An assessment is offered of the recent debate on information in the philosophy of biology, and an analysis is provided of the notion of information as applied in scientific practice in molecular genetics. In particular, this paper deals with the dependence of basic generalizations of molecular biology, above all the ‘central dogma’, on the so-called ‘informational talk’ (Maynard Smith [2000a]). It is argued that talk of information in the ‘central dogma’ can be reduced to causal claims. In that respect, the (...) primary aim of the paper is to consider a solution to the major difficulty of the causal interpretation of genetic information: how to distinguish the privileged causal role assigned to nucleic acids, DNA in particular, in the processes of replication and protein production. A close reading is proposed of Francis H. C. Crick's On Protein Synthesis (1958) and related works, to which we owe the first explicit definition of information within the scientific practice of molecular biology. Introduction 1.1 The basic questions of the information debate 1.2 The causal interpretation (CI) of biological information and Crick's ‘central dogma’ Crick's definitions of genetic information The main requirement for (CI) Types of causation in molecular biology 4.1 Structural causation in molecular biology 4.2 Nucleic acids as correlative causal factors The ‘central dogma’ without the notion of information Concluding remarks This is a new version of this article as there were errors in the abstract and full text in the previous version. (shrink)

An assessment is offered of the recent debate on information in the philosophy of biology, and an analysis is provided of the notion of information as applied in scientific practice in molecular genetics. In particular, this paper deals with the dependence of basic generalizations of molecular biology, above all the 'central dogma', on the socalled 'informational talk'. It is argued that talk of information in the 'central dogma' can be reduced to causal claims. In that respect, the primary aim of (...) the paper is to consider a solution to the major difficulty of the causal interpretation of genetic information: how to distinguish the privileged causal role assigned to nucleic acids, DNA in particular, in the processes of replication and protein production. A close reading is proposed of Francis H. C. Crick's On Protein Synthesis and related works, to which we owe the first explicit definition of information within the scientific practice of molecular biology. (shrink)

The most recent resurgence of philosophical attention to the so-called ‘functional talk’ in the sciences can be summarized in terms of the following questions: (Q1) What kind of restrictions, and in particular, what kind of evolutionary restrictions as well as to what extent, are involved in functional ascriptions? (Q2) How can we account for the explanatory import of function-ascribing statements? This paper addresses these questions on the basis of a modified version of Cummins’ functional analysis. The modification in question is (...) concerned with phylogenetical restrictions on causal role functions, and it stems from an analysis of some primary areas in molecular biology. I examine how evolutionary consideration affects the so-called “function-analytical explanatory strategy” (Cummins [1975] 1998, 2002). Finally, I argue that the neo-functional analysis here proposed accounts for a certain convergence between the main rival theories of biological function. (shrink)

The most recent resurgence of philosophical attention to the so-called ‘functional talk' in the sciences can be summarized in terms of the following questions: (Q1) What kind of restrictions, and in particular, what kind of evolutionary restrictions as well as to what extent, is involved in functional ascriptions? (Q2) How can we account for the explanatory import of function-ascribing statements? This paper addresses these questions through a modified version of Cummins' functional analysis. The modification in question is concerned with phylogenetical (...) restrictions on causal role functions, and it stems from an analysis of some primary areas in molecular biology. I examine how evolutionary consideration affects the so-called ‘function-analytical explanatory strategy' (Cummins [1975] 1998, 2002). Finally, I argue that the neo-functional analysis here proposed accounts for a certain convergence between the main rival theories of biological function. ‡I wish to thank David Davies, Eva Jablonka, Thomas Reydon, and Marcel Weber for their helpful comments. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka, Omladinska 14, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This book explains the ethical and conceptual tensions in the use of psychopathy in different countries, including America, Canada, the UK, Croatia, Australia, and New Zealand. It offers an extensive critical analysis of how psychopathy functions within institutional and social contexts. Inside, readers will find innovative interdisciplinary analysis, written by leading international experts. The chapters explore how different countries have used this diagnosis. A central concern is whether psychopathy is a mental disorder, and this has a bearing upon whether it (...) should be used. The book’s case studies will help readers understand the problems associated with psychopathy. Academics and students working in the philosophy of psychiatry, bioethics, and moral psychology will find it a valuable resource. In addition, it will also appeal to mental health professionals working in forensic settings, psychologists with an interest in the ethical implications of the use of psychopathy as a construct and particularly those with a research interest in it. (shrink)

Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal, and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether ‘psychopathy’ designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways (...) of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualized. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasize its role in clinical and forensic research that makes it an important pragmatic kind. (shrink)

The concept of regulation pervades biology, for example in models of genetic regulatory networks and the endocrine system. Regulation has a normative opposite, dysregulation, which figures prominently in biomedical models of disease. The use of normative concepts in biology, however, has been thought to present some challenges for the physicalist view of the world, and various resolutions have been proposed. Up to now the problem of biological normativity has been debated largely in connection with the concept of biological information. In (...) this paper we shift focus to the concept of biological regulation, proposing that it provides a promising new approach to these issues. Models of regulatory systems have several features: they are causal, but they do not deal with the energy exchanges and transformations covered by physics and chemistry; further, and entirely connected, regulatory systems can break down, and this is because they and their causal-regulatory properties are dependent on fragile molecular structures. Biological regulatory systems exhibit normativity, because they are not determined by physical and chemical laws, but their close relationship with physical laws and physicalist ontology is transparent. (shrink)

We examine the use of the notion of natural selection in the philosophical debate on functions in biology. This debate has been largely shaped by the way in which different accounts assess various selective pressures in justifying claims about biological functions. Cummins (Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 157–172, 2002), one of the main proponents of the causal role account of biological functions, argues that a correctly understood neo-Darwinian notion of natural (...) selection has nothing to do with functional talk in biology. In this paper, we counter Cummins’ account by showing that progress in the molecular approaches to evolutionary biology—specifically scientific data available in neo-functionalization research—offers valuable support to the etiological selectionist approach to functions in biological and biologically-related sciences. Finally, we use the presented data to build our own account of biological functions, which tries to avoid the wrong turns taken by both major strands in the biological function debate, namely causal role and etiological accounts. According to our account, the function of a certain gene or a protein in the biological system that contains it is a particular causal activity, or a group of causal activities whose manifestation is in a specific way determined by corresponding mechanisms of genetic expression. Also, we argue that in many important cases this particular expression of genetic activity was positively selected at a certain point in evolutionary history. Since we take selection as an important but not the only factor that grounds biological functions, we are committed to a weak etiological account. (shrink)

We examine the philosophical and empirical issues related to the question whether psychopathy can be considered a psychiatric natural kind. Natural kinds refer to categories that are privileged because they the capture certain real divisions in nature. Generally, in philosophical debates regarding psychiatry, there is much scepticism about the possibility that psychiatric categories track natural kinds. We outline the main positions in the debate about natural kinds in psychiatry and examine whether psychopathy can be considered as a natural kind on (...) any of the proposed accounts. By examining the scientific literature on psychopathy, we draw two main conclusions: (1) the empirical data currently do not support the view that this condition is unified enough to be considered a natural kind; (2) the construct of psychopathy plays useful roles both in the context of scientific research and in forensic and clinical settings. These considerations bring us to our tentative conclusion about psychopathy as a kind in the making, a sort of “under construction” category with potential for improvement and refinement with further research. (shrink)

It has become a standard view in the philosophy of science scholarship (e.g., van Fraassen [1989]) that debates on the problem of laws of nature and/or scientific laws employ pre-Kantian approaches to the subject in question. But what exactly a Kantian approach might look like and, above all, what Kant endorses on this matter are not entirely settled issues. In particular, this regards Kant’s argument on the problem of ’necessity grounding’ with respect to different types of the so-called “empirical laws (...) of nature” (empirische Naturgesetze) in the third Critique. In order to assess the aforementioned problem, in this paper I will address the following questions:1) What is Kant’s main nomological criterion or a combination of criteria, that is, the criterion/criteria according to which we can explicate the distinction between laws of nature and accidentally true statements?2) What exactly is the role of an apriori law of nature, such as the one instantiated by the Second Analogy of Experience, in considering nature as a lawful existence of objects?3) On what grounds can a statement describing a particular causal regularity, for example, the statement “the sun warms the stone” (Prolegomena, N 301), be viewed as an empirical law of nature?4) Is Kant’s systematicity a nomological criterion in the strict and standard sense or, rather, is it a certain kind of transcendental criterion, which not only makes the whole of Kant’s nomological machinery up and running, but also has decisive influence on the final arrangement of nomological criteria? (shrink)

It has become a standard view in the philosophy of science scholarship (e.g., van Fraassen [1989]) that debates on the problem of laws of nature and/or scientific laws employ pre-Kantian approaches to the subject in question. But what exactly a Kantian approach might look like and, above all, what Kant endorses on this matter are not entirely settled issues. In particular, this regards Kant’s argument on the problem of ’necessity grounding’ with respect to different types of the so-called “empirical laws (...) of nature” (empirische Naturgesetze) in the third Critique. In order to assess the aforementioned problem, in this paper I will address the following questions:1) What is Kant’s main nomological criterion or a combination of criteria, that is, the criterion/criteria according to which we can explicate the distinction between laws of nature and accidentally true statements?2) What exactly is the role of an apriori law of nature, such as the one instantiated by the Second Analogy of Experience, in considering nature as a lawful existence of objects?3) On what grounds can a statement describing a particular causal regularity, for example, the statement “the sun warms the stone” (Prolegomena, N 301), be viewed as an empirical law of nature?4) Is Kant’s systematicity a nomological criterion in the strict and standard sense or, rather, is it a certain kind of transcendental criterion, which not only makes the whole of Kant’s nomological machinery up and running, but also has decisive influence on the final arrangement of nomological criteria? (shrink)

In recent years the number of scholarly publications devoted to Kant's theory of biology has rapidly growing, with particular attention being given to Kant's thoughts about the concepts of teleology, function, organism, and their respective roles in scientific practice. Moving from these recent studies, and distancing itself from their mostly evolutionary background, the main aim of the present paper is to suggest an original "cognitive turn" in the interpretation of Kant's theory of biology. More specifically, the Authors will trace a (...) connection between some Kantian theses about the “peculiar” or special nature of the human mind, advanced in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, and some specific epistemological issues pertaining to the research practice of contemporary molecular biology. (shrink)

In the debate on causal explanation in biology, in the past two decades largely influenced by the new mechanist approach, the concept of a pathway has recently reemerged as a promising research agenda, 551-572, 2018; The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72, 131-158, 2021). Ross’ account of biological explanation differentiates several autonomous types of causal structures that play explanatory and other roles across the life sciences. NM, however, prioritizes mechanisms as vehicles of biological explanations. According to this program, (...) the causal architecture of biological pathways and other causal structures, such as cascades and processes, can be interpreted with at least one of the NM’s mechanism concepts. In other words, these alternative causal structures are not sufficiently distinctive to merit the explanatory autonomy with regard to the NM corresponding concepts. We examine the explanatory practice of molecular biology and concur with Ross that there are indeed distinct types of causal structures, not all falling under the concept of a mechanism. Nonetheless, we show that the concept of mechanism is referring to a privileged causal structure, at the center of explanatory efforts in molecular biology. Pathways and other causal concepts, while somewhat distinct from mechanisms themselves, are explanatorily relevant to the degree in which they exhibit mechanistic features, are parts of a mechanistic architecture, or may lead to a mechanistic arrangement. What emerges in that manner is a hierarchy of causal structures with mechanisms at the explanatory top, and lower levels differing in the degree in which they contribute to mechanistic arrangements. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze, from a philosophical perspective, the scientific robustness of the construct of psychopathy as measured by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised that was developed by Robert Hare (1991; 2003). The scientific robustness and validity of classifications are topics of many debates in philosophy of science and philosophy of psychiatry more specifically. The main problem consists in establishing whether scientific classifications reflect natural kinds where the concept of a natural kind refers to the existence of (...) some objective divisions in nature that do not depend exclusively on subjective judgments of the classifier. The construct of psychopathy is especially interesting since the diagnosis of psychopathy has substantial social consequences. In the light of the recent debates regarding the problem of natural kinds in philosophy of psychiatry, we advocate the following distinction between two types of scientific classifications: natural and practical kinds. Natural kinds refer to those categories that are united by common causal mechanisms or properties. Practical kinds refer to categories that fulfill some practical classificatory goals such as prediction. We argue that the construct of psychopathy can fulfill the role of a practical kind. In addition, we contend that our current scientific knowledge about psychopathy does not allow us to conclude that this category is a natural kind. (shrink)

Argues for the continuing relevance of Albert Schweitzer's thought, especially of his overarching theme of Reverence for Life.

This book is the first to systematically develop, explain, and apply diagrammatic projection operators to construct all semi-simple Lie algebras, both classical and exceptional.

The key assumption behind evolutionary epistemology is that animals are active learners or ‘knowers’. In the present study, I updated the concept of natural learning, developed by Henry Plotkin and John Odling-Smee, by expanding it from the animal-only territory to the biosphere-as-a-whole territory. In the new interpretation of natural learning the concept of biological information, guided by Peter Corning’s concept of “control information”, becomes the ‘glue’ holding the organism–environment interactions together. The control information guides biological systems, from bacteria to ecosystems, (...) in the process of natural learning executed by the universal algorithm. This algorithm, summarized by the acronym IGPT (information-gain-process-translate) incorporates natural cognitive methods including sensing/perception, memory, communication, and decision-making. Finally, the biosphere becomes the distributed network of communicative interactions between biological systems termed the interactome. The concept of interactome is based on Gregory Bateson’s natural epistemology known as the “ecology of mind”. Mimicking Bateson’s approach, the interactome may also be designated “physiology of mind”—the principle behind regulating the biosphere homeostasis. (shrink)

U clanku je naznacen model za naucnu deskripciju stilova politickog liderstva u Srbiji u periodu od 1990. do danas, odnosno, ukazano na osnovne elemente koncepta koji je autor razvio u studiji?Stil politickih lidera u Srbiji: U periodu 1990-2006. godine?. Autor izlaze oceni analiticki instrumentarij koji pomenuti koncept obuhvata, istovremeno ukazujuci na korelativne teorijske pristupe koje u navedenoj studiji nije razmatrao, a mogu biti od znacaja za istrazivanje politickih elita u Srbiji. Doprinos u epistemoloskom delu metoda registruje se u definisanju pojma (...) stila politickog liderstva, kao i kategorijalnog aparata koji ga prati - pojmljenog sa aspekta politickog stila: stila gradjenja politicke moci, stila politicke komunikacije, stila gradjenja legitimiteta, stila ideologije, politickog jezika, politicke simbolike i rituala, neverbalne komunikacije i stila iskazivanja patriotizma. Polazeci od stanovista da politicki stilovi odgovaraju karakteristikama politickih kultura i da je potrebno koncipirati idealno-tipske modele stilova fokusnih politickih subjekata, u clanku se ocrtava tipologija stilova politickog liderstva primerena specificnostima delanja politickih lidera u Srbiji: autoritarni, republikanski, realisticki, populisticki, konformisticki, revolucionarni i stil politicara buntovnika. (shrink)

Selvhjælpsbog, som forbedrer læserens kommunikationsevne.

knjiga 1. Od antike do kraja devetnaestog stoljeća -- knjiga 2. Od kraja devetnaestoga stoljeća do drugoga svjetskog rata.

Enkulturacija u sociologiji označava uključivanje neke osobe, najčešće djeteta, u obrasce kulture u kojoj se razvija i odrasta. Stoga možemo reći da su i moralni obrasci koje je ta osoba stekla proizišli iz te kulture. Otuda je očevidno da ne postoji jedan univerzalan moral, već se on razlikuje od kulture do kulture. Teza enkulturacije uklapa se u govor o moralnom relativizmu, koji tvrdi da su moralne tvrdnje istinite samo u odnosu na neki standard ili okvir, a ujedno ni taj standard (...) nije isključivo moralno opravdan. Stoga se nameću sljedeća pitanja: smijemo li uopće moralne vrijednosti neke kulture proglasiti nemoralnima?; postoje li granice do kojih bi moral neke kulture bio prihvatljiv i gdje te granice prestaju?; pomaže li stav o prihvaćanju kulture koja ima drukčije moralne vrijednosti njegovanju tolerancije i smanjivanju napetosti među ljudima? U ovoj raspravi nezaobilazni su rezultati istraživanja antropologa koji su se putujući svijetom susretali s kulturama koje niti malo ne nalikuju njihovoj.Enculturation in sociology signifies the inclusion of a person, most often a child, into the patterns of a culture it is developed and grows up in. Thus, we can say that the moral patterns that person acquired are the product of this culture. Hence, it is obvious that there is no universal morality, but that it is different from one culture to another. The thesis of enculturation fits into the discourse about moral relativism, which claims that moral postulates are only true relative to a standard or framework, and that even this standard is not exclusively morally justified. So the following questions arise: can we even announce that the moral values of a culture are amoral; are there limits to which a morality of a culture is acceptable, and where those limits stop; does the attitude about the acceptance of a culture with different moral values helps cherishing of tolerance and the reduction of tensions between people? In this discussion the results of research by anthropologists who met with cultures unlike their own in their travel around the world, are unavoidable. (shrink)

Deklaracija o svjetskome ethosu, što su ju predstavnici velikih svjetskih religija i manjih duhovnih konfesija usvojili na drugom Parlamentu religija svijeta u Chicagu 1993., utrla je put prema onoj vrsti sporazumijevanja koju nije imala nikada do sada. Naime, pokušaji dijaloga među religijama, ekumenizam i tolerancija, koji su bili ključni pojmovi u drugoj polovini 20. stoljeća, imali su bazični nedostatak, a to je pokušaj prihvaćanja i uvažavanja tuđeg učenja, koje se razlikuje od vlastitoga, tj. sve se svodilo na »vježbanje tolerancije«. Naspram (...) navedenih nastojanja u međureligijskoj i međukonfesionalnoj suradnji, svjetski ethos nastoji doći do zajedničkih temelja, i to ne samo zajedničkih u religijama već i u nereligijskim etičkim sustavima, te se trudi pronaći i odrediti ethos na kojemu bi se zasnivale profesije koje čine bazu razvoja suvremenog društva.Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, adopted by representatives of great world religions and lesser spiritual confessions at II. Parliament of World Religions in Chicago 1993, have paved the way towards that kind of understanding that was never reached before. Namely, attempts of dialogue between religions, ecumenisms of tolerances, that were key terms in the second half of 20th century, all have basic failure, i.e., an attempt to accept and respect doctrines of the others, different from our own, i.e. everything was reduced to “practicing tolerance”. Against the above mentioned efforts in interreligious and interconfessional cooperation, the global ethic try to reach the common grounds, not just common in religion but also in unreligious ethical systems, and it attempts to find and determine the ethos which should serve as fundamentals for professions that make basics of contemporary society development. (shrink)