Theories of adverbial modification can be roughly distinguished into two sorts. One kind of theory takes logicalform to follow surface grammatical form. Adverbs are treated as unanalyzable logical operators that turn a predicate or sentence into a different predicate or sentence respectively. And new rules of logic are stated for these operators. -/- A different kind of theory does not suppose that logicalform must parallel surface grammatical form. It allows that (...) class='Hi'>logicalform may have more to do with deeper structures that might be studied in transformational grammar. Adverbs are treated as surface forms of the underlying predicates represented by corresponding adjectives and verbs. 'Slowly' is derived from 'slow'; 'intentionally' from 'intentional' or 'intend'; etc. And new rules of logic are avoided where they can be. -/- In this paper I attempt to state some of the advantages of the second sort of theory. My procedure will be this. First, I will try to say in outline what theories of logicalform are. Then I will state five principles for evaluating such theories. Next, I will sketch the sorts of analyses acceptance of principles (1)-(5) leads to. In particular I will talk about adverbial phrases (e.g. locatives) that are best analyzed in terms of implicit references to events, relative modifiers (like 'large') which relate something to a comparison class, and 'that' clauses taken as names of propositions. By appealing to principles (1)-(5) I will defend these analyses against certain others, one that appeals to many logical operators, a second that treats all sentences as names of propositions, and a third that sees implicit reference to possible worlds in the language being analyzed. Finally, I will offer a pragmatic defense of my approach in terms of principles (1)-(5) as against a different approach that appeals to possible world semantics. (shrink)
This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logicalform, that is, a view according to which logicalform is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As _§_1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. _§_3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logicalform (...) that has been defended in the past. _§§_4-6 draw attention to its impact on three major issues that concern, respectively, the extension of the domain of formal explanation, the semantics of tensed discourse, and the analysis of quantication. (shrink)
Donald Davidson contributed to the discussion of logicalform in two ways. On the one hand, he made several influential suggestions on how to give the logical forms of certain constructions of natural language. His account of adverbial modification and so called action-sentences is nowadays, in some form or other, widely employed in linguistics (Harman (forthcoming) calls it "the standard view"). Davidson's approaches to indirect discourse and quotation, while not as influential, also still attract attention today. (...) On the other hand, Davidson provided a general account of what logicalform is. This paper is concerned with this general account. Its foremost aim is to give a faithful and detailed picture of what, according to Davidson, it means to give the logicalform of a sentence. The structure of the paper is as follows. (1) I will first informally introduce a notion of logicalform as the form that matters in certain kinds of entailments, and indicate why philosophers have taken an interest in such a notion. (2) The second section develops constraints that we should arguably abide by in giving an account of logicalform. (3) I then turn to Davidson’s view of what is involved in giving such an account. To this end, I will try to reconstruct Davidson’s view of the connection between an assignment of logical forms, a truth theory and a meaning theory. (4) Finally, I will briefly discuss possible problems of Davidson’s account as developed in this paper. (shrink)
Logical Forms explains both the detailed problems involved in finding logical forms and also the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical logic. In this revised edition, exercises are integrated throughout the book. The result is a genuinely interactive introduction which engages the reader in developing the argument. Each chapter concludes with updated notes to guide further reading.
The notion of logicalform and its applications are at the heart of some of the classical problems in philosophical logic and are the focus of Peter Long’s investigations in the three essays that comprise this volume. In the first, major, essay the concern is with the notion of logicalform as it applies to arguments involving hypotethical statements, for example ‘If today is Wednesday then tomorrow is Thursday; today is Wednesday: therefore tomorrow is Thursday.’ Whilst (...) such an argument is cited by logical textbooks as a paradigm of one that is ‘formally valid’, it is not hard to show that the conjunction forming a hypothetical statement is not a logical constant, in which case the argument form If p then q; p: therefore q is not a logicalform. But, then, how can logic claim to be the science of formal inference? The author resolves this difficulty by drawing a fundamental distinction within the notion of the form under which an argument is valid. With this distinction it becomes possible for the first time to determine the status of any formally valid argument involving hypotheticals, whether as premises or conclusion or both. The second and third essays take up the notion of logicalform as it applies to such simple propositions as ‘This sheet is white’ and ‘London is north of Paris.’ When we speak of the first as giving expression to the relation of relations’s relating to its terms, what is in question is a formal relation and we call it such because the relation is expressed through these propositions having the respective forms Fa and Fab. It is shown that the confusion of formal relations with relations proper explains the assimilation of facts to complexes and is that the root of the theory of universals. _Peter Long_ has taught at the University of Leeds and University College London, and is a past Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. (shrink)
The LOGICALFORM of a sentence (or utterance) is a formal representation of its logical structure; that is, of the structure which is relevant to specifying its logical role and properties. There are a number of (interrelated) reasons for giving a rendering of a sentence's logicalform. Among them is to obtain proper inferences (which otherwise would not follow; cf. Russell's theory of descriptions), to give the proper form for the determination of truth-conditions (...) (e.g. Tarski's method of truth and satisfaction as applied to quantification), to show those aspects of a sentence's meaning which follow from the logical role of certain terms (and not from the lexical meaning of words; cf. the truth-functional account of conjunction), and to formalize or regiment the language in order to show that it is has certain metalogical properties (e.g. that it is free of paradox, or that there is a sound proof procedure). (shrink)
Chapter. 1. Logical. Form. as. a. Level. of. Linguistic. Representation. What is the relation of a sentence's syntactic form to its logicalform? This issue has been of central concern in modern inquiry into the semantic properties of natural ...
A LogicalForm (LF) is a syntactic structure that is interpreted by the semantic component. For a particular structure to be a possible LF it has to be possible for syntax to generate it and for semantics to interpret it. The study of LF must therefore take into account both assumptions about syntax and about semantics, and since there is much disagreement in both areas, disagreements on LF have been plentiful. This makes the task of writing a survey (...) article in the field fairly difficult, a difficulty that is amplified by the amount of material that needs to be covered if the result is going to be in any way representative. My response to this difficulty is to limit my objectives. As a start, I will confine myself to issues relating to the syntactic positions of Quantificational Noun Phrases (QNPs) at LF and to various interpretive consequences. But even within these relatively narrow confines, I will not attempt anything close to a comprehensive survey. Instead my goal will be restricted to the presentation of one leading idea and to the discussion of some evidence that might bear on it.1 Much research on the nature of LF has consisted in attempts to account for the meaning of sentences containing QNPs. (shrink)
Interpreted Logical Forms are objects composed of a syntactic structure annotated with the semantic values of each node of the structure. We criticize the view that ILFs are the objects of propositional attitude verbs such as believe, as this is developed by Larson and Ludlow. Our critique arises from a tension in the way that sen-.
This work contains Peter Long's important essay, _Logic, Form and Grammar_, which resolves many difficulties for the logicalform of an argument where the reasoning is hypothetical. Also included are two essays on classical problems in philosophical logic, relating to logicalform and formal relations. All of the essays provide clear thinking and philosophical explanations, overturning many unchallenged suggestions in philosophical logic.
Seventeen specially written essays by eminent philosophers and linguists appear for the first time in this anthology, all with the central theme of logicalform -- a fundamental issue in analytic philosophy and linguistic theory. LogicalForm and Language brings together exciting new contributions from diverse points of view, which illuminate the lively current debate about this topic.
The standard view of logicalform is that logical forms are synthetic structures which are the forms of sentences and of other linguistic entities. This is often associated with a more general linguistic view of logic which is articulated in different ways by various authors. This paper contains a critical discussion of such linguistic approaches to logicalform, with special emphasis on Quine’s formulation of a logical grammar in Philosophy of Logic. An account of (...)logical forms as higher-order properties, which essentially builds on Frege’s analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, is suggested at the end. (shrink)
Physicalistic theories of psychology are a classic case of scientific imperialism: the explanatory capacity of physics, both with respect to its methods and to its domain, is taken to extend beyond the traditional realm of physics, and into that of psychology. I argue in this paper that this particular imperialistic venture has failed. Contemporary psychology uses methods not modelled on those of physics, embracing first-personal methodology where physics is strictly impersonal. I make the case that whether or not scientific imperialism (...) is in general harmful, in this instance naturalists who reject first philosophy should give up physicalist imperialism. Using only general principles from the philosophy of logic plus accepted physicalist criteria of identity, I show that first-personal psychology embodies a minor but fruitful increase in expressive strength compared to impersonal psychology: the ability to distinguish descriptively indiscriminable posits. (shrink)
Logicalform has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logicalform has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logicalform, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that (...) there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logicalform: two significantly different notions of logicalform are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logicalform turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logicalform that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logicalform, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language. (shrink)
In his paper John Corcoran examines in detail many issues relating to logicalform, and raises some questions about my formulations. In my response I emphasize two main distinctions that may clear up some of the issues. One is the distinction between logical forms, in the sense of logical properties of an abstract character, and logicalform, in the sense in which we speak of the logicalform of a sentence, or of (...) a proposition. Another is the distinction, emphasized by Boole, between primary propositions , and secondary propositions —which I illustrate through the distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation.Em seu artigo John Corcoran examina em detalhe muitas questões sobre forma lógica e levanta alguns problemas relativos à minhas formulações. Na réplica enfatizo duas distinções principais, que podem esclarecer algumas questões. A primeira é a distinção entre formas lógicas, no sentido de propriedades lógicas de caráter abstrato, e forma lógica, no sentido em que falamos da forma lógica de uma sentença ou de uma proposição. A segunda é a distinção, enfatizada por Boole, entre proposições primárias e proposições secundárias , exemplificada com a distinção entre negação predicativa e negação sentencial. (shrink)
Consider the following argument: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. Intuitively, what makes this a valid argument has nothing to do with Socrates, men, or mortality. Rather, each sentence in the argument exhibits a certain logicalform, which, together with the forms of the other two, constitute a pattern that, of itself, guarantees the truth of the conclusion given the truth of the premises. More generally, then, the logicalform of (...) a sentence of natural language is what determines both its logical properties and its logical relations to other sentences. The logicalform of a sentence of natural language is typically represented in a theory of logicalform by a well-formed formula in a ‘logically pure’ language whose only meaningful symbols are expressions with fixed, distinctly logical meanings (e.g., quantifiers). Thus, the logical forms of the sentences in the above argument would be represented in a theory based on pure predicate logic by the formulas ‘∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)’, ‘Fy’, and ‘Gy’, respectively, where ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘y’ are all free variables. The argument’s intuitive validity is then explained in virtue of the fact that the logical forms of the premises formally entail the logicalform of the conclusion. The primary goal of a theory of logicalform is to explain as broad a range of such intuitive logical phenomena as possible in terms of the logical forms that it assigns to sentences of natural language. (shrink)
What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, (...) requires that thinkers have general abilities to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules. But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others. We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking has to be logical – but not perfectly so. When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense within the pretence relies on the role of logicalform in understanding. Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical constitutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to show that the logicalform of action sentences are dependent upon the concept of 'agent' that one takes. A thing type of agent leads to the extensional form while a thinking type of agent leads to intentional form of action sentences. Consequently, it is important to note the locus of the describer who himself is also an agent. If the describer is someone other than theagent, the ascription of action (...) is based on a tacit counterfactual. The agent could have done otherwise, implying the agent to be a being-of-the-world, who acts on the things of the world to bring about a change which could not have occurred otherwise. (shrink)
One of the main criteria for an adequate semantic theory is that it solve the problem of substitution into intensional contexts, otherwise known as Frege's Puzzle. Given common-sense assumptions about how natural language functions, a contradiction arises in explaining attitude reports. For example, Lisa might believe that Twain is tall, but not believe that Clemens is tall. Lisa is perhaps unaware that the names "Twain" and "Clemens" corefer. But Twain's being tall is just Clemens' being tall, so one and the (...) same state of affairs is either believed or not. The tasks are to specify what Lisa believes and to accurately and consistently describe the situation given certain foundational semantic principles. ;I argue that of three main semantic frameworks: Davidsonian Semantics, Model-Theoretic Semantics and Propositional Semantics , PS has the best chance to provide a complete, consistent and natural solution. On my view, dynamic propositions are complex states of affairs where things stand in the propositional relation of having expressions of a certain type which pick them out as semantic values and where those expressions stand in appropriate syntactic relations. The propositional relation crucially involves restricted quantification over expression types which are logical features of the language. The sentences "Twain is tall" and "Clemens is tall" express different DP's because even though their constituents are identical, they stand in distinct propositional relations in virtue of the different syntactic expressions. This explains how Lisa could believe one and not the other. These fine-grained propositions successfully serve as both the truth-conditions of sentences and the objects of propositional attitudes. The solution leads to the surprising result that the question of whether singular terms are Fregean or directly referential is actually irrelevant to Frege's Puzzle. ;While DP's are naturalistic and theoretically well-motivated, they face apparent difficulty accounting for translation and being the objects of mental content. The logicalform of DP's limits their possible interpretation and thus sheds light on the conceptual framework of its user. I argue that DP's are not beliefs, but cognitive models that serve as interpretations of beliefs in communication. (shrink)
This work contains Peter Long's important essay, Logic, Form and Grammar , which resolves many difficulties for the logicalform of an argument where the reasoning is hypothetical. Also included are two essays on classical problems in philosophical logic, relating to logicalform and formal relations.
We are able to participate in countless different sorts of social practice. This indefinite set of capacities must be explainable in terms of a finite stock of capacities. This paper compares and contrasts two different explanations. A standard decomposition of the capacity to participate in social practices goes something like this: the interpreter arrives on the scene with a stock of generic practice-types. He looks at the current scene to fill-in the current tokens of these types. He looks at the (...) current state of these practice tokens to see what actions are available to him. He uses his current desires to choose between these various possible actions. I argue that this standard explanation is defective, drawing on arguments by Searle and Wittgenstein and Garfinkel. I propose an alternative explanation, in which the participants must continually show each other the state of the scene in order to maintain the scene’s intelligibility. I provide a simple formal language in which to describe this alternative approach, in which we can state quite precisely what someone is doing when they participate in a practice. This language is related to both deontic and epistemic logics, but it is much simpler – it does not include the classic propositional connectives, and it is driven by a very different set of assumptions. The inspirations for this formal language are Searle’s analysis of directions of fit, Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. (shrink)
Two arguments favoring propositionalist accounts of attitude sentences are being revisited: the Church-Langford translation argument and Thomason's argument against quotational theories of indirect discourse. None of them proves to be decisive, thus leaving the option of searching for a developed quotational alternative. Such an alternative is found in an interpreted logicalform theory of attitude ascription. The theory differentiates elegantly among different attitudes but it fails to account for logical dependencies among them. It is argued, however, that (...) the concept of logical consequence does not well apply to dependencies among belief sentences and that the requirement to account for logical relations among such sentences should be relaxed. (shrink)
An attractive semantic theory presented by Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow takes a report of propositional attitudes, e.g 'Tom believes Judy Garland sang', to report a believing relation between Tom and an interpreted logicalform constructed from 'Judy Garland sang'. We briefly outline the semantic theory and indicate its attractions. However, the definition of interpreted logical forms given by Larson and Ludlow is shown to be faulty, and an alternative definition is offered which matches their intentions. (...) This definition is then shown to imply that Tom does not know his own mind, a result without intuitive support. A third definition is offered to deal with this problem. (shrink)
Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logicalform favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logicalform impose only structural constraints (...) on a metaphysics of truth. Monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints, and there is a pluralistic theory that does so. (shrink)
In the 82/2 (2000) issue of this journal, Michael Friedman has offered a stimulating discussion of my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. His conclusion is that on the whole I fail to do justice to what is most revolutionary about Kant's natural philosophy, and instead end up attributing to Kant a pre-Newtonian, Aristotelian philosophy of nature. This is because, according to Friedman, I put excessive weight on Kant's claim to have derived his categories from a set of (...)logical forms of judgment which he inherits from a traditional Aristotelian logic. In taking Kant at his word on this point, I fail to give their full import to Kant's insights into the newly discovered applications of mathematical concepts and methods to the science of nature. (shrink)
This critical notice of Stephen Neale's "Descriptions", (MIT Press, 1990) summarizes the content of the book and presents several objections to its arguments, as well as praising Neale for showing just how close the linguistic notion of L F is to the analytic philosopher's notion of "logicalform". It is claimed that Neale's use of generalized quantifiers to represent definite descriptions from Russell's account by which descriptions are "incomplete symbols". I also argue that his assessment of the Quine/Smullyan (...) exchange about "Necessarily the number of the planets is greater than seven" is incorrect. (shrink)
Though, at first sight, logical formalization of natural language sentences and arguments might look like an unproblematic enterprise, the criteria of its success are far from clear and, surprisingly, there have only been a few attempts at making them explicit. This paper provides a picture of the enterprise of logical formalization that does not conceive of it as a kind of translation from one language (a natural one) into another language (a logical one), but rather as a (...) construction of a 'map' of (a piece of) the 'inferential landscape' of the natural language. The criteria that appear to govern the enterprise are labeled as those of reliability, ambitiousness, transparency and parsimony. These criteria, it is argued, do not provide for an excavation of a ready-made logical structure, but rather help us achieve a "reflective equilibrium" between the normative authority of logic and the answerability of logic to a natural language. (shrink)