Results for 'moral emotion'

999 found
Order:
See also
  1. Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
  2. Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach.John J. Drummond - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
  3. Influence of the Cortical Midline Structures on Moral Emotion and Motivation in Moral Decision-Making.Hyemin Han, Jingyuan E. Chen, Changwoo Jeong & Gary H. Glover - 2016 - Behavioural Brain Research 302:237-251.
    The present study aims to examine the relationship between the cortical midline structures (CMS), which have been regarded to be associated with selfhood, and moral decision making processes at the neural level. Traditional moral psychological studies have suggested the role of moral self as the moderator of moral cognition, so activity of moral self would present at the neural level. The present study examined the interaction between the CMS and other moral-related regions by conducting (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4. Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason and the Gap Between Us and Them.Joshua D. Greene - 2013 - Penguin Press.
    Our brains were designed for tribal life, for getting along with a select group of others and for fighting off everyone else. But modern times have forced the world’s tribes into a shared space, resulting in epic clashes of values along with unprecedented opportunities. As the world shrinks, the moral lines that divide us become more salient and more puzzling. We fight over everything from tax codes to gay marriage to global warming, and we wonder where, if at all, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  5.  12
    Self‐Perceived Burden to Others as a Moral Emotion in Wishes to Die. A Conceptual Analysis.Christoph Rehmann‐Sutter - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (4):439-447.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Moral Enhancement Via Direct Emotion Modulation: A Reply to John Harris.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (3):160-168.
    Some argue that humans should enhance their moral capacities by adopting institutions that facilitate morally good motives and behaviour. I have defended a parallel claim: that we could permissibly use biomedical technologies to enhance our moral capacities, for example by attenuating certain counter-moral emotions. John Harris has recently responded to my argument by raising three concerns about the direct modulation of emotions as a means to moral enhancement. He argues that such means will be relatively ineffective (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  7.  29
    Children’s and Adolescents’ Moral Emotion Attributions and Judgements About Exclusion of Peers with Hearing Impairments.Jennifer Chilver-Stainer, Luciano Gasser & Pasqualina Perrig-Chiello - 2014 - Journal of Moral Education 43 (3):235-249.
    Children and adolescents with hearing impairments are at risk of being excluded from activities with hearing peers. Moral emotion attributions may represent important indicators for children’s identification with the moral norm not to exclude peers based on disability. Against this background, we investigated how 10-, 12- and 15-year-olds feel and judge about social exclusion of peers with hearing impairments. Emotion attributions and moral judgements were assessed using four different hypothetical scenarios about the exclusion of peers (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - In Heidi Maibom (ed.), Empathy and Morality. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, my aim is to bring together contemporary psychological literature on emotion regulation and the classical sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith to arrive at a plausible account of empathy's role in explaining patterns of moral judgment. Along the way, I criticize related arguments by Michael Slote, Jesse Prinz, and others.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  9.  39
    Neural Correlates of Moral and Non-Moral Emotion in Female Psychopathy.Carla L. Harenski, Bethany G. Edwards, Keith A. Harenski & Kent A. Kiehl - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    This study presents the first neuroimaging investigation of female psychopathy in an incarcerated population. Prior studies have found that male psychopathy is associated with reduced limbic and paralimbic activation when processing emotional stimuli and making moral judgments. The goal of this study was to investigate whether these findings extend to female psychopathy. During fMRI scanning, 157 incarcerated and 46 non-incarcerated female participants viewed unpleasant pictures, half which depicted moral transgressions, and neutral pictures. Participants rated each picture on (...) transgression severity. Psychopathy was assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) in all incarcerated participants. Non-incarcerated participants were included as a control group to derive brain regions of interest associated with viewing unpleasant vs. neutral pictures (emotion contrast), and unpleasant pictures depicting moral transgressions vs. unpleasant pictures without moral transgressions (moral contrast). Regression analyses in the incarcerated group examined the association between PCL-R scores and brain activation in the emotion and moral contrasts. Results of the emotion contrast revealed a negative correlation between PCL-R scores and activation in the right amygdala and rostral anterior cingulate. Results of the moral contrast revealed a negative correlation between PCL-R scores and activation in the right temporo-parietal junction. These results indicate that female psychopathy, like male psychopathy, is characterized by reduced limbic activation during emotion processing. In contrast, reduced temporo-parietal activation to moral transgressions has been less observed in male psychopathy. These results extend prior findings in male psychopathy to female psychopathy, and reveal aberrant neural responses to morally-salient stimuli that may be unique to female psychopathy. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. The Creeps as a Moral Emotion.Jeremy Fischer & Rachel Fredericks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (6):191-217.
    Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Emotion and Moral Judgment.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):104–124.
    This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  12.  31
    A Woman's Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion.Macalester Bell - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (4):80-93.
    In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. 1 argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male'dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. 1 begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  89
    Does Emotion Mediate the Relationship Between an Action's Moral Status and its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence.Liane Young, Daniel Tranel, Ralph Adolphs, Marc Hauser & Fiery Cushman - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):291-304.
    Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  14. Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 139-156.
    This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15.  7
    A Study on Moral Emotion Education in Moral Education. 박형빈 - 2009 - Journal of Ethics: The Korean Association of Ethics 1 (74):283-317.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  92
    The Appropriateness of Moral Emotion and Humean Sentimentalism.Sunny Yang - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):67-81.
  17.  34
    Emotion: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology.Robert C. Roberts - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  18.  22
    Compassion: Α Natural, Moral Emotion.Peter Goldie - 2002 - In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle. De Gruyter. pp. 199-212.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  87
    Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):288-289.
    Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  20.  24
    Emotion, Moral Perception, and Nursing Practice.P. Anne Scott - 2000 - Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):123-133.
  21.  37
    Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them. [REVIEW]Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):746-750.
    Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.871618.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22.  14
    Emotion and Moral Judgment.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):104-124.
    This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a “thick affective concept” A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  23.  32
    Moral Undertow and the Passions: Two Challenges for Contemporary Emotion Regulation.Louis C. Charland - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (1):83-91.
    The history and philosophy of affective terms and concepts contains important challenges for contemporary scientific accounts of emotion regulation. First, there is the problem of moral undertow. This arises because stipulating the ends of emotion regulation requires normative assumptions that ultimately derive from values and morals. Some historical precedents are considered to help explain and address this problem. Second, there is the problem of organization. This arises because multiple emotions are often organized and oriented in very particular (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24.  33
    Emotion and Judgment: Two Sources of Moral Motivation in Mèngzǐ.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2018 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17 (1):51-80.
    David Nivison has argued that Mèngzǐ 孟子 postulates only one source of moral motivation, whereas Mèngzǐ’s rival thinkers such as Gàozǐ 告子 or the Mohist Yí Zhī 夷之 additionally postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. In this essay I critically examine this interpretation of Nivison’s, and alternatively argue that moral emotions in Mèngzǐ, basically understood as concern-based construals, are often an insufficient source of moral action, and an additional source (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. The Role of Emotion in Moral Psychology.Bryce Huebner, Susan Dwyer & Marc Hauser - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):1-6.
    Recent work in the cognitive and neurobiological sciences indicates an important relationship between emotion and moral judgment. Based on this evidence, several researchers have argued that emotions are the source of our intuitive moral judgments. However, despite the richness of the correlational data between emotion and morality, we argue that the current neurological, behavioral, developmental and evolutionary evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgments. We suggest instead, that the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  26.  24
    Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27.  13
    Moral Knowing in a Hindu Sacred City: An Exploration of Mind, Emotion, and Self.Steven M. Parish - 1994 - Columbia University Press.
  28. Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).
    In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  12
    Anticipatory-Vicarious Grief: The Anatomy of a Moral Emotion.Somogy Varga & Shaun Gallagher - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):176-189.
    Grief is often described as characterized by a particular emotional response to another person’s death. While this is true of paradigm cases, we argue that a broader notion of grief allows accommodating forms of this emotional experience that deviate from the paradigmatic case. The bulk of the paper explores such a nonparadigmatic form of grief, anticipatory-vicarious grief, which is typically triggered by pondering the inevitability of our own death. We argue that AV-grief is a particular moral emotion that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  35
    Moral Conviction and Emotion.Linda J. Skitka & Daniel C. Wisneski - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):328-330.
    People’s feelings about political issues are often experienced as moral convictions, that is, as rooted in beliefs about right and wrong, morality and immorality. The authors tested and found that morally convicted policy preferences are associated with positive as well as negative emotions among policy supporters and opponents, respectively, and that positive and negative emotions partially mediate the effects of moral convictions on relevant behavioral intentions (i.e., willingness to engage in activism).
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31.  58
    The Role of Emotion Regulation in Moral Judgment.Chelsea Helion & Kevin N. Ochsner - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):297-308.
    Moral judgment has typically been characterized as a conflict between emotion and reason. In recent years, a central concern has been determining which process is the chief contributor to moral behavior. While classic moral theorists claimed that moral evaluations stem from consciously controlled cognitive processes, recent research indicates that affective processes may be driving moral behavior. Here, we propose a new way of thinking about emotion within the context of moral judgment, one (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, Written by Joshua D. Greene. [REVIEW]Simon Rosenqvist - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2):225-228.
  33.  24
    Moral Dilemmas and Moral Principles: When Emotion and Cognition Unite.Andrea Manfrinati, Lorella Lotto, Michela Sarlo, Daniela Palomba & Rino Rumiati - 2013 - Cognition and Emotion 27 (7):1276-1291.
  34.  34
    Reasons, Emotion, and Moral Judgment in the Psychopath.Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  35. Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic Emotion.Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt - 2003 - Cognition and Emotion 17 (2):297-314.
  36. Restoring Emotion's Bad Rep: The Moral Randomness of Norms.Ronald De Sousa - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):29-47.
    Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37.  54
    Emotion, Perception, and the Self in Moral Epistemology.Michael Lacewing - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):335-355.
    In this paper, I argue against a perceptual model of moral epistemology. We should not reject the claim that there is a sense in which, on some occasions, emotions may be said to be perceptions of values or reasons. But going further than this, and taking perception as a model for moral epistemology is unhelpful and unilluminating. By focusing on the importance of the dispositions and structures of the self to moral knowledge, I bring out important disanalogies (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  11
    Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them.Andrew Scott Conning - 2015 - Journal of Moral Education 44 (1):119-121.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. A Woman's Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion.Macalester Bell - 2000 - Hypatia 20 (4):80-93.
    In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. I argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male-dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. I begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  89
    Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory.John M. Cooper - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
    This book brings together twenty-three distinctive and influential essays on ancient moral philosophy--including several published here for the first time--by the distinguished philosopher and classical scholar John Cooper.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  41.  15
    Moral Judgment Is Not Based on a Dichotomy Between Emotion and Cognition: Commentary on Bazerman Et Al.Ulas Kaplan - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (1):86-86.
  42.  89
    Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.
    One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43.  69
    Is Shame an Ugly Emotion? Four Discourses—Two Contrasting Interpretations for Moral Education.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2014 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 33 (5):495-511.
    This paper offers a sustained philosophical meditation on contrasting interpretations of the emotion of shame within four academic discourses—social psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology and Aristotelian scholarship—in order to elicit their implications for moral education. It turns out that within each of these discourses there is a mainstream interpretation which emphasises shame’s expendability or moral ugliness (and where shame is typically described as guilt’s ugly sister), but also a heterodox interpretation which seeks to retrieve and defend shame. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  44. Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation.David B. Wong - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):343-367.
  45.  13
    Wang Yangming's Theory of the Unity of Knowledge and Action Revisited: An Investigation From the Perspective of Moral Emotion.Yinghua Lu - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (1):197-214.
    This article is an extension of my previous article, which describes pure knowing as the ability and criteria for making moral judgment.1 Due to apparent contradictions among Wang Yangming's statements, there are controversies over the evaluation and interpretation of Wang's idea of the relation between moral knowledge 2 and moral action. Generally, on the one hand, Wang admits that there are people who commit wrong actions even though they recognize that these actions are wrong. He claims not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of "Dao Begins in Qing".Tang Yijie, Brian Bruya & Hai-ming Wen - 2003 - Philosophy East and West 53 (2):271-281.
    There is a view that Ruists never put much emphasis on qing and even saw it in a negative light. This is perhaps a misunderstanding, especially in regard to pre-Qin Ruism. In the Guodian Xing zi ming chu, the passage "dao begins in qing" (dao shi yu qing) plays an important role in our understanding of the pre-Qin notion of qing. This article concentrates on the "theory of qing" in both pre-Qin Ruism and Daoism and attempts a philosophical interpretation of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47.  95
    Seeing Color, Seeing Emotion, Seeing Moral Value.Benjamin De Mesel - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):539-555.
    Defenders of moral perception have famously argued that seeing value is relevantly similar to seeing color. Some critics think, however, that the analogy between color-seeing and value-seeing breaks down in several crucial respects. Defenders of moral perception, these critics say, have not succeeded in providing examples of non-moral perception that are relevantly analogous to cases of moral perception. Therefore, it can be doubted whether there is such a thing as moral perception at all. I argue (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  40
    Are There `Degrees' of the Moral Emotion?C. A. Campbell - 1936 - Mind 45 (180):492-497.
  49.  22
    'Happenings Outside One's Moral Self': Reflections on Utilitarianism and Moral Emotion.Edward Harcourt - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):239-258.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  35
    'Happenings Outside One's Moral Self': Reflections on Utilitarianism and Moral Emotion: Bernard Williams,'A Critique of Utilitarianism', in JJC Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 1977.Edward Harcourt - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):239-258.
1 — 50 / 999