This paper is divided into four sections. -/- The first section contains an informal characterization of what may, for the purposes of this discussion, be referred to as the standard interpretation of theological statements. -/- Then, in the second section, I mention two challenges to the commonsense view that theological statements have cognitive content: the quote “falsifiability challenge” and the “ translatability challenge”. -/- Both of these challenges involve an appeal to an empiricist criterion of cognitive content, but I contend (...) that they are nonetheless very different arguments and that clarity about the fundamental issues involved in the question of theology and verificationism cannot be achieved unless these two lines are argument are carefully distinguished. -/- The third section is concerned with the question of the possibility of an empiricist criterion of cognitive significance. The underlying purpose of the discussion will be to arrive derive at an evaluation of the commonly advanced claim that verificationist objections to the meaningfulness of theological language can be refuted by simply arguing that is not possible to formulate an adequate confirmability criterion of cognitive significance. -/- I then conclude by suggesting some responses that seem more promising. (shrink)

The verification theory of meaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful and also what kind of abstract object the meaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by Rudolph Carnap, one of the theory's most prominent defenders: If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. [...] thus the meaning of a sentence is in (...) a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. [4: 420] In short, the verification theory of meaning claims that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they (...) smack of the totalitarian linguistic tactics of the Party in Orwell’s 1984 and b) because they dehumanize the opposition by portraying them as mere spouters of gibberish; 2) that they are profoundly illiberal since if true, they would undermine Mill’s arguments for free speech; 3) that such theories are prone to self-contradiction, pragmatic and otherwise; 4) that they often turn against their creators including what they were meant to exclude and excluding what they were meant to include; 5) that such theories are susceptible to a modus tollens pioneered by Richard Price in his Review Concerning the Principle Questions of Morals(1758); and 6) that such theories are prima facie false since they fail to ‘predict’ the data that is it their business to explain (or, in the case of criteria, fail to capture the concept that they allegedly represent). The butcher’s bill is quite considerable: some of Hobbes, a fair bit of Locke, half of Berkeley, large chunks of Hume, Russell's Theory of Types, verificationism in its positivist and Dummettian variants, much of pragmatism and most of Wittgenstein - all these have to be sacrificed if we are to save our souls as philosophic liberals. (shrink)

Anti-realism was first introduced by Michael Dummett. He famously preferred to reduce issues about common sense metaphysics to issues about our statements and especially assertions about a certain sort of subject matters, such as those about the past, the physical world, and so on. On the basis of his view of metaphysical problems, he believes that we should initially choose an appropriate model of meaning and a proper conception of the notion of truth applicable to such linguistic statements. By (...) doing so, the dispute between realism and anti-realism can be rendered to a disagreement on the kind of meaning such statements may have. After criticizing the realist view, he goes on to claim that without having proper evidence, we cannot judge about the truth-value of our linguistic statements. To understand a sentence, according to Dummett, is to have the capacity of recognizing what would be counted as evidence for or against its truth. Therefore, an anti-realist believes that there can be no guarantee for every sentence to be true, independently of our epistemic capabilities and other relevant abilities. An advocate of realism, by contrast, admits the principle of bivalence and believes that all sentences are either true or false in terms of the reality which exists independently of us. In this essay, after introducing Dummett’s anti-realist view and his criticisms of realism, I am going to discuss the relationship between his desired theory of meaning and his view of anti-realism. (shrink)

This volume develops a theory of meaning and a semantics for both mathematical and empirical sentences inspired to Chomsky’s internalism, namely to a view of semantics as the study of the relations of language not with external reality but with internal, or mental, reality. In the first part a theoretical notion of justification for a sentence A is defined, by induction on the complexity of A; intuitively, justifications are conceived as cognitive states of a particular kind. The main source (...) of inspiration for this part is Heyting’s explanation of the intuitionistic meaning of logical constants. In the second part the theory is applied to the solution of several foundational problems in the theory of meaning and epistemology, such as Frege’s puzzle, Mates’ puzzle about synonymy, the paradox of analysis, Kripke’s puzzle about belief, the de re/de dicto distinction, the specific/non-specific distinction, Gettier’s problems, the paradox of knowability, and the characterization of truth. On a more general philosophical level, throughout the book the author develops a tight critique of the neo-verificationism of Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf, and defends a mentalist interpretation of intuitionism. (shrink)

What sense, if any, does it make to speak of God? This question, of such vital importance to religious commitment, occupies an important place in discussion among Anglo-American philosophers of religion whose orientation is logical analysis. ‘Metatheological scepticism’ is the view that denies the intelligibility of religious discourse, derived from a theory of meaning which holds that a sentence has cognitive significance only if it makes a statement that is conclusively verifiable on empirical grounds. Dr Heimbeck’s argument for the (...) cognitive nature of religious discourse is twofold. First, he shows that such discourse can qualify as cognitively significant without having to satisfy the verification requirement. Secondly, he shows that it does in fact satisfy such a requirement because it is firmly rooted in the empirical realm. Originally published in 1969, this book, for teachers and students of philosophy of religion, is both easily comprehensible and highly readable, although the discussion of philosophical and theological points is conducted at an advanced level. (shrink)

What sense, if any, does it make to speak of God? This question, of such vital importance to religious commitment, occupies an important place in discussion among Anglo-American philosophers of religion whose orientation is logical analysis. ‘Metatheological scepticism’ is the view that denies the intelligibility of religious discourse, derived from a theory of meaning which holds that a sentence has cognitive significance only if it makes a statement that is conclusively verifiable on empirical grounds. Dr Heimbeck’s argument for the (...) cognitive nature of religious discourse is twofold. First, he shows that such discourse can qualify as cognitively significant without having to satisfy the verification requirement. Secondly, he shows that it does in fact satisfy such a requirement because it is firmly rooted in the empirical realm. Originally published in 1969, this book, for teachers and students of philosophy of religion, is both easily comprehensible and highly readable, although the discussion of philosophical and theological points is conducted at an advanced level. (shrink)

Questioning some of the repetitive and narrow theoretical writings on rights, a group of leading intellectuals examine human rights from philosophical, theological, historical, literary and political perspectives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:356 BOOK REVIEWS The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. By MICHAEL DUMMETT; The William James Lectures, 1976. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. xi + 355. $34.95 (cloth). Michael Dummett, who is Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford, represents an influential force in contemporary analytical philosophy. In the tradition of Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Dum· mett has contributed significant works in philosophy of language (theory of meaning) (...) and intuitionistic logic as well as in current metaphysics, liberated from the neopositivistic imprisonment. Dummett's newest book has a self-explanatory title and is based on the William James Lectures which he delivered at Harvard University in 1976. As he explains in his Preface (1989), the publication of these lectures, however delayed and edited, should show the importance of the theory of meaning " for its more glamorous relative, metaphysics." Dummett is known as the leading proponent of "anti-realism "-a position endorsed, for instance, by Hilary Putnam-and the book under review amply demonstrates his views on this current controversial issue. Various " anti-realists," Dummett contends, share their rejection of the prin· ciple of bivalence (according to which every proposition is determinately either true or false) and of the related law of the excluded middle. Such rejections require the acceptance of " stricter canons of valid deductive reasoning" (p. 11), which, in turn, demand tightened and clarified concepts of meaning and truth or, in Wittgenstein's phrase, "a clear view of the working of our language." (p. 13). What one needs, in short, is a good theory of meaning which will " determine the correct logic " of a language and also settle various metaphysical controversies with regard to the nature of physical reality, time, mind, mathematics, etc. Dummett understands such theory of meaning as the key part of the philosophy of thought that has been so much stimulated by Frege's theory of sense and reference. Dummett's methodology de· mands therefore the following order: a good theory of meaning leading to " correct " logic, which in turn helps to settle metaphysical controversies. He aspires to show " how the choice between different logics arises at the level of the theory of meaning" (p. 18) and makes no apologies for using in this process a highly technical conceptual apparatus of mathematical logic. By his own admission, Dummett does not want to raise classical metaphysical questions of God, free will, and immortality, but "others almost equally profound" yet requiring a "painfully slow pace of advance" (p. 19). In spite of such declarations Dummett touches upon the problem of BOOK REVIEWS 357 God's omniscience: if, determinately, one of two possibilities holds, then God must know which of the two possibilities it is. Yet this example is utilized by Dummett not because of its theological impact (which he seems to take for granted) hut for the service it can provide in clarifying the problem of hivalence. At the very end of the last chapter, entitled ".Realism and the Theory of Meaning," Dummett concludes that the premise which expresses God's omniscience does not entail that God knows whether any given proposition is true or false nor does such a premise entail that the proposition is either true or false. Allegedly, an additional premise is needed asserting the truth or the falsehood of the proposition in question (whichever the case) " in order to deduce from his omniscience that he knows, in the sense stated, whether it is true or false" (p. 351). This anti-realistic position is thus based on the rejection of classical, two-valued logic and on the endorsement of intuitionistic logic, developed by the Dutch mathematician Brouwer and his followers, including Dummett himself (see his Elements of Intuitwnism, published in 1977 by Oxford Clarendon Press). According to this logic, if a statement is true only if we are able to prove it (to provide or construct evidence for it, etc.), then " there is no ground to assume every statement to he either true or false" (p. 9). Dummett claims that intuitionistic logic is supported by a verificationist meaningtheory which gets a large share of his attention. In the verificationist theory of meaning, " the meaning of a statement is determined by what we acknowledge as grounds... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND THE INTERPRE.TATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE FREDERICK SONTAG Pomona OoUego Olaremont, Oalifornia " It is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to the Revolution, without treating insurrection as an art." Lenin, paraphrasing Karl Marx WHENEVER Liberation Theology ·and its contributions to theologicail discussion al'e ·concerned, no aspect has been more controversirul than its association with violence. There is no question that Marxism/Leninism depends on the (...) use of violence. But all liberation theories must take violence into consideration. On the one hand, the ties that hold humans in bondage may be so strong that only violent means ca.n be effective to release us. On the other hand, it is well known that violenre often breeds its own do·wnfall and results in ten·or more often than peace. Since the beginning of time, probably every prrogram seeking to release human beings to their furhl. potential has had to consider the use of violence to achieve its ends, even while awal'e of its potential dangers. Yet this issue takes on a new urgency in our time because of two s[gnificant changes in our situation: (I) Most communist proposals which have resulted in world~wide change have militantly asserted the necessity to use force if we are to be set free; (2) In recent times Liberati.on Theofogy has been espoused by some Christian theologians even while the adoption of pacifism or the abhorrence of violence by most Christian groups is well known. The question of religion's intrusion into the politicaiJ. reailm is problem 271 FREDERICK SONTAG enough, but add to this the question of the use of violence and the discussion becomes very heated indeed. Although many traditions have well-developed positions regarding violence and non-violence, Christianity will be our frame of reference in discussing these issues, since Liberation Theology has, in fact, developed in a Christian context. First of all we havie to ask whether the use of violence to ruchieve politicaJ ends is a;lways ruled out or whether some circumstances might justify it as an ruooeptable tool for Christian use. Where Christianity is concerned, it is always instructive to begin by looking at the life and work of Jesus. Trruditionally, Jesus is seen as rejecting the use of violence and as having suffered vioilence himself. Can anything so change this image as to make violence acceptable on Christian grounds? In ·considering this, we first have to note that Jesus himself lived under po1itiool oppression. We must oons~der the Jewish expectations for the ' Messiah ' and how this role came to be projecbed onto Jesus; their hope for release from Roman oppressors was what plruced mroh high political expectations on Jesus. Christians recognized Jesus as a' Messiah', even though he obvious1ly did not fulfill the role of a political liberato·r. Afiter his death and for centuries fater, Jewish political fortunes went from bad to worse. The people's expectations of gaining release by the hand of Jesus did not result in a change in their political fortunes. Christians diid enter into politics and governments in!Later years, and some welcome changes can be attributed to Christian influence. But still, none of these improvements can be directly attributed to Jesus' efforts in his own fileis a prime :requfoement for success. We 'are aware of the Marxist/Leninist insistency on toeing the line on dogma, for conformity to doctrine. But can the Christian,aiccept the uniformity of interpretation which effective acbion seems to require? If the Christian liberation theofogian argues that aU Christians cannot be required to aiocept some one program of wction, he or she is limited by the division that plurality brings. On the other LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL VIOL]j]NCE '277 hand, the Christian revotutionary activist should not be told that his program is " unchristian " as judged by some singular, authoritative standard. Of course, the chief complication in saying this lies with a hieI"archical church which includes authorities to formulate doctrine. The Christian who wants to act differently from what the srbructure of such a chureh allows will either: (1) have to find a way to act independently and still stay within that community; or (2) convince... (shrink)

The analogies between religious and secular juridical arguments interest political theorists because they suggest a hidden link between religion and politics. However, merely describing analogies does not show that the link is significant. Why are there such analogies? The question matters because answering is a prerequisite for determining whether there can be a neutral political background to religion. This paper argues that there are such analogies because arguments in theology and arguments in the juridical theory of the state share (...) a common structure. This structure is such that the meaning of some concepts in the theory of the state, like political order and sovereignty, cannot be fully understood without reference to theological concepts. This thesis – political theology – has become associated with Carl Schmitt, but the argument in this paper differs importantly from his. Unlike Schmitt, this paper claims that in the contemporary state political theology can be superseded. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:160 BOOK REVIEWS Theology and the Dialectics of History. By ROBERT M. DORAN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. Pp. xvi + 732. Can. $95.00 (hardcover) ; Can. $45.00 (paper). This work aims to explain, extend, complement, and employ the philosophical and theological writings of Bernard Lonergan. The University of Toronto Press has recently begun publishing Lonergan's Collected Works, a series projected to 22 volumes; Doran's book is (...) the first in a related series of monographs planned by the same publisher. The book consists of an introduction plus 21 chapters, with the chapters grouped into five main sections: (1) Basic Terms and Relations; (2) Personal Values and the Dialectic of the Subject; (3) Social Values and the Dialectic of Community; (4) Cultural Values and the Dialectic of Culture; and (5) Hermeneutics and the Ontology of Meaning. Doran's fundamental argument is that careful phenomenological analysis brings to light a series of utterly basic and pre-voluntary structural tensions in the concrete life processes of human individuals in community. These tensions may be characterized generically as the resultants of two contrasting human tendencies, the tendency toward limitation and the tendency toward transcendence. At the level of the individual person as such, at the level of the culture, and at the level of the society, these structural tensions constitute occasions of lifeshaping decision for human agents, occasions of unavoidable choice among what in fact are alternative basic personal, cultural, and social values. For at each level there is the " dialectical option" of living in such a way as to do justice to both poles of the tension, or of reinforcing only the tendency toward limitation, or of reinforcing only the tendency toward transcendence. Drawing upon Lonergan's studies of personal conversion in the intellectual, moral, and religious realms, and complementing them with his own extensive study of personal conversion in the psychic realm, Doran goes on to argue that the constructive option at every level is that of reinforcing both the tendency toward limitation and the tendency toward transcendence. To favor either tendency alone is ultimately at odds with individual, cultural, and/or social well-being. This conclusion, in turn, provides the basis from which Doran proceeds in elaborating anticipatory or " heuristic " categories for a normative theory of history-general categories for discriminating between progress and decline in the reciprocal relations among individual lives, cultural ideals, and social structures. Because at its most fundamental level it expressly addresses the issue of religious conversion, this heuristic theory of history is a heuristic theology of history. More- BOOK REVIEWS 161 over, because academic inquiry is one of the human activities it anticipates, this heuristic theology of history stands as the potential framework of fully integrated interdisciplinary studies, a foundational framework clearly distinguishing and relating theological studies, human scientific and scholarly studies, and the natural sciences. I see four main reasons why this hook is noteworthy. First, the significance of thoroughly and accurately explaining someone else's work is proportionate to the significance of that other person's work in the first place. But Lonergan's studies of human knowing, deciding, and loving, of bias and conversion, and of social progress, decline, and healing are coming to be widely recognized as the work of a seminal thinker. Doran's account of this work is lucid, detailed, and nuanced. Second, Doran extends Lonergan's work itself, making explicit certain important points that Lonergan merely implies and completing certain fundamental analyses that Lonergan does not bring fully to term. Especially significant in this regard are Doran's treatments of such themes as " the situation" as a theological source; the notion of dialectic ; the apprehension of value; the fivefold scale of values; understanding religious doctrines in terms of understanding historical process ; and the notion of cosmopolis. Third, the hook goes beyond Lonergan's own studies in many important respects, complementing Lonergan's findings with brilliant, profound, and far-reaching conclusions by Doran himself. Among the most notable of these original conclusions are those regarding the relationship of feelings, symbols, and values (a topic on which Doran's previous writings have already earned him an extensive following) ; psychic conversion; a:ffectivity, meaning, and praxis; the dialectic of... (shrink)

The economic theory of the consumer, which assumes individual satisfaction as its goal and individual freedom to pursue satisfaction as its sine qua non, has become an important ideological element in political economy. Some have argued that the political dimension of economics has evolved into a kind of "secular theology" that legitimates free market capitalism, which has become a kind of "religion" in the United States [Nelson: 1991, Reaching for Heaven on Earth: The Theological Meaning of Economics. ; (...) 2001, Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond ; Thurow: 1983, Dangerous Currents: The State of Economics ; Milbank: 1990, Theology and Social Theory, Beyond Secular Reason ]. Consumer theory in its ideological form provides an important base for this religion and is no longer merely a positive framework for understanding consumer choice or estimating market demand. The paper explores the view of the human being, the "anthropology," that is implicit in the economic theory of the consumer and compares its "theological" implications with the corresponding theological anthropologies in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The paper outlines the assumptions of consumer theory and then focuses on three aspects of the theory from a critical theological perspective: the individual in community, property ownership, and human destiny. The principal conclusion is that consumer theory, viewed from this perspective, leads to a reductionist and existentially harmful view of human beings. The maximization of individual satisfaction raises genuine ethical issues when viewed as a political and religious value. The paper argues that the issues could be ameliorated if economists would include more explicit treatment of a social dimension and ethical alternatives in consumer theory and if theologians would give greater attention to economic theory. (shrink)

The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.

We have seen that the theory of the evolution of the universe is very remote from being matter of absolute knowledge as its popular presentation today would have us believe. Moreover, it is based on a certain aspect of reality, namely, that of science, which cannot pretend to be the only one possible and thus to exclude the religious aspect of the world as a creation by God. The same is true regarding the evolutionary theories of life by Eigen (...) or Vollmert, both being based on polymeric chemistry. If, therefore, Vollmert confesses, as already quoted, that he is not afraid to accept a creating God as an alternative to Darwinism, so in this respect he speaks despite everything as a believer and not as a scientist. By no means do I deny that the scientific results of Vollmert which seem to reveal the mystery of life to us can strengthen our faith — but never can faith be based on it. Faith springs from another source.Despite that, we can say today that the situation has changed principally, because both the philosophy of science and the discussions of the theories of evolution have shaken that kind of naive belief in science which in contrast to former times has turned theology into the ancilla, the maid of science.On the other hand, it would be a great misunderstanding to assume that now we can simply turn the tables. The criticism which I have partly put forward against the modern theories of evolution cannot obscure the numerous discoveries of the highest importance which are connected with them. These discoveries have provided us with an immensely deepened knowledge both of the physical conditions of the universe and of the chemical foundations of life. To conclude, I want to quote an American scientist who said: “I am as confused as before — but on a much higher level.” And this, I think, is the best summary of the present situation. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of human imagination from the perspective of 'niche construction' in the wider discussion about 'what makes us human' and what it means to be a 'self', specifically for the Christian faith and for theology. In the article, a brief review of human origins and human evolution demonstrates the path and substantive impact of changes in behaviour, life histories and bodies in our human ancestors and us as humans ourselves. In the interactive process of niche (...) construction, potentially changeable natural environments were, and are, acting continuously on variation in the gene pools of populations, and in this way gene pools were modified over generations. It is argued that a distinctively human imagination is part of the explanation for human evolutionary success and can be seen as one of the structurally significant aspects of the transition from earlier members of the genus Homo to ourselves as we are today. There is thus a naturalness to human imagination, even to religious imagination, that facilitates engagement with the world that is truly distinct. This provides fruitful addition to the toolkit of inquiry for both evolutionary scientists and interdisciplinary theologians interested in reconstructing the long, winding historical path to humanity. (shrink)

Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a (...) principle central to Rumfitt's first argument, ‘It is assertible that if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that ’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a plaidoyer for bilateralists to adopt this logic. (shrink)

The economic theory of the consumer, which assumes individual satisfaction as its goal and individual freedom to pursue satisfaction as its sine qua non, has become an important ideological element in political economy. Some have argued that the political dimension of economics has evolved into a kind of “secular theology” that legitimates free market capitalism, which has become a kind of “religion” in the United States [Nelson: 1991, Reaching for Heaven on Earth: The Theological Meaning of Economics. (Rowman (...) & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Savage, Maryland); 2001, Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania); Thurow: 1983, Dangerous Currents: The State of Economics (Random House, New York); Milbank: 1990, Theology and Social Theory, Beyond Secular Reason (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts)]. Consumer theory in its ideological form provides an important base for this religion and is no longer merely a positive framework for understanding consumer choice or estimating market demand. The paper explores the view of the human being, the “anthropology,” that is implicit in the economic theory of the consumer and compares its “theological” implications with the corresponding theological anthropologies in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The paper outlines the assumptions of consumer theory and then focuses on three aspects of the theory from a critical theological perspective: the individual in community, property ownership, and human destiny (or “eschatology” in theological terminology). The principal conclusion is that consumer theory, viewed from this perspective, leads to a reductionist and existentially harmful view of human beings. The maximization of individual satisfaction raises genuine ethical issues when viewed as a political and religious value. The paper argues that the issues could be ameliorated if economists would include more explicit treatment of a social dimension and ethical alternatives in consumer theory and if theologians would give greater attention to economic theory. (shrink)

Mackie outlines Locke's representationalist theory. He analyses the relation between representationalism and the picture theory of ideas. The theory's relation to the veil of perception doctrine is also critically examined. Mackie criticizes the verificationist theory of meaning and instead argues that ideas should be understood as intentional objects. Mackie introduces and defends a version of realism, which he calls ‘common‐sense realism’.

Seventeenth century scholastics had a rich debate about the ontological status and nature of lacks, negations, and privations. Realists in this debate posit irreducible negative entities responsible for the non-existence of positive entities. One of the first scholastics to develop a realist position on negative entities was Thomas Compton Carleton. In this paper I explain Carleton's theory of negative entities, including what it is for something to be negative, how negative entities are individuated, whether they are abstract or concrete, and (...) how they affect their subjects. I argue that for Carleton, negative entities are conceived as spatially extended simples that affect their subjects by means of spatial overlap. I also show how Carleton responds to some theological worries about his realism concerning negative entities. (shrink)

"The thought of Immanuel Kant has had incalculable - and, many would say, negative - impact on the modern estimation of religion, religious belief, and religious knowledge. Yet, Davidovich argues in the strikingly original interpretation, the chief lines and import of Kant's work on religion have been crippingly misunderstood." "Davidovich radically refigures Kant scholarship by focusing decisively on his Third Critique, long thought his weakest, where she finds Kant confronting the results of his strong distinction between theoretical and practical reason. (...) There he attempts a comprehensive theory of reflective judgment, in which contemplative thought of a moral designer of the universe is a principle that overcomes the bifurcation of scientific (rational) and moral (practical) activities." "Moreover, this specifically religious consciousness, which harmonizes the lawfulness of nature with the purposiveness of freedom, is further developed, Davidovich maintains, by Rudolf Otto's and Paul Tillich's influential theories of religion. Today it can safeguard the status of religion and a normative science of religion." "Davidovich's work is an outstanding contribution, breaking new ground in both Kantian scholarship and the theory of religion."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

C. S. Peirce claimed that the pragmatic method of clarifying ideas is "nothing but a particular application of an older logical rule, 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'"1 While Jesus spoke about discriminating between true and false religious teachers, Peirce was concerned with clarifying our intellectual concepts. Peirce's pragmatism asserts that we clearly understand the meaning of a concept if we can state the potentially practical and empirical consequences that would follow from the truth of a proposition involving (...) that concept. Robert C. Neville's semiotic and pragmatic theory of religious truth unites Jesus's and Peirce's concerns, proposing that religious truth consists in an adaptedness or fit between... (shrink)

In late September 1838, Darwin read Malthus's Essay on Population, which left him with “a theory by which to work.”115 Yet he waited some twenty years to publish his discovery in the Origin of Species. Those interested in the fine grain of Darwin's development have been curious about this delay. One recent explanation has his hand stayed by fear of reaction to the materialist implications of linking man with animals. “Darwin sensed,” according to Howard Gruber, “that some would object to (...) seeing rudiments of human mentality in animals, while others would recoil at the idea of remnants of animality in man.”116 With this link closed, Darwin hung the materialist chain around his own neck, where it rested most uncomfortably. Stephen Gould, supporting Gruber's argument, finds evidence for this reconstruction in Darwin's M and N notebooks, whichinclude many statements showing that he espoused but feared to expose something he perceived as far more heretical than evolution itself: philosophical materialism-the postulate that matter is the stuff of all existence and that all mental and spiritual phenomena are its by-products. No notion could be more upsetting to the deepest traditions of Western thought than the statement that mind-however complex and powerful-is simply a product of brain.117The proferred hypothesis suggests, then, that Darwin was acutely sensible of the social consequences of equating men with animals and therefore mind with brian, and that he thus shied from publically revealing his views until the intellectual climate became more tolerant.The history I have examined makes this hypothesis implausible. Even if Darwin warily explored the implications of his emerging theory in his notebooks, his subsequent study of Fleming, Wells, Brougham, and Kirby should have quieted any trepidation. If these natural theologians did not flinch at seeing human reason prefigured in the mind of a worm, should Darwin have? Moreover, he recognized in his M notebook that the thesis of evolutionary continuity between men and animals did not require an explicit avowal of his conviction that brain was the agent of thought.118 And in any case, his materialism was of a rather benign sort; at least he so expressed it in an annotation in Abercrombie's Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers (1838): “By materialism I mean, merely the intimate connection of thought with form of brain — like kind of attraction with nature of element.”119 This belief would have held little terror for British intellectuals, who were quite familiar — some even comfortable-with Locke's anti-Cartesian argument that there was nothing contradictory in supposing God could make matter to think.120 Finally, even if the intellectual atmosphere of early nineteenth-century Britain were inhospitable to Darwin's brand of materialism, there is little reason to believe he breathed a different air at mid-century while preparing his manuscript.That Darwin should not have feared suspicions of materialism, of course, does not mean that he did not. But I think there were other, more persistent sources of anxiety that kept him from rushing to publish: namely, the several conceptual obstacles he had to overcome if his theory of evolution by natural selection were to be made scientifically acceptable. Prominent among these were the problems surrounding his changing notions of instinct.The inertia of his older ideas about instinct at first made it hard for Darwin to gauge how far the theory of natural selection might be applied to behavior. By the early 1840s he finally felt ready to meet the challenge of the natural theologians by providing a naturalistic explanation for the wonderful instincts of animals. In his “Essays” of 1842 and 1844 one sort of instinct is, however, not considered-that of neuter insects. Yet Darwin seems to have appreciated the difficulties such instincts entailed at least by 1843, when he read Kirby and Spence. He simply required time to work out a solution to a problem he initially perceived as “fatal to my whole theory.” Even while writing the “Species Book” in the summer of 1857, he was still juggling several possible solutions compatible with natural selection. It was only a short time before he actually turned to work on the Origin of Species that he appears to have settled on a single explanation for the difficulties posed by the instincts of worker bees and ants. The force of his theory of community selection snapped the last critical support of the creationist hypothesis and, conveniently enough, also fractured the generalized Lamarckian account of the evolution of behavior. These results were worth waiting for. (shrink)

It should be clear by now the extent to which many features of Thorpe's interpretation of animal behavior and of the animal mind rested, at bottom, not simply on conventional scientific proofs but on interpretive inferences, which in turn rested on a willingress to make extensions of human experience to animals. This, in turn, rested on his view of evolution and his view of reality. And these were governed by his natural theology, which was the fundamental stratum of his (...) intellectual experience.Contrary to the scientific ethos, which restricts theory choice to scientific issues alone, Thorpe's career suggests that the actual reasons for theory choice among scientists often are not limited to science, but are multiple and may sometimes be difficult to discover. It is largely because Thorpe took a public part in the natural theology enterprise that we can know something about his religious beliefs and so can see their probable influence on his scientific decisions. Similar beliefs of other scientists are sometimes harder to get at. Most may be practically beyond discovery, for the ethos of science has discouraged public professions of personal belief in relation to scientific work.101 Yet does it seem plausible that, for example, the restriction of self-consciousness to humans by some scientists is a purely scientific decision?102 Surely not, any more than that the strong influence of natural theology on Thorpe's thought means that he was not a good scientist. His natural theology may have led him into incautious enthusiasms regarding the animal mind — such as the potential if unrealizable linguistic ability of chimpanzees — through a bias in favor of the continuity of emergents in a progressive evolutionary system, just as it led him to advocate animal consciousness long before the recent upsurge of interest, but the scientific integrity of his work overall is unimpeachable. And yet, that work is not comprehensible historically as science alone. Personal philosophy must not be discounted in writing the history of recent science. This somewhat obvious conclusion (obvious to historians of science) needs emphasis, for we are still prone to think that the sciences of our own time provide their own internal dynamic that is in itself sufficient to account for their content and development. (shrink)

Methexiology is not a particular theory, but rather a general philosophical orientation. Therefore, in Methexiology: Philosophical Theology and Theological Philosophy for the Deification of Humanity, Nicolas Laos elucidates the significance of methexiology for the study of ontology, epistemology, ethics, philosophical psychology, theory of justice, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. Laos argues that, faced with the modern and the postmodern crises of meaning, we need a new myth, a new spiritual formula, for the resacralization of humanity and (...) the cosmos, without restoring defunct totems, without using tales as "cheap" substitutes for the lack of a life-giving myth, and without negating history. In his Methexiology, Laos studies the "genealogy" of the modern and the postmodern crises of meaning, and, based on his new interpretation of classical Greek philosophy and Hesychasm, proposes methexiology as a way of overcoming the crises of meaning and as a way of resacralizing humanity and the cosmos through a new metaphysically grounded humanism. (shrink)

The article begins by distinguishing a number of theses which, in the past, have sometimes been lumped together under the heading of 'anti-realism'. One of the theses is that there is something wrong with truth-conditional theories of meaning (what a truth-conditional theory of meaning is a matter discussed at some length), another is what I take to be the central thesis of anti-realism, that all truths are knowable. Several writers on the subject, such as Wright and Prawitz, (...) have defended the latter thesis while jettisoning the former. I argue that this position is exactly the wrong way around. Given the 'meaning is use' principle, which is also called the 'manifestation requirement', a very powerful case can be made that true theory of meaning cannot be truth-conditional. But I argue that, given the current state of our logical knowledge, there is no good reason for concluding from this that a true theory of meaning must be of the 'verificationist' type, as Dummett seems to think, and still less for thinking that anti-realism follows. I end by examining theories of meaning against Dummett's criticisms. (shrink)

In the perspective of Hasan Hanafi, the renewal of Islamic thought in the Arab world must produce a new concept of theology and present a cultural revolution. A new theology must be developed through a progressive life perspective rooted in liberation and social justice. It is intended to free Arab–Islamic society from regression and fragmentation, producing a society that is just, prosperous, and civilized. The renewal of Islamic thought must be progressive to ensure it can produce a cultural (...) revolution that can create a populistic social and ideological structure in Arab life, thereby ensuring that the faithful are intelligent, modern, and have a high level of social solidarity. This study is guided by the theory of cultural intensification, which emphasizes that the relations between individuals and society are rooted in sociological, psychological, and theological challenges, and holds that social and divine laws are intended to promote a personal/collective emotional involvement in social life. The analysis emphasizes the relationship between Hasan Hanafi, as an individual, with general Arab society, with a focus on his understanding of social challenges, the psychological condition of Arab society, and classical theology. This study indicates that the Arab–Islamic world requires a new theology, one that is anthropocentric, populistic, and transformative, which remains grounded and oriented towards the realization of prosperity and social justice. Cultural revolution, meanwhile, offers a liberational ideology for the subjugated as well as legitimization for every social struggle. It also holds that no entity that exists on its own, without any humanitarian context, has meaning; there is only a correlational truth connecting objective reality and universal human values. As such, new theology—in conjunction with cultural revolution—can radically transform the orientation of Arab–Islamic thought from static, passive, and traditional to progressive and oppositional. In doing so, it can offer liberation and social justice.Contribution: This article provides intelectual framework to dissect Hasan Hanafi’s new theological ideas by using cultural perspective, particularly cultural intensification theory, as well as work praxis in effort to build democratic, egalitarian, just, equality before the law, and uphold human rights of Muslim society. (shrink)

How does a biblical narrative shape the life and action of its readers ? This question is receiving a wide interest in contemporary theology. Reading the 'Bible as literature' has provided a renewed interest in the creation of meaning in biblical narrative. Moreover, there is a current of narrative theology and ethics, which views human life and action as a form of narrative. narrative is approached through the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. The narrative theory of this hermeneutic (...) philosopher offers the means for comprehending the formative force of narrative, as well as the limits of narrative figuration. Ricoeur's interest in the relation between narrative and ethics and his view of the tensions between text and reader are applied to an interpretation of the biblical Joseph narrative from Genesis. The results of this interpretation are used to treat problems of narrative ethics and narrative theology. similarities between biblical narrative and the narrative of one's life, a narrative does not answer all problems for its readers. As a story of reconciliation and providence the Joseph narrative makes a strigent appeal of transformation to its readers. It is up to the reader to answer this call by reading for good. (shrink)

The problem of human freedom have been addressed by al-Mutakallimūn (Islamic theologians) in the context of human acts and discussed from the point of view its relation with the will and other elements. At this point, whether the human has will and power in his own act, the limits of his will and power, the role of human in the act and his responsibilities have prompted to different debates. The theory of tawlīd put forward by Mu‘tazila is very crucial in (...) terms of determining the scope and limits of the freedom of human in acts. Mu‘tazila’s tawlīd theory defenses based on two important reasons. The first is to present the nature and limits of the acts that man did them outside himself. The other is to explain the relationship of human with such acts with regards to moral responsibility. Because both issues are very important in the principle of justice of Mu‘tazila. The effort to put the cause-effect relationship of human with his acts in terms of tawhīd and justice on the rational and moral ground is the reason for emergence of the theory. In this respect, the purpose of this theory which enables establishing a causality relationship between the human act and nature is aimed at the justification of freedom and responsibility between agent (fā‘il) and act.In this study, firstly, the definition of the concept of tawlīd and its meaning area have been presented and tackled the discussions about the agent of indirect acts. And then it has been discoursed upon the criticisms of Ahl al-Sunna about the subject of tawlīd. The subject has been outlined in the context of the intellectual discussion between Ahl al-Sunna and Mu‘tazila which constitute the dominant part of theological dispute tradition. In this respect, the main purpose of the study is to reveal how the limits of indirect actions belonging to human by force of freedom and moral responsibility are drawn and understood.Although they did not have a uniform thought about the topic, Mu‘tazila theologians who accepted semi-determinism in the theory of tawlīd acknowledged the existence of natures in the substances. Those who admitted the reason as a means of the act did not approve this. By accepting the continuity of the accidents in the acts, they twisted together the voluntary acts and the natural acts, and accepted that directly acts were realized through the human will and the other according to the principle of necessity. According to Mu‘tazila, causes are only means. Hence, the act emerging as a result of the means is the act of the agent who used this means to reach the result, not the means. Therefore, man is the agent of engendered acts and responsible for all kinds of acts that arise as a reflection of the will and their consequences. While Ahl al-Sunna has directly associated the action of man and all its consequences with the power of Allah, Mu‘tazila has based these actions on the power of man, which Allah has created in man and has been the source of the acts. Contrary to Mu‘tazila, the continuance of power which are not a constant accident is not possible for a second act from the point of Ahl al-Sunna since they have accepted the idea that the accidents will not be continuous. In this respect, according to Ahl al-Sunna, there is no compulsory relationship between the agent that caused the formation of the acts and the result supervening from them. They did not accept the idea of tawlīd, which its meaning is that accident gives birth to accident, because it would oblige the relationship between cause and effect. Because this relationship, which Mu‘tazila gives the name of tawlīd in human acts, is made up for that Allah has created His laws right after the orientation of human to the cause. In this respect, Ahl al-Sunna thinkers rejected tawlīd because it would mean attributing an act to an inanimate being and require a mandatory relationship between cause and effect in the functioning of the universe. Although the result does not occur with his own act when the person applies to the cause, he is responsible for his act because it is related to the person who did it. Māturīdī tradition did not accept the acts that emerged as a result of tawlīd as the production of man, but they tried to establish a balance by holding the person responsible because he is the reason for the outcome that emerged. As for the Ash‘arites, they avoided giving a real effect of the will and power to the causes by considering that created will and power is only a locus in the emergence of the act. The person has no effect on his act except for directing his will to that act and his behavior which will make the person responsible is based on this will. (shrink)

In this paper 1 argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are “on the inside.” My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical “intuitions”. Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and (...) propositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, 1 argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. I urge that we should therefore reject the invitation to revise the application of these concepts in the ways that would be required by recent proposals in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In this book, Nicolas Laos studies the meaning of the terms "world" and "order," the moral dimensions of each world order model, and wider issues of meaning and interpretation generated by humanity's attempt to live in a meaningful world and to find the logos of the beings and things in the world. The aim of this book is to propose a unified theory of world order (i.e., a theory that combines philosophy, theology, and political theory). In this (...) context, the author provides a thought-provoking (re)interpretation of classical philosophy (placing particular emphasis on Platonism), an in-depth inquiry into medieval philosophy and spirituality (placing particular emphasis on the cultural differences between the Greek East and the Latino-Frankish West), and an intellectually challenging review and evaluation of modern Western philosophy (including Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger) and of Nietzsche's and the postmodernists' revolt against modernity. He then elucidates the philosophical foundations and "pedigree" of each of the three basic political theories of modernity (i.e., Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism), and he studies the basic theoretical debates in International Relations, Geopolitics, and Noopolitics. Finally, Laos proposes a new, "fourth," political theory which he calls "metaphysical republicanism.". (shrink)

The first theory of confirmation that Carnap developed in detail is to be found in "Testability and Meaning". In this paper, he addressed the issue of a definition of empiricism, several years after abandoning the quest for a unique and universal logical framework supposed to be the basis of a clear distinction between the meaningful sentences of science and the pseudo-sentences of metaphysics. The principle of tolerance (according to which everyone is free to build up his own form of (...) language as he wishes) had been adopted near the end of 1932, at a time when it was already obvious to Carnap that a strictly verificationist criterion of meaning was inadequate. He therefore considered a variety of empiricisms and a variety of choices for the language of science. As Carnap put it, "there are many different possibilities in framing an empiricist language" and, correspondingly, several degrees of liberalization of the criterion of meaning. It was in this context that Carnap provided both a logical (syntactical) and an empirical analysis of confirmation (and of testing), before distinguishing requirements of different strengths which served the purpose of defining several versions of empiricism. (shrink)

The term verificationism is used in two different ways: the first is in relation to the verification principle of meaning, which we usually and rightly associate with the logical empiricists, although, as we now know, it derives in reality from Wittgenstein, and the second is in relation to the theory of meaning for intuitionistic logic that has been developed, beginning of course with Brouwer, Heyting and Kolmogorov in the twenties and early thirties, but in much more detail lately, (...) particularly in connection with intuitionistic type theory. It is therefore very natural to ask how these two forms of verificationism are related to one another: was the verificationism that we had in the thirties a kind of forerunner of what we have now, or was it something entirely different? I would like to discuss this question by considering a very particular problem, which was at the heart of Schlick’s interests, namely, the problem whether there might exist undecidable propositions or, if you prefer, unsolvable problems or unanswerable questions: it is merely a matter of wording which of these terms you choose. As I said, it is a problem which was at the heart of Schlick’s interests: it is explicitly discussed already in his early, programmatic paper Die Wende in der Philosophie in the first volume of Erkenntnis from 1930, and there is a short late paper, which has precisely Unanswerable Questions? as its title, from 1935, and he discussed it on several occasions in between also. (shrink)

Students of the Hegelian school must acknowledge an abiding debt to Ernst Barnikol. Upon his death in 1968, he left uncompleted a voluminous manuscript on Bruno Bauer, representing over forty years of research. Of this manuscript, conserved at the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, only a fraction has been published, but even this fraction, in its almost six hundred pages, continues to set standards in the field for meticulous scholarship, rigorous analysis, and balanced criticism. Barnikol's interests were primarily theological, (...) though he recognised clearly that Bauer's religious critique was politically motivated. Barnikol also discovered, but did not publish, Bauer's 1829 Latin manuscript on Kant's aesthetics. This text, adjudicated by Hegel and awarded the Prussian royal prize in philosophy, had been deposited among Hegel's correspondence in the archives of the Humboldt-Universität, Berlin. It was first published in 1996, in the original Latin, with German translation and commentary. In referring to his discovery, Barnikol made a substantive claim which must be disputed here, that Bauer's early text remained without influence on his subsequent work. Focusing on Bauer's depiction of art, and on the relation of art and religion as manifestations of spirit, we can trace lines of continuity and development in his thought, from his 1829 manuscript to his writings of 1841-42. The central idea of the early manuscript, a Hegelian conception of the unity of thought and being, is the key to deciphering the complex and elusive meaning of Bauer's critical theory in the Vormdrz. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of KnowledgeSteven P. MarroneLydia Schumacher. Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge. Challenges in Contemporary Theology. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Pp. xiii + 250. Cloth, $119.95.Lydia Schumacher has written an ambitious book. Among the many things she tries to accomplish in the volume, three stand out to this reviewer. First of all, she proposes to (...) reexamine Augustine’s theory of knowledge. She argues that Augustine’s philosophy is grounded in theology. For his theory of knowledge this means, by Schumacher’s reading, that the aim of cognition is to enable the human being to regain its original status as “image of God,” which latter state is manifested in knowing God and making God known. It is the mental, and by extension ethical, process of becoming God’s image that Schumacher says we should, in the Augustinian context, take the phrase ‘divine illumination’ to signify. For Augustine, Schumacher insists, this process is an entirely internal phenomenon constituted by a self-correcting series of intellectual reflections on the part of the mind. In holding to this view, Schumacher emphatically rejects the understanding, common in scholarship, that “divine illumination” for Augustine had to do with mental reference to what she labels an “extrinsic” standard such as the eternal ideas in God’s mind. [End Page 293]Second, Schumacher argues that the Augustinian project, epitomized in his theory of knowledge, was carried out by most of the thinkers of the Latin Middle Ages, particularly by Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. These latter two individuals are therefore divine illumi-nationists of the first order. What historians often designate as an Augustinian current, evident in the high Middle Ages among scholastics from the Franciscan Order, represented instead a deviation, a turn to an entirely novel theological-philosophical project. Here, mind’s work was conceived of as “the immediate and totalized knowledge of an individual essence.” And for this, recourse to an extrinsic standard filled the bill. Consequently, high-medieval Franciscans were the actual propounders of the theory of knowledge Schumacher tells us has wrongly been associated with divine illumination. Moreover, this Franciscan current of thought, once severed from its original theological underpinnings, provided the historical inspiration for modern philosophy, thereby acting as a kind of catalyst for the modernist philosophical problems—as Schumacher receives them—of rationalism and fideism, skepticism as well.Third, Schumacher sounds the call for a contemporary return to the authentic Augustinian project. By starting philosophy, as she claims Augustine did, with theological assumptions, she wants to fashion a “faith-based concept of knowledge” and with it, most importantly, to escape the modernist dilemma of the incompatibility of faith and reason. Grounding philosophy in theology—Christian theology, she maintains—will restore a lost integrity to our procedures of thinking, ultimately redeeming philosophy itself.How much of this program has Schumacher managed to achieve? Since this reviewer is marked out as the key spokesperson for the interpretation of both divine illumination and the history of medieval thought against which Schumacher inveighs, perhaps he should not be the one to answer the question. Still, the reader forewarned, I lay out my opinion. With regard to her first goal, Schumacher makes good on her promise to render Augustine as a theologian bent on working from his assumptions to designate a process whereby philosophy and mankind can be simultaneously restored. She is not so convincing in her attempt to equate this program with divine illumination. For Schumacher, the process of divine illumination is correlative to the idea of God as source of the mind’s power to act. Yet Augustine often plainly associates what he describes as illumination with turning to God and conceding his ideas an important role in the mental processes of judgment and concept formation. It is hard to see how one can honestly exclude this extrinsic element of what Augustine intended.Regarding her second goal, Schumacher does an excellent job of reminding us how Augustinian were almost all medieval scholastics, Thomas included, and warning us not to take the high-scholastic recourse to Aristotle as a sign of opposition to Augustinian modes of thought... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God, Evil and the Limits of Theology by Karen KilbyVincent BirchGod, Evil and the Limits of Theology by Karen Kilby (London: T&T Clark, 2020), 176 pp.Karen Kilby's God, Evil and the Limits of Theology is a collection of essays reminiscent in multiple respects of Herbert McCabe's God Matters. Kilby cites McCabe on only a handful of occasions, but, more so than the references, the form (...) and the content of Kilby's volume bring McCabe to mind. Like McCabe's book, God, Evil and the Limits of Theology consists of mostly short and readable but highly provocative essays, notwithstanding that Kilby's essays are more academic in form and hang together thematically better than McCabe's text. Regarding content, it is clear that Kilby is aligning herself in certain respects with the tradition of grammatical Thomism that McCabe helped initiate, though it might be better to consider Kilby's work an exercise in "grammatical apophaticism," since Thomas figures prominently in only three of the eleven essays. Even the "grammatical" attribution should be applied with caution, though Kilby does use the term herself, because Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence puts the "grammatical" in grammatical Thomism, is not at all explicitly drawn upon for theological purposes. Nevertheless, as will become clear through our discussion of the essays in particular, the arguments and themes of the collection build upon and assist in providing a valuable expansion of the line of thinking carried on by grammatical Thomists.The first four essays treat various concerns in Trinitarian theology, and the first, entitled "Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity," does some important preliminary critical work before Kilby makes her own constructive contribution to Trinitarian theology. For Kilby, social Trinitarianism (Jurgen Moltmann, Colin Gunton, and Patricia Wilson-Kastner are some proponents with whom she engages) is characterized by the idea that the Trinity, conceived as the interpenetration or perichoresis of three persons ("person" applied with fairly minimal negation), should be understood more as a rich source of [End Page 733] insight for apprehending the proper nature of human sociality than as a fundamentally mysterious doctrine. As the title of the chapter suggests, Kilby's primary critique of social theories of the Trinity is that they entail projection of human experience and reality into the Godhead, and she takes this critique a step further in arguing that it is of the very nature of social theories of the Trinity that they do just that. Her defense consists of a key claim that recurs throughout the rest of the Trinitarian essays—that human beings cannot know what it means for God to be three persons but one God. Consequently, social Trinitarians' bold descriptions of insights pertaining to how the three persons are united in perichoresis could be only a product of projection. Kilby concludes this essay by gesturing toward her constructive alternative to social theories of the Trinity: the doctrine of the Trinity does not give insight into God; rather, it determines the grammar for the structure of Christianity.Kilby follows up her first chapter with a study of Thomas Aquinas's Trinitarian theology, and as might be suggested by the conclusion of her first essay, she offers a thoroughly apophatic interpretation of Thomas, very much in the vein of David Burrell's Aquinas: God and Action. That is, Kilby claims that Thomas is not giving us insight into God but only manifesting the limits of our God-talk. Kilby is critical of various contemporary retrievals of Thomas that attempt to show some sort of "making sense" in Thomas's Trinitarian theology, and she focuses her argument regarding what might be called its "nonsense" on Thomas's uses of the terms "procession" and "relation." Kilby claims these terms appear to lose all intelligible connection to human experience when applied to the Trinity, especially noting the tension between, on the one hand, the subsisting relations being identical to the divine essence and, on the other, their being really distinct from each other. It is precisely the apparent incoherencies that arise within Thomas's Trinitarian theology that corroborate for Kilby that Thomas's theology offers... (shrink)

Scientific discoveries and the emergence of cosmological theories such as the Big Bang Theory and evolution have challenged the Christian doctrine of creation and its reliability on many fronts, because the discoveries appear to contradict the Christian account as to how creation unfolded. Hefner sees the situation as an additional interpretative task to theologians. He, however, posits that scientific discoveries are an opportunity to communicate the Christian message through social and scientific experience to bring meaning to broader society. (...) He expresses the notion that religion will remain relevant only if it measures up to science, because we are in a science and technology era. Hefner, therefore, introduced the concept of created co-creator as a metaphor and analytical tool to explain the meaning and purpose of humans within the biosphere. The concept is characterized by the ability to communicate religion through science and to relate with available models of origin. This work expounds on the concept of created co-creator’s ability to explain human technological trajectory in theology. There is also an effort to establish a relationship between Hefner’s concept and Haraway’s cyborg with an emphasis on the concept’s ability to communicate the Christian doctrine of creation through scientific knowledge and why such an enterprise is useful. (shrink)

This article examines how theology and social science can contribute to the specific task of talking about God in management without compromising the integrity of the Triune God. To talk about God in management studies initially requires a discussion on the character of modernity and about whether modernity is absence or transformation of religious forms; to follow is an examination of the governing assumptions operating in social theory from a religious perspective. The conclusion is that without the correct hermeneutics, (...) what management scholars mean by God cannot be more than an idea. (shrink)

마이클 더밋은 20 세기 후반 영국의 분석철학을 대표하는 탁월한 철학자였다. 지금까지 우리 학계에서 더밋은 도널드 데이비슨의 진리조건적 의미 이론에 맞서 검증주의적 의미 이론(verificationistic theory of meaning)을 제창하고, 이런 의미 이론을 바탕으로 반실재론(anti-realism)이라는 형이상학적 입장을 정립한 인물로 알려져 왔다. 하지만 이후 더밋은 자신의 전기 철학 중 일부 내용을 수정하거나 포기하고, 자신을 전반적 반실재론자라고 보는 상식적 평가에 대해 재고해 줄 것을 요청하였다. 그의 사상적 변화를 가장 잘 보여주는 글로는 1982년에 쓴 논문 ‘실재론’과 1991년에 출판된 그의 저서 『형이상학의 논리적 기초』가 있다. 특히 (...) 이 책은 이전까지의 더밋 철학의 전반적 면모를 가장 잘 정리하여 보여주고 있을 뿐만 아니라, 그 제목부터가 의미심장한 함축을 담고 있다. 후기 분석 철학의 전개 과정에서 형이상학의 갱생을 이처럼 노골적으로 알리는 책 제목은 없었던 것처럼 보이기 때문이다. 이 논문은 후기 더밋 철학의 이런 변화가 아직 우리 학계에서 검토된 일이 없으므로, 그 방향 전환에 대해 소개하고, 그 전환에 따라 실재론, 반실재론이라는 형이상학적 개념이 더밋의 후기 철학 내에서 어떤 위상을 지니고 있는지를 살펴볼 것이다. 그 결과 논자는 후기 더밋 철학에서의 실재론-반실재론 지도가 전기 철학에서와는 다른 모습으로 그려졌다는 것을 보여주게 될 것이다. 후기에 가서 더밋은 자신을 어떤 특수한 종류의 반실재론을 옹호하는 자로서 보아주기보다는, 다양한 의미 이론의 강점과 약점을 탐구하면서 그 바탕 위에서 여러 형이상학적 입장의 수용 여부를 판정하는 프로그램에 종사하는 자로서 보아 줄 것을 요구하였다. 그 과정에서 전기 철학에서의 이가 원리의 부정과 반실재론 간의 긴밀한 연관은 후기에 갈수록 느슨해 졌으며, 실재론-반실재론이라는 각박한 이분법에서 벗어나 각 형이상학적 입장에 대해 상대적으로 더 실재론적이거나 덜 실재론적인(또는 더 반실재론적이거나 덜 반실재론적인) 경향을 띠는 것으로 분류하였다. 이 글을 통하여 논자는 그간 우리 학계에서 발표된 더밋 철학에 관한 논문들에서, 더밋을 마냥 반실재론만을 옹호하는 철학자라고 규정했던 상식적 평가도 재고될 수 있을 것이라고 믿는다. (shrink)

In a number of essays published over the last decade or so, W. V. Quine has made some interesting suggestions concerning the ontology of theories. If I understand him correctly, one of his principal objects has been to formulate a criterion by means of which one can correctly decide what are the ontological commitments of any given theory. My aim in this paper is to reveal what I think are inadequacies in Quine's criterion and to indicate the direction in (...) which a proper formulation lies. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His pragmatism is not verificationism; (...) rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and (...) propositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, I argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. I urge that we should therefore reject the invitation to revise the application of these concepts in the ways that would be required by recent proposals in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The thesis examines the thought of Thomas More and Gerrard Winstanley, emphasizing the concern of both theorists with the prevailing moral depravity of human nature attributable to the Fall of Man, and their proposals for the amendment of men's conduct by institutional means, especially by the establishment of a communist society. The thesis opens with a conceptual exploration of 'utopianism' and 'millenarianism' before discussing the particular forms of these concepts employed by More and Winstanley. The introductory section also includes an (...) investigation of the context which constituted the background to the ideas of More and Winstanley. More's theology, his conception of human nature, and his view of contemporary civil society are examined in detail. It is argued that the conclusions More derived from this aspect of his thought formed his basic conception of the situation to which the institutional amendments outlined in Utopia were directed. These proposals, regarding communism, the state, family and community life, education, religion, and ethics, are discussed. It is argued that Utopia constitutes More's model of a society designed to facilitate the salvation of man. Winstanley's appreciation of man's nature, prevailing condition, and potential for spiritual regeneration, are outlined. The development of Winstanley's thought, and the impression his active involvement with the Diggers made upon him, is described. It is argued that Winstanley renounced millenarianism and ultimately assumed utopian social theory as a medium for the articulation of his proposals for the restoration of man to spiritual regeneracy on earth. The institutional aspects of this scheme, regarding communism, the state, patriarchalism, labour, and education, which he outlined in The Law of Freedom, are evaluated. The thesis concludes, with a brief comparative analysis before setting the ideas of More and Winstanley'in the context of the changing worldview, appreciation of man's potential and progress, and the emphasis upon aspiration, which evolved in the early modern period. (shrink)

Reviving the ancient political wisdom of St. Augustine in combination with insights drawn from contemporary political theorist John Rawls, Joseph Rivera grapples with the polarizing nature of religion in the public square. Political theology, as a discipline, tends to argue that communitarianism remains the only viable political option for religious practitioners in a complex, pluralist society. Unsurprisingly, we are increasingly accustomed to think the religious voice is anti-secular and illiberal. On the contrary, Christian theology and political liberalism, Rivera (...) argues, are not incompatible. Political Theology and Pluralism challenges the longstanding antithesis between theology and political liberalism by asking his readers to focus not on difference, but on our common humanity. Outlining real strategies for public dialogue in a liberal state, Rivera offers the opportunity to discover what it means to practice civic friendship in pluralist context. (shrink)

The epistemological prestige of science challenges theologians and philosophers to give an account of their forms of reasoning. The universal character of scientific discourse contrasts with the multilayered language of meaning used in both theology and philosophy. However, does that mean that the language of those disciplines goes beyond the boundaries of reason? Can theologians and philosophers justify their reliance upon rational discourse? Indeed, the epistemological status and capacity of these disciplines to enter into dialogue with the language (...) of science depends on the rationality of their discourse. To deal with these questions, one must examine the elaboration of concepts in theology, philosophy and science, and confront their respective rationalities.0In this book, eighteen theologians, philosophers and scientists from Belgium, France, and the USA bring their contributions to a common reflection on the genesis of concepts and the confrontation of rationalities between theology, philosophy and science. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background Atheism and Meaninglessness The Positivist Verifiability Theory of Meaning Three Typical Responses Three Standard Criticisms of the Theory and Its Present Standing Can the Standard Criticisms be Answered? Conclusion Works cited.

Since the publication of Ruth Millikan's Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories in 1984, a great deal of literature has discussed her so-called teleosemantic or biosemantic solution to the problem of intentionality. Only recently, though, has much attention been paid to her co-ordinated solution to the problem of productivity. This article, first, clearly describes the problems of intentionality, productivity, and compositionality, and describes their relationships and their relevance for the theory of meaning. It then describes Millikan's proposal with respect (...) to the problem of intentionality and shows how this buys her a novel solution to the problem of productivity. The article closes by discussing some alternative teleosemantic theories and some issues that will contribute to deciding between them. (shrink)