This comprehensive and accessible volume covers four periods, each with a different focus. From 300 to 750, Canning examines Christian ideas of rulership. The often neglected centuries from 750 to 1050, the Carolingian period and its aftermath, are given special attention. From 1050 to 1290 the conflict between temporal and spiritual power comes to the fore. Finally, in the period from 1290 to 1450, Canning focuses on the confrontation of church and state ideas with political realities.

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic (...) norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative. (shrink)

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 35.1 (2005) 99-118MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Klossowski's AlternativePeter CanningThe sympathy that binds friends together into an extended family (a socius or community of allies), countering the impulse to tear each other apart, stops at the gate where the stranger is received with courtesy or turned away. Is it safe to let the other in, past the frontier of my territory, my extended Self? An ancient Greek proverb says (...) that "a friend is a second self"—which echoes the reversible sense of the word guest in ancient Indo-European languages (*hosti-pets-, "guest-master"), which continues into modern French hôte, "host" or "guest." This reciprocity actualizes the inclusive "or": one is guest or host in a reciprocal relation of hospitality. The friend is another self in that each becomes master of the other's house when received by the other as guest. Nor is the relation of hospitality limited to friendship; for according to an archaic tradition the Other, the "stranger sent from god" (as Homer says) is also to be received as guest-master of one's house.These are mythic and etymological conditions, probably idealized and in any case obsolete—what does the archaic institution of hospitality (supposing it was ever practiced in its ideal form) have to do with the crisis of social relation today?In what follows I propose an extended Klossowskian response to this question. But as a preliminary abbreviation let us turn the question around: is any social relation, today or any other day, even possible without passing through—or holding open—the moment of hospitality, of reception of the other, friend or stranger?When I let the other cross my threshold and penetrate the precinct of my home, my family, my own and proper extension of Self, when I give him my friendship and trust, it is then he becomes dangerous to me.1 Menelaus gave Paris his trust as an honored guest, whereupon his guest-friend abducted his wife, instigating the Trojan War.What is the psychic situation conditioned by receiving the other inside my Self? Taken literally, topologically, it is that the other as stranger becomes a part of me, inside me, that is, outside my control. What is inside and what is out, who is me and who is not-me? What and where is the psyche; what is its topology? Does it have an interior and exterior separated by a border between? "To see in the human soul a place [lieu, locus]—no longer to regard the human person otherwise than cohabited by the powers that can take possession of it: exterior powers, autonomous, those evoked by the Gospel—the ornate house that awaits the visit of demons and which, visited, is the parable [End Page 99] of the soul of each among us; this mental topology... the pathos itself [being] only a topos" [Monnoyer 35].Psyche and home are not only analogous or parabolic but the same situation, the same structure. Hospitality is a practice of that patho-logical identity, and a parable of psyche as locus of the Other.* * *Preliminary to entering further into this topic, it is necessary to raise another Klossowskian problem, of equal urgency (and intersecting that of hospitality): the place of perversion.Rather than take space to justify Klossowski's numerous equivocal apologias for the "singular case" of Sade (or Nietzsche),2 theorist of perversion, rhetorician, metteur en scène anxious to infect others with his unspeakable visions (demonic forms of perversion itself) and provoke them to institute the secret cult and practice of his theories—let us take up directly the matter of a definition: what is perversion? More to the point: what is its logic?Freud derives perversion from narcissism: to take one's own body as the object of the drive (or as object of desire), that is, as the object of eros and thanatos, self-love and self-destruction. But all drive passes by way of this loop from the body to itself—to the point that it becomes a question of how one is ever to get... (shrink)

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...) to an accidentally true belief; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink)

" Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...) moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia ; let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes' evil demon, and yet what the figment is made of will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences. Descartes claimed to doubt everything that could be doubted, but he never doubted that his conscious experiences had qualia, the properties by which he knew or apprehended them. (shrink)

The social sciences playa variety of multifaceted roles in the policymaking process. So varied are these roles, indeed, that it is futile to talk in the singular about the use of social science in policymaking, as if there were one constant relationship between two fixed and stable entities. Instead, to address this issue sensibly one must talk in the plural about uses of dif ferent modes of social scientific inquiry for different kinds of policies under various circumstances. In some cases, (...) the influence of social scientific research is direct and tangible, and the connection between the find ings and the policy is easy to see. In other cases, perhaps most, its influence is indirect-one small piece in a larger mosaic of politics, bargaining, and compromise. Occasionally the findings of social scientific studies are explicitly drawn upon by policymakers in the formation, implementation, or evaluation of particular policies. More often, the categories and theoretical models of social science provide a general background orientation within which policymakers concep tualize problems and frame policy options. At times, the in fluence of social scientific work is cognitive and informational in nature; in other instances, policymakers use social science primarily for symbolic and political purposes in order to le gitimate preestablished goals and strategies. Nonetheless, amid this diversity and variety, troubling general questions persistently arise. (shrink)

Written for anyone working in the field of early years education and care, this book encourages students and practitioners to consider their own practice and to examine practice in a wide range of early years settings.

The question of ‘who owns genetic information‘ is increasingly a focus of ethical inquiry. Applied to predictive testing, several recent critiques suggest that persons with a genetic disorder have a moral duty to disclose that information to other family members. The justification for this obligation is that genetic information belongs to and may benefit not only a single individual, but also members of a biological kinship. This paper considers this issue from a different vantage point: How does gender intersect with (...) the moral duty to disclose genetic information? Scholars have argued that gender is partly comprised of distinct assignments and assumptions of responsibility. Thus, there is a danger that gendered patterns of socialization will make women feel that they should take primary responsibility for disclosing genetic information to others. This article explores issues of responsibility and disclosure of risk information by drawing on an empirical study of women and men who have undergone genetic testing for hereditary breast/ovarian cancer. The research study suggests that disclosure of genetic information is a gendered activity, with both the benefits and burdens of this task falling primarily on women. It also illustrates that when disclosure is understood contextually, it is a far more complicated matter than when viewed through a theoretical lens. The article considers the relevance of these findings on ethical debate and genetic counselling practices. (shrink)

Through a focused and systematic examination of late medieval scholastic writers - theologians, philosophers and jurists - Joseph Canning explores how ideas about power and legitimate authority were developed over the 'long fourteenth century'. The author provides a new model for understanding late medieval political thought, taking full account of the intensive engagement with political reality characteristic of writers in this period. He argues that they used Aristotelian and Augustinian ideas to develop radically new approaches to power and authority, (...) especially in response to political and religious crises. The book examines the disputes between King Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII and draws upon the writings of Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham, Bartolus, Baldus and John Wyclif to demonstrate the variety of forms of discourse used in the period. It focuses on the most fundamental problem in the history of political thought - where does legitimate authority lie? (shrink)

1. Happiness, then and now -- Happiness, eudaimonia, and practical reasoning -- Happiness as eudaimonia -- Happiness and virtuous activity -- New directions from old debates -- 2. Happiness then: the sufficiency debate -- Aristotle's case against the sufficiency thesis -- 3. Happiness now: rethinking the self -- Socrates' case for the sufficiency thesis -- Epictetus and the stoic self -- The Stoics' case for the sufficiency thesis -- The embodied conception of the self -- The embodied conception and psychological (...) well-being -- The Stoics' case against the embodied conception. (shrink)

The question of ‘who owns genetic information‘ is increasingly a focus of ethical inquiry. Applied to predictive testing, several recent critiques suggest that persons with a genetic disorder have a moral duty to disclose that information to other family members. The justification for this obligation is that genetic information belongs to and may benefit not only a single individual, but also members of a biological kinship. This paper considers this issue from a different vantage point: How does gender intersect with (...) the moral duty to disclose genetic information? Scholars have argued that gender is partly comprised of distinct assignments and assumptions of responsibility. Thus, there is a danger that gendered patterns of socialization will make women feel that they should take primary responsibility for disclosing genetic information to others. This article explores issues of responsibility and disclosure of risk information by drawing on an empirical study of women and men who have undergone genetic testing for hereditary breast/ovarian cancer. The research study suggests that disclosure of genetic information is a gendered activity, with both the benefits and burdens of this task falling primarily on women. It also illustrates that when disclosure is understood contextually, it is a far more complicated matter than when viewed through a theoretical lens. The article considers the relevance of these findings on ethical debate and genetic counselling practices. (shrink)

Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!".

Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise (...) some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism. (shrink)

Canning, Raymond I was born on 15 September 1947. That same year, on 5 August, the International Council of Christians and Jews, meeting in Switzerland, had issued what have become known as 'The Ten Points of Seelisberg'.1 As grief and shame over the Shoah took root, the necessity for a radical change of theological, cultural and political attitudes on the part of Christians became clear. These Ten Points articulate key dimensions of that growing perception. They can therefore be understood (...) as forming an initial basis for the Christian-Jewish dialogue that was already gathering momentum.2 They also represent a first step in the process that led, eighteen years later, to Nostra Aetate, the document on the Catholic Church's relation to non-Christian religions that would emerge from the Second Vatican Council in late 1965. At various stages during the council years, it had appeared that the bishops' engagement with the new demands and manifold ramifications of Christian-Jewish relations expressed at Seelisberg might fail to produce any new official statement of Catholic Church teaching on the matter. Would the council after all remain silent on this crucial question? Yves Congar expressed the sentiments of many when, faced with this prospect in May 1965, he wrote in his council diary: 'For myself, however, I am in no way in favour of the pure and simple withdrawal of the text. Twenty years after Auschwitz it is impossible for the Council to say nothing'.3 And, as we now know, with the declaration Nostra Aetate the 'something' the council did succeed in saying, however small it may have appeared at that time, continues to resonate more than fifty years later. (shrink)

It has become customary to conceptualize the living cell as an intricate piece of machinery, different to a man-made machine only in terms of its superior complexity. This familiar understanding grounds the conviction that a cell's organization can be explained reductionistically, as well as the idea that its molecular pathways can be construed as deterministic circuits. The machine conception of the cell owes a great deal of its success to the methods traditionally used in molecular biology. However, the recent introduction (...) of novel experimental techniques capable of tracking individual molecules within cells in real time is leading to the rapid accumulation of data that are inconsistent with an engineering view of the cell. This paper examines four major domains of current research in which the challenges to the machine conception of the cell are particularly pronounced: cellular architecture, protein complexes, intracellular transport, and cellular behaviour. It argues that a new theoretical understanding of the cell is emerging from the study of these phenomena which emphasizes the dynamic, self-organizing nature of its constitution, the fluidity and plasticity of its components, and the stochasticity and non-linearity of its underlying processes. (shrink)

Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. Instead, I argue (...) that realists should follow Prior (1971) and others in treating higher-order quantification (e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position) as a genuine form of quantification in its own right, and so in particular, not to be analysed in terms of first-order quantification over abstract objects. I argue that from this ‘higher-orderist’ perspective, there is a relatively straightforward answer to the question of how possible worlds-as-propositions succeed in representing possibilities. (shrink)

The question of power occupied an even more central role in Marsilius' political thought than previously thought. Behind the appearances of consent in his thought lay, at a deeper level, the idea of power. The core concept of coercive power was located within the field of meaning of plenitudo potestatis through which Marsilius' new theory of the nature of power was strained and projected onto the papacy. But the modern debate about whether Marsilius was a legal positivist has been wrongly (...) posed. His stress on the necessity of a clear power structure had a biological basis. Comparison with jurists reveals the strengths and weaknesses of his treatment of power. (shrink)

Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. Instead, I argue (...) that realists should follow Prior (1971) and others in treating higher-order quantification (e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position) as a genuine form of quantification in its own right, and so in particular, not to be analysed in terms of first-order quantification over abstract objects. I argue that from this ‘higher-orderist’ perspective, there is a relatively straightforward answer to the question of how possible worlds-as-propositions succeed in representing possibilities. (shrink)

Balancing Change and Tradition in Global Education Reform is an invaluable resource for policymakers, faculty, students, and anyone interested in how decisions made about the education system ultimately affect the quality of education, educational access, and social justice.