Actualmente, el feminismo, en su condición de movimiento, pero también de teoría viva, fluctuante y sometida a un proceso de revisión, (auto)crítica y disputa permanente, estaría experimentando importantes cambios en el marco de lo que algunas autoras han denominado como cuarta ola. En todo este proceso de emergencia de nuevos feminismos, pero también de pujanza por la categoría y por la significación de la misma, el papel de las políticas e iniciativas públicas —feministas y no feministas— sería de gran relevancia. (...) A lo largo de este trabajo, nos centraremos en analizar algunas propuestas feministas vinculadas a la promoción del empleo y el emprendimiento entre mujeres desarrolladas por el Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2015-2019). De esta manera, analizaremos la producción de sentido y de ideales subjetivos femeninos fomentada en el marco de estas políticas, atendiendo a posibles contradicciones y ambivalencias inherentes a los marcos referenciales movilizados y a su interacción.Currently, the feminist social movement and feminist theories are being subjected to a process of resignification, change and conceptual dispute in the frame of what some authors have called the Fourth Wave. This process involves the theoretical development of new feminist approaches and, thus, the struggle for signifying and owning the category feminism. In this complex process, the role of public initiatives and policies is crucial for setting and promoting the hegemonic meaning of this (and any) category. Throughout this paper, we aim to analyse two feminist initiatives developed by Madrid’s City Council in order to promote employment from an entrepreneurial approach. By doing so, we will be looking into the production of meaning linked to a feminine ideal subject as well as into a gender biased entrepreneurial discourse. (shrink)

Several studies on research misconduct have already explored and discussed its potential occurrence in universities across different countries. However, little is known about this issue in Spain, a paradigmatic context due to its consolidated scientific evaluation system, which relies heavily on metrics. The present article attempts to fill this gap in the literature through an empirical study undertaken in a specific university: Universitat Jaume I (Castelló). The study was based on a survey with closed and open questions; almost half the (...) total population of the university’s researchers participated (505 out of 1030, i.e. 49.03%), yielding a representative sample of different academic career stages and areas of knowledge. Results show that 71.68% (n = 362) of the respondents consider at least one form of misconduct to be proliferating in their area of knowledge at the national level. This figure falls to 48.95% (n = 247) in reference to misconduct in their own institution. The most frequently reported types of misconduct linked to life with colleagues are especially the use of personal influence (in evaluation or review processes); lax supervision of doctoral theses; and the abuse of power over people in lower positions. Personal ambitions and pressure from the evaluation system are regarded as the most influential causes of misconduct proliferation, according to academics at this Spanish university. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es analizar un compendio de términos que oscilaron alrededor de los últimos cuarenta años del siglo XIX e inicios del siglo XX y que, entre ellos, se establece una red de conexiones que atañen a la marginalidad y al aislamiento de quienes se definían y eran definidos en estas calificaciones. Ante el contexto presentado, se procederá a un recorrido lingüístico-semántico de la evolución de tales términos, cuándo surgieron y a quién se designaba como tal. En (...) segundo lugar, ejemplificaremos dichas apelaciones con autores, artistas e intelectuales de esos períodos. Por último, se busca constatar hasta dónde se han desarrollado tales denominaciones, concluyendo si los términos han ido modificándose de una manera radical o, por el contrario, actualmente se mantienen en su misma esencia. (shrink)

This paper aims to enhance security in IoT device networks through a visual tool that utilizes three projection techniques, including Beta Hebbian Learning (BHL), t-distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) and ISOMAP, in order to facilitate the identification of network attacks by human experts. This work research begins with the creation of a testing environment with IoT devices and web clients, simulating attacks over Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) for recording all relevant traffic information. The unsupervised algorithms chosen provide a set (...) of projections that enable human experts to visually identify most attacks in real-time, making it a powerful tool that can be implemented in IoT environments easily. (shrink)

Desde el 2020 se ha generado en España una emergencia discursiva en torno al suicidio que ha ocasionado una relevante movilización de la agenda mediático-política. Esto se advierte en el impulso de medidas como el teléfono de asistencia (024) por parte del Gobierno central. Sin embargo, lo interesante de esta decisión es su sustrato en un nuevo marco interpretativo de los significados del suicidio en la (pos)pandemia. Por tanto, a través de un análisis crítico del discurso, el presente texto observa (...) una serie de fragmentos discursivos del discurso gubernamental y el testimonio de 4 periodistas especializados y 8 miembros de asociaciones de supervivientes en relación con estos cambios. Como principales resultados, se observan convergencias respecto a la identificación contextual del suicidio y la salud mental en la pandemia. Asimismo, supervivientes y periodistas destacan en problematizar la salud emocional como clave de un reclamo terapéutico de una prevención efectiva del suicidio. (shrink)

In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences (...) worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences. (shrink)

Our work aimed to study the relationships between different dimensions of school climate, moral disengagement, empathy, and bullying behaviors (perpetration and victimization). The study sample consisted of 629 students (304 boys and 325 girls) aged 12–14 years (M= 12.55,SD= 0.67). Results showed how different dimensions of school climate predicted moral disengagement, empathy, and victimization, and these, in turn, predicted bullying perpetration. The results show the need to generate favorable educational environments to reduce the levels of moral disengagement and victimization and (...) to increase empathy in students as a strategy to prevent negative consequences related to bullying. (shrink)

The Queen's College, Oxford, UK In his article `Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact- in sensitive. We argue that Cohen's `fact-insensitivity thesis' does not provide a successful refutation of constructivism because it pertains to an area of meta-ethics which differs from the one tackled by constructivists. While Cohen's thesis concerns the logical structure of normative principles, constructivists ask how normative principles (...) should be justified . In particular, their claim that justified fundamental normative principles are fact-sensitive follows from a commitment to agnosticism about the existence of objective moral facts. We therefore conclude that, in order to refute constructivism, Cohen would have to address questions of justification, and take a stand on those long-standing meta-ethical debates about the ontological status of moral notions (for example, realism versus anti-realism) with respect to which he himself wants to remain agnostic. Key Words: John Rawls • normative justification • realism versus anti-realism • methodological versus substantive principles. (shrink)

The revival of recognition theory has brought new energy to critical theory. In general terms, recognition theory aims to critically evaluate social structures against a standard of social freedom identified with norms of interaction which are freely recognized by all parties. Until now, attention has primarily focused on the categories and forms of recognition theory. However, the influence of contemporary French theory upon the development of theories of recognition has not yet received the consideration it merits. The book takes up (...) this task. With chapters by internationally recognized authors, the collection outlines the current state of recognition theory, studies the impact of French theory, and uses French thought to identity aspects of the recognitive process which are often overlooked. Exploring French accounts of agonistic identity construction, vulnerability, power, ethical obligation, and reflexive theory construction, this book supports the intentions of critical theory with heightened attentiveness to oppression in all of its forms. (shrink)

The article looks at Novi ecclesiastico-scholastici Annales (…), a periodical which is a significant resource in book culture research. The authors focus mainly on book distribution and propagation in Protestant communities during the last decade of the 18th century.

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Improving human characteristics goes beyond compensating for an impairment. This book explores the rich and complex relationship between enhancement and impairment, showing that the study of disability offers new ways of thinking about the social and ethical implications of improving the human condition.

From the Ancient Greeks, through medieval Christian doctrine, and into the modern age, philosophers have long held envy to be irrational, a position that increasingly accompanies the political view that envy is not a justification for redistributing material goods. After defining the features of envy, and considering two arguments in favour of its irrationality, this article opposes the dominant philosophical and political consensus. It does so by deploying Rawls's much-ignored concept of ‘excusable envy’ to identify a form of envy that (...) is not imprudent and does not mis-describe. With this work completed, the article then argues – no doubt controversially – that excusable envy constitutes good grounds for redistribution or inequality-mitigation. In so doing, the article throws light on the moral significance of certain forms of uncivil disobedience, and also offers a new vocabulary for popular ‘politics of envy’ debates, which are yet to acknowledge the role of social institutions in reproducing envy-excusing economic inequalities. (shrink)

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. Discussing the matter in connection with the status (...) of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. This paper appeals to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and argues that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

Paul Bernays was both a philosopher and a mathematician. He is famous for his logical-mathematical production (also in collaboration with David Hilbert), while his philosophical works have been given less consideration. The present article is an attempt to reconstruct the way that led Bernays from his early writings on ethics to his final epistemological thought.

This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient. I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence.

Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. In this paper I show that their result only applies to a restricted range of cases. I then show that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in general is one in which, upon learning P, we conditionalize, not on P, but on the proposition that we learned P. After proving this result, I provide further generalizations and show that much of the accuracy-first epistemology program is committed to KK-like iteration principles (...) and to the existence of a class of propositions that rational agents will be certain of if and only if they are true. (shrink)

In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the (...) irrational ones? My aim is to turn this challenge on its head and argue that, actually, those who deny permissivism will have a harder time responding to such a challenge than those who accept it. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness—a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order propositions. The argument for this will require a generalization of (...) an important result by Greaves and Wallace for the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. The generalization I provide will, among other things, allow us to apply the result to cases of self-locating evidence. In the second stage, I develop an alternative framework. Very roughly, what distinguishes the traditional approach from the alternative one is that, on the traditional picture, we're interested in evaluating the expected accuracy of conforming to an update procedure. On the alternative picture that I develop, instead of considering how good an update procedure is as a plan to conform to, we consider how good it is as a plan to make. I show how, given the use of strictly proper scoring rules, the alternative picture vindicates calibrationism: a view according to which higher order evidence should have a significant impact on our beliefs. I conclude with some thoughts about why higher order evidence poses a serious challenge for standard ways of thinking about rationality. (shrink)

The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products (...) of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief. (shrink)

This article summarizes a virtual live‐streamed panel event that occurred in August 2020 and was cosponsored by the International Philosophy of Nursing Society (IPONS) and the University of California, Irvine's Center for Nursing Philosophy. The event consisted of a series of three self‐contained panel discussions focusing on the past, present and future of IPONS and was moderated by the current Chair of IPONS, Catherine Green. The first panel discussion explored the history of IPONS and the journal Nursing Philosophy. The second (...) panel involved a reflection on the challenges of doing nursing philosophy in a research‐intensive context of a Canadian university and the history and current movements in nursing philosophy in the Nordic countries. The final panel involved presentations on the future potential for philosophy in/and for nursing, the critical connections between nursing philosophy and nursing theory, dismantling racism in nursing and the potential for process philosophy to help explore nursing's unique efficacy in creating possibilities for health. The panels were followed by a lively Q&A session with participants, of which there were 252 registrants from across the globe. The event underscored the wide and diverse interests of nurses in philosophical discussion and the need for more virtual events and other connective modalities bringing nurses together to discuss and analyze the value and potential of philosophy to better understand and advance nursing theory and practice. (shrink)

Jacqueline Fawcett's nursing metaparadigm—the domains of person, health, environment, and nursing—remains popular in nursing curricula, despite having been repeatedly challenged as a logical philosophy of nursing. Fawcett appropriated the word “metaparadigm” (indirectly) from Margaret Masterman and Thomas Kuhn as a devise that allowed her to organize then‐current areas of nursing interest into a philosophical “hierarchy of knowledge,” and thereby claim nursing inquiry and practice as rigorously “scientific.” Scholars have consistently rejected the logic of Fawcett's metaparadigm, but have not yet proposed (...) a substantially agreed‐upon alternative. Through an analysis of articles introducing and critiquing Fawcett's metaparadigm, I argue for a re‐conceptualized metaparadigm that articulates nursing's ontology. What exists for the nursing discipline are not already‐demarcated metaparadigm domains, but rather interdependent, dynamic relations that constitute people, including nurses, in their health/environment circumstance. The nursing discipline aims to skillfully access this dynamic relationality as the basis for action and reflection to produce both positive health trajectories and knowledge that facilitates future action and reflection. Further inquiry into the onto‐epistemology of nursing will produce a more robust understanding of nursing practice, science, and philosophy, and clarify its unique contribution to health and healthcare. (shrink)

Life is better at the beach--but you already knew that. Escape with a beach read focused on the beauty of God's seaside wonders. The stunning photography and devotions will take you right to the water's edge, where God's voice is often clearer than ever. Devotions from the Beach is a beautiful gift with: 100 devotions focused on the beach Gorgeous photography Life parallels with elements of the shore Messages of hope, comfort, strength, and rest This beautiful book gives you a (...) front-row seat to God's majestic creation. So breathe deeply and open your heart and soul to the One who shaped it all. Devotions from the Beach is the perfect gift for every beach lover, women who appreciate gentle reminders of days at the beach and the call of God's love, and anyone who finds peace standing beside the ocean. Other books in the Devotions from… series include Devotions from the Mountains, Devotions from the Lake, Devotions from the Front Porch, Devotions from the Kitchen Table, and Devotions from the Garden. (shrink)

Theories and models are not equivalent. I argue that an orientation towards models as a primary carrier of nursing knowledge overcomes many ongoing challenges in philosophy of nursing science, including the theory–practice divide and the paradoxical pursuit of predictive theories in a discipline that is defined by process and a commitment to the non‐reducibility of the health/care experience. Scientific models describe and explain the dynamics of specific phenomenon. This is distinct from theory, which is traditionally defined as propositions that explain (...) and/or predict the world. The philosophical case has been made against theoretical universalism, showing that a theory can be true in its domain, but that no domain is universal. Subsequently, philosophers focused on scientific models argued that they do the work of defining the boundary conditions—the domain(s)—of a theory. Further analysis has shown the ways models can be constructed and function independent of theory, meaning models can comprise distinct, autonomous “carriers of scientific knowledge.” Models are viewed as representations of the active dynamics, or mechanisms, of a phenomenon. Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Importantly, mechanisms are by definition not static: change may alter the mechanism and thereby alter or create entirely new phenomena. Orienting away from theory, and towards models, focuses scholarly activity on dynamics and change. This makes models arguably critical to nursing science, enabling the production of actionable knowledge about the dynamics of process and change in health/care. I briefly explore the implications for nursing—and health/care—knowledge and practice. (shrink)

It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence, agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy-centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy-centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted (...) or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy. (shrink)

It seems like we care about at least two features of our credence function: gradational-accuracy and verisimilitude. Accuracy-first epistemology requires that we care about one feature of our credence function: gradational-accuracy. So if you want to be a verisimilitude-valuing accuracy-firster, you must be able to think of the value of verisimilitude as somehow built into the value of gradational-accuracy. Can this be done? In a recent article, Oddie has argued that it cannot, at least if we want the accuracy measure (...) to be proper. I argue that it can. 1Introduction2Some Nuts and Bolts3First Attempts4Oddie’s Constraint5The Good5.1Proximity over the disagreement metric 5.2Proximity over the magnitude metric 6The Bad and the Ugly 7Some More Good: The Role of Evenness of Distribution 8Some More Bad: Which Propositions to Privilege? 9Concluding Thoughts: Accuracy and Practical Value. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. The argument is by elimination: I show that neither semantic nor epistemic approaches to moral vagueness are satisfactory.

The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I (...) argue, has the implausible consequence that, in a wide range of cases, calibrationism is the only constraint on rational belief. The second version, in addition to having some puzzling consequences, is unmotivated. At the end of the paper I sketch a possible solution. (shrink)

A defense of imprecise credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes).

Ocurre algo curioso con la manera cómo vemos la doctrina de Descartes. Sabemos, por un lado, que es un dualismo y, por el otro, que es un mecanicismo. Sinembargo, rara vez paramos mientes en el hecho de que esa combinación esinsólita desde el punto de vista de nuestras actuales mores filosóficas. El dualistacontemporáneo suele ser antimecanicista y el mecanicista contemporáneo suele ser antidualista. Este artículo ofrece una revisión de las obras principales deDescartes en un intento por hacer comprensible a los (...) lectores contemporáneosuna combinación doctrinal cuya naturaleza chocante no percibimos por el merohecho de que tendemos a mantener sus diversas partes en compartimentosestancos. La revisión que se propone nos muestra, de paso, que Descartes esun autor mucho más interesante y rico de lo que esconden los clichés ordinarios. Así por ejemplo, tomar en serio el intento de Descartes de construir unafísica y una fisiología nos llevaría a reconocer que sus preocupaciones metafísicas, contra la opinión común, están bastante lejos de ser el centro de su obra. (shrink)

What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s Formula (...) of Humanity. Lastly, I discuss the overall merits of what I call ‘Kantian moral love’. I argue that while Kantian moral love might rightly identify, from the moral point of view, how we ought to act and think when loving other people, it fails to provide a complete account of love, crucially leaving out certain key elements from the wide range of loving relationships we find ourselves in, especially romantic love. That is, while Kantian moral love might successfully identify a morally ideal way to love other people, it falls short of capturing the full essence of love—mainly because love is not simply a moral affair but also a matter of the heart. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy. I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one. Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called “parity” (as well as for cases in (...) which agents have incomplete preferences or imprecise credences). The problem with the all of the decision theories that have been defended to account for parity is that they are committed to a claim I call unanimity: when all of the functions in the set agree that an agent ought to do A, then an agent ought to do A. A decision theory committed to unanimity violates the constraint I defend in this paper. Thus, if parity exists, a new approach to decision theory is necessary. (shrink)

Had we grown up elsewhere or been educated differently, our view of the world would likely be radically different. What to make of this? This paper takes an accuracy-centered first-personal approach to the question of how to respond to the arbitrary nature in which many of our beliefs are formed. I show how considerations of accuracy motivate different responses to this sort of information depending on the type of attitude we take towards the belief in question upon subjecting the belief (...) to doubt. (shrink)