We will consider alternative ways that Kant’s philosophical views on ethics generally and on punishment more particularly could be brought into harmony with the present near consensus of opposition to the death penalty. We will make use of the notion of the contemporary consensus about certain issues, particularly equality of the sexes and the death penalty, found in widespread agreement, though not unanimity. Of course, it is always possible that some consensuses are wrong, or misguided, or mistaken. We should not (...) put too much philosophical weight on the notion of a consensus here. If there is a consensus for the equality of women as citizens, and against the death penalty, this will simply suggest to us that we will want to reconsider Kant’s views on such topics. In both instances mentioned, his views lie outside the current consensus. We will consider how to revise Kant’s views to bring them into accord with these current consensuses, within a theory that is still, in as significant a sense as possible, Kantian. Since the use of the idea of a consensus is a sort of short-cut, there will not be much direct discussion of arguments for or against the equality of women as citizens, or for or against the advisability of using the death penalty. Yet the discussions of these issues will illuminate certain facts about the structure of Kant’s moral and political theories, and about how the basic principles within those theories relate to particular moral applications or topics. If we can still end up with a thoroughly Kantian view on the death penalty, that also will tell us something about the relation of Kantian ethical and legal principles to the death penalty as that issue is discussed today. Opposition to the death penalty in present day circumstances is not at variance with the basic principles of Kantian ethical, political, and legal theory, including his retributivism in the justification of punishment. Indeed, there is a way of revising Kant’s views to bring them into harmony with abolition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 151-153 [Access article in PDF] Allen W. Wood. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xxiv + 436. Cloth, $54.95. This book by Allen Wood in its first half gives us a state-of-the-art survey of traditional topics in the interpretation of Kant's ethics, and in the second half breaks new ground, and significantly widens the canon of works that (...) need to be taken account of in presenting Kant's ethics as a whole. Wood tells us that his main criticism of previous interpretations of Kant's ethics is that they overemphasize the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, when the most promising version is the formula of humanity. One of the major contributions of this book is the detailed argument (passim, but especially Chapter IV) that the formula of humanity is the preferable one for understanding Kant's ethics in application, and the one used most in the Metaphysics of Morals.Part I takes the reader on the familiar traversal of the text of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Chapter 1 is a discussion of the topics that come up in Chapter One of the Groundwork. Chapter 2 is a coverage of the first part of Kant's Chapter Two. Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are discussions of what are usually called the first (universal law), second (humanity), and third (autonomy and kingdom of ends) formulations of the categorical imperative. The discussion of Kant's Chapter Three is brief (basically, Wood's pages 171-182).Wood comments that the proper way to expound Kant's views on ethics would be, after (1) an introductory exposition based in the Groundwork, (i.e., his Chapters 1-5) to present (2) Kant's views on "human nature and its consequences for the application of the foundational principles" (13) (his Chapters 6-9). Only then would one be in a position to "provide (3) a systematic exposition of the Metaphysics of Morals as the definitive form of Kant's practical philosophy" (13). But such an undertaking would have been too ambitious for any single book. Hence Wood's book omits part (3), though he makes significant use of the Metaphysics of Morals throughout.Wood urges his readers not to neglect his extensive endnotes (xv), where sometimes [End Page 151] important matters are discussed that could not be accommodated within the main text. In addition, in the notes one can find some fascinating passages, e.g., (1) a significant self-criticism (345, n.12). (2) Another note finds Wood saying that Andrea Dworkin borrows her views of sexuality from Simone de Beauvoir (without acknowledgment), and that Beauvoir and Sartre's views were largely anticipated by Kant. Then he adds this zinger: "These comparisons also shed light on the cogency of the condescending explanations usually offered for Kant's views on sex. For it would not naturally occur to us to attribute the views of Beauvoir or Sartre to their sexual inexperience, to the lingering effects of their excessively religious upbringing or to the puritanical attitudes characteristic of mid-century Parisian intellectuals" (397, n.11).One of the traditional topics Wood discusses is the proper formulation of maxims for evaluation by the universal law formulation. He thinks that there are bound to be some systematic failures to achieve correct results because of inadequacies of this formulation, but he discusses fairly extensively how to minimize such erroneous outcomes by correct formulations of maxims (97-107), and his discussion makes some useful contributions to this once heavily discussed topic. One might add another, almost commonsense suggestion to his: Maxims mention ends of action, as well as proposed action-kinds; since actions are thus described within maxims as means to ends, action-descriptions would include only action characteristics that are causally relevant to the achievement of the ends of actions. This reminder enables us to eliminate many irrelevant action-descriptors.Part II of the Wood book is entitled "Anthropological Applications." In this section he pursues topics that have not been central to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 151-153 [Access article in PDF] Allen W. Wood. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xxiv + 436. Cloth, $54.95. This book by Allen Wood in its first half gives us a state-of-the-art survey of traditional topics in the interpretation of Kant's ethics, and in the second half breaks new ground, and significantly widens the canon of works that (...) need to be taken account of in presenting Kant's ethics as a whole. Wood tells us that his main criticism of previous interpretations of Kant's ethics is that they overemphasize the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, when the most promising version is the formula of humanity. One of the major contributions of this book is the detailed argument (passim, but especially Chapter IV) that the formula of humanity is the preferable one for understanding Kant's ethics in application, and the one used most in the Metaphysics of Morals.Part I takes the reader on the familiar traversal of the text of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Chapter 1 is a discussion of the topics that come up in Chapter One of the Groundwork. Chapter 2 is a coverage of the first part of Kant's Chapter Two. Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are discussions of what are usually called the first (universal law), second (humanity), and third (autonomy and kingdom of ends) formulations of the categorical imperative. The discussion of Kant's Chapter Three is brief (basically, Wood's pages 171-182).Wood comments that the proper way to expound Kant's views on ethics would be, after (1) an introductory exposition based in the Groundwork, (i.e., his Chapters 1-5) to present (2) Kant's views on "human nature and its consequences for the application of the foundational principles" (13) (his Chapters 6-9). Only then would one be in a position to "provide (3) a systematic exposition of the Metaphysics of Morals as the definitive form of Kant's practical philosophy" (13). But such an undertaking would have been too ambitious for any single book. Hence Wood's book omits part (3), though he makes significant use of the Metaphysics of Morals throughout.Wood urges his readers not to neglect his extensive endnotes (xv), where sometimes [End Page 151] important matters are discussed that could not be accommodated within the main text. In addition, in the notes one can find some fascinating passages, e.g., (1) a significant self-criticism (345, n.12). (2) Another note finds Wood saying that Andrea Dworkin borrows her views of sexuality from Simone de Beauvoir (without acknowledgment), and that Beauvoir and Sartre's views were largely anticipated by Kant. Then he adds this zinger: "These comparisons also shed light on the cogency of the condescending explanations usually offered for Kant's views on sex. For it would not naturally occur to us to attribute the views of Beauvoir or Sartre to their sexual inexperience, to the lingering effects of their excessively religious upbringing or to the puritanical attitudes characteristic of mid-century Parisian intellectuals" (397, n.11).One of the traditional topics Wood discusses is the proper formulation of maxims for evaluation by the universal law formulation. He thinks that there are bound to be some systematic failures to achieve correct results because of inadequacies of this formulation, but he discusses fairly extensively how to minimize such erroneous outcomes by correct formulations of maxims (97-107), and his discussion makes some useful contributions to this once heavily discussed topic. One might add another, almost commonsense suggestion to his: Maxims mention ends of action, as well as proposed action-kinds; since actions are thus described within maxims as means to ends, action-descriptions would include only action characteristics that are causally relevant to the achievement of the ends of actions. This reminder enables us to eliminate many irrelevant action-descriptors.Part II of the Wood book is entitled "Anthropological Applications." In this section he pursues topics that have not been central to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 151-153 [Access article in PDF] Allen W. Wood. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xxiv + 436. Cloth, $54.95. This book by Allen Wood in its first half gives us a state-of-the-art survey of traditional topics in the interpretation of Kant's ethics, and in the second half breaks new ground, and significantly widens the canon of works that (...) need to be taken account of in presenting Kant's ethics as a whole. Wood tells us that his main criticism of previous interpretations of Kant's ethics is that they overemphasize the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, when the most promising version is the formula of humanity. One of the major contributions of this book is the detailed argument (passim, but especially Chapter IV) that the formula of humanity is the preferable one for understanding Kant's ethics in application, and the one used most in the Metaphysics of Morals.Part I takes the reader on the familiar traversal of the text of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Chapter 1 is a discussion of the topics that come up in Chapter One of the Groundwork. Chapter 2 is a coverage of the first part of Kant's Chapter Two. Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are discussions of what are usually called the first (universal law), second (humanity), and third (autonomy and kingdom of ends) formulations of the categorical imperative. The discussion of Kant's Chapter Three is brief (basically, Wood's pages 171-182).Wood comments that the proper way to expound Kant's views on ethics would be, after (1) an introductory exposition based in the Groundwork, (i.e., his Chapters 1-5) to present (2) Kant's views on "human nature and its consequences for the application of the foundational principles" (13) (his Chapters 6-9). Only then would one be in a position to "provide (3) a systematic exposition of the Metaphysics of Morals as the definitive form of Kant's practical philosophy" (13). But such an undertaking would have been too ambitious for any single book. Hence Wood's book omits part (3), though he makes significant use of the Metaphysics of Morals throughout.Wood urges his readers not to neglect his extensive endnotes (xv), where sometimes [End Page 151] important matters are discussed that could not be accommodated within the main text. In addition, in the notes one can find some fascinating passages, e.g., (1) a significant self-criticism (345, n.12). (2) Another note finds Wood saying that Andrea Dworkin borrows her views of sexuality from Simone de Beauvoir (without acknowledgment), and that Beauvoir and Sartre's views were largely anticipated by Kant. Then he adds this zinger: "These comparisons also shed light on the cogency of the condescending explanations usually offered for Kant's views on sex. For it would not naturally occur to us to attribute the views of Beauvoir or Sartre to their sexual inexperience, to the lingering effects of their excessively religious upbringing or to the puritanical attitudes characteristic of mid-century Parisian intellectuals" (397, n.11).One of the traditional topics Wood discusses is the proper formulation of maxims for evaluation by the universal law formulation. He thinks that there are bound to be some systematic failures to achieve correct results because of inadequacies of this formulation, but he discusses fairly extensively how to minimize such erroneous outcomes by correct formulations of maxims (97-107), and his discussion makes some useful contributions to this once heavily discussed topic. One might add another, almost commonsense suggestion to his: Maxims mention ends of action, as well as proposed action-kinds; since actions are thus described within maxims as means to ends, action-descriptions would include only action characteristics that are causally relevant to the achievement of the ends of actions. This reminder enables us to eliminate many irrelevant action-descriptors.Part II of the Wood book is entitled "Anthropological Applications." In this section he pursues topics that have not been central to... (shrink)

What if human joy went on endlessly? Suppose, for example, that each human generation were followed by another, or that the Western religions are right when they teach that each human being lives eternally after death. If any such possibility is true in the actual world, then an agent might sometimes be so situated that more than one course of action would produce an infinite amount of utility. Deciding whether to have a child born this year rather than next is (...) a situation wherein an agent may face several alternatives whose effects could well ramify endlessly on such suppositions, for the child born this year would be a different person—one who preferred different things, performed different actions, and had different descendants—from a child born next year. It has recently been suggested that traditional utilitarianism stumbles on such cases of infinite utility. Specifically, utilitarianism seems to require, for its application, that all experience of pleasure and pain cease at some time in the future or asymptotically approach zero.2 If neither of these conditions holds, then the utility produced by each of two alternative actions may turn out to be infinite, and utilitarianism thus loses its ability to discriminate morally between them. (shrink)

Kant gives four examples to illustrate the application of the categoricaI imperative immediately after in troducing its “universal Iaw” formulation in Chapter Two his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. These examples have been much discussed to gain an understanding of how the categorical imperative applies to derive specific duties. It is argued that the discussions found in these examples do not accord well with Kant’s fuller account of that application in his Iater work The Metaphysics of Morals. That [Iater] (...) work has quite different, sometimes better, arguments for the same moral conclusions, and never mentions the argument against making a lying promise (the second example). Giving exclusive or excessive altention to these four examples has distorted our understanding of Kant’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

Kant gives four examples to illustrate the application of the categoricaI imperative immediately after in troducing its “universal Iaw” formulation in Chapter Two his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. These examples have been much discussed to gain an understanding of how the categorical imperative applies to derive specific duties. It is argued that the discussions found in these examples do not accord well with Kant’s fuller account of that application in his Iater work The Metaphysics of Morals. That [Iater] (...) work has quite different, sometimes better, arguments for the same moral conclusions, and never mentions the argument against making a lying promise (the second example). Giving exclusive or excessive altention to these four examples has distorted our understanding of Kant’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

Kant's "supreme principle of morality," which he calls the "categorical imperative," is often applied by him to specific cases to reach conclusions about particular moral duties, e.g., to abstain from suicide, to not make lying promises, to render assistance to others. There are a number of such applications in the first part of his Metaphysik der Sitten , entitled the Rechtslehre, that have had less attention paid to them. In the Rechtslehre Kant is concerned with state-created laws enforced by punishment, (...) that will serve to guarantee the rights of citizens. This makes the application process somewhat different from the more familiar examples from Kant's earlier Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, which are concerned with the agent's inner decision process and the self-constraint of moral motivation. The present essay examines in some detail Kant's argument to show that there should be no such thing as an hereditary aristocracy, and compares it with the argument against making a lying promise in the Grundlegung. There are significant similarities and differences, and there are also significant connections to the ideas of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice . More briefly discussed are Kant's arguments in the Rechtslehre concerning punishment and the right of property. The whole discussion is intended as an introduction to the issues concerning the application of the categorical imperative in contexts where the result is external state-enforced laws, rather than an internal morally motivated moral decision. The issue in the former is said to be what persons abstractly considered could give their consent to in advance, where Kant makes a key distinction between a priori considerations having to do with agent liberty which lead to a moral decision concerning citizen rights, and empirical considerations having to do with happiness, which do not lead to conclusions concerning citizen rights. (shrink)

Kant behauptet, daß wir nur indirekte Pflichten haben können, von Grausamkeiten und Gewalt gegen Tiere abzusehen. Pflichten dieser Art seien direkte Pflichten gegen uns selbst, um unseren moralischen Charakter nicht zu verderben, aber könnten nicht direkte Pflichten gegenüber den Tieren sein, weil Tiere keine rationalen Wesen sind. Diese Sichtweise erscheint unbefriedigend, da die Tiere die Opfer einer solchen Mißhandlung sind, wenn sie stattfindet, und die Vorstellung, daß wir keine direkten Pflichten ihnen gegenüber haben sollen, erscheint merkwürdig. Ich plädiere dafür, daß (...) Kant, durchaus in Übereinstimmung mit seiner allgemeinen Moralphilosophie, hätte ein Konzept von direkten Pflichten gegenüber Tieren entwickeln können. Ein solches Konzept wäre weitaus plausibler und hätte Kant geholfen, mit allfälligen Problemen umzugehen, die sich im Hinblick auf die Behandlung von zurechnungsunfähigen Personen ergeben, die ebenfalls keine rationalen Wesen sind, sondern allenfalls potentiell. Zwar kann Kant durchaus plausibel machen, daß es die von ihm behaupteten indirekten Pflichten im Hinblick auf Tiere gibt, aber nicht, daß unsere Pflichten gegenüber Tieren auf derartige indirekte Pflichten beschränkt sind. Kant claimed that we could only have indirect duties to abstain from cruelty and violence to animals; such duties were directly duties to ourselves not to degrade our moral character, but could not be direct duties to animals because animals are not rational beings. This view seems unsatisfactory because animals are the victims of such mistreatment when it occurs, and the idea that we have no direct obligations to them seems odd. I urge that Kant, consistent with his general moral philosophy, could have developed a view of DIRECT duties to animals. Such a view would have been more plausible and would also have helped him deal with lurking problems concerning the treatment of incompetent humans, some of whom are also not rational beings, even potentially. Kant can plausibly claim that there are such indirect duties to animals, but not that our duties to them are limited to such indirect duties. (shrink)

The first part of Immanuel Kant's Metaphysics of Morals , Rechtslehre , has usually been discussed as a political treatise. But there are parallels between law and ethics in Kant; lawgiving in either realm is a combination of precept and incentive. In works that present his core moral philosophy of inner freedom, this freedom is an internal ethical freedom based on an underlying purely moral incentive, whose adequacy is a transcendental assumption of this part of Kant's moral philosophy. But this (...) inner freedom is paralleled by Kant's account of external freedom, where our external rights, including rights to property, are secured based on the deterrent effect of punishment under criminal law for violations of the rights of others. When we look at the Rechtslehre thus as part of Kant's practical philosophy we notice: Kant's view is that the validity of a legal precept entails an adequate incentive for acting in accord with the precept. The scope of law, and hence of imputation under law, is limited in various ways by the reach of the external incentives of deterrence, including actions based on a so-called "right of necessity." There are parallels between Kant's arguments for extending the categorical imperative as a principle for the use of our freedom to ends in the Tugendlehre and to objects in the Rechtslehre . Kant's theory of punishment, though retributivist in how it assigns appropriate punishment, is teleological/deterrent in providing incentives for not violating positive laws. Der erste Teil in Kants Werk Die Metaphysik der Sitten , die Rechtslehre , wird üblicherweise als eine politische Abhandlung diskutiert. Aber es gibt Parallelen zwischen Recht und Ethik bei Kant. Gesetzgebung ist in beiden Bereichen eine Kombination von Gesetz und Triebfeder. In den Arbeiten, die das eigentliche Herzstück von Kants Tugendlehre behandeln, ist die Freiheit eine innere ethische Freiheit, die auf einer rein moralischen Triebfeder basiert, deren Angemessenheit und Zulänglichkeit eine transzendentale Annahme dieses Teils von Kants Moralphilosophie ist. Die innere Freiheit hat jedoch eine Parallele in Kants Darstellung der äußeren Freiheit. Hier geht es um die Sicherung unserer äußeren Rechte, einschließlich des Rechts auf Eigentum, durch den Abschreckungseffekt einer Strafe für die Verletzung der Rechte Anderer. Wenn wir die Rechtslehre gerade als Teil von Kants praktischer Philosophie verstehen, dann stellen wir fest: Kant geht davon aus, daß gültige juridische Normen stets ausreichende Triebfedern dafür enthalten, daß unser Handeln diesen Normen entspricht. Der Bereich des Rechts, und damit auch der Zurechnung unter Rechtsgesetzen, wird auf unterschiedliche Weise von der Wirksamkeit äußerer Triebfedern zur Abschreckung begrenzt. Das gilt auch für Handlungen, die auf dem sogenannten "Notrecht" beruhen. Zwischen Kants Argumenten in der Tugendlehre für die Erweiterung des kategorischen Imperativs als eines Prinzips für den Gebrauch unserer Freiheit durch die Annahme, daß es Zwecke gibt, die zugleich Pflicht sind, und dem Argument in der Rechtslehre für die Notwendigkeit der Anerkennung von Eigentumsrechten bestehen signifikante Parallelen. Kants Theorie der Strafe ist, obwohl vergeltungstheoretisch mit Blick auf die Frage der Angemessenheit einer Strafe, jedenfalls auch teleologisch/abschreckungstheoretisch konzipiert, nämlich insoweit, als die Androhung von Strafen Triebfedern für die Befolgung der positiven Rechtsgesetze bereitstellt. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Capital Punishment Conclusion Bibliography.

Kant informs us that the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori proposition. It might be thought that Kant means thereby to say that we have an a priori rational insight, somewhat like that which Plato claimed for the Forms, into this basic moral truth. W. D. Ross had a similar view about human rational insight into certain basic moral principles, and in his book Kant's Ethical Theory he attritubes such a view to Kant.I argue that this initially plausible interpretation (...) is not correct, and that the "rational intuitionism" that it involves goes against Kant's whole approach to philosophy, in the first Critique as well as in the moral philosophy. I develop a new alternative interpretation, as follows: the categorical imperative is synthetic because it contains a claim about the causal/motivational power we have to act purely from the motive of duty, without any assistance from "sensible" or empirical motives, such as pleasure or pain. This claim, qua motivational, goes beyond the meaning of the categorical imperative considered as a mere ethical precept. It is a priori because this motive's source is the noumenal self.Hence to justify the categorical imperative is to show that this sort of non-sensible motive is or could be active in us as agents, and Kant is an "internalist": one who believes that morality and motivation are internally, analytically connected. Nach Kant ist der kategorische Imperativ ein synthetischer Satz a priori. Kant könnte damit sagen wollen, wir hätten in die grundlegende moralische Wahrheit, die der kategorische Imperativ darstellt, eine vernünftige Einsicht a priori, die unserer Wahrnehmung der Formen, wie Plato sie sieht, vergleichbar wäre. W. D. Ross vertrat eine ähnliche Auffassung von einer vernünftigen menschlichen Einsicht in gewisse grundlegende moralische Prinzipien, und in seinem Buch "Kant's Ethical Theory" schreibt er diese Auffassung auch Kant zu.Ich behaupte, daß diese auf den ersten Blick als plausibel erscheinende Interpretation nicht richtig ist, und daß der "rationale Intuitionismus", den sie impliziert, Kants philosophischem Ansatz, sowohl in der ersten Kritik als auch in der Moralphilosophie, ganz grundsätzlich widerspricht. Ich entwickele eine neue, alternative Interpretation: Der kategorische Imperativ ist synthetisch, weil er eine Behauptung über eine kausale/motivationale Kraft enthält, die uns zukommt und die uns befähigt, ohne irgendeine Unterstützung durch bloß empirische oder Beweggründe der Zweckrationalität wie Freude oder Schmerz allein aus der Vorstellung der Pflicht heraus zu handeln. Soweit sie den vernünftigen Beweggrund zu handeln betrifft, geht die Behauptung über die Bedeutung des kategorischen Imperativs als eines rein ethischen Gebots hinaus. Sie ist a priori, da die Quelle des vernünftigen Beweggrunds das noumenale Ich ist.Jede Rechtfertigung des kategorischen Imperativs muß folglich zeigen, daß die fragliche Art vernünftiger Beweggründe, die nicht Beweggründe bloßer Zweckrationalität sind, in uns als Handelnden aktiv ist oder jedenfalls aktiv sein könnte und daß Kant insoweit ein "Internalist" ist: das ist jemand, der meint, Moral und Motivation seien innerlich, analytisch miteinander verbunden. (shrink)

I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an 'environmental ethic' with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic (...) might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context. (shrink)

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an 'environmental ethic' with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic (...) might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context. (shrink)

Is it possible to have moral knowledge? ‘Moral justification skeptics’ hold it is not, because moral beliefs cannot have the sort of epistemic justification necessary for knowledge. This skeptical stance can be summed up in a single, neat argument, which includes the premise that ‘Inductive arguments from non-moral premises to moral conclusions are not possible.’ Other premises in the argument may rejected, but only at some cost. It would be noteworthy, therefore, if ‘inductive inferentialism’ about morals were shown to be (...) at least possible. Some philosophers may suppose that inductive moral arguments from non-moral premises cannot get off the ground, but I show that a perfectly legitimate inductive moral argument exists. This argument has non-moral premises and a moral conclusion, its premises are related to its conclusion in the right way, and it avoids some of the problems of other, better-known arguments from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’. (shrink)

The authors report and comment on student reactions to a clinical example of moral choice in the microallocation of scarce resources. Four patients require dialysis simultaneously, but only one kidney machine is available. What moral, as opposed to clinical, criteria are available to determine who should have priority?

In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. Given the many parallels between ethics and epistemology, we might suppose that the same is true in epistemology, and that we have both positive epistemic duties and negative epistemic duties. I argue that this is false; that is, that we have negative epistemic duties, but no positive ones. There are things that we ought (...) not to believe, but there is nothing that we ought to believe, on purely epistemic grounds. I also consider why the parallels between ethics and epistemology break down at this particular point, suggesting that it is due to what I call the infinite justificational ‘fecundity’ of perceptual and propositional evidence. (shrink)