Simon Jarvis shows how a re-examination of Adorno's work from the perspective of classical German philosophy allows us to achieve a fuller understanding of all ...

This paper attempts to specify the force of Michel Henry’s concept of life. It suggests that the phenomenological clarity of Henry’s concept of life is nevertheless accompanied by a certain ambiguity about the relationship between phenomenological description of life, on the one hand, and the value or pathos which is attached to ‘life’ in Henry’s work, on the other. The article pursues this relationship by showing how Henry’s account of life’s value is developed through two subsidiary but important ideas in (...) Henry’s authorship: the notions of ‘culture’ and of ‘barbarism’. It concludes that not even a material phenomenology can demonstrate that the attempt to find ‘life’ in ‘the world’ must always be (in Henry’s phrase) a ‘ruinous confusion’. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno was a German philosopher, sociologist and musicologist and was a leading member and eventually director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Adorno studied an extraordinary range of subjects during his lifetime – from dialectical logic and the syntax of poetry to newspaper astrology columns and the Hollywood studio system – and he left a significant mark on each of the many disciplines in which he worked. His philosophically sophisticated rethinking of Marxian materialism has been central to much (...) European and American social theory in the latter half of the twentieth century and his studies of mass culture, radio and television were foundational documents for the discipline of cultural studies. This collection charts the most important moments in the international reception of Adorno's thinking, covering the wide range of disciplines his studies touched upon, including literary criticism, musicology, aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics. There is also a great deal of important scholarship and commentary on Adorno in German that remains untranslated into English. This set will therefore provide Anglophone scholars with the first English translations of these important works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.1 (2001) 3-24 [Access article in PDF] Forlorn fortThe Left in trialogue Simon Jarvis Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left.London: Verso, 2000. These "Contemporary Dialogues on the Left" are both on the Left and partly worried about whether there is a future for the Left. Once, talk on the Left was largely concerned with the hope that (...) there might one day be a good end to the Left. If it now sometimes sounds worried about how to stop the Left's being brought to an end, that is partly because, as the prose for the Phronesis series candidly puts it, "Today, the left-wing project is in an even deeper crisis than it was ten years ago" [iv].One sign of hope is that the mantra "Left" of itself carries so little weight now even with those (of us) found there. It is a sign of hope that the meaning of that word is so unclear. The writers of these dialogues disagree about much. If we knew what they shared, we should know more about what in their view is the Left. By luck, what they do agree about is something striking and unusual. It is not a method, approach, or language for thinking. It is not any set of substantial theses about social experience, far less any set of proposals for altering it. It is rather an idea that is subtle, of uncertain meaning, full of political resonance, difficult in the extreme to keep hold of, and whose consequences are hard accurately to delimit. One of the contributors formulates it thus: "The universal is an empty place, a void which can be filled only by the particular, but which, through its very emptiness, produces a series of crucial effects in the structuration/destructuration of social relations" [L 58]. 1What is it for an empty place, a void, to produce a series of effects, a series of critical effects? A fair response to this question has to go a long way around. Each of these writers has come to think of "the universal" as a category both necessary and impossible. It is in the strict sense an aporetic word: we cannot do without it, yet cannot say what it "is." When it is asked, "who, we?" the question itself shows the difficulty. Insofar as the "we" of "the Left" understands itself as demanding justice for any individual or number of individuals, it finds itself appealing to an "us" that will exclude no—what, no sentient human being? Each of these writers will find lacking any theory of justice floated free into an ideal domain of rights. Yet each has seen, in quite different idioms, that it proves impossible utterly to delete all appeal to universality from political thinking. Each is trying to think new and true thoughts. Yet each understands that such thoughts are defined only through a relation to traditions of thinking with which they cannot but be entangled. The method of dialogue fosters a still more concentrated [End Page 3] complexity than that, already in-wrought, from which the authors began. In these circumstances, the long, slow route round, through intellectual history, recommends itself as a provisional method to a commentator. Triangulations Perhaps many readers start navigating this kind of book by noting the distancings. In this case, refusals to belong provide a rough means of orientation. If these maps are rough, however, they are an important part of the book's own method. The thinking of each contributor, for example, can in certain ways be understood as made possible by Hegel and Marx. Rarely, though, are Hegelian Marxists, or anyone associated with them, reasoned with here. The exceptions afford defining moments. Zizek's assertion that "one of the great and permanent results of the so-called 'Western Marxism' first formulated by the young Lukács is that the class-and-commodity structure of capitalism is not just a phenomenon limited to the particular 'domain' of economy, but the structuring principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to art and religion... (shrink)

Wordsworth wrote that he longed to compose 'some philosophic Song/Of Truth that cherishes our daily life'. Yet he never finished The Recluse, his long philosophical poem. Simon Jarvis argues that Wordsworth's aspiration to 'philosophic song' is central to his greatness, and changed the way English poetry was written. Some critics see Wordworth as a systematic thinker, while for others, he is a poet first, and a thinker only (if at all) second. Jarvis shows instead how essential both (...) philosophy and the 'song' of poetry were to Wordsworth's achievement. Drawing on advanced work in continental philosophy and social theory to address the ideological attacks which have dominated much recent commentary, Jarvis reads Wordsworth's writing both critically and philosophically, to show how Wordsworth thinks through and in verse. This study rethinks the relation between poetry and society itself by analysing the tensions between thinking philosophically and writing poetry. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Undeleter for CriticismSimon Jarvis (bio)Is there experience of beauty, or is it only that we sometimes choose to sort and name certain experiences by using a set of terms, originating often in ancient and medieval philosophy and theology and by a long process of mutation and manipulation arriving under the disciplinary heading of "aesthetics"? This question asks for at least two kinds of information. It does not (...) only ask for information about the history of the formation of the concepts of aesthetics; it also asks for information about experiences. But information about experiences is hard to come by. This is not only, perhaps, for the large reason that "information is concerned with alien objects," rather than with experiences,1 but also for the more local one that "aesthetics" does not often attempt to describe any experiences with determined fidelity.2I can illustrate this with reference to a branch of aesthetics in which I have a particular interest, the aesthetics of prosody. A good deal of subtle and sometimes brilliant work exists in this field. It is rare, however, to find writing which describes in any detail the particular experiences which a particular living individual has had in relation to a line of poetry.3 One is much more likely to find such descriptions in works of fiction (or, rarely, in brief reviews) than in professional writing on the topic of prosody. There seem at first to be some obvious and good reasons for this. Professional writing demands not that we merely report our own subjective experiences, but that we produce knowledge. Critics are not paid to be artists but to be a kind of scientists of art. But what if there is no such science? What if "there is no science of the beautiful" [Kant, CJ 172]? Would that mean that the whole subject area should simply be—deleted?That this is a possibility is confirmed by the fact that in one area of thinking about aesthetic experience, it has almost happened already. While there are still a number of paid professionals who understand part of their vocation to be bound up with investigating the experience of the beauty or other value of works of art, there are few paid aestheticians of nature.4 There have been historical periods in which numbers of printed nonfiction [End Page 3] texts were devoted both to experiences of natural beauty and also to the relative propensity of natural appearances to occasion such experiences. Such descriptions are now thought to be, insofar as they are of interest at all, the province of artists.5 This is indeed a consequence of something like an acceptance that, in the sphere of experiences of nature, at least, "there is no science of the beautiful." Most agree that "an ideal of a beautiful view is unthinkable" [CJ 80]. Yet few, perhaps, would now argue that an ideal of a beautiful poem is quite thinkable either.We are thus returned to the question posed above. If there is no science of the beautiful, must claims to experiences of beauty be treated as fictional—in the specific sense that they are matters for fiction, and not for science? Why should the concept not be altogether eliminated?Perhaps for this reason. Let us imagine that I think I have had an experience. I have been walking along a street at night, say, head down as though scrutinizing the quite complex surface of tarmacadam, kerbstone, painted parking and motoring instructions, drain covers and grilles, although perhaps in distraction I may have been allowing my eyes simply to pass lightly over all this while I think about a mortifying remark addressed to me at a recent committee meeting, or attempt to identify the catalogue number relevant to a fragment of piano music which has come into my head; may, for example, as if startled by a call or a cry of pain have raised my look from the wet pavement—which I now possibly "see" for the first time (since it is the soul which sees, and not the eye [Descartes 1: 172])—and now indeed see at a great distance ahead of me, almost at the horizon of... (shrink)

This essay considers some problems in philosophical approaches to poetry. Philosophers’ accounts of what poetry is are often ill informed. They tend to select, as essential, features that can also characterize prose works: conspicuous metaphoricity, imagination, fictionality, and so on. This essay considers instead a humbler term: verse. It argues that the constraints on language implied by composing in verse are not only a handicap but can also be an engine for thinking. Even philosophy has sometimes been thought in verse, (...) rather than thought first in prose and versified later. This argument is explored through a brief consideration of Alexander Pope's Essay on Man. The essay concludes by questioning a further way of distinguishing between poetry and philosophy, Peter Lamarque's claim that paraphrasability is essential to philosophy but fatal to poetry. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

This essay revisits the relationship between philosophy and poetry. It argues that a crucial term, ‘verse’, is often missing from discussion of that relationship. The broader term, ‘poetry’, is so difficult to define that it offers insufficient specific resistance to large philosophical schemas. The question is explored here through an analysis of the prosodic microstructures in John Wilkinson's The Speaking Twins. I conclude that Wilkinson's poem is an instance of ‘unfree verse’ and that the poem's verse technique is also the (...) site of its historical truth-content. (shrink)

Adenosine transport in cultured human umbilical vein endothelial cells (HUVEC) was characterized and shown to be mediated by a single facilitated diffusion mechanism. Initial rates of adenosine influx at 22 degrees C were saturable [apparent Michaelis constant, 69 +/- 10 mu M; maximum velocity (V-max), 600 +/- 70 pmol.10(6) cells(-1).s(-1)] and inhibited by nitrobenzylthioinosine (NBMPR). Formycin B had an unusually high affinity [inhibitory constant K-i), 18 +/- 4.3 mu M], whereas inosine had a low affinity (K-i, 440 +/- 68 mu (...) M) and nucleobases were without effect on adenosine influx. The number of transporters (1.2 x 10(6) sites/cell) was estimated by NBMPR equilibrium binding (apparent dissociation constant, 0.11 +/- 0.01 nM; maximum binding, 2.0 +/- 0.15 pmol/10(6) cells). In addition, we compared these endothelial cells with those obtained from cords from pregnancies complicated by diabetes (HUVEC-D), since embriopathy may occur in these conditions. HUVEC-D exhibited a 2.3-fold reduction in both the V-max for adenosine influx and the maximum number of NBMPR binding sites (260 +/- 40 pmol.10(6) cells(-1).s(-1) and 0.86 +/- 0.08 pmol/10(6) cells, respectively). However, the turnover number for each nucleoside transporter in normal and diabetic HUVEC was similar (approximate to 300 adenosine molecules/s). Adenosine metabolism at 10 mu M in HUVEC-D was modified compared with normal cells. Intracellular phosphorylation (> 90%) was the predominant pathway in normal HUVEC, whereas in HUVEC-D, substantial levels of adenine and adenosine were detected. The present results demonstrate therefore the downregulation of the NBMPR-sensitive nucleoside transporter and changes in adenosine metabolism in HUVEC from diabetic pregnancies. (shrink)

Polyclonal antibodies raised against the human erythrocyte nucleoside transporter were used to investigate the distribution of the nucleoside transporters in the placenta. Immunoblots of brush-border membranes isolated from the human syncytiotrophoblast revealed a cross-reactive species that co-migrated with the erythrocyte nucleoside transporter as a broad band of apparent M 55,000. In contrast, no labelling was detected in basal membranes containing a similar number of equilibrative nucleoside transporters as assessed by nitrobenzylthioinosine -binding. The absence of cross-reactive epitopes in basal membranes and (...) their presence in brush-border membranes was confirmed by confocal immunofluorescence microscopy. The results suggest that at least two isoforms of the NBMPR-sensitive nucleoside transporter are present in the human placenta. The lumenal surfaces of fetal capillaries, small placental vessels and umbilical vein ware also strongly labelled by the antibody, a finding that suggests that the high fetal-placental adenosine uptake previously reported is due to endothelial transporters. (shrink)

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology is the idea that whether one knows some proposition depends on whether one can rely on it practically. Total pragmatic encroachment affirms that practical considerations of this sort encroach not just on knowledge but on all interesting normative epistemic statuses a belief might have. Ichikawa, Jarvis, and Rubin (2012) have argued that this stronger thesis conflicts with mainstream belief‐desire psychology. Worse still, they argue that attempting to defend the thesis gets one caught in vicious circularities. (...) The aim of this paper is to show that, if we are careful in how we understand the key idea of being sensitive to practical considerations, we can defend total pragmatic encroachment and avoid the circularities. In fact, depending on how it is understood, we can even square mainstream belief‐desire psychology with total pragmatic encroachment as well. (shrink)

Popper's Open Society After Fifty Years presents a coherent survey of the reception and influence of Karl Popper's masterpiece The Open Society and its Enemies over the fifty years since its publication in 1945, as well as applying some of its principles to the context of modern Eastern Europe. This unique volume contains papers by many of Popper's contemporaries and friends, including such luminaries as Ernst Gombrich, in his paper "The Open Society and its Enemies: Remembering its Publication Fifty Years (...) Ago.". (shrink)

In The Realm of Rights Judith Thomson provides a full-scale, systematic theory of human and social rights, bringing out what in general makes an attribution of ...

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next twenty (...) or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

According to robust virtue epistemology , knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We propose (...) a novel way to resolve this problem. Key to our proposal will be an appreciation of different representational states beholden to truth. We suggest these different representational states are distinguished by how, in the proper governance of these states, the twin goods of attaining truth and avoiding error are weighted. Moreover, we explain how varieties of representational states line up with varieties of cognitive achievement such that knowledge, cum cognitive achievement, must be safe because of the kind of attempt at success that belief is—namely, an attempt that places the premium it does on avoiding error. (shrink)

One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core problem, we suggest, is that belief may not be (...) enough to register all aspects of a subject’s epistemic position with respect to any given proposition. We claim this problem can be solved by introducing other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations—that differ in strength from belief. The resulting alternative picture, a kind of doxastic states pluralism, retains the central features of traditional epistemology—most saliently, an emphasis on truth as a kind of objective accuracy—while adequately accounting for rational action. (shrink)

I show that frequentism, as an explanation of probability in classical statistical mechanics, can be extended in a natural way to a decoherent quantum history space, the analogue of a classical phase space. The result is a form of finite frequentism, in which Gibbs’ concept of an infinite ensemble of gases is replaced by the quantum state expressed as a superposition of a finite number of decohering microstates. It is a form of finite and actual frequentism (as opposed to hypothetical (...) frequentism) insofar as all the microstates exist, in keeping with the decoherence-based Everett interpretation, and some versions of pilot-wave theory. (shrink)

The central claim of this article is that post-truth requires a political and socio-economical perspective, rather than a moral or epistemological one. The article consists of two parts. The first part offers a critical examination of the dominant analyses of post-truth in terms of shifting standards of the origin and the evaluation of facts. Moreover, the claim that postmodernism is the cause of post-truth is examined and refuted. In the second part an alternative perspective is developed, centring around the notion (...) of gatekeepers. Rather than linking post-truth to bullshit and postmodernism, it should be understood as a symptom of a contemporary shift in the gatekeepers of truth and knowledge. Knowledge and truth are always mediated in society through the hands of gatekeeping institutions such as journalism or science. Post-truth is a symptom of a broader transformation of the gatekeeping institutions of our current society. It therefore requires a political philosophy of these institutional shifts and the new risks they involve. (shrink)

One Stoic response to the skeptical indistinguishability argument is that it fails to account for expertise: the Stoics allow that while two similar objects create indistinguishable appearances in the amateur, this is not true of the expert, whose appearances succeed in discriminating the pair. This paper re-examines the motivations for this Stoic response, and argues that it reveals the Stoic claim that, in generating a kataleptic appearance, the perceiver’s mind is active, insofar as it applies concepts matching the perceptual stimulus. (...) I argue that this claim is reflected in the Stoic definition of the kataleptic appearance, and that it respects their more general account of mental representation. I further suggest that, in attributing some activity to the mind in creating each kataleptic appearance, and in claiming that the expert’s mind allows her to form more kataleptic appearances than the amateur, the Stoics draw inspiration from the wax tablet model in Plato’s Theaetetus (190e–196d), where Socrates distinguishes the wise from the ignorant on the basis of how well they match sensory input with its appropriate mental ‘seal’ (σφραγίς). (shrink)

This is a book about the religious life of the Greeks from the eighth century BC to the fifth century AD, looked at in the context of a variety of different cities and periods. Simon Price does not describe some abstract and self-contained system of religion or myths but examines local practices and ideas in the light of general Greek ideas, relating them for example, to gender roles and to cultural and political life (including Attic tragedy and the trial (...) of Socrates). He also lays emphasis on the reactions to Greek religions of ancient thinkers - Greek, Roman, Jewish and Christian. The evidence drawn on is of all kinds: literary texts, which are translated throughout; inscriptions, including an appendix of newly translated Greek inscriptions; and archaeology, which is highlighted in the numerous illustrations. (shrink)

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)