All cells have electric potentials across their membranes, but is there really compelling evidence to think that such potentials are used as instructional cues in developmental biology? Numerous reports indicate that, in fact, steady, weak bioelectric fields are observed throughout biology and function during diverse biological processes, including development. Bioelectric fields, generated upon amputation, are also likely to play a key role during vertebrate regeneration by providing the instructive cues needed to direct migrating cells to form a wound epithelium, a (...) structure unique to regenerating animals. However, mechanistic insight is still sorely lacking in the field. What are the genes required for bioelectric‐dependent cell migration during regeneration? The power of genetics combined with the use of zebrafish offers the best opportunity for unbiased identification of the molecular players in bioelectricity. BioEssays 29:1133–1137, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

La alteridad y la interculturalidad son realidades inherentes a la existencia misma de la humanidad; sin embargo, como conceptos, han adquirido especial relevancia en los últimos cuarenta años debido a las complejas realidades socioculturales. No obstante, personajes de otras épocas, como Francisco de Asís, lo habían experimentado y referenciado en su vivencia; por ello, cobra importancia reflexionar en torno a estos conceptos actuales en la vida de un santo que ha sido el emblema del ser humano diverso a partir de (...) un análisis hermenéutico de las fuentes hagiográficas y documentales. Este estudio permite evidenciar que la alteridad estuvo presente en la vida del santo de Asís en su acto cristiano de la hermandad y en el encuentro con los otros diferentes, especialmente en su vivencia con el leproso, los pobres, las mujeres excluidas del culto y la Creación. Por otro lado, la interculturalidad se hizo realidad en su vida en el diálogo con los otros diferentes. En este sentido, se resalta el hecho histórico del encuentro que él tuvo con el sultán de Marruecos, Malik al-Kamil, hacia el año 1219, el cual fue conmemorado en el año 2019 por el papa Francisco como una invitación a los diferentes líderes para promover el diálogo interreligioso y la paz en el mundo. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.

Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.

"This book is an important contribution in Spanish to the philosophical literature on Michael Foucault's thought, as it allows for a basic, general approach to the work of one of the most important post-war European thinkers.".

Moral philosophy is often said to be about what we owe to each other. Do we owe anything to ourselves?

Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.

In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for (...) agents and advisors. (shrink)

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an (...) internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental. (shrink)

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...) mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account. (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...) since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

Este trabajo de reflexión e investigación va a la fuente misma del pensamiento político kantiano, para mostrar cómo su concepción republicana se funda en lo que él llama el uso reflexionante de la razón. Para ello, se ha dividido en tres partes: en la primera se señala cómo el pensamiento político kantiano no se funda en el uso teórico ni práctico de la razón, sino en su uso reflexionante, al mismo tiempo que se señalan sus características. En la segunda se (...) desarrolla el pensamiento filosófico político kantiano, teniendo como eje articulador su idea de republicanismo de un pueblo de demonios. Y, finalmente, en la tercera, se muestra cómo, a partir de su concepción reflexionante, puede ser pensada una acción política en el mundo contemporáneo, insinuando su oposición a todo pensamiento revolucionario, dogmático tradicionalista o moralista, que no considere los límites “estructurales” propios de la capacidad moral particular de los seres humanos. (shrink)

Resumen: Chile, a pesar de su historia migratoria, no ha generado programas educativos sustentados por políticas gubernamentales que propicien la adquisición de la variedad lingüística de la comunidad de acogida, por parte de la inmigración no hispanoparlante, integrando los referentes culturales de ambos colectivos. Se propone una alternativa a este olvido histórico y nos planteamos lo siguiente: ¿Qué elementos debiesen integrar un programa de adquisición de la variedad lingüística de la comunidad de acogida dirigido a inmigrantes haitianos propiciando el conocimiento (...) cultural? Se presenta el diseño e implementación de un programa que adopta la Hipótesis de Interdependencia Lingüística, en un aula dinámica donde se trabaja de forma colaborativa y situada. Se concluye que es posible educar en una segunda lengua a partir de la incorporación de elementos que propicien la interrelación de los aprendices en igualdad de conocimientos, y el uso de los códigos lingüísticos de los participantes como manifestación de respeto e interés por lo que cada uno pueda aportar a partir de su L1, develando su cultura de origen.: Chile, despite having a migration history, has not generated educational programs supported by government policies that encourage the acquisition of the linguistic variety of the host society, by non-Spanish-speaking immigration community, integrating the cultural referents of both collectives. It is suggested an option to this historical oblivion and we consider the following: What elements should be integrated into a program for acquiring the linguistic variety of the host society focused to Haitian immigrants fostering the cultural recognition? It is presented the design and implementation of a program that adopts the Linguistic Interdependence Hypothesis in a dynamic classroom working in a collaborative and situated way. As a conclusion, it is possible to educate in a second language from a program that incorporates elements that promote the interrelation of all participants in equality of knowledge, as well as the use of participants’ linguistic codes as a manifestation of respect and interest for what each participant can contribute from his/her L1, revealing their culture of origin. (shrink)

Some sacrifices—like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building—are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn’t morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial—the view that (...) we are each anyone’s equal. I propose an alternative Self-Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves—and have the same rights against ourselves—as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision. (shrink)

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is (...) vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show that such examples are not easily resisted; that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through? (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

El autorrespeto se configura como una de las dimensiones morales más valiosas para la vida de una persona. Tanto es así que Rawls en la Teoría de la Justicia lo eleva a la categoría de bien primario más importante. El ser humano que se estima y respeta a sí mismo está dotando a su vida de un incalculable sentido moral y convierte su existencia en un proyecto pleno y meritorio. La autoestima proporciona al individuo un sentido de su propia valía (...) y le asegura la confianza necesaria para emprender y desarrollar un proyecto de vida significativo. La humillación y la vergüenza menoscaban las bases del autorrespeto y suponen un daño a la dignidad humana. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterexamples and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on firmer footing. We (...) conclude by defending Dimensionalism, the hypothesis that overall value relations are determined solely by how things compare along value dimensions. These are first steps towards a more systematic value pluralism. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se enmarca en la propuesta fenomenológica de Jean Luc Marion, comenzando por la crítica que él realiza a Husserl y Heidegger. Luego de adentrarnos en lo fundamental de su propuesta fenomenológica, ‘cuanto de reducción, tanto de donación’, podremos acercarnos a comprender la llamada que genera y su fenomenalización por medio de la respuesta que se apila en nuestra carne. Frente a lo propuesto por Marion, esperamos encontrar una posibilidad de acercarnos a indicios del pensamiento filosófico de Cristo (...) sobre el rol del tercero y su testimonio. El trabajo se centra, por lo tanto, en los rastros que nos deja el pensamiento de Cristo, que puede ser esbozado a partir de una escapatoria al pensamiento griego. (shrink)

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...) of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

En este artículo se quiere ahondar en la propuesta que Jean Luc Marion ofrece sobre el ídolo en relación con el icono y cómo esta puede aportar al pensamiento artístico. Para esto, abordaremos la relación del ídolo con los distintos rostros que pretenden mostrarse como tal y luego el pensamiento sobre el icono cristiano. En este sentido, nos adentraremos en la propuesta estética cristiana y la posibilidad de pensar un arte a posteriori, es decir, que surge desde un acontecimiento, extendiéndolo (...) y haciéndolo más visible. (shrink)

How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad—like giving to a wasteful charity—if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

Este artículo se propone mostrar que el significado de aisthesis para Protágoras responde al uso y significación de la filosofía jónica, esto es, aún significa indistintamente juicio, sensación, emoción, creencia, en fin, doxa. Esto tiene una consecuencia muy relevante para la comprensión del homo mensura y la tesis que afirma: aisthesis es episteme.

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...) reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. (shrink)

We propose a reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the problem of Self-Affection in the first Kantian Critique. If the Time and the ‘I Think’ are unified is due to the notion of time as pure Self-Affection, that could capture the formation of Self without subordinating it to an extra-temporal connection. We attempt to show that Heidegger’s account considers time as a self-referential movement which however requires a delay and a retreat of itself to release what is coming. In order to (...) allow an encounter with another, the self-affective structure must give time to herself, which prevents the autarchic closure of herself. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Juliana Guerrero. Música y humor en la obra de Les Luthiers. Santa Fe: Ediciones UNL, 2021, 280 páginas. Héctor Olivos. Prometeo: el fuego insumiso. Madrid: Prisa Noticias Colecciones y EMSE EDAPP, S.L., 2020, 125 páginas.

El artículo presenta el análisis de las implicaciones de evaluar la comprensión de lectura y la redacción en pruebas de ingreso a la educación superior, como una consideración necesaria para el desarrollo de una política de competencia comunicativa. Se describe el diseño de un instrumento, partiendo de la concepción sociosemiótica de la lengua, del enfoque metodológico de la comprensión por niveles intra, inter y extratextual, ligado a procesos cognitivos, y la escritura como tecnología. Se incluye, además, un concepto de evaluación (...) enmarcado en el desarrollo de competencia, es decir, los resultados de la prueba se utilizan, por fuera de concepciones deterministas excluyentes, para mostrar un estado de la competencia y las acciones posibles de mejoramiento de la misma. La competencia comunicativa se demuestra como saber transversal, inter y transdisciplinario. (shrink)

Este texto pregunta filosóficamente porel sustento poético de la pieza literariade Simón Bolívar, Mi delirio sobre El Chimborazo. De la lectura del poema sedesprende la vinculación de lo pensante con lo axiológico y lo político, y desde allí,con los universales de justicia, libertad y dignidad como auténticas expresiones de lo bello, y por ende, de lo estético de la naturaleza y de la gramática del lenguaje. Se analizan así los andamios históricos y evolutivos que le permiten al hombre atravesar los (...) niveles de su configuración pensante en una equivalencia perfecta con su naturaleza lingüística, la cual, desde el desempeño biográfico de cada sujeto, permite reconciliarse con una comprensión estética de la naturaleza. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the relation between discourse, knowledge and institutions, in the context of the teachings of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. The question about discourse leads Foucault to inquire about the relation between knowledge and power. The imbrication of knowledge and power that his analysis uncovers sets in motion a powerful and multiple production technology that extends with positive effects to all society and institutions. An example of this is the institution of school and in its particular rediscovery (...) of disciplines. We briefly review the writings of humanists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as examples of the positive effects of the idea of educating men and women in intellectual tasks through the study of school disciplines, indispensable to achieve critical thought, the core of the positive and productive effect of school learning. (shrink)

: We offer a response to three themes arising from the commentators’ inquiries and critiques: The epistemological compatibility of enactivism and conceptual metaphor theory; the ….

Context: How can an enactive approach to the teaching and learning of mathematics be implemented, which fosters mathematical thinking, making intensive use of metaphorizing and taking into account ….

Del maestro Fernando González Ochoa se han dicho y escrito muchas cosas. Se le hatildado de ateo, rebelde, mal hablado; pero se olvida que fue un místico que buscó llegara una comunión con la Intimidad, un hombre amante de la vida; se olvida sulabor de maestro de escuela que quiso formar hombres auténticos, sacándolos de suvida de rebaño y dándoles el lugar que se merecen. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo,a partir de la lectura de algunas de sus obras, indagar (...) sobre el pensamientoantropológico y educativo del maestro Fernando González Ochoa. Presento al lector alFernando González que encontré a lo largo de mi lectura de sus obras y del diversomaterial consultado para este trabajo. He sido lo más fiel posible a su pensamiento,realizando una actividad hermenéutica en la que busco presentar la comprensión propiadel autor ante el contexto que le tocó vivir, el cual le sirvió de pretexto para escribir sustextos. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)