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  1. Stephen C. Angle (2005). Sagely Ease and Moral Perception. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 5 (1):31-55.
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  2. Adam J. Arico (2012). Breaking Out of Moral Typecasting. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):425-438.
    In their recent paper, Kurt Gray and Daniel Wegner offer a model of moral cognition, the “Moral Typecasting” thesis, in which they claim that perceptions of moral agency are inversely related to perceptions of moral patiency. Once we see someone as a moral agent, they claim, we cannot see them as a moral patient (and vice versa). In this paper, I want both to challenge the conception of morality on which the typecasting thesis is fundamentally based and to raise some (...)
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  3. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
    Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
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  4. Lawrence Blum (1991). Moral Perception and Particularity. Ethics 101 (4):701-725.
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  5. Andrew Cullison (2010). Moral Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
    Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non-moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non-moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately (...)
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  6. P. DesAutels (1995). Two Types of Theories: The Impact of Churchland's Perceptual Plasticity. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33.
    In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of (...)
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  7. Peggy Desautels (1998). Psychologies of Moral Perceivers. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):266-280.
  8. Kurt Gray, Liane Young & Adam Waytz (2012). Mind Perception is the Essence of Morality. Psychological Inquiry 23 (2):101-124.
    Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions (...)
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  9. Xinyan Jiang (2008). Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:215-220.
    Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral perception i.e., moral perception's making a certain feature of a given (...)
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  10. Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it would have (...)
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  11. Pekka Väyrynen, Doubts About Moral Perception.
    This paper argues against the claim that at least some moral properties can figure in the contents of perceptual experience. I'll grant that perceptual experience is cognitively permeable and that its contents admit some higher level properties. But a property can make a phenomenological difference to an overall experience E without figuring in the content of a perceptual experience which E has as a part. I'll suggest that a different explanation of putative cases of moral perception is more general and (...)
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  12. Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
    The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge (...)
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