Recently, Edward Furton commented on an article that we published in Health Care Ethics USA concerning the philosophical and theological anthropology informing the discussion of appropriate care for individuals with gender dysphoria and intersex conditions. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify the points we made in that article, particularly the metaphysical mechanics underlying our contention that, as part of a unified human person, the human rational soul is sexed. We hope this more in-depth metaphysical explanation shows that Furton’s concern, while (...) valid insofar as our position may have needed clarifying, is nevertheless ill-founded with respect to our contention that actually existent human rational souls are sexed. (shrink)

Opponents of conscience protections for Catholic Health Care institutions claim that, since institutions are not autonomous individuals, they are not subjects of conscience. Therefore, since institutional conscience does not exist, it does not deserve protection. In this article, the author demonstrates not only that institutional conscience exists but that it is an activity that pervades all human institutions. He provides a metaphysical sketch that illustrates how institutions are organic outgrowths of human social nature which mitigate the natural limitations of human (...) individuals. Consequently, the activity of conscience is inherently a component of the life of human institutions. (shrink)

Some hold that the revision to directive 58 of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services—which sought to incorporate the language of Pope John Paul II’s 2004 statement regarding the obligation to provide patients in a persistent vegetative state—represents a threat to patient’s end-of-life decisions. I argue this position is unfounded. The revision to the directive, and the statements that inspired this linguistic modification, do not represent a substantive change in the Church’s teaching. I support this position (...) based on two claims. First, in his statement, the Holy Father speaks of food and water and care personnel’s obligation to provide them as relative to the patient’s status as a person. That is, relative to the patient’s human nature, food and water represent a per se useful means for preserving life and, as such, should be considered ordinary and obligatory. Second, since his teaching is directed toward care personnel, John Paul II does not discuss the patient’s judgment of the means with the assumption that the Tradition has already clearly established the legitimacy of patients refusing means they judge to be extraordinary. Finally, I argue that one of the effects of the Pope’s statement is that it manages to reaffirm the Church’s teaching on euthanasia and ordinary and extraordinary means without institutionalizing a particular theologian’s vision of anthropology. (shrink)

Some bioethical commentators argue that protection for the institutional conscience of Catholic health care providers should be discarded because the notion is conceptually flawed and conflicts with the demands of medical professionalism. This paper argues in defense of the concept of Catholic institutional conscience. The arguments leveled against the concept of institutional conscience are based on an unsound definition of conscience, assume the validity of a definition of conscience that is amenable to the concept of institutional conscience, and indeed assume (...) the validity of the concept of institutional conscience in order to argue against the conceptual validity of the consciences of Catholic health care institutions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 12.3 (Autumn 2012): 409–420. (shrink)

In recent articles, Daniel Gannon argues that, according to Catholic morality, morally good decision making about life-sustaining treatment is intrinsically based on in-the-moment circumstances. Measured against this moral criterion, Gannon finds physician orders for life-sustaining treatment to be morally unacceptable and proposes his own medical order form. The authors argue here that Catholic moral teaching and tradition do not reduce the role of circumstances to those in the present moment and that such a reductive criterion undermines many of the sources (...) of morality, including conscience, prudence, and moral principles such as the principle of ethically proportionate and disproportionate means. The authors also show that Gannon’s criterion and form generate conceptual and practical contradictions, that POLST is not intrinsically evil, and that when properly implemented, POLST can be morally acceptable. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.1 : 53–61. (shrink)

This article critically examines, from the perspective of a Roman Catholic Healthcare ethicist, the second edition of the Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation report recently published by the American Society for Humanities and Bioethics. The question is posed: can the competencies identified in the report serve as the core competencies for Roman Catholic ethical consultants and consultation services? I answer in the negative. This incongruence stems from divergent concepts of what it means to do ethics consultation, a divergence that (...) is rooted in each perspective's very different visions of autonomy. Furthermore, because of the constitutive elements of Catholic ethics consultation, such as the Ethical and Religious Directives for Health Care Services, the tradition needed to apply those directives, and the Catholic facility’s membership in the institutional Church, the competencies needed for its practice differ in kind from those identified by the report. While there are many practical points of convergence, the competencies identified by the report should not be adopted uncritically by Catholic healthcare institutions as core competencies for ethical consultation services. (shrink)

Abortion is the central issue in the conscientious objection debate. In this article I demonstrate why this is so for two philosophical viewpoints prominent in American culture. One, represented by Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, holds that the fundamental moral value of being human can be found in bare life and the other, represented by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, holds that this fundamental value is found in the life that can choose and determine itself. First, I articulate Lee (...) and George’s philosophical theory and demonstrate how the fundamental moral value of their theory, personhood, is represented in the issue of abortion. Second, I examine Beauchamp and Childress’ theoretical vision and demonstrate how their fundamental moral value, the right to autonomous self-determination, is represented in abortion. Third, I sketch the theoretical and practical dynamics of the conscientious objection debate as well as each author’s understanding of conscience. Fourth, I demonstrate how abortion, which represents their respective fundamental value, shapes each perspectives’ approach to the conscientious objection debate. I conclude that because each theory finds its fundamental value represented in the issue of abortion, each perspective is bound to engage the conscientious objection debate in a way that centers on the issue of abortion. (shrink)

The metaphysical status of the placenta has bearing on several ongoing discussions within Catholic moral theology. Numerous bioethicists and theologians have touched on this topic briefly, but to date no robust metaphysical argument appears in the literature. The authors aim to provide such an analysis. First, they provide an overview of the existing literature on the topic. Second, they briefly review the anatomy and physiology of the placenta. Third, they provide metaphysical and biological reasons why the placenta cannot be a (...) part of the fetus, a part of the mother, simultaneously a part of both, the border at which mother and fetus meet, or a separate individual substance. Finally, they provide reasons that support their claim that the placenta is a quasi-substance that exists in symbiosis with mother and child. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.2 : 295–333. (shrink)

In this essay, some of the signatories to “Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal–Fetal Vital Conflicts: A Statement of Consensus” respond to “The Placenta as an Organ of the Fetus: A Response to the Statement of Consensus on Maternal–Fetal Conflict,” both recently published in this journal. The response examines Bringman and Shabanowitz’s claims and assumptions about the morally relevant pathologic condition in some cases of peripartum cardiomyopathy complicated by a subsequent pregnancy, the moral status of a normally functioning placenta, and (...) the use of the principle of double effect in these cases. The signatories’ response sets out to demonstrate how Bringman and Shabanowitz do not engage the essential points of the statement of consensus and how their argument is premised on false assumptions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 : 241–250. (shrink)

Aesthetics in a Multicultural Age examines a variety of significant multidisciplinary and multicultural topics within the subject of aesthetics. Addressing the vexed relation of the arts and criticism to current political and cultural concerns, the contributors to this volume attempt to bridge the two decades-old gap between scholars and critics who hold conflicting views of the purposes of art and criticism. By exploring some of the ways in which global migration and expanding ethnic diversity are affecting cultural productions and prompting (...) reassessment of the nature and role of aesthetic discourse, this volume provides a new evaluation of aesthetic ideas and practices within contemporary arts and letters. (shrink)

Catholic healthcare institutions live amidst tension between three intersecting primary values, namely, a commitment of service to the poor and vulnerable, promoting the common good for all, and financially sustainability. Within this tension, the question sometimes arises as to whether it is ever justifiable, i.e., consistent with Catholic identity, to place limits on charity care. In this article we will argue that the health reform measures of the Affordable Care Act do not eliminate this tension but actually increase the urgency (...) of addressing it. Moreover, we will conclude that the question of limiting charity care in a manner that is consistent with the obligations of Catholic identity around serving the poor and vulnerable, promoting the common good, and remaining financially sustainable is not a question of if, but of how such limits are established. Such limits, however, cannot be established in light of one overriding moral consideration or principle, but must be established in light of a multitude of principles guiding us to a holistic understanding of the interrelatedness of the moral dimensions of Catholic identity. (shrink)

R K Elliott; Louis Arnaud Reid: a remembrance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 3–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-97.

R K Elliott; Louis Arnaud Reid: a remembrance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 3–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-97.

This essay is not about contemporary French philosophy, strictly speaking, but something which concerns it—an important episode in its modern history. Its intention is to deal, in very schematic terms, with the nature and evolution of French Marxism from the mid-1950s to the end of the 70s, focusing on two of its best-known and most influential representatives, Jean-Paul Sartre and Louis Althusser, and relating the internal history of their ambitious reconstructions of Marxism to the wider, non-theoretical history of which (...) they were a part— and for whose comprehension they sought to supply the conceptual instruments. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's balance-sheet of a century of Marxism, Adventures of the Dialectic, published in 1955, provides my starting point and explains my title. (shrink)

In the past few years there has been a renewed interest in the work of Louis Althusser, although, in some cases, this interest has been one-sided, focusing mainly on his later writings on aleatory materialism. The three books reviewed in this article, however, offer balanced and insightful overviews of the totality of Althusser's work, placing it in the wider context of Marxist political and theoretical debates and stressing both its originality and strengths, but also its contradictions.

Moral naturalists are often said to have trouble making sense of inter-communal moral disagreements. The culprit is typically thought to be the naturalist’s metasemantics and its implications for sameness of meaning across communities. The most familiar incarnation of this metasemantic challenge is the Moral Twin Earth argument. We address the challenge from the perspective of analytic naturalism, and argue that making sense of inter-communal moral disagreement creates no special issues for this view.

The potential for financial conflicts of interest (COIs) to damage the credibility of scientific research has become a significant social concern, especially in the wake of high-profile incidents involving the pharmaceutical, tobacco, fossil-fuel, and chemical industries. Scientists and policy makers have debated whether the presence of financial COIs should count as a reason for treating research with suspicion or whether research should instead be evaluated solely based on its scientific quality. This paper examines a recent proposal to develop criteria for (...) evaluating the credibility of research without considering its source of funding. It concludes that proposals of this sort are likely to be either ineffective or impractical in many cases. Nevertheless, this does not imply that all research funded by those with an interest in the outcome must be placed under a cloud of suspicion; there are conditions under which research is at much more serious risk of being corrupted than in other cases, and attention to these conditions can guide productive responses to financial COIs. (shrink)

How does the complex nature of ecological systems affect ecologists' ability to study them? This Element argues that ecological systems are complex in a rather special way: they are causally heterogeneous. The author presents an updated philosophical account with an optimistic outlook of the methods and status of ecological research.

Changes and additions in the new edition reflect the ways in which the subject has broadened and deepened on several fronts; more than half of the-chapters are ...

Now in a third edition, Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings is a highly acclaimed, topically organized collection that covers five major areas of philosophy--theory of knowledge, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, freedom and determinism, and moral philosophy. Editor Louis P. Pojman enhances the text's topical organization by arranging the selections into a pro/con format to help students better understand opposing arguments. He also includes accessible introductions to each chapter, subsection, and individual reading, a unique feature for (...) an anthology of this depth. While the book focuses on a compelling sampling of classical material--including selections from Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant--it also incorporates some of philosophy's best twentieth-century and contemporary work, featuring articles by Bertrand Russell, Richard Taylor, John Searle, Thomas Nagel, and others. This third edition contains an expanded glossary, more extensive section introductions, and twelve new selections: Karl Popper: "Epistemology without a Knowing Subject" Richard Rorty: "Dismantling Truth: Solidarity Versus Objectivity" Daniel Dennett: "Postmodernism and Truth" Bruce Russell: "The Problem of Evil: Too Much Suffering" David Chalmers: "Against Materialism: Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?" Baron Paul Henri d'Holbach: "A Defense of Determinism" Michael Levin: "A Compatibilist Defense of Moral Responsibility" Plato: Socratic Morality: "Crito" Herodotus: "Custom Is King" J. L. Mackie: "The Subjectivity of Values" Louis P. Pojman: "A Critique of Mackie's Theory of Moral Subjectivism" Thomas Nagel: "Moral Luck". (shrink)

Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and (...) an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. (shrink)

Quine has developed two reasons for thinking that our ontology should not include the ontological category of properties. His first point is that the criterion for individuating properties is unclear, and the second is that postulating the existence of properties would not explain anything. In what follows I critically examine these two themes, which I will call the clarity argument and the parsimony argument. Although I will suggest that these two arguments are defective, I also will try to show that (...) certain related arguments on behalf of the existence of properties are likewise flawed. This will set the stage for the discussion in the fourth section of the perspective provided by evolutionary theory on the question of the ontological status of properties. It will emerge that evolutionary theory provides reason for thinking that properties exist, and, additionally, gives an interesting point of view on the epistemological and metaphysical issues that Quine has addressed. (shrink)

This article reviews two standard criticisms of creationism/intelligent design (ID): it is unfalsifiable, and it is refuted by the many imperfect adaptations found in nature. Problems with both criticisms are discussed. A conception of testability is described that avoids the defects in Karl Popper’s falsifiability criterion. Although ID comes in multiple forms, which call for different criticisms, it emerges that ID fails to constitute a serious alternative to evolutionary theory.

Michael Scriven’s (1959) example of identical twins (who are said to be equal in fitness but unequal in their reproductive success) has been used by many philosophers of biology to discuss how fitness should be defined, how selection should be distinguished from drift, and how the environment in which a selection process occurs should be conceptualized. Here it is argued that evolutionary theory has no commitment, one way or the other, as to whether the twins are equally fit. This is (...) because the theory of natural selection is fundamentally about the fitnesses of traits, not the fitnesses of token individuals. A plausible philosophical thesis about supervenience entails that the twins are equally fit if they live in identical environments, but evolutionary biology is not committed to the thesis that the twins live in identical environments. Evolutionary theory is right to focus on traits, rather than on token individuals, because the fitnesses of token organisms (as opposed to their actual survivorship and degree of reproductive success) are almost always unknowable. This point has ramifications for the question of how Darwin’s theory of evolution and R. A. Fisher’s are conceptually different. (shrink)

Practical ethics in context -- Teaching and learning ethics in an ethical environment -- Aspirations, activities, and assessment -- The theoretical toolkit -- Systematic case analysis -- Relativism and moral development -- A bridge across cultures.

In their book What Darwin Got Wrong, Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini construct an a priori philosophical argument and an empirical biological argument. The biological argument aims to show that natural selection is much less important in the evolutionary process than many biologists maintain. The a priori argument begins with the claim that there cannot be selection for one but not the other of two traits that are perfectly correlated in a population; it concludes that there cannot be an evolutionary (...) theory of adaptation. This article focuses mainly on the a priori argument. (shrink)

Developing a definition of group selection, and applying that definition to the dispute in the social sciences between methodological holists and methodological individualists, are the two goals of this paper. The definition proposed distinguishes between changes in groups that are due to group selection and changes in groups that are artefacts of selection processes occurring at lower levels of organization. It also explains why the existence of group selection is not implied by the mere fact that fitness values of organisms (...) are sensitive to the composition of groups. And, lastly, the definition explains why group selection need not involve selection for altruism. Group selection is thereby seen as an evolutionary force which is objectively distinct from other evolutionary forces. Applying the distinction between group and individual selection to the holism/individualism dispute has the desirable result that the dispute is not decidable a priori. This way of looking at the dispute yields a conception of individualism which is untainted by atomism and a conception of holism which is unspoiled by hypostatis. (shrink)

This volume will thus appeal to advanced students and scholars not just in the history of early modern philosophy but in epistemology and other core areas of ...

Adaptationism is a doctrine that has meant different things to different people. In this essay, I want to isolate and discuss a reading of adaptationism that makes it a non-trivial empirical thesis about the history of life. I'll take adaptationism to be the following claim: natural selection has been the only important cause of most of the phenotypic traits found in most species. I won't try to determine whether adaptationism, so defined, is true. Rather, my task will be one of (...) clarification. What does this statement mean, and how is it related to various remarks that biologists have made about adaptationism, pro and con? (shrink)

Maximum Parsimony (MP) and Maximum Likelihood (ML) are two methods for evaluating which phlogenetic tree is best supported by data on the characteristics of leaf objects (which may be species, populations, or individual organisms). MP has been criticized for assuming that evolution proceeds parsimoniously -- that if a lineage begins in state i and ends in state j, the way it got from i to j is by the smallest number of changes. MP has been criticized for needing to assume (...) some model or other of the evolutionary process even though biologists often do not know what that process really is. This paper critically evaluates both criticisms. (shrink)

This is an indispensible book for students, teachers and professional researchers in sociology, cultural studies, politics, feminism and philosophy.

In this paper, I'll explore three contexts in which the heuristic of personification yields the wrong answer. They all come from game theoretic discussion of altruism and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Whether it is applied to evolution or to rational deliberation, game theory models situations that involve frequency dependence. In the evolutionary case, how fit a trait is, and whether it is more or less fit than the alternatives, depends on the composition of the population (Maynard Smith 1982). In the case (...) of rational deliberation, which act is best for the agent depends on what other actors are likely to do. As we now will see, frequency dependence can throw a monkey wrench into the convenient relationship between deliberation and evolution posited by the heuristic of personification. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophers of science have taken renewed interest in pursuing scholarship that is “socially engaged.” As a result, this scholarship has become increasingly relevant to public policy. In order to illustrate the ways in which the philosophy of science can inform public policy, this chapter focuses specifically on environmental research and policy. It shows how philosophy can assist with environmental policy making in three ways: clarifying the roles of values in policy-relevant science; addressing scientific dissent, especially in response (...) to “hot-button” policy issues; and responding thoughtfully to scientific uncertainty. (shrink)

Michaël Crevoisier : Fraichement retraité, vous avez été Maître de conférences au département de philosophie de l’Université de Franche-Comté. Toute votre carrière, mais en réalité déjà vos études, se sera déroulée ici, à Besançon. Je souhaiterais donc commencer par cette ville, cet ancrage. Est-ce que cela revêt une signification particulière pour vous? Et s’il fallait nous le rappeler en quelques mots, qu’avez-vous fait et vécu à Besançon à travers vos travaux philosophiques? Louis Uccian...

Environmental pollution played a central role in launching the environmental movement during the twentieth century. While some environmental ethicists have worried that concerns about pollution reflect a relatively “shallow” form of environmentalism focused on the concerns of the wealthy, pollution is also a significant threat to many disadvantaged groups, citizens of low-income countries, and non-human organisms. Ethical issues arise both in the course of scientific research to identify harmful pollutants and in policy decisions about how to regulate them. New strategies (...) are needed for generating scientific research that adequately reflects the concerns and priorities of the public as a whole rather than the values of polluting industries. Creative policy approaches are also needed so that we can identify harmful pollutants more quickly and avoid generating them in the first place. (shrink)