_Purpose._ The authors of this paper seek to comprehend, on the basis of ethics of discourse and communicative philosophy, the dimensions of human existence in times of war. This involves solving the following research tasks: to show the importance of moral and ethical norms in the structure of human existence and to emphasize the need for their observance by a person in the realities of war; to find out what the role of responsibility and co-responsibility is in preserving the (...) space of human existence in times of war; to explore the influence of discourse on the establishment of rational and social dimensions of human existence, formation of communicative space of understanding. _Theoretical basis._ The ideas of communicative philosophy and principles of discourse ethics, focused on the problems of substantiating ethical norms and values in their relationship with the human life world, and its activities are underlying the research. The analysis of human existence in times of war was carried out considering the theoretical and methodological foundations of philosophical anthropology. _Originality._ It is substantiated that the recognition of the universality of moral norms and values, and the productive power of communication contribute to deepening the understanding of the complexity and versatility of human existence in times of war. It has been determined that human existence’s rational and moral dimensions acquire particular significance in the context of russian aggression against Ukraine. The role of discourse was defined for affirming the humanistic foundations of human existence, in achieving cohesion, interaction, social solidarity, which is a condition for human development as a collective and unique being. It is noted that in war conditions the value of individual forms of human existence is complemented by the obligatory responsibility and co-responsibility for a person, awareness of the significance of coexistence in a situation where there is a threat to human life. _Conclusions._ The study of human existence involves the use of the methodological potential of discourse ethics, the significance of the ideas of which is increasing in the modern world because of the dangers caused by russian aggression against Ukraine. The recognition of the power of universal moral norms and the productive power of communication results in the affirmation of the humanistic foundations of human existence, the formation of the communicative space of understanding and consent necessary for a person. In times of war, the need for communicative rationalization of human existence, awareness of the value of morality and human humanity becomes obvious. (shrink)

The author of the article assumes that any human activity is normative. In the case of philosophical discourse, the normative ground is its indispensable condition, which makes it possible to compare the foundations of philosophy and other scientific disciplines. The norm (law) has, on the one hand, descriptive content related to the description of the noumenal world, and, on the other, prescriptive content related to the counterfactuality of what ought to be. The author emphasizes that the functional (...) aspect of a norm is that it is a means of socially integrating the behavior of people and social groups into a whole. Due to the requirements and requirements of society, social groups are transformed into standards, models, standards of modal and obligatory behavior of the representatives of these groups, performing the function of motivation, orientation and legitimacy. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on a narrower understanding of discourse as speech, dialogue, discussions, which presuppose argumentation based on certain principles, rules, rules and regulations. This interpretation of discourse is peculiar to representatives of the ethics of discourse (K.-O. Apel, Y. Habermas, D. Böhler, V. Kulman, G. Gronke, etc.). Within ethics, principles, imperatives, rules, norms and guidelines both normalize the discourse and substantiate this discourse. Adherence to these principles, rules, norms, and guidelines ensures the normative coherence of discourse as the instance of consensus building on the basis of revealing the performative contradiction of the statement. The normative coherence of discourse is also the basis for its functioning as a meta-institution of justification of social (moral, legal) norms and legitimation of institutions of deliberative democracy in a society of communication and dialogical civilization. Summarizing, the author formulates generalized requirements-guidelines that make it possible to implement the principles, norms and rules of discourse as a meta-institutional instance of society. (shrink)

In recent years we have seen a newfound engagement with Jürgen Habermas's work in philosophy of education, focusing on his conception of argumentative dialogue, or discourse, as the origin of both truth-related epistemic judgments and justifications of moral norms that claim rightness rather than truth. In this article, Krassimir Stojanov first reconstructs the way in which Habermas determines the relation between truth and rightness, and he then shows that moral rightness functions as a “truth-analogue” since moral norms, like true (...) facts, transcend the actual and local practices of their justification. In the case of moral rightness, this transcendence occurs as an infinite process of inclusion of the perspectives and interests of all potentially concerned persons — also (and foremost) the perspectives and interests of those who are strange to each other in their respective values, worldviews, and interests. With this account of “truth-analogue” moral rightness, Habermas conceptualizes a kind of processual and “difference-sensible” universalism, which is very different from the substantialist universalism of some traditional conceptions of education, or Bildung. In the final section, Stojanov shows why including children in their otherness as children in the discursive process of production of moral knowledge, and thus treating them with a kind of epistemic respect, is a constitutive condition for that process. The demand for the discursive inclusion of children follows from the discourse ethics approach, but it requires an enlargement and some corrections of that approach. (shrink)

The article aims at organizing multifaceted discourse on the concept of nondirectiveness in the practice of genetic counseling. The analysis of areas where nondirectiveness was invoked and discussed reveals the problematic confusion of different meanings of the term that often leads to false conclusions about the relations between the professional standards and the practice of genetic counseling. The article offers clear and comprehensive description of different approaches to nondirectiveness and various ideas associated with the term. Normative consequences of (...) various meanings attributed to nondirectiveness are explored. The article concludes by presenting important but unsolved problems regarding both theory (the meaning of nondirectiveness and its operational definition) and practice of genetic counseling (the scope and content of the norm of nondirective counseling). (shrink)

Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and systematize the main tenets in Rawls’s and Habermas’s discursive theories, and will suggest that the principles of justice (Rawls) and universalization (Habermas) can and play the role of mandates of optimalization in real deliberations on justice.

In this article, I revise the normative account of sport that I proposed in ‘William J. Morgan’s “conventionalist internalism” approach. Furthering internalism? A critical hermeneutical response.’ I first present Habermas’ discursive ethics, placing emphasis on his interpretation of the relationship between moral (Kantian) and ethical (Hegelian/hermeneutical) principles. Then, I provide a reformulation of my account by both drawing on Habermas and going beyond him—as I go beyond Habermas, I will refer to the account as ‘discourse-ethics based.’ To (...) further explore the normative potential of the account, I connect its main tenets to the three main normative theories of sport (formalism, broad internalism, and deep conventionalism) and illustrate it with examples from anti-doping governance. (shrink)

Central to the discourse ethics advanced by Jürgen Habermas is a principle of universalization (U) amounting to a dialogical equivalent of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Habermas has proposed that ?U? follows by material implication from two premises: (1) what it means to discuss whether a moral norm ought to be . adopted and (2) what those involved in argumentation must suppose of themselves if they are to consider a consensus they reach as rationally motivated. To date, no satisfactory derivation of (...) ?U? from these two premises has been presented. Thus the present study attempts to show how one can, without begging the question, arrive at ?U? by assuming a suitable explication of these two premises, supplemented with a fairly innocuous assumption about the context of discourse. If the argument is sound, then ?U? brings both deontological and consequentialist intuitions together with a notion of solidarity that requires an intersubjective account of insight. (shrink)

Quine claims that his naturalized epistemology which is a science about science must take the place of traditional epistemology. Because physics is the paradigm of science for Quine, there is apparently no room for normative and intentional discourses in Quine's naturalized epistemology. However, Quine uses normative and intentional discourses in his naturalized epistemological inquiry. Hence, the problem addressed in this dissertation is the place of normative and intentional discourses in Quine's naturalized epistemology. ;My procedure is to examine (...) critically the above mentioned contradiction from two different angles. In an initial and external criticism I assume the in-principle gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses. In an internal criticism I assume the gap merely practical. In the former criticism I offer my own interpretation of the status of naturalized epistemology in Quine's philosophy and argue for the presence of a tension between methodological concerns and what Quine calls his physicalistic bias. I explain three manifestations of the tension in Quine's writings: his discussions of language acquisition, induction and scientific method in general. I also argue that methodological concerns play the ineradicable role in an epistemology, which Quine must and at least partially does recognize. In the internal criticism I discuss the nature of the gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses and examine and criticize Quine's behavioristic physicialism. On the basis of the criticism of Quine's behavioristic physicalism I criticize Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation which denies the fact of the matter for intentional discourse. ;I find, as a result, that because both methodological concerns and physicalistic bias are basic elements of Quine's naturalized epistemology, the resultant tension is serious. I also find that Quine's naturalized epistemology as it is cannot resolve the tension, whether we assume the gap as in-principle or merely practical. ;Thus, I conclude that as the unsettling status of normative and intentional discourses indicates, Quine's naturalized epistemology does not make a coherent whole. (shrink)

The volume starts with the paper of Lynn Maurice Ferguson Arnold, former Premier of South Australia and former Minister of Education of Australia, concerning the Exposition Internationale des Arts et Techniques dans la Vie Moderne (International Exposition of Art and Technology in Modern Life) that was held from 25 May to 25 November 1937 in Paris, France. The organization of the world exhibition had placed the Nazi German and the Soviet pavilions directly across from each other. Many papers are devoted (...) to the interpretation of this opposition. Arnold’s paper considers the differences in the two totalitarian states’ architectural and design discourse styles. Although each of them communicated a totalitarian language of purposes, permissions, and boundaries, they essentially differed in the styles of discourse represented by the architecture and design of their respective pavilions. They were opposites of each other and the liberal ideals they contested. The internationalist viewpoint reflecting the multi-ethnic mix of the USSR is contrasted to the ein Volk homogeneity represented in the German pavilion. The Soviet pavilion opted for a utopian future to be arrived at by “benign” leadership, whereas the German pavilion anchored itself in the myth of Teutonic history with the nostalgic pride protected by the swastika-bearing eagle. Jean-Yves Béziau is best known as a logician and founder of Universal Logic. However, in this paper, he poses a new philosophical question: why philosophical discourse does not use images? The paper begins with a general analysis of different types of philosophical discourses. Then, he focuses on why images have been and are still rejected in philosophical discourse. He explains various ways to use images in a fruitful way to develop philosophical thinking and discourse and illustrates his view by providing several examples. He concludes with a promising programmatic declaration about founding a new journal entitled World Journal of Pictorial Philosophy to stimulate the usage of images for developing philosophical thinking. Although complaints about the obscurity of many philosophers’ discourse are widespread, Tatiana Denisova, ex-professor of the Surgut University and a research associate of the University of the Aegean undertakes a positive attitude to this problem. She explains that the reasons for the obscurity of philosophical texts, the subsequent complexity in communicating philosophers’ meanings and their eventual incomplete understanding is not a sign of their inferiority. On the contrary, it is a sign of the fruitfulness of philosophical discourse, which can generate new meanings. Thus, the darkness of philosophical discourse is like the life-giving chaos, and the obscurity that it inevitably contains can be the keeper of implicit meanings and even their generator. Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska and Piotr Leśniewski, authors of a monograph on Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890 – 1963), make a comparative analysis of his educational style with that of Paulo Reglus Neves Freire (1921 – 1997). The authors highlight that these scholars have distinctly different backgrounds. The former was an educator, philosopher and a leading advocate of critical pedagogy connected with the dialogical Latin-American tradition. The latter was a philosopher and logician, a notable representative of the Lwów–Warsaw school of logic with significant contributions to semantics, model theory and the philosophy of science. Despite their apparent difference, the authors identify some striking similarities regarding their attitudes towards education; notably, their approaches are essentially dialogical. Gilah Yelin Hirsch is a multidisciplinary artist who works as a painter, writer, curator, educator, and filmmaker. In her experiential paper, he explains how and why she uses four channels of communication in her creative expression: writing, painting, filmmaking, and teaching, as dialogic inquiry. She considers that these channels compose a continuum of discourse styles, each reaching a different facet of kaleidoscopic consciousness. She claims that her choice of medium is prompted by a need to communicate her insights profoundly. Thus, for instance, she created painted allegories to express narratives based on dreams and visions emerging from her subconscious. Art and healing is another Tibetan-rooted type of discourse practised by the author. Creating and observing a healing image produces a positive psychophysiological change in both the artist and the viewer. The discourse here is tripartite between creator, image, and viewer. Filmmaking is another type of discourse she practices between the filmmaker/artist as shaman or healer and the viewer as respondent or participant. These films are meant to be experienced frame by frame, physically and emotionally in both the body and mind. Jocelyn Ireson-Paine is a cartoonist and programmer. His paper offers an original attempt to use category theory in cartooning. Category theory is a branch of mathematics that provides concepts and methods to describe general abstract structures in terms of a labelled directed graph called category, whose nodes are called objects, and whose labelled directed edges are called arrows (or morphisms or transformations or mappings). The author explores different ways to define “style” in art using category theory and a relational view of art. Moreover, he examines how “translation” (transformation) between styles could be defined and reveals the difficulties of how it could be implemented in a computer using special software. Jens Lemanski is a philosopher who has revived research in Arthur Schopenhauer’s legacy by exploring his work on mathematical evidence, logic diagrams, and problems of semantics. In this paper, he advances a new approach to eristic as an art of protecting oneself from the one who deliberately violates norms of discourse ethics to win an argument. The author attributes the origins of this view to Schopenhauer, suggesting a new reading of his work. According to the author, eristic is a prohibitive technique that takes effect when the norms of discourse ethics are transgressed and violated. Thus, eristic is viewed as a discipline of Enlightenment philosophy and a correlate of discourse ethics. Roshdi Rashed is an authority on the history of Arabic mathematical sciences. Proceeding from Gilles-Gaston Granger’s definition of mathematical style, he studies the question of whether a mathematical work can be characterized by a single style or by a multitude of styles. This question is explored within the style of a single work, namely Menelaus’s Sphaerica, and through the study of the development of a single problem over time, namely the isoperimetric problem. He indicates Menelaus’s divergence from the Euclidean style of (plane and stereometric) geometry caused by the drop of the Parallel Postulate, which associated it with hyperbolic geometry. Hence, the author concludes that Menelaus’s Sphaerica incorporates the well-known Euclidean style with a variation of the non-Euclidean one. On the other hand, examining the isoperimetric problem reveals another interesting historical picture. A succession of different styles (cosmological, geometric, infinitesimalistic, style of the calculus of variations, of synthetic geometry) can be observed due to the transformation of the research object over time. Boris Shalyutin, a Russian social philosopher, and Ombudsman for Human Rights in the Kurgan Region, explores the origins of discourse in combination with the birth of society and law. He claims that legal discourse marks the historical emergence of discourse in general. Homo Juridicus generated Homo Sapiens, which have created new spheres of discourse, notably moral discourse and further philosophical, political, and scientific discourse. Petros Stefaneas, a logician, computer scientist and novelist, suggests an alternative to the traditional narratology approach for studying (interactive) social media discourse. He claims that style describes how the parts of a narrative are blended into a whole. The author relies upon Goguen’s and Harrel’s concept of style as a choice of blending principles and transfers to the study of the social media narratives elements from the methodology of studying Web-based collaborative search for mathematical proofs like those implemented within the Polymath project. The last paper belongs to Ghil‘ad Zuckermann, a linguist, language revivalist, and proponent of a model of the emergence of Israeli Hebrew, according to which Hebrew and Yiddish were the primary sources of Modern Hebrew. This paper explores the fascinating and multifaceted Yiddish language and its survival in Israeli. Yiddish is characterized by a unique style that embeds psycho-ostensive expressions throughout its discourse. The author highlights the cross-fertilization between Hebrew and Yiddish as it manifests itself in any aspect of the Israeli language. He claims that Yiddish survives beneath Israeli phonetics, phonology, discourse, syntax, semantics, lexis, and even morphology, although traditional and institutional linguists have been most reluctant to admit it. (shrink)

The following paper considers the extent to which discourse ethics can adequately respond to Habermas' own call for normative justification for the expectation of tolerance. It concludes that discourse ethics is able to lend its services to the flagging fortunes of the idea of toleration, not by seeking to underscore this idea with rationally compelling argumentation,but by offering insights into the possibilities opened up to a life which accepts this principle.

This paper aims to introduce, in the context of Latin America, the theoretical epistemic discussion regarding the theme of the ‘common’ as a political principle which substantiates instituting and autonomous processes of government, control and community regulation. The work seeks to relate a democratic scenario of the ‘common’ with the discourses of pluralist and decolonial normativity, in a way that would guarantee not only horizontal communal self-management, but also a legitimate ordering of forms of life, founded on common interest, social (...) relations and interconnected structures. For this purpose the instrument of critical-socio-legal analysis is applied at the intersections with the ‘participative-communitary’ type of legal pluralism. Our proposal is to combine the contemporary meaning of the ‘common’, its relation to the Latin American principles of ‘buen vivir’ (living well) and ‘interculturalidade’ (interculturality), as well as the instituting practice of the ‘common’, that engenders a normativity built ‘from below’, which is in opposition to the traditional positivist and state legal system imposed through colonization in Latin America. Such achievements that, although formalized, are not being successful against institutional ruptures, have ‘cloistered’ the practices of the ‘common’ and made the existence of legal pluralism invisible. (shrink)

R. M. HARE takes the following view of the task of moral philosophy, "The function of moral philosophy—or at any rate the hope with which I study it—is that of helping us think better about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the language in which this thought is expressed." The purpose of this essay is to show that this restriction of ethics to the logical dimensions of moral discourse is grounded in an excessively narrow conception of the (...) resources of human reason. Specifically, I shall argue that a more thoroughgoing grasp of these resources shows that reason has the capacity to move beyond such a purely logical task and to function as a normative source of moral demands. Central to the argument is the contention that the capacities of reason are restricted neither to the discovery of facts, nor to the opening of human discourse to the demands of logic, but include also the capacity to function as a principle constitutive of human agency as capable of self-awareness. I shall try to show that this latter capacity enables reason to play a morally normative role in human life. The argument will be divided into three major components, beginning with a brief expository sketch of Hare’s position aimed at providing the problematic framework for my argument by stating the essentials of his case against naturalism and for prescriptivism. The second component will describe the reflective capacity of reason and will point out that this capacity is at work in Hare’s writings. Finally, the third component will be directed toward showing how reflectivity is capable of founding a normative ethics. (shrink)

What is pedagogy, exactly? Merriam-Webster defines it simply as “the art, science, or profession of teaching.” In contemporary academic discourse, however, pedagogy is generally left undefined — with its apparent implicit meanings ranging anywhere from a specific “model for teaching” (e.g., behaviorist or progressivist instruction) to a broadly political philosophy of education in general (most famously, a “pedagogy of the oppressed”). In this paper, Norm Friesen and Hanno Su follow the Continental pedagogical tradition in giving pedagogy a general but (...) explicit definition. They do so by looking at how pedagogy arises both in everyday life and in school as unavoidably ethical activity undertaken primarily for the sake of the young person or child. Such activities, the authors maintain, are structured not so much by processes, methods, and outcomes, but by irresolvable oppositions and the tensions between them. They illustrate this inductively through a series of images and examples — moving gradually from ones involving parenting and early childhood to ones from elementary and secondary schooling. In this way, Friesen and Su show that pedagogy is not so much one or more ideologically focused or evidence-based instructional or psychological approaches to be mastered by a professional or teaching specialist. It is instead an independent but ethically informed practical perspective — one that can (and has) been extended to form a distinctively pedagogical theory and discipline. As such, it is something that is not only a part of our everyday life and culture, but arguably of all human cultures. (shrink)

The situation of public functioning of philosophy today is being fundamentally changed in comparison with it that even was by the end of last century. The new opportunities of free appeal to philosophical concepts and meanings and their use by every participant of unlimited networks of open communication raise issues of preservation and protection of normative philosophical discourse. The author formulates the need in such normativity as an issue of difference between the context of reproduction and the innovation (...) one or as interdependence of reproduction and elaborating interpretation of normative meanings in philosophy. He takes attention to highlighting the issue of making and recognizing normativity in discourse/communicative practices that could be find out in works of Michel Foucault and Jurgen Habermas. It helps to clarify a role and place of validity claims in communication actions including their meaning in philosophical discourse. Following Habermas’ theory of both linguistic and contextual depending of discourse’s normative meanings the author pays particular attention to meaning creation role of lifeworld as a cultural context that determines communicators’s understanding. It gives an opportunity to point out a principle role of communicator’s position or his or her self-understanding the lifeworld context they embodied. It also makes it possible to demonstrate clear examples of inconsistency of philosophical discourses depending on the position taken by a philosopher as we can meet radical critical position of Roger Scruton in his assessment of many prominent European philosophers’ works. In conclusion the author stresses on dependence of capacity to get added interpretation value in philosophy not only from a level of theoretical knowledge, but from his or her personal appropriation of own horizon of cultural meanings. Following Habermas's theory of linguistic and contextual dependence of normative values of discourse on context, the author draws attention to the role in the creation of values of the lifeworld as a cultural context that determines the participant's understanding. It gives an opportunity to point out a principle role of communicator’s position or his or her understanding the lifeworld context they embodied. It also allows to demonstrate clear examples of inconsistency of philosophical discourses depending on the position taken by a philosopher as we can meet in radical critical position of Roger Scruton within his assessment of many prominent European philosophers’ works. In conclusion the author stresses capacity to get added interpretation value in philosophy depends not only on a level of theoretical knowledge a person owns, but from his or her personal appropriation of own horizon of cultural meanings. (shrink)

Social entrepreneurship is not just an objective description of a phenomenon; it also carries a positive normative connotation. However, the academic discourse barely reflects social entrepreneurship’s inherent normativity and often grounds it implicitly on the mission of a social enterprise. In this paper, we argue critically that it is insufficient to ground social entrepreneurship’s inherent normativity on a social mission. Instead, we will show how such a mission-centric conception of social entrepreneurship, when put into practice, is prone to (...) enhance rather than diminish societal grievances. In order to give social entrepreneurship an explicit and sound ethical grounding, we draw on integrative economic ethics as a frame of reference. From this perspective, social entrepreneurship necessitates adherence to the discourse-ethically reasoned moral principle in order to live up to its inherent normative validity claim of good entrepreneurship. The consideration of social entrepreneurship practices is crucial to make this approach less vulnerable to ethical critique. The addition of a practice dimension overcomes the mission-centric view of social entrepreneurship and opens up a typology of enterprise forms, thereby enabling a more fine-grained distinction between social enterprises and other forms of organization. (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is to provide a critique of Jurgen Habermas's communication-theoretic proposal for a discourse ethics. In doing so, I confront the theory of communicative rationality with the pronounced intention of letting discourse ethics take, as Habermas puts it, its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the categorical imperative from Hegel's theory of recognition. My objections to this attempt to provide a critical theory with normative grounds generally relate to what I see as a (...) too excessive formalism, and a tendential repression of the dimension of ethical ontology. ;Although Habermas insists that agents always bring their lifewordly conditions of existence--their particular identities and histories--with them when they engage argumentatively to redeem validity claims, the discourse model has throughout its effective history been notoriously helpless when engaging with the internally related issues of motivation and the cognitive problems of judgment and context-sensitive application. In analyzing the principle of universalizability , I show why it is necessary to construct a dialectical relationship between morality and issues of the good life, and to introduce a notion of reflective judgment. Moreover, I argue for a detachment of moral theory from the quasi-transcendental grounding in formal structures of rationality. ;In the course of my successive interpretative confrontations with discourse ethics, I formulate a hermeneutic approach. One important upshot of this is that discourse ethics will be situated closer to Habermas's early suggestions towards a critical hermeneutics. This is a conception which emphatically promotes an internal link between judgment, action and argumentation. Another consequence relates to the need for a realist realignment of discourse ethics. I suggest that reflection and moral discourse, starting from the particularity of concrete cases but ultimately aiming towards universality , should be involved, not in a process of further disintegration of ethical life , but in a process of healing, in which universality serves a memorial, imaginative and communicative function: it creates a conceptual reservoir for interpreting our complex moral experiences, and ultimately for gaining knowledge of the self and its intricate bonds and attachments to others. (shrink)

This contribution explores correctives to several errors that Thomas Nagel seems to presuppose in his seminal defence of scepticism about global justice. I rely on lessons learned and conventions surviving in West African contemporary social and moral contexts, where people engage as a matter of course in divergent, historically antagonistic cultural and political traditions. On this view, global justice is a work in progress—not a fixed univocal formula but an on-going collaborative effort, a project in perpetual renovation and inter-cultural reconsideration (...) by successive generations which presupposes a diversity of values and ways of sanctifying human life. I consider ways in which an ethics of care, as suggested by Virginia Held, might have been anticipated by the time-honoured norms of governance and political culture surviving in complex African polities, cultures which have withstood the corrosion of external colonialism since early modernity. How might iconically African, universally fundamental moral notions of decency and fairness find their way back into the global marketplace of diplomatic discourse and economic policy design?To demonstrate the need to navigate towards some consensus within the diversity of indigenous concepts associated with justice and good governance in Africa, I discuss the fiasco displayed in a widely celebrated proposal for exercising globally principles of justice in the Western liberal political tradition applied to remedy Africans’ notorious resource curse. (shrink)

Focusing on the terms 'possibly affected persons' and 'those affected' in the Habermasian ' discourse principle', I argue that we need a notion of moral subjects in addition to that of a person and that this notion of moral subjects implies a 'normative gradualism' which weakens the participatory and consensual aspect of discourse theory and strengthens the aspect of enlightened 'advocatory' deliberation in terms of needs and the good life. I argue that this notion of moral subjects (...) represents a challenge for the discourse principle. Confronted with the huge number of moral subjects and of future persons, demanding various kinds of advocatory representation, the Habermasian discourse principle, as stated in Between Facts and Norms, becomes unsatisfactory. (shrink)

In this article we consider certain elements of the normative theory of Jürgen Habermas in the light of the proposals of Bruce Ackerman, with a view to strengthening a concept of deliberative democracy applied to the legitimation of juridical rules. We do not construct a hierarchy of the two positions, but seek to bring together certain elements to achieve a common project. As the starting point for examining the work of the two authors, we take the scheme proposed by (...) Habermas in Faktizität und Geltung. In this connection, through the work of Ackerman, we intend to fill in some of the gaps that Habermas appears to have left in the theory of radical democracy applied to the law. The work of Ackerman can make a significant contribution to deliberative democracy, to the discourse principle that Habermas defines, and to the contractualist theories from a liberal perspective. The study of these contributions makes possible a critical judgment that enables the legitimation of juridical rules carried out by Habermas to acquire greater practicity. In examining the epistemological status of juridical science and law, we attempt to determine the weight and the performance of normative democracy. In Tarr's view, it is a matter for philosophers to examine direct democracy and its desirability. (shrink)

This article explores universal normative bases that could help to shape a workable legal construct that would facilitate a global use of advance directives. Although I believe that advance directives are of universal character, my primary aim in approaching this issue is to remain realistic. I will make three claims. First, I will argue that the principles of autonomy, dignity and informed consent, embodied in the Oviedo Convention and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, could arguably (...) be regarded as universal bases for the global use of advance directives. Second, I will demonstrate that, despite the apparent consensus of ethical authorities in support of their global use, it is unlikely, for the time being, that such consensus could lead to unqualified legal recognition of advance directives, because of different understandings of the nature of the international rules, meanings of autonomy and dignity which are context‐specific and culture‐specific, and existing imperfections that make advance directives either unworkable or hardly applicable in practice. The third claim suggests that the fact that the concept of the advance directive is not universally shared does not mean that it should not become so, but never as the only option in managing incompetent patients. A way to proceed is to prioritize work on developing higher standards in managing incompetent patients and on progressing towards the realization of universal human rights in the sphere of bioethics, by advocating a universal, legally binding international convention that would outlaw human rights violations in end‐of‐life decision‐making. (shrink)

In 2004 Emanuel et al. published an influential account of exploitation in international research, which has become known as the 'fair benefits account'. In this paper I argue that the thin definition of fairness presented by Emanuel et al, and subsequently endorsed by Gbadegesin and Wendler, does not provide a notion of fairness that is adequately robust to support a fair benefits account of exploitation. The authors present a procedural notion of fairness – the fair distribution of the benefits of (...) research is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the parties involved in each study. The fairness of the distribution of benefits is not assessed against an independent normative standard. Emanuel et al.'s account of fairness provides a framework for objecting only to transactions that occur without the fully informed consent of the weaker party. As a result, a debate about exploitation collapses into a debate about consent. This is problematic because, as the proponents of the fair benefits framework acknowledge, neither the trial participants' consent nor the host community's consent preclude exploitation. Attempts to stipulate normative standards of fairness to protect research subjects in developing countries have been controversial and divisive, and it is therefore understandable that bioethicists would be tempted to develop accounts of exploitation that are independent of such prescriptive principles. I conclude, however, that the utility of the fair benefits model of exploitation as a policy tool will ultimately depend on whether a substantive principle of fairness can be developed to underpin it. (shrink)

Fleur Johns argues that the contraposition of a ‘bottom-up’ approach of politics of prototypical technique rather than the ‘top-down’ politics of the master plan or normative principle no longer seems as straightforwardly radical as it appeared when James C Scott posited the value of local knowledge or métis against grand plans of high modernization, just over 20 years ago. This paper seeks to follow Johns’ call, ‘to capture and probe some of the effects of sensibility, rationality or style widely (...) reproduced in the details of development work’. It draws upon fieldwork in Nairobi to open up a discussion of a shift in sensibility from a ‘bottom-up’ or ‘postliberal’ approach to a framing of open-ended encounter. The paper critiques this imaginary of relational encounter by engaging contemporary work in critical black studies. It suggests that the problem of critique is that it reproduces the problems of governing imaginaries, continually seeking to rework the human subject via adaptive capacities, sensitivities to difference and openness to alterity, while leaving intact the coloniality of being, the antiblack world. (shrink)

Several years ago Jürgen Habermas wrote a short answer to the question: “Does Hegel's Critique of Kant apply to Discourse Ethics?” The gist of his short answer is, “no”. Insofar as Hegel's criticisms of the formalism and abstract universalism of the moral law never even applied to Kant's moral theory in the first place, they also fail to apply to discourse ethics. Insofar as Hegel's criticisms of the rigorism of the moral law and of Kant's conception of autonomy (...) do hit the mark, discourse ethics successfully draws their sting by reconceiving Kant's moral standpoint along the following lines. 1. Kant wrongly undertakes to establish the moral law as a “fact of reason”: discourse ethics derives the moral standpoint from two premises — one formal, a rationally reconstructed logic of argumentation, and one material, namely our intuitions about how to justify utterances. 2. Kant wrongly contends that we must be able to think of ourselves as both intelligible characters, inhabiting a noumenal world, and as empirical characters inhabiting the world of appearances: discourse ethics allows that in everyday contexts of action and in the context of moral discourse we have one character that has real needs and interests. 3. Kant is also mistaken in arguing that moral autonomy requires human beings to abstract away from their needs and interests and to will universalizable maxims for the sake of their universal form: discourse ethics understands moral autonomy to consist in the free adoption of a standpoint from which conflicts of interest can be impartially regulated, by giving special weight to the satisfaction of universalizable interests. 4. Kant misconceives the categorical imperative as an objective test of universalizability that is applied by individual wills in isolation: discourse ethics reconceives the moral universalism as an ideal of intersubjective agreement of participants in discourse. On the differences between the principles of discourse ethics and Kant's categorical imperative Habermas is wont to cite McCarthy's summary of his — Habermas' — position: “Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for the purposes of discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm”. (shrink)

This book investigates context-sensitivity in natural language by examining the meaning and use of a target class of theoretically recalcitrant expressions. These expressions-including epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague language -exhibit systematic differences from paradigm context-sensitive expressions in their discourse dynamics and embedding properties. Many researchers have responded by rethinking the nature of linguistic meaning and communication. Drawing on general insights about the role of context in interpretation and collaborative action, Silk develops an improved contextualist theory (...) of CR-expressions within the classical truth-conditional paradigm: Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the distinctive linguistic behavior of a CR-expression from a particular contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. It is shown how in using CR-expressions, speakers can exploit their mutual grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to coordinate their attitudes and negotiate about how the context should evolve. The book focuses primarily on developing a Discourse Contextualist semantics and pragmatics for epistemic modals. The Discourse Contextualist framework is also applied to other categories of epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague adjectives. The similarities/differences among these expressions, and among context-sensitive expressions more generally, have been underexplored. The development of Discourse Contextualism in this book sheds light on general features of meaning and communication, and the variety of ways in which context affects and is affected by uses of language. Discourse Contextualism provides a fruitful framework for theorizing about various broader issues in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Sport categorization is often justified by benefits such as increased fairness or inclusion. Taking inspiration from John Rawls, Sigmund Loland’s fair equality of opportunity principle in sport (FEOPs) is a tool for determining whether the existence of an inequality ethically justifies the institution of a new category in any given sport. It is an elegant ethical normative framework, but since FEOPs does not account explicitly for athlete safety (i.e. athlete physical and mental wellbeing), we are left in an ethically (...) dubious situation where the risk of harm associated with a categorization regime might in fact prove to be greater than the risk of harm present within the sport before its introduction. To address this critical gap, I propose the ‘scales of ignorance’ ethical normative framework to weigh the relative risk of harm within a sport, crucially inserting athlete safety into the discourse surrounding ethical justification for categorization in sport. The current paper is the first explicit formulation of assessment and ethical justification of risk of harm in the familiar logic of FEOPs. The scales of ignorance framework can also be used independently of Loland’s approach. Two new concepts are also proposed: ‘insidious risk of harm’ and ‘pernicious risk of harm’. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability is widely used in human rights policy documents, reports, and case law focusing on the impacts of climate change on human rights. In academic discussions, the concept, however, has also sparked a discussion on its benefits and challenges for the advancement of human rights, especially concerning the principles of equality and non-discrimination. This article aims at contributing to this debate from a frame-analytical perspective. In social sciences, frame-analysis is a form of discourse analysis which (...) focuses on the consequences of different concepts for legal, political, and social discussions and norms. With the example of selected UN documents on different human rights issues in the context of climate change, the article, firstly, analyzes whether and how the concept of vulnerability is defined in the documents and why it is used in the documents. Secondly, it is elaborated to which individuals and groups the concept is applied. Thirdly, it is discussed how vulnerability is conceptualized in relation to or in distinction to the concepts of inequality and discrimination. In a further section it is analyzed what narratives are mobilized by the frame of vulnerability. The article concludes that from a discourse-analytical perspective the frame of vulnerability mobilizes problematic narratives which has gendered and racialized implications for those labeled vulnerable. (shrink)

This article explores universal normative bases that could help to shape a workable legal construct that would facilitate a global use of advance directives. Although I believe that advance directives are of universal character, my primary aim in approaching this issue is to remain realistic. I will make three claims. First, I will argue that the principles of autonomy, dignity and informed consent, embodied in the Oviedo Convention and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, could arguably (...) be regarded as universal bases for the global use of advance directives. Second, I will demonstrate that, despite the apparent consensus of ethical authorities in support of their global use, it is unlikely, for the time being, that such consensus could lead to unqualified legal recognition of advance directives, because of different understandings of the nature of the international rules, meanings of autonomy and dignity which are context-specific and culture-specific, and existing imperfections that make advance directives either unworkable or hardly applicable in practice. The third claim suggests that the fact that the concept of the advance directive is not universally shared does not mean that it should not become so, but never as the only option in managing incompetent patients. A way to proceed is to prioritize work on developing higher standards in managing incompetent patients and on progressing towards the realization of universal human rights in the sphere of bioethics, by advocating a universal, legally binding international convention that would outlaw human rights violations in end-of-life decision-making. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what discourse ethics might have to contribute to increasingly urgent issues in intergenerational justice. Discourse ethics and deliberative democracy are often accused of neglecting the issue, or, even worse, of an inherently presentist bias that disregards future generations. The few forays into the topic mostly seek to extend to future people the “all affected principle” according to which only those norms are just to which all affected can rationally consent. However, this strategy (...) conflicts with core commitments of discursive ethics, as it renders agreement hypothetical and discursive participation virtual. I will attempt a supplementary route toward a connection between discourse ethics and intergenerational justice. Discourse ethics must be concerned, in what Habermas calls the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, with the emergence of rational minds capable of assessing reasons for proposed norms and policies, and such emergence is an intrinsically intergenerational affair. Symbolic reproduction links overlapping and non-overlapping generations in what has been elaborated as a chain-of-concern model, which I show to be linked to forms of indirect reciprocity among more than two parties. I conclude by discussing some consequences of this model for the all affected principle when viewed as specifically applied to future generations. (shrink)

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the do main of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scho lars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal (...) philosophy from both the Anglo American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also en courages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, aIthouogh some eidted volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of inter nationally renowned scholars. (shrink)

This article critically re-examines the application of the principle of patient autonomy within bioethics. In complex societies such as those found in North America and Europe health care professionals are increasingly confronted by patients from diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. This affects the relationship between clinicians and patients to the extent that patients' deliberations upon the proposed courses of treatment can, in various ways and to varying extents, be influenced by their ethnic, cultural, and religious commitments. The principle of (...) patient autonomy is the main normative constraint imposed upon medical treatment. Bioethicists typically appeal to the principle of patient autonomy as a means for generally attempting to resolve conflict between patients and clinicians. In recent years a number of bioethicists have responded to the condition of multiculturalism by arguing that the autonomy principle provides the basis for a common moral discourse capable of regulating the relationship between clinicians and patients in those situations where patients' beliefs and commitments do or may contradict the ethos of biomedicine. This article challenges that claim. I argue that the precise manner in which the autonomy principle is philosophically formulated within such accounts prohibits bioethicists' deployment of autonomy as a core ideal for a common moral discourse within multicultural societies. The formulation of autonomy underlying such accounts cannot be extended to simply assimilate individuals' most fundamental religious and cultural commitments and affiliations per se. I challenge the assumption that respecting prospective patients' fundamental religious and cultural commitments is necessarily always compatible with respecting their autonomy. I argue that the character of some peoples' relationship with their cultural or religious community acts to significantly constrain the possibilities for acting autonomously. The implication is clear. The autonomy principle may be presently invalidly applied in certain circumstances because the conditions for the exercise of autonomy have not been fully or even adequately satisfied. This is a controversial claim. The precise terms of my argument, while addressing the specific application of the autonomy principle within bioethics, will resonate beyond this sphere and raises questions for attempts to establish a common moral discourse upon the ideal of personal autonomy within multicultural societies generally. (shrink)

This chapter develops a contextualist account of normative language, focusing on broadly normative readings of modal verbs. The account draws on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist semantics and pragmatics, Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the discourse properties of normative language from a contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with principles of interpretation and conversation. In using normative language, interlocutors can exploit their (...) grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to manage an evolving system of norms. Discourse Contextualism provides a perspicuous framework for further philosophical theorizing about the nature of normativity, normative language, and normative judgment. Delineating these issues can help refine our understanding of the space of overall theories and motivate more fruitful ways the dialectics may proceed. Discourse Contextualism provides a linguistic basis for a more comprehensive theory of normativity and normative discourse and practice. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental debates in metaethics is whether the normative facts are mind-dependent. Yet some philosophers are skeptical that mind-dependence is a category that's significant in the way metaethicists have assumed it is. In this paper, I consider a puzzle that showcases this skepticism, explaining how it undermines the most natural reading of the mind-dependence claim. I then go on to show that no modification of this reading within a certain class can hope to solve the problem. (...) I conclude by suggesting a new way that mind-dependence should be understood: mind-dependence is ultimately a matter of how normative principles are grounded. I develop this view briefly before concluding. (shrink)

This chapter develops an account of the meaning and use of various types of legal claims, and uses this account to inform debates about the nature and normativity of law. The account draws on a general framework for implementing a contextualist theory, called 'Discourse Contextualism' (Silk 2016). The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the apparent normativity of claims of law from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, along with general principles of (...) interpretation and conversation. Though the semantics is descriptivist, it avoids Dworkin’s influential criticism of so-called “semantic theories of law,” and elucidates the nature of “theoretical disagreements” about the criteria of legal validity. The account sheds light on the social, interpersonal function of normative uses of language in legal discourse. It also gives precise expression to Hart’s and Raz’s intuitive distinctions among types of legal claims (internal/external, committed/detached), while giving them a uniform type of analysis. The proposed semantics and pragmatics of legal claims provides a fruitful framework for further theorizing about the nature and metaphysics of law, the relation between law and morality, and the apparent practical character of legal language and judgment. Discourse Contextualism provides a solid linguistic basis for a broader account of legal discourse and practice. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of a standard legal language (e.g. English) for a principled evolution of law in line with technological development. In doing so, reference is made to blockchain networks and smart contracts to emphasise the discontinuity with the liberal legal tradition when it comes to decentralisation and binary code language. Methodologically, the argument is built on the underlying relation between law, semiotics and new forms of media adding to natural language; namely: code and symbols. In what follows, (...) I will concentrate on the study of factors that explain why such approach can be fruitful for the future of law and innovation. I have three reasons for selecting this topic. The first is a more pragmatic reason, based on my current research of law as a linguistic phenomenon. Secondly, the topic does also touch the matter on binary code language, rivalrous to legal alphabetic language. Lastly, the study aims at emphasizing the pivotal role of the jurist as an interpreter in a changing society accommodating diverging realms of reality. The study is structured as follows. Firstly, a quick exam of the traits of blockchain networks would provide the contextual link to establish the arguments in support of the need of a standard legal language. Secondly, a comparison between liberal legal institutions and theory of semiotics is set to perceive their functioning and ascertain their limits in the light of todays unprecedented changes. Thirdly, a summary on blockchain networks’ legal features would constitute the thrust behind the idea of a uniform legal language. Methodologically, the argument does also establish some relations with classical laws of physics and philosophy of media. Its aim is to demonstrate how the suggested legal interpretation and semiotic-based approach can contribute to overcome existing stumbling blocks including, but not limited to, the lack of cooperation at the international level as well as the gap in State norms when it comes to innovation. In this sense, the proposed strategies do not intend to replace current advances in the legal thought. In contrast, it seeks to harmonise their results providing a methodical approach that can concur to inform a new technique to address new controversial issues. In practice, the proposed method regarding the adoption of a uniform legal language would lower transactive costs in terms of normative coordination in the matter of international cooperation and in the definition of applicable law among different legal systems. Alternatively, it might contribute to the convergence of legal systems and/or their underlying concepts. Differently put, article’s contribution can be envisaged in fostering juridical consistency with regards to different forms of languages’ coexistence. (shrink)

This article surveys four approaches to moral obligation to non-Muslims found in Islamic legal thought. The first three approaches I refer to in this article as the "revelatory-deontological," the "contractualist-constructivist" and the "consequentialist-utilitarian." The main argument of this article is that present in many of the contemporary works on the "jurisprudence of Muslim minorities" (fiqh al-aqalliyyat) is an attempt to provide an Islamic foundation for a relatively thick and rich relationship of moral obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims. This attempt takes (...) the form of a fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to political ethics in that it appeals not to juridical reasoning of the type "is x permissible and in which conditions?" but rather to Islamic ideals of what it means to live a good life, of what believing, normatively-committed Muslims want to pursue in this world, not only what they may pursue without fear of punishment. This meta-ethical approach builds on and goes beyond the first three. The force of this argument is that this fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to moral obligation to non-Muslims is novel, emergent and not found not in the writings of outright reformers but in those of conservative, "neo-classical," shari'a-minded - even Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated - Islamic scholars. What also adds to the force of this argument is that the other meta-ethical discourses, particularly of contract and utility (maslaha), already get these scholars quite far towards a doctrine of "loyal resident alienage" in non-Muslim societies. That even orthodox Islamic scholars go further shows that they have some interest in giving a theological or principled foundation to a much thicker and richer form of moral obligation to non-Muslims, a relationship which involves recognizing non-Muslims qua non-Muslims and contributing to their well-being. (shrink)

The United Nations Scientific, Education and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) expresses in its title and substance a controversial linkage of two normative systems: international human rights law and bioethics. The UDBHR has the status of what is known as a ‘non-binding’ declaration under public international law. The UDBHR’s normative foundation within bioethics (and association, for example, with virtue-based or principlist bioethical theories) is more problematic. Nonetheless, the UDBHR contains socially important (...) class='Hi'>principles of technology transfer and transnational benefit (articles 14, 15 and 21). This paper is one of the first to explore how the disciplines of bioethics and international human rights law may interact in the UDBHR to advance the policy relevance and health impact of technology transfer and transnational benefit principles. It investigates their normative ancestry in the UDBHR, as well as relevant conceptual differences between bioethics and public international law in this respect and how these may be relevant to their conceptual evolution and application. (shrink)

The consequences of restricting or not restricting the right to freedom of assembly are potentially magnified in transitional societies. Yet determining whether such consequences are indeed ‘harmful’, and whether their cost should be borne despite the harms caused, requires the elaboration of criteria which define what are valid and relevant harms. While a human rights framework can perform this task, open-textured rights standards prescribe neither the threshold of legal intervention nor the goals of transition. By extension, the rule of law—underpinned (...) by this rights discourse—is silent about whether liberal or communitarian ideals should inform the reconstruction of public space in conflicted or nascent democracies. Illustrated by analysis of legal interventions in parade disputes in Northern Ireland, this article argues that the rule of law is necessarily orientated by ethical consensus about its scope. Furthermore, this consensus operates as a restraint upon the degree of normative discontinuity permitted during transitional compromises. The article frames the ethical options in terms of three liberty-limiting principles—the argument from democracy, the argument for toleration, and the argument for recognition. Each suggests different parameters for the transitional project and for the role of law within it. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to examine the concept of "public interest" and show that, while it has no general, unchanging, descriptive meaning applicable to all policy decisions, it does have a non-arbitrary descriptive meaning which can be determined in particular cases. This meaning can be found through "reasoned discourse" which attempts to relate the anticipated effects of a policy to community values. The concept of public interest is, the author argues, neither a vacuous phrase nor a verbal device (...) useful only for propaganda purposes. The author then attempts to see whether "reason" as it appears in "reasoned discourse" mentioned above can carry the burden assigned to it. In a close examination of what "giving reasons" consists of in the absence of a hierarchy of values, the author shows that it amounts to more than an infinite logical regress. The author admits that there remains an arbitrary element in value judgments which is much smaller and capable of more precise definition than is usually thought). In situations of conflict and diversity of values among reasoning men, the dilemma is resolved by the principle of "authority." Authority itself is required to justify its decisions by giving reasons, but precisely what authority is, beyond this giving of reasons based on somewhat arbitrary values, is not examined.—S. W. (shrink)

The book defines and critically discusses the following five principles: the harm principle, legal paternalism, the offense principle, legal moralism and the dignity principle of criminalization. The book argues that all five principles raise important problems that point to rejections (or at least a rethink) of standard principles of criminalization. The book shows that one of the reasons why we should reject or revise standard principles of criminalization is that even the most plausible versions of the (...) harm principle and legal paternalism that have been offered so far are rendered redundant by general moral theories. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the other three principles (or versions thereof), the offense principle, legal moralism and the dignity principle of criminalization, can either be covered by the harm principle, thus making these principles also redundant, or be seen to have what look like other unacceptable implications (e.g. that versions of legal moralism are based on speculative and incorrect empirical assumptions or violate what is called the criminological levelling-down challenge). As such, there is reason to move beyond traditional principles of criminalization, and instead to investigate alternative principles the state should be guided by when attempting to justify which kinds of conduct should be criminalized. Moreover, this book presents and defends such a principle – the utilitarian principle of criminalization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Dialogue:The Principle of Civility in Academic DiscourseForest HansenSeveral months ago New York Times columnist David Brooks addressed the lack of civility in recent public discourse. "So... you get narcissists who believe they or members of their party possess direct access to the truth.... You get people who prefer monologues to dialogue.... You get people who... loathe their political opponents."1One might think that by contrast academia, and especially (...) academic publications, would provide a bastion of civil discourse. Alas, even academia has been infiltrated. At least it so appears to me when I read some of what has been recently published in the name of the philosophy of music education.I find that disheartening.However one defines "philosophy," it minimally entails raising questions whose answers are reasonably debatable. The key word here is "reasonably." Those who are committed to philosophical activity criticize positions they oppose by formulating arguments, giving examples, calling on accepted facts, clarifying the meaning of terms, and bringing to bear the principles of formal and informal logic. And thus they open themselves to counter-criticism of the same [End Page 198] sort. Nowhere in this enterprise is there need—or room—for invective, sarcasm, name-calling, ad hominems, or any other kind of personal abuse. One might call this The Principle of Civility in Academic Discourse.Philosophy differs in this respect from polemics. In one of its senses "polemics" means "the art or practice of disputation or controversy," and so seems a close cousin to philosophy. However, while "philosophy" traces its etymological roots to "love" and "wisdom," "polemics" is derived from "war." Polemics is a kind of verbal warfare. Typically polemicists are willing to use any tool at their disposal—even underhanded ones—to "win" the war of ideas. Polemics in this usual sense dispenses with objectivity and fairness (though it may make such a pretense). In fact, people who mount personal attacks thereby reveal their lack of philosophical tools and diminish their argument.Distinguishing philosophy from polemics does not mean that all philosophical claims are equal. Some positions are stronger than others, some weaker. Some can be dismissed relatively out of hand if they are illogical or do not square with normal experience. But even when positions are inadequate, the persons who advance the positions deserve to be treated with courtesy, respect, and collegiality.Typically, people trained in philosophy assimilate this principle as a matter of course. They have learned that over the centuries great minds have disagreed about every philosophical issue—whether the make-up of ultimate reality, the nature and sources of knowledge, the existence of god, the justification of morality. So too with what the nature of music is, what music should be taught and how, what is the purpose of music education.No one has a corner on the answers to such questions. The floor should always be open to debate—to consideration of new proposals and reconsideration of old ones. In disciplines where some matters are more or less settled (as in natural science and mathematics), such arguments disappear and new quests hope to find new settled answers. But in philosophy, more fundamentally than in any other traditional academic discipline, the discussion, the reasoned argumentation, is ongoing.Many years ago Douglas Morgan, in his essay "Must Art Tell the Truth"2 eloquently captured this spirit of philosophy:Philosophy is itself to be conceived as an invitational, dialectical activity rather than as any system of dicta. A philosopher can be thought of as [one] who, far from commanding assent with any thunderous barrage of argumentative artillery, invites you to think [about] the world or some aspect of it in a somewhat different way. "Come in," [the philosopher] says cordially, "and welcome. Sit down. Let me mix you an idea. Sip this thought, and tell me how your own experience looks. If you should find my way of construing our [End Page 199] world unappetizing or unpromising, pray show me your way. Let us once again in the good old Greek way, dia-lego, talk it through together."Finally, The Principle of Civility in Academic Discourse ought to be conveyed in our classrooms, as we foster new generations in... (shrink)

In 1894, the Institut Colonial International was founded in Brussels, with the aim to engage and promote transnational exchanges between jurists, scholars, politicians, colonial administrators and experts, comparing different colonial experiences. As the Institut Colonial International’s founders had hoped, its publications promoted legal debates, discussions and the prospects of specific legislation, decrees or norms to be adapted and used in entirely different colonial systems. This paper will show that the Institut Colonial International encouraged the exchange of ideas about the various (...) colonial experiences in order to create common and universal principles. International law and domestic law, or national law concerning land register systems and land law were part of the colonial discourse as it endeavoured to create and adopt universal principles of law, trying to establish a platform of common dialogue, with common premises, concerning different colonies, different colonial experiences and ultimately different cultural, social and political contexts. (shrink)

In the third and fourth parts of the book, Günther shows--in debate with Hare, Dworkin, and others--how argumentation on the appropriate application of norms and principles in morality and law is possible.

The article of Volodymyr Moroz ―Normative character of the principles of Social doctrine of Catholic Church: an evolutional way of formation - is devoted to the analysis of Catholic Church’s Teaching over the human dignity. Author explores also the process of settling of the principles of common good, subsidiarity and solidarity in the Teaching of Catholic Church. Mentioned principles are investigated in the case of orientation to provide a reverence to transcendent human dignity. Author sums up (...) that all three principles have normative character. That is to say the principles are called to guarantee certain coordination between the social reality and the verities, which were declared by the Social doctrine of the Church. (shrink)