Results for 'moral emotion'

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  1. Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart.Anthony J. Steinbock - 2014 - Northwestern University Press.
    Moral Emotions builds upon the philosophical theory of persons begun in _Phenomenology and Mysticism _and marks a new stage of phenomenology. Author Anthony J. Steinbock finds personhood analyzing key emotions, called moral emotions. _Moral Emotions _offers a systematic account of the moral emotions, described here as pride, shame, and guilt as emotions of self-givenness; repentance, hope, and despair as emotions of possibility; and trusting, loving, and humility as emotions of otherness. The author argues these reveal basic structures (...)
     
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  2. Moral Emotions.Ronald de Sousa - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position (...)
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  3.  94
    Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A False Dichotomy?Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (4):397-409.
    In the post‐Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ‘moral gap’ has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge‐building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral‐self solution relies upon an anti‐realist conception of the self as ‘identity’, and I dissect its limitations. In its (...)
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  4. Educating Moral Emotions: A Praxiological Analysis. [REVIEW]Bruce Maxwell & Roland Reichenbach - 2007 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (2):147-163.
    This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions. The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize the significance (...)
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  5. Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
  6. Introduction: Moral Emotions.Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):397-400.
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  7.  79
    Moral Emotions.Ronald de Sousa - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109 - 126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position (...)
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  8. The Moral Emotions.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
     
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  9.  82
    Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation. [REVIEW]Taya R. Cohen - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4):569-579.
    Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents' networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement (...)
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  10. Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
  11. The Impact of Moral Emotions on Cause-Related Marketing Campaigns: A Cross-Cultural Examination.Jae-Eun Kim & Kim K. P. Johnson - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 112 (1):79-90.
    This research was focused on investigating why some consumers might support cause-related marketing campaigns for reasons other than personal benefit by examining the influence of moral emotions and cultural orientation. The authors investigated the extent to which moral emotions operate differently across a cultural variable (US versus Korea) and an individual difference variable (self-construal). A survey method was utilised. Data were collected from a convenience sample of US ( n = 180) and Korean ( n = 191) undergraduates. (...)
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  12.  14
    Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review.Benjamin R. Walker & Chris J. Jackson - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 141 (4):797-810.
    While psychopathy research has been growing for decades, a relatively new area of research is corporate psychopathy. Corporate psychopaths are simply psychopaths working in organizational settings. They may be attracted to the financial, power, and status gains available in senior positions and can cause considerable damage within these roles from a manipulative interpersonal style to large-scale fraud. Based upon prior studies, we analyze psychopathy research pertaining to 23 moral emotions classified according to functional quality and target. Based upon our (...)
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  13.  40
    Moral Emotions From the Frog’s Eye View.Fiery A. Cushman - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend to guide (...)
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  14.  28
    Moral Emotions and the Envisaging of Mitigating Circumstances for Wrongdoing.Jared Piazza, Pascale Sophie Russell & Paulo Sousa - 2013 - Cognition and Emotion 27 (4):707-722.
  15.  10
    Are Moral Emotions Key to Informed Risk Decisions? A Commentary on Sabine Roeser, Risk, Technology, and Moral Emotions.Madeleine Hayenhjelm - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 2020 (4):1-12.
  16.  59
    A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions.Tina Malti & Sebastian P. Dys - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):453-459.
    This article outlines a developmental approach to the study of moral emotions. Specifically, we describe our developmental model on moral emotions, one in which emotions and cognitions about morality get increasingly integrated and coordinated with development, while acknowledging inter-individual variation in developmental trajectories across the lifespan. We begin with a conceptual clarification of the concept of moral emotions. After a brief review of our own developmental approach to the study of moral emotions, we provide a selective (...)
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  17.  9
    Judging Passions: Moral Emotions in Persons and Groups.Roger Giner-Sorolla - 2012 - Psychology Press.
    Shortlisted for the British Psychological Society Book Award (Academic Monograph category) 2014! A CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title 2013! Psychological research shows that our emotions and feelings often guide the moral decisions we make about our own lives and the social groups to which we belong. But should we be concerned that our important moral judgments can be swayed by "hot" passions, such as anger, disgust, guilt, shame and sympathy? Aren't these feelings irrational and counterproductive? Using a functional conflict (...)
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  18. Psychopathy, Autism, and Basic Moral Emotions: Evidence for Sentimentalist Constructivism.Erick Ramirez - 2019 - In Serife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.
    Philosophers and psychologists often claim that moral agency is connected with the ability to feel, understand, and deploy moral emotions. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of these emotions and their connection with moral agency. First, I examine the degree to which these emotional capacities are innate and/or ‘basic’ in a philosophically important sense. I examine three senses in which an emotion might be basic: developmental, compositional, and phylogenetic. After considering the evidence for basic (...), I conclude that emotions are not basic in a philosophically important sense. Emotions, I argue, are best understood as socially constructed concepts. I then investigate whether these emotions are necessary for moral agency. In order to do this I examine the philosophical and psychological literature on psychopathy and autism (two conditions defined in terms of empathic and emotional deficits). Persons with psychopathy appear incapable of distinguishing moral from non-moral norms. Additionally, while persons with autism often struggle to develop their empathic capacities, they are capable of understanding and deploying moral emotions like guilt and shame. I conclude that, in line with the conceptual act theories of emotion, that only contagion-based empathy is necessary for the acquisition of moral concepts. (shrink)
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  19.  60
    Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion.Jeffrie G. Murphy - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    The essays in this collection explore, from philosophical and religious perspectives, a variety of moral emotions and their relationship to punishment and condemnation or to decisions to lessen punishment or condemnation.
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  20.  22
    Moral Emotions.Georg Spielthenner - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (17):1 - 13.
    Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they are moral emotions. In I (...)
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  21.  79
    Dimensions of Moral Emotions.Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):258-260.
    Anger, disgust, elevation, sympathy, relief. If the subjective experience of each of these emotions is the same whether elicited by moral or nonmoral events, then what makes moral emotions unique? We suggest that the configuration of moral emotions is special—a configuration given by the underlying structure of morality. Research suggests that people divide the moral world along the two dimensions of valence (help/harm) and moral type (agent/patient). The intersection of these two dimensions gives four (...) exemplars—heroes, villains, victims and beneficiaries—each of which elicits unique emotions. For example, victims (harm/patient) elicit sympathy and sadness. Dividing moral emotions into these four quadrants provides predictions about which emotions reinforce, oppose and complement each other. (shrink)
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  22. Moral Emotions.Kevin Mulligan - unknown
    Emotions are said to be moral, as opposed to non- moral, in virtue of their objects. They are also said to be moral, for example morally good, as opposed to immoral, for example morally bad or evil, in virtue of their objects, nature, motives, functions or effects. The definition and content of moral matters are even more contested and contestable than the nature of emotions and of other affective phenomena. At the very least we should distinguish (...)
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  23. Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political.Robin S. Dillon - 1997 - Ethics 107 (2):226-249.
  24.  13
    Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception.Joseph E. Corbi - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):61-80.
    I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across (...)
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  25.  9
    An Attributional Analysis of Moral Emotions: Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges.Udo Rudolph & Nadine Tscharaktschiew - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (4):344-352.
    This article provides an analysis of moral emotions from an attributional point of view, guided by the metaphors of man as a naïve scientist and as a moral judge. The theoretical analysis focuses on three concepts: The distinction between the actor and the observer, the functional quality of moral emotions, and the perceived controllability of the causes of events. Moral emotions are identified. A classification of these moral emotions is suggested and the empirical evidence briefly (...)
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  26. Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach.John J. Drummond - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
  27.  45
    Varieties of Moral Emotional Experience.Hanah A. Chapman & Adam K. Anderson - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):255-257.
    Although much research on emotion and morality has treated emotion as a relatively undifferentiated construct, recent work shows that moral transgressions can evoke a variety of distinct emotions. To accommodate these results, we propose a multiple-appraisal model in which distinct appraisals lead to different moral emotions. The implications of this model for our understanding of the relationship between appraisals, emotions and judgments are discussed. The complexity of moral emotional experience presents a methodological challenge to researchers, (...)
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  28.  3
    Risk, Technology, and Moral Emotions: Reply to Critics.Sabine Roeser - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):1921-1934.
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  29.  52
    Reid and Moral Emotions.Sabine Roeser - 2009 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):177-192.
    The name of Thomas Reid rarely appears in discussions of the history of moral thought. This is a pity, since Reid has a lot of interesting ideas that can contribute to the current discussions in meta-ethics. Reid can be understood as an ethical intuitionist. What makes his account especially interesting is the role affective states play in his intuitionist theory. Reid defends a cognitive theory of moral emotions. According to Reid, there are moral feelings that are the (...)
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  30.  8
    Morals, Emotions and Race: Educational Links.Mal Phillips-Bell - 1982 - Journal of Moral Education 11 (3):167-171.
    Abstract In this paper a reinterpretation of G.E. Moore's distinction between two senses of ?ought? leads to the exposure of a strong connection between the education of the emotions and moral education such that the former is seen to be partly constitutive of the latter. I argue that what Moore calls ?Rules of Feeling?, which inculcate a moral ideal, the attainment of which is not directly within the power of our wills, could on the contrary, be either interpreted (...)
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  31.  13
    The Importance of Moral Emotions for Effective Collaboration in Culturally Diverse Healthcare Teams.Catherine Cook & Margaret Brunton - 2018 - Nursing Inquiry 25 (2):e12214.
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  32. Movies, the Moral Emotions, and Sympathy.Noël Carroll - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):1-19.
  33.  9
    Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception.Josep E. Corbi - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2006):61-80.
    I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming (...)
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  34. Moral Emotions and Unnamed Wrongs: Revisiting Epistemic Injustice.Usha Nathan - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue of moral emotions. (...)
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  35. Influence of the Cortical Midline Structures on Moral Emotion and Motivation in Moral Decision-Making.Hyemin Han, Jingyuan E. Chen, Changwoo Jeong & Gary H. Glover - 2016 - Behavioural Brain Research 302:237-251.
    The present study aims to examine the relationship between the cortical midline structures (CMS), which have been regarded to be associated with selfhood, and moral decision making processes at the neural level. Traditional moral psychological studies have suggested the role of moral self as the moderator of moral cognition, so activity of moral self would present at the neural level. The present study examined the interaction between the CMS and other moral-related regions by conducting (...)
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  36. A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue.Susan Stark - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):31-50.
    Inspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral (...)
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  37.  47
    Moral Emotions and Intuitions. By Sabine Roeser. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Pp. Xvii + 207. Price £55.).Peter Goldie - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):204-206.
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  38.  9
    Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart. By Anthony J. Steinbock.David Markwell - 2016 - Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):58-60.
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  39.  20
    Testing Moral Foundation Theory: Are Specific Moral Emotions Elicited by Specific Moral Transgressions?Helen Landmann & Ursula Hess - 2018 - Journal of Moral Education 47 (1):34-47.
    Moral foundation theory posits that specific moral transgressions elicit specific moral emotions. To test this claim, participants were asked to rate their emotions in response to moral violation vignettes. We found that compassion and disgust were associated with care and purity respectively as predicted by moral foundation theory. However, anger, rage, contempt, resentment and fear were not associated to any single moral transgression. Thus, even though the type of moral violation matters for the (...)
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  40.  45
    Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts: A Critical Notice of Gibbard’s Non-Reductive Noncognitivism.Sunny Yang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:469-479.
    My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify (...) considerations with anger in particular, it overly emphasizes one seemingly arbitrary emotion. In other words, I doubt whether ‘other’s anger’ can be the general concept corresponding to thick concepts such as courage or generosity. My doubt about the objectivity of Gibbard’s moral emotion depends on Bernard Williams’doubt about ethical objectivity in terms of a critical notice of the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts. Finally, I shall pose a challenge to the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts on the ground that it is not in fact a clear one. I shall argue that it is impossible clearly to classify various ethical concepts either as thick or thin. This is because, I shall argue, as Scheffler points out, “any division of ethical concepts into the two categories of the thick and the thin is itself a considerable oversimplication.” Indeed, I shall argue, our ethical vocabulary is tragically rich with an irreconcilable plurality of values. If my analysis is right, I argue Gibbard’s attempt to appeal to thick concepts to explain the rationality of moral emotion is open to question. (shrink)
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    The Appropriateness of Emotions. Moral Judgment, Moral Emotions, and the Conflation Problem.Hanno Sauer - 2011 - Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):107-140.
    What is the connection between emotions and moral judgments? Neo-sentimentalism maintains that to say that something is morally wrong is to think it appropriate to resent other people for doing it or to feel guilty upon doing it oneself. But intuitively, it seems that there is no way to characterize the content of guilt and resentment independent from the fact that these emotions respond to morally wrong actions. In response to this problem of circularity, modern forms of sentimentalism have (...)
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  42. Forgiveness, Commemoration, and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions.Jeffrey Blustein - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (4):582-617.
    Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral (...)
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  43.  40
    Moral Emotions, Awareness, and Spiritual Freedom in the Thought of Zhu Xi.Kai Marchal - 2013 - Asian Philosophy 23 (3):199-220.
    It is well known that the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi particularly emphasizes the role of emotions in human life. This paper shows that the four ‘moral emotions’ are central to Zhu's thinking, insofar as only their genuine actualization enables the individual to achieve spiritual freedom. Moreover, I discuss the crucial notions of ‘awareness’/‘perception’ and ‘knowledge’/‘wisdom’, in order to reveal the complex dynamic that moral emotions are said to create in the moral agent. I also analyse two important (...)
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  44. The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely (...)
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  45. Moral Enhancement Via Direct Emotion Modulation: A Reply to John Harris.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (3):160-168.
    Some argue that humans should enhance their moral capacities by adopting institutions that facilitate morally good motives and behaviour. I have defended a parallel claim: that we could permissibly use biomedical technologies to enhance our moral capacities, for example by attenuating certain counter-moral emotions. John Harris has recently responded to my argument by raising three concerns about the direct modulation of emotions as a means to moral enhancement. He argues that such means will be relatively ineffective (...)
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  46.  9
    Moral Emotions and Morals.Rocío Orsi Portalo - 2006 - Ideas Y Valores 55 (131):33-50.
    My aim in this paper is to explore the ambivalent role played by the so called moral emotions in moral thinking, overall when the concept of responsibility is concerned. In the first part of this paper I show how moral emotions such as guilt and shame can appear in circumstances that are not under the agent’s control, and therefore the agent could be though of free or responsibility for them. By contrast, in the second part of this (...)
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  47.  42
    Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart, by Anthony J. Steinbock.Kyle David Bennett - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (3):358-362.
  48. Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  49.  12
    Justifying Deviant Behavior: The Role of Attributions and Moral Emotions.Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko & Nancy Borkowski - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 141 (4):779-795.
    We present two studies investigating the impact of causal perceptions and the moral emotions of anger, shame, and guilt on the justification of deviant workplace behavior. Study 1 tests our conceptual framework using a sample of undergraduate business students; Study 2 examines a population of practicing physicians. Results varied significantly between the two samples, suggesting that individual and contextual factors play an important role in shaping the perceptual and emotional processes by which individuals form reactions to undesirable affective workplace (...)
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  50.  27
    Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both (...)
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