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Sven Rosenkranz [22]S. Rosenkranz [1]
  1. Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz (2013). 9. Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block! Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:333.
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  2. Sven Rosenkranz (2013). Fallibility and Trust. Noûs 48 (4).
    I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far-reaching consequences for our account (...)
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  3. Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz (2012). Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):307 - 320.
    In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classification of A-theories of time and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine's classification in not exhaustive, as it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism, according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and yet undergo qualitative changes as time goes by. We expound this theory (...)
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  4. Sven Rosenkranz (2012). In Defence of Ockhamism. Philosophia 40 (3):617-631.
    Ockhamism implies that future contingents may be true, their historical contingency notwithstanding. It is thus opposed to both the Peircean view according to which all future contingents are false, and Supervaluationist Indeterminism according to which all future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper seeks to defend Ockhamism against two charges: the charge that it cannot meet the requirement that truths be grounded in reality, and the charge that it proves incompatible with objective indeterminism about the future. In each (...)
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  5. Sven Rosenkranz (2012). Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
    This paper contributes to the current debate about radical scepticism and the structure of warrant. After a presentation of the standard version of the radical sceptic’s challenge, both in its barest and its more refined form, three anti-sceptical responses, and their respective commitments, are being identified: the Dogmatist response, the Conservativist response and the Dretskean response. It is then argued that both the Dretskean and the Conservativist are right that the anti-sceptical hypothesis cannot inherit any perceptual warrants from ordinary propositions (...)
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  6. Sven Rosenkranz (2011). Objective Content. Erkenntnis 74 (2):177-206.
    We conceive of many general terms we use as having satisfaction conditions that are objective in that the thought that something meets them neither entails nor is entailed by the thought that we are currently in a position in which we are ready, or warranted, to apply those terms to it. How do we manage to use a given term in such a way that it is thereby endowed, and conceived to be endowed, with satisfaction conditions that are objective in (...)
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  7. Sven Rosenkranz (2011). European Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.
    Functionalism about mental phenomena must account for their multiple realizability. According to standard doctrine, this can be achieved by allowing our folk theory's realization formula to be multiply satisfied by distinct physical properties. If at all, uniqueness can then be restored by suitable relativization to populations or worlds. Recent arguments suggest that this is a dead end. Here the attempt is made to devise a novel type of functionalism that accounts for multiple realizability but rejects the standard doctrine and thus (...)
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  8. Sven Rosenkranz (2010). Agnosticism and Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.
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  9. Sven Rosenkranz (2009). Liberalism, Entitlement, and Verdict Exclusion. Synthese 171 (3):481 - 497.
    In a series of recent papers, Crispin Wright has developed and defended an epistemic account of borderline cases which he calls ‘Liberalism’. If Verdict Exclusion is the claim that no polar verdict on borderline cases is knowledgeable, then Liberalism implies the view that Verdict Exclusion is itself nothing we are in a position to know. It is a matter of ongoing discussion what more Liberalism implies. In any case, Wright argues that Liberalism affords the means to account for the intuition (...)
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  10. Sven Rosenkranz (2008). Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement. In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 225.
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  11. Sven Rosenkranz (2008). Knowability, Closure, and Anti-Realism. Dialectica 62 (1):59–75.
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  12. Sven Rosenkranz (2007). Agnosticism as a Third Stance. Mind 116 (461):55-104.
    Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than (...)
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  13. Sven Rosenkranz (2006). Metaethics, Agnosticism, and Logic. Dialectica 60 (1):47–61.
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  14. Sven Rosenkranz (2006). Priest and the Bishop. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):335–347.
    According to metaphysical realism, there may be features of reality which we cannot conceive. If this thesis of cognitive closure is inconsistent, then, pace dialetheism, metaphysical realism proves incoherent. Recently, Graham Priest has revived Berkeley's idealist argument meant to show that cognitive closure is inconsistent. If cogent, this argument poses a threat to metaphysical realism. I argue that while Priest's reconstruction of Berkeley's argument may be seen to be paradoxical on one interpretation of ‘conceive’, that interpretation is not the intended (...)
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  15. Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi (2006). Platitudes Against Paradox. Erkenntnis 65 (3):319 - 341.
    We present a strategy to dissolve semantic paradoxes which proceeds from an explanation of why paradoxical sentences or their definitions are semantically defective. This explanation is compatible with the acceptability of impredicative definitions, self-referential sentences and semantically closed languages and leaves the status of the so-called truth-teller sentence unaffected. It is based on platitudes which encode innocuous constraints on successful definition and successful expression of propositional content. We show that the construction of liar paradoxes and of certain versions of Curry’s (...)
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  16. Sven Rosenkranz (2005). Knowledge in Borderline Cases. Analysis 65 (285):49–55.
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  17. Sven Rosenkranz (2004). Fitch Back in Action Again? Analysis 64 (1):67–71.
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  18. S. Rosenkranz (2003). Pragmatism, Semantics, and the Unknowable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):340 – 354.
    Pragmatism in semantics is hampered by its proponents' tendency to tie understanding too closely to our mastery of epistemic practice. Both Brandom's inferentialist semantics and the anti-realist semantics championed by Dummett and Tennant amply illustrate this tendency. As a consequence, neither theory can successfully handle cases of the innocuously unknowable in which two sentences, though mutually consistent, nonetheless cannot be known to be true together. On Brandom's account, such sentences are treated as being mutually inconsistent after all. According to both (...)
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  19. Sven Rosenkranz (2003). Realism and Understanding. Erkenntnis 58 (3):353 - 378.
    Realists claim that, amongst the statements weunderstand, there are some which are true, yetwhose truth potentially transcends the limits ofwhat we can recognize. Dummett and othershave argued that this realist thesis is incompatiblewith an account of understanding in termsof recognitional capacities. But careful analysis revealsthat this contention is mistaken. Thealleged incompatibility presupposes the truth of ametaphysical principle which cannot bevindicated on the basis of an account of understanding.Realists have independent reason toreject this metaphysical principle, as it leads to a collapseof (...)
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  20. Sven Rosenkranz (2003). Wright on Vagueness and Agnosticism. Mind 112 (447):449-464.
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  21. Sven Rosenkranz (2001). Farewell to Objectivity: A Critique of Brandom. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):232-237.
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  22. Sven Rosenkranz (1994). Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  23. Sven Rosenkranz (1994). A Review of Eccles' Arguments for Dualist-Interactionism. [REVIEW] In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
     
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