strategies for interpreting Socrates’ reluctance to engage Glaucon’s question. (shrink)

A bit of fiction: the long-lost epilogue to Plato's Republic focused on the Myth of Er.

Although we are likely unaware of it, in one troubling respect nearly all of us today wear the ring of Gyges. Because we are “invisible,” we use the ring to harm others with impunity. What is our ring of Gyges? It is our use/release of epigenetically toxic environmental pollutants (ETEP), such as endocrine disruptors, metals, and some pesticides. For developmentally/pre- and-postnatally-exposed children, ETEP often cause heritable gene-expression changes, developmental toxicity (DT) that increases later-life disease/dysfunction/death, including asthma/allergy, cancer, cardiovascular disease, depression, (...) diabetes, hypertension, immune/precocious autoimmune diseases, infertility, neuro-developmental/neuro-degenerative diseases, obesity, osteoporosis, puberty, and schizophrenia.Yet, like Gyges, we offenders are “invisible” in at least two senses: (i) invisible before the law, because current regulations do not prohibit ETEP exposures able to cause DT; (ii) invisible as perpetrators, because most child-DT harms appear later in life. This paper (1) uses ETEP and DT to explain how we cause severe, hidden, pollution harms to children and future generations, (2) argues that no major ethical theory can justify allowing avoidable ETEP, and (3) shows that we have justice-based duties to help stop avoidable ETEP exposures, because, to varying degrees, we help cause ETEP and profit from them. Finally, the paper (4) answers objections to (3). (shrink)

I argue that the internal evidence of the Republic supports a conjecture first advanced by the historian Mark Munn: Glaucon was an accomplice of the so-called Thirty Tyrants who most likely died at the side of his relatives Critias and Charmides in the Battle of Munychia. If Munn is right, the Republic must be read as a poignant philosophical drama, the tragedy of Socrates’ unsuccessful struggle to save Plato’s brother from the corrupting influence of his family and his city. (...) This perspective raises important questions about the nature and limits of Socrates’ philosophical pedagogy, which must in turn be seen within the context of the dialogue’s symbolic and mythical representation of the cosmic moral drama of the soul. (shrink)

Elaborating the analogy between the sun and the good, Plato's Socrates tells Glaucon to divide a line αβ into two unequal segments at γ. The result is that αγ represents what is intelligible and γβ what is visible.1 Then Glaucon is to divide each of the two segments by the same ratio as he used in the original division.2 Whatever proportion he used to make the cuts γ, δ, and ε in the divided line, generating its four segments, (...) the geometrical implication is that the two middle segments must be equal in length. As both Nicholas D. Smith and Richard Foley have emphasized, when Socrates reiterates the characteristics of the line at 534a3–5, transposing δγ and γε, there should be no doubt that Plato... (shrink)

been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over (...) which they show the puppets. (shrink)

In Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus contends two major claims: (1) justice is the advantage of the stronger, and (2) justice is the good of the other, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage. In the beginning of Book II, Glaucon self-proclaims that he will be representing Thrasymachus’ claims in a better way, and provides a story of how justice has originated from a state of nature situation. However, Glaucon’s story of the origin of justice (...) has an implication that justice is the advantage of the weak rather than the stronger. This is inconsistent with Thrasymachus’ first claim which states that justice is the advantage of the stronger. This is a problem for Glaucon since Glaucon is supposed to be representing Thrasymachus’ original claims in a better way. In this paper, I provide two solutions to this puzzle with the help of elementary game theory. (shrink)

This paper identifies major inconsistencies in the threefold argument that Glaucon presents in defence of Thrasymachus in the second book of Plato's Republic. Specifically, the paper argues for three claims. Firstly, it argues that in his account of the origin of justice Glaucon treats the consequences of justice as necessary, while in the test case he merely emphasizes incidental consequences. Secondly, the paper argues that in setting up the test case of the perfectly unjust man and the perfectly (...) just man Glaucon -- despite claiming to be restating Thrasymachus' claims, and also to be presenting the ordinary view of justice -- uses some Socratic assumptions about the nature of justice. That is, although Gyges' example follows directly from the first part of the argument and, in particular, from the claim that justice is grounded in convention, the unshakably just man of the test example is supposed to be motivated by justice itself. Finally, it is argued that the test case and Gyges' example are at variance with respect to public recognition: in the test case Glaucon suggests that most people would respect and admire a man who seemed to be perfectly just, while in his discussion of Gyges he intimates that tyrannical power strengthens itself not by the false appearance of perfect justice, but by appealing to a secret and yet widespread admiration for unpunished injustice. (shrink)

This paper identifies major inconsistencies in the threefold argument that Glaucon presents in defence of Thrasymachus in the second book of Plato’s Republic. Specifically, the paper argues for three claims. Firstly, it argues that in his account of the origin of justice Glaucon treats the consequences of justice as necessary, while in the test case he merely emphasizes incidental consequences. Secondly, the paper argues that in setting up the test case of the perfectly unjust man and the perfectly (...) just man Glaucon—despite claiming to be restating Thrasymachus’ claims, and also to be presenting the ordinary view of justice — uses some Socratic assumptions about the nature of justice. That is, although Gyges’ example follows directly from the first part of the argument and, in particular, from the claim that justice is grounded in convention, the unshakably just man of the test example is supposed to be motivated by justice itself. Finally, it is argued that the test case and Gyges' example are at variance with respect to public recognition: in the test case Glaucon suggests that most people would respect and admire a man who seemed to be perfectly just, while in his discussion of Gyges he intimates that tyrannical power strengthens itself not by the false appearance of perfect justice, but by appealing to a secret and yet widespread admiration for unpunished injustice. (shrink)

Resumo: O Livro II da República de Platão se inicia com um desafio de Gláucon para Sócrates, onde este deve provar que o homem justo é, de toda maneira, melhor do que o injusto. Para isso, pedirá que Sócrates defenda a justiça por si mesma e censure a injustiça. O discurso de Gláucon pode ser dividido em três partes, sendo a primeira dedicada à origem e à natureza da justiça; a segunda irá indicar a justiça como algo necessário, mas não (...) como um bem; e a terceira, na qual ele irá tentar provar que a vida do injusto é melhor do que a do justo. Neste trabalho, iremos nos centrar em seu primeiro argumento e de que maneira Gláucon defende a justiça através de um contrato.: Book II of Plato's Republic opens with Glaucon's challenge to Socrates, where the latter must prove that the just man is in all ways possible better than the unjust one. Glaucon asks Socrates to advocate justice for it's own sake and to censor injustice. Glaucon's discourse can be divided into three parts. The first is dedicated to the origin and nature of justice; the second argues that justice is something necessary, but is not a good. In the third part, he tries to prove that the unjust life is better than the just one. This work focuses on the first speech and on how Glaucon defends justice by means of a contract. (shrink)

Glaucon in Plato's _Republic_ fails to grasp intermediates. He confuses pursuing a goal with achieving it, and so he adopts ‘mathematical platonism’. He says mathematical objects are eternal. Socrates urges a seriously debatable, and seriously defensible, alternative centered on the destruction of hypotheses. He offers his version of geometry and astronomy as refuting the charge that he impiously ‘ponders things up in the sky and investigates things under the earth and makes the weaker argument the stronger’. We relate his (...) account briefly to mathematical developments by Plato's associates Theaetetus and Eudoxus, and then to the past 200 years' developments in geometry. (shrink)

Aunque el Libro I de República parece un diálogo socrático estándar sobre un término moral como justicia, que culmina con un estado de aparente aporía, se termina afirmando que la justicia es como un estado del alma caracterizado por el conocimiento. El libro I termina siendo el preámbulo para mostrar que ser justo es mejor que ser injusto, y que la justicia es en y por sí misma beneficiosa sin relación con cualquier ‘recompensa o consecuencia’ que devenga para el individuo (...) justo (358b). Ello mueve a Adimanto y Glaucon a retar a Sócrates a que muestre cómo independientemente de cualquier otra consideración, el hombre verdaderamente justo está mejor que el verdaderamente injusto, aun cuando el hombre verdaderamente justo se halle en el máximo de dolor y su reputación de bueno haya sido destruida, y el hombre malo no esté sufriendo ningún dolor y disfrute de una reputación de absolutamente virtuoso. En el presente artículo se examina este argumento y la relación entre justicia y eudaimonía, como solución platónica al reto de los sofistas. La clave interpretativa consiste en examinar los sentidos en los que se entiende la noción de eudaimonía en el contexto del reto. Palabras clave: Platón; República; Sócrates; Justicia; EudaimoníaAlthough Republic’s Book I seems a standard Socratic dialogue on a moral term as justice, which culminates with a state of apparent aporia, it ends up asserting that justice is like a state of the soul characterized by knowledge. Book I ends up being the preamble to show that being just is better than being unjust, and that justice is in itself and by itself beneficial, regardless of any ‘reward or consequence’ to the just individual (358b). This leads Adeimantus and Glaucon to challenge Socrates to show how, regardless of any other consideration, the truly just man is better than the truly unjust one, even when the truly just man found himself in the highest pain and his reputation as a good man had been destroyed, while the mean man did not suffer any pain and enjoyed a reputation as an absolutely virtuous man. In this paper we examine this argument and the relation between justice and eudemonia, as a Platonic solution to the sophists’ challenge. The interpretative key consists in examining the senses in w ich the notion of eudemonia is understood in the context of the challenge. Keywords: Plato; Republic; Socrates; Justice; Eudaimonia. (shrink)

Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ (...) behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain. (shrink)

This chapter presents an excerpt from the The Republic with Socrates conversing with Glaucon. Socrates shows Glaucon the figure of a cave to explain how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened. He shows prisoners in an underground den facing a wall and shackled in such a way that they cannot move, and can only see before them. Men walk behind the prisoners, they and the objects they carry cast shadows on the cave wall. Knowing nothing of the (...) real causes of the shadows, the prisoners naturally mistake these shadows for the real nature of things. Plato asks whether this is analogous to our own understanding of reality; that is, is the human condition such that our grasp of reality is only partial, catching only the slightest glimpse into the true nature of things, like the prisoners’ world of shadows?. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Justice? Glaucon's Theory of a Social Contract Glaucon and Thrasymachus on what Justice is: Results and Methods Why should I be Just?

Glaucon¿s story about the ring of invisibility in Republic 359d-60b is examined in order to assess the wider role of fictional fabrication in Plato¿s philosophical argument. The first part of the article (I) looks at the close connections this tale has to the account of Gyges in Herodotus (1.8-12). It is argued that Plato exhibits a specific dependence on Herodotus, which suggests Glaucon¿s story might be an original invention: the assumption that there must be a lost ¿original¿ to (...) inspire Plato¿s story of the ring has never accommodated the possibility of Plato drawing, perhaps quite directly, from Herodotus. The next section (II) considers the function of that fable within the larger philosophical and aesthetic structure of the Republic. Appreciation of the entire dialogue as an exercise in fiction, as well as philosophy, helps to reveal the ways in which philosophical argument and fictional invention are closely bound up in the formation of Glaucon¿s fabulous anecdote. Finally (III), a reading of Cicero¿s treatment of the story in De Officiis confirms the degree to which philosophical reasoning and fiction can be quite generally interdependent. Although the arguments in Sections II and III are consistent with the opening contention that the ring story was invented by Plato, they do not presuppose it. (shrink)

In Republic II Glaucon assigns to Socrates the task of praising justice for itself. What it means to praise justice for itself is unclear. A new interpretation is offered on the basis of an analysis of Glaucon's division of goods. A distinction is developed between criterial benefits, those valuable consequences of a thing which provide a standard for evaluating a thing as a good instance of its type, and fringe benefits, valuable consequences which do not provide such a (...) standard. Socrates is expected to praise justice by describing the benefits it constitutes as a valuable activity of soul. He may also use the criterial benefits of justice but not its fringe benefits. This account of Socrates' task is superior to those interpretations which rule out all use of valuable consequences in praising justice and to those interpretations which fail to preserve the distinction between the second and third classes of goods. (shrink)

Glaucon's Challenge at the beginning of Book 2 of Plato's Republic has long prompted interpretive difficulties, due to a misunderstanding of its central aspect. The task of this essay is to correct...

This article brings out ethical aspects arising in Plato’s classical critique of narrative and imitative art in The Republic, especially when it comes to reading stories about the past. Socrates’s and Glaucon’s most important suggestion, I argue, is to cultivate an ethical consciousness where one ought to see the distinctions between how the real and the imaginary in narratives are to be conceived, and what that insight ethically demands of the reader. Taken as an ethical insight for the reader (...) when engaging in narrative understanding, this should be to resist the temptation to think that past suffering and misery as told in a story can be read analogously to narratives having a tragic plot. The article clarifies the meaning of Plato’s critique through the ideas of Simone Weil, Emmanuel Lévinas and Iris Murdoch. These existential moral philosophers work towards having an ethical consciousness in one’s personal relationship with stories of our lifeworld. (shrink)

According to Glaucon’s conception of justice, the government is constituted by a contract which determines the legal and the just. From its constitution the ruler may control the subjects’ justice without being subject to the contract himself. To reinforce Thrasymachus’ speech Glaucon will offer Socrates a challenge where the latter has to prove that justice is superior to injustice. Thus, it is Socrates’ task to show this under any counterfactual circumstance, always bringing benefit to the one who acts (...) justly. The difficulty in responding to the challenge proposed by Glaucon is shown by the case in the Republic where the fulfillment of justice seems not to bring benefits, but penalty to the agent. This is precisely the case of the Philosopher Ruler and his coercion to rule. For that one must understand the reason why the philosopher is coerced to rule, not as a matter of choice, but something whose denial is made impossible due to justice. Socrates’ solution to the challenge of justice starts from the definitions of political justice, where each citizen is compelled to do his own duty, and psychic justice, defined as a harmony between the parts of the soul. Our argument shows that the justice within the philosopher’s soul itself is justified by the necessity of fulfilling the justice in Kallipolis, as well as allowing good government. (shrink)

Tracing a central theme of Plato's Republic , G. R. F. Ferrari reconsiders in this study the nature and purpose of the comparison between the structure of society and that of the individual soul. In four chapters, Ferrari examines the personalities and social status of the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's notion of justice, coherence in Plato's description of the decline of states, and the tyrant and the philosopher king—a pair who, in their different ways, break with the terms (...) of the city-soul analogy. In addition to acknowledging familiar themes in the interpretation of the Republic —the sincerity of its utopianism, the justice of the philosopher's return to the Cave—Ferrari provocatively engages secondary literature by Leo Strauss, Bernard Williams, and Jonathan Lear. With admirable clarity and insight, Ferrari conveys the relation between the city and the soul and the choice between tyranny and philosophy. City and Soul in Plato's Republic will be of value to students of classics, philosophy, and political theory alike. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Situation of Republic II What Kind of Good is Justice? The Origin and Nature of Justice The Tale of Gyges Life Choices Socrates' Reaction and Ours.

Plato's Republic centers on a simple question: is it always better to be just than unjust? The puzzles in Book One prepare for this question, and Glaucon and Adeimantus make it explicit at the beginning of Book Two. To answer the question, Socrates takes a long way around, sketching an account of a good city on the grounds that a good city would be just and that defining justice as a virtue of a city would help to define justice (...) as a virtue of a human being. Socrates is finally close to answering the question after he characterizes justice as a personal virtue at the end of Book Four, but he is interrupted and challenged to defend some of the more controversial features of the good city he has sketched. In Books Five through Seven, he addresses this challenge, arguing (in effect) that the just city and the just human being as he has sketched them are in fact good and are in principle possible. After this long digression, Socrates in Books Eight and Nine finally delivers three "proofs" that it is always better to be just than unjust. Then, because Socrates wants not only to show that it is always better to be just but also to convince Glaucon and Adeimantus of this point, and because Socrates' proofs are opposed by the teachings of poets, he bolsters his case in Book Ten by indicting the poets' claims to represent the truth and by offering a new myth that is consonant with his proofs. (shrink)

This essay explores the treatment of the relation between nature (phusis) and norm or convention (nomos) in Democritus and in certain Platonic dialogues. In his physical theory Democritus draws a sharp contrast between the real nature of things and their representation via human conventions, but in his political and ethical theory he maintains that moral conventions are grounded in the reality of human nature. Plato builds on that insight in the account of the nature of morality in the myth in (...) the Protagoras. That provides material for a defense of morality against the attacks by Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the Republic, all of whom seek to use the nature-convention contrast to devalue morality. (shrink)

This article considers two related and fundamental issues about morality in a virtual world. The first is whether the anonymity that is a feature of virtual worlds can shed light upon whether people are moral when they can act with impunity. The second issue is whether there are any moral obligations in a virtual world and if so what they might be. -/- Our reasons for being good are fundamental to understanding what it is that makes us moral or indeed (...) whether any of us truly are moral. Plato grapples with this problem in book two of The Republic where Socrates is challenged by his brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon. They argue that people are moral only because of the costs to them of being immoral; the external constraints of morality. -/- Glaucon asks us to imagine a magical ring that enables its wearers to become invisible and capable of acting anonymously. The ring is in some respects analogous to the possibilities created by online virtual worlds such as Second Life, so the dialogue is our entry point into considering morality within these worlds. These worlds are three dimensional user created environments where people control avatars and live virtual lives. As well as being an important social phenomenon, virtual worlds and what people chose to do in them can shed light on what people will do when they can act without fear of normal sanction. -/- This paper begins by explaining the traditional challenge to morality posed by Plato, relating this to conduct in virtual worlds. Then the paper will consider the following skeptical objection. A precondition of all moral requirements is the ability to act. There are no moral requirements in virtual worlds because they are virtual and it is impossible to act in a virtual world. Because avatars do not have real bodies and the persons controlling avatars are not truly embodied, it is impossible for people to truly act in a virtual world. We will show that it is possible to perform some actions and suggest a number of moral requirements that might plausibly be thought to result. Because avatars cannot feel physical pain or pleasure these moral requirements are interestingly different from those of real life. Hume’s arguments for why we should be moral apply to virtual worlds and we conclude by considering how this explains why morality exists in these environments. (shrink)

Le passage, au livre II de la République, décrivant ce que Glaucon, un des principaux interlocuteurs de Socrate, considère avec dédain comme une cité seulement digne de porcs, est en réalité central dans la stratégie globale de Platon. Le Socrate de Platon nomme de fait cette cité la cité « véritable » et « saine », et cela est vrai pour Platon comme pour Socrate – ce que démontre le présent article. La « belle cité », Callipolis, que Socrate (...) souhaite ériger dans la suite de la République, est donc par conséquent une cité moins « véritable », et les développements concernant l ’âme et la justice qui se fondent sur elle (au livre IV) sont, de même, des développements qui n’embrassent pas la vérité de l’âme ni de la justice. Dans leur nature vraie et essentielle, ni la cité ni l ’âme ne sont divisées en parties, que ces parties s’opposent ou coopèrent ; et la justice non plus ne peut être absolument définie, au sens de sa nature véritable, en terme de coopération entre les parties d’une âme divisée. Si nous regardons rétrospectivement l’ensemble de la démonstration à partir du livre X, le dernier de la République, tous ces éléments semblent être anticipés dans la description de la « cité des porcs » et sa suite immédiate. (shrink)

JL his paper calls into question a conventional way of reading the passage concerning knowledge and belief at the end of book 5 of Plato's Republic. On the conventional reading, Plato is committed to arguing on grounds that his philosophical opponents would accept, but this view fails to appreciate the rhetorical context in which the passage is situated. Indeed, it is not usually recognized or considered important that the passage has a rhetorical context at all. Philoso phers typically reduce the (...) questions asked by Socrates and the an swers given by Glaucon in the presence of a large audience, to one continuous argument of Plato's. Unfortunately, this way of reading book 5 ignores two points that are crucial to its interpretation: (1) the Socrates-Glaucon dialectic is directed to hostile (not merely intel lectually opposed) interlocutors, and (2) the relation between Socra tes and his audience (Glaucon excepted) is one of antagonism.1 I shall argue that scholars have for a long time been trying to find more philosophical fruit in the passage than it has to bear, largely because they have misconstrued its role in the argument of the Re public. (shrink)