The present experimental status in the search for neutrinoless double beta decay is reviewed, with emphasis on the first indication for neutrinoless double beta decay found in the HEIDELBERG-MOSCOW experiment, giving first evidence for lepton number violation and a Majorana nature of the neutrinos. Future perspectives of the field are briefly outlined.

Double beta decay is indispensable to solve the question of the neutrino mass matrix together with ν oscillation experiments. Recent analysis of the most sensitive experiment since nine years—the HEIDELBERG-MOSCOW experiment in Gran-Sasso—yields a first indication for the neutrinoless decay mode. This result is the first evidence for lepton number violation and proves the neutrino to be a Majorana particle. We give the present status of the analysis in this report. It excludes several of the neutrino (...) mass scenarios allowed from present neutrino oscillation experiments—only degenerate scenarios and those with inverse mass hierarchy survive. This result allows neutrinos to still play an important role as dark matter in the Universe. To improve the accuracy of the present result, considerably enlarged experiments are required, such as GENIUS. A GENIUS Test Facility has been funded and will come into operation by early 2003. (shrink)

The present experimental status in the search for neutrinoless double beta decay is reviewed, with emphasis on the first indication for neutrinoless double beta decay found in the HEIDELBERG-MOSCOW experiment, giving first evidence for lepton number violation and a Majorana nature of the neutrinos. Future perspectives of the field are briefly outlined.

A large Hilbert space is used for the calculation of the nuclear matrix elements governing the light neutrino mass mediated mode of neutrinoless double beta decay (Ovββ-decay) of76Ge,100Mo,116Cd,128Te, and136Xe within the proton-neutron quasiparticle random phase approximation (pn-QRPA) and the renormalized QRPA with proton-neutron pairing (full-RQRPA) methods. We have found that the nuclear matrix elements obtained with the standard pn-QRPA for several nuclear transitions are extremely sensitive to the renormalization of the particle-particle component of the residual interaction (...) of the nuclear hamiltonian. Therefore the standard pn-QRPA does not guarantee the necessary accuracy to allow us to extract a reliable limit on the effective neutrino mass. This behavior already known from the calculation of the two-neutrino double beta decay matrix elements, manifests itself in the neutrinoless double-beta decay but only if a large model space is used. The full-RQRPA, which takes into account proton-neutron pairing and considers the Pauli principle in an approximate way, offers a stable solution in the physically acceptable region of the particle-particle strength. In this way more accurate values on the effective neutrino mass have been deduced from the experimental lower limits of the half-lifes of neutrinoless double beta decay. (shrink)

A short review is given of three experimental works on tests of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP) in which the author has been involved during the last 10 years. In the first work a search for anomalous carbon atoms was done and a limit on the existence of such atoms was determined, $^{12}\tilde{\mathrm{C}}$ /12C <2.5×10−12. In the second work PEP was tested with the NEMO-2 detector and the limits on the violation of PEP for p-shell nucleons in 12C were obtained. (...) Specifically, transitions to the fully occupied 1s 1/2-shell yielded a limit of 4.2×1024 y for the process with the emission of a γ-quantum. Similarly limits of 3.1×1024 y for β − and 2.6×1024 y for β + Pauli-forbidded transition of 12C → 12Ñ( $^{12}\tilde{\mathrm{B}}$ ) are reported. In the third work it was assumed that PEP is violated for neutrinos, and thus, neutrinos obey at least partly the Bose-Einstein statistics. Consequences of the violation of the exclusion principle for double beta decays were considered. This violation strongly changes the rates of the decays and modifies the energy and angular distributions of the emitted electrons. It was shown that pure bosonic neutrinos are excluded by the present experimental data. In the case of partly bosonic neutrinos the analysis of the existing data allows one to put an upper bound for sin 2 χ<0.6. The sensitivity of future measurements is also evaluated. (shrink)

Nelson’s stochastic quantum mechanics provides an ideal arena to test how the Born rule is established from an initial probability distribution that is not identical to the square modulus of the wavefunction. Here, we investigate numerically this problem for three relevant cases: a double-slit interference setup, a harmonic oscillator, and a quantum particle in a uniform gravitational field. For all cases, Nelson’s stochastic trajectories are initially localized at a definite position, thereby violating the Born rule. For the double (...) slit and harmonic oscillator, typical quantum phenomena, such as interferences, always occur well after the establishment of the Born rule. In contrast, for the case of quantum particles free-falling in the gravity field of the Earth, an interference pattern is observed before the completion of the quantum relaxation. This finding may pave the way to experiments able to discriminate standard quantum mechanics, where the Born rule is always satisfied, from Nelson’s theory, for which an early subquantum dynamics may be present before full quantum relaxation has occurred. Although the mechanism through which a quantum particle might violate the Born rule remains unknown to date, we speculate that this may occur during fundamental processes, such as beta decay or particle-antiparticle pair production. (shrink)

Noradrenergic pathways are involved in mediating the central and peripheral effects of physiological arousal. The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of noradrenergic transmission in moral decision-making. We studied the effects in healthy volunteers of propranolol (a noradrenergic beta-adrenoceptor antagonist) on moral judgement in a set of moral dilemmas pitting utilitarian outcomes (e.g., saving five lives) against highly aversive harmful actions (e.g., killing an innocent person) in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel group design. Propranolol (40 (...) mg orally) significantly reduced heart rate, but had no effect on self-reported mood. Importantly, propranolol made participants more likely to judge harmful actions as morally unacceptable, but only in dilemmas where harms were ‘up close and personal’. In addition, longer response times for such personal dilemmas were only found for the placebo group. Finally, judgments in personal dilemmas by the propranolol group were more decisive. These findings indicate that noradrenergic pathways play a role in responses to moral dilemmas, in line with recent work implicating emotion in moral decision-making. However, contrary to current theorising, these findings also suggest that aversion to harming is not driven by emotional arousal. Our findings are also of significant practical interest given that propranolol is a widely used drug in different settings, and is currently being considered as a potential treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder in military and rescue service personnel. (shrink)

The apolipoprotein E gene plays an important role in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's disease , and amyloid plaque comprised mostly of the amyloid-beta peptide ) is one of the major hallmarks of AD. However, the relationship between these two important molecules is poorly understood. We examined how A treatment affects APOE expression in cultured cells and tested the role of the transcription factor NF-B in APOE gene regulation. To delineate NF-B's role, we have characterized a 1098 nucleotide segment containing (...) the 5'-flanking region of the human APOE gene . Sequence analysis of this region suggests the presence of two potential NF-B elements. To demonstrate promoter activity, the region was cloned upstream of a promoterless luciferase gene. This segment was able to drive expression of luciferase in transient transfections of human fetal glial cells. Promoter activity was stimulated twofold by A treatment. Pretreatment with double-stranded DNA decoy oligonucleotides against NF-B reduced A stimulation. Deletion and mutagenetic analyses demonstrated that the distal NF-B element was functional and showed a strong DNA-protein complex band in gel shift analysis, similar to that from control NF-B consensus element. An anti-inflammatory and anti-NF-B drug, sodium salicylate, significantly blocked A-induced APOE promoter function. Our data provide evidence that upregulation of APOE by A in astroglial cells is mediated by an NF-B-element present in the 5'-flanking region of the APOE gene. (shrink)

In this paper, a degenerate parabolic equation u t − div x θ ∇ u = x a u p with p > 1 and θ < 2, a ∈ ℝ, is considered. Based on rescaling arguments combined with a doubling property, the space-time singularity and decay estimates are established. Moreover, a universal and a priori bound of global nonnegative solutions for the corresponding initial boundary value problem is derived.

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 37-50.

The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within (...) our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. (shrink)

Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory (...) to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed. (shrink)

Confidence ratings have often been integrated into reasoning and intelligence tasks as a means for assessing meta-reasoning processes. Although it is often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks has no effect on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be established empirically. The current study examines whether eliciting CR from participants during a fluid-reasoning task influences their performance and how this effect is moderated by their initial self-confidence in their own reasoning abilities. In a first experiment, we (...) found that participants performing CR during Raven's Progressive Matrices significantly outperformed a control group who did not provide ratings. Additionally, a second experiment demonstrated that CR only facilitated performance in participants who have a high level of initial self-confidence in their reasoning ability, whereas they were detrimental to participants low in self-confidence. (shrink)

The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all (...) persons of moral responsibility, or, at least, would not espouse libertarianism. I do not address the view held by some libertarians that we do have epistemic justification for thinking that persons make libertarian choices, a minority position that I believe cannot be sustained. (shrink)

Philosophers’ intuitions about what constitutes autonomy are largely driven by the exemplars or paradigms that we recognize. There are indefinitely many exemplars, inasmuch as there are relatively private personae that serve as autonomy exemplars such as our parents, third grade teacher, or, for the megalomaniac, oneself. But among Western philosophers there are doubtless some exemplars that are widely shared and broadly influential. Philosophical exemplars include Socrates, Aristotle’s magnanimous man, Kant’s noumenal self that is perfectly attuned to the moral law, Mill’s (...) anti-authoritarian non-conformist, Marx’s manin-society, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and Sartre’s authentic youth who must decide whether to join the French resistance or stay at home for the sake of his mother. Exemplars from outside of philosophy include Antigone, Christ, Faust, Ibsen’s Enemy of the People, Winston Churchill, and even figures from popular culture such as the baseball player Ted Williams, the free spirited flower children of the 1960s, and practically any character that John Wayne ever played. (shrink)

The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...) logically necessary and sufficient conditions for free will, but rather give us answers that agree with our intuitions regarding paradigms of free and unfree decisions. The Irrelevancy reply completed our reply to incompatibilists who continue to object that determinism per se destroys the R-S program. It may be debated whether my autonomy variable account is a satisfactory way to spell out the Irrelevancy reply, but I think that this type of approach suggests the way to vindicating the R-S view from an important type of objection. (shrink)

In “The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism”, I accuse libertarians of being morally unsympathetic if they hold three widely shared beliefs: that persons are morally responsible only if they make libertarian choices; that we should hold persons morally responsible; and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make libertarian choices. In “Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism”, John Lemos, relying on the Kantian principle of ends, suggests a way for libertarians to accept these three beliefs while avoiding the charge of hard-heartedness. In this (...) paper, I criticize Lemos’s rebuttal. (shrink)

In this article I consider when the question of whether entities exist subjectively (only in the minds of subjects) or objectively (in themselves, independently of the minds of subjects) is important, both theoretically and practically. I argue that when it comes to the metaphysics underlying three types of moral questions, broadly conceived, the subjectivity question does not matter practically, although it is widely thought to matter. Subjectivism does not matter in these moral questions in the same way(s) it matters in (...) some nonmoral metaphysical issues. The moral questions I consider are the meaning of life, normative ethics, and the free‐will problem. The nonmoral issues I address are the existence of God, the traditional mind/body problem, and personal identity. I explain the difference by noting that certain metaphysical issues on the fact side of the fact/value distinction impinge on persons' lives more prominently than do the metaphysics behind the three moral questions. (shrink)

Psychiatry is increasingly dominated by the reductionist claim that mental illness is caused by neurobiological abnormalities such as chemical imbalances in the brain. Critical psychiatry does not believe that this is the whole story and proposes a more ethical foundation for practice. This book describes an original framework for renewing mental health services in alliance with people with mental health problems. It is an advance over the polarization created by the "anti-psychiatry" of the past.

The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are (...) correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question. (shrink)

In "The Illusion of Conscious Will," Daniel Wegner (2002) argues that our commonsense belief that our conscious choices cause our voluntary actions is mistaken. Wegner cites experimental results that suggest that brain processes initiate our actions before we become consciously aware of our choices, showing that we are systematically wrong in thinking that we consciously cause our actions. Wegner's view leads him to conclude, among other things, that moral responsibility does not exist. In this article I propose some ways that (...) traditional philosophical defenders of moral responsibility, both compatibilists and libertarians, might accept Wegner's empirical premise regarding the will but amend their theories so that they may reject his conclusion regarding moral responsibility. (shrink)