El objetivo del presente trabajo es poner en diálogo la filosofía poliana del límite mental con el criticismo de Kant. Mantengo que por comenzar desde el hecho de que ellos toman el mismo método como tema, ambas posiciones teóricas están interconectadas. La limitación del conocimiento, el problema de su fundamentación, y la antropología que responde a ambas cuestiones será objeto de estudio del presente artículo.

El límite mental y la fenomenología.- En este artículo se compara la fenomenología de Husserl con la filosofía del límite mental de Leonardo Polo; dicha comparación quiere subrayar la importancia de los hábitos en antropología.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es poner en diálogo la filosofía poliana del límite mental con el criticismo de Kant. Mantengo que por comenzar desde el hecho de que ellos toman el mismo método como tema, ambas posiciones teóricas están interconectadas. La limitación del conocimiento, el problema de su fundamentación, y la antropología que responde a ambas cuestiones será objeto de estudio del presente artículo.

In this article I compare the phenomenology of Husserl with Polo’s philosophy of the mental limit. This comparison is orientated to highlight the importance of habits in anthropology.

Against contemporary philosophy, Leonardo Polo's thought is a defense of realism. This realism is neither the forgetfullness of Modern Philosophy (mere approbation of classic philosophy) nor a critic-realism. The author calls "methodic realism". Between Modern Philosophy and traditional metaphysic, L. Polo's philosophy can be called metaphisics.

In this paper I show the importance of the methodical dimension in the philosophy of Leonardo Polo. This point is well illustrated in the recent book of Héctor Esquer Gallardo, El límite del pensamiento. La propuesta metódica de Leonardo Polo.

En este trabajo se exponen las dimensiones superiores del abandono del límite mental, distinguiendo algunos pasos en ellas. Como consecuencia se enfrenta a la persona humana con el entero ámbito de la existencia, y se distinguen los distintos niveles de su inclusión en ella. La libertad trascendental es, según Polo, la inclusión atópica en el ámbito de la máxima amplitud de la existencia.

In this paper, after briefly reviewing and explaining the access to God in Polo's philosophy, according to the four ways of the "abandonment of mental limit" method, and showing what can be gained from each of them, I gloss the way of a possible access into the Intimacy of the divine as Origin. I hold that, while we cannot acquire an ultimate access to it, we can conclude at least that it is impossible for this Intimacy to be intrinsically (...) solitary. The consequences of this doctine are then expounded. (shrink)

La persona humana busca hacia dentro su verdad más íntima; o bien omite esa búsqueda y se olvida generosamente de sí. Entonces encuentra: advirtiendo sin llegar a ver, y también mirando y vigilando. Es el despliegue metalógico de la libertad personal: un don que aceptamos y devolvemos buscando la aceptación divina.

La doctrina de Polo sobre la muerte afirma que se debe al límite mental. El objetivo de este trabajo es aclarar esa afirmación exponiendo la noción de cuerpo propio como un hecho enigmático, que late bajo el límite mental; y que por ello mismo puede faltar: su falta es la muerte. La libertad personal no informa suficientemente el cuerpo, sino que lo da por hecho; y como el propio cuerpo escapa así de su completo dominio, le (...) puede ser expropiado a la persona. La falta del propio cuerpo es la muerte; y sin su propio cuerpo, la persona humana sale del mundo y deja la historia. (shrink)

La persona humana busca hacia dentro su verdad más íntima; o bien omite esa búsqueda y se olvida generosamente de sí. Entonces encuentra: advirtiendo sin llegar a ver, y también mirando y vigilando. Es el despliegue metalógico de la libertad personal: un don que aceptamos y devolvemos buscando la aceptación divina.

The human person looks wither inside towards her more intimate truth, or it omits that search and one forgets himself generously. Then it finds: noticing without getting to see, and also watching and supervising. It is the metalogic unfolding of the personal freedom: a gift that we accept and we give back looking for the divine acceptance.

According to a standard picture of agency, a person’s actions always reflect what they most desire, and many theorists extend this model to mental illness. In this chapter, I pin down exactly where this “volitional” view goes wrong. The key is to recognize that human motivational architecture involves a regulatory control structure: we have both spontaneous states (e.g., automatically-elicited thoughts and action tendencies, etc.) as well as regulatory mechanisms that allow us to suppress or modulate these spontaneous states. Our (...) regulatory abilities, however, are bounded. Mental illnesses, I argue, arise precisely where these bounds are reached, thus allowing inappropriate spontaneous states to regularly manifest in thought and action. I conclude that the volitional view of mental illness is wrong: when a person with mental illness reaches the limits of control, what they do often does not reflect what they most prefer. (shrink)

The information processing capacity of the human mind is limited, as is evidenced by the so-called ‘‘attentional-blink’’ deficit: When two targets (T1 and T2) embedded in a rapid stream of events are presented in close temporal proximity, the second target is often not seen. This deficit is believed to result from competition between the two targets for limited attentional resources. Here we show, using performance in an attentional-blink task and scalp-recorded brain potentials, that meditation, or mental training, affects the (...) distribution of limited brain resources. Three months of intensive mental training resulted in a smaller attentional blink and reduced brain-resource allocation to the first target, as reflected by a smaller T1-elicited P3b, a brain-potential index of resource allocation. Furthermore, those individuals that showed the largest decrease in brain-resource allocation to T1 generally showed the greatest reduction in attentional-blink size. These observations provide novel support for the view that the ability to accurately identify T2 depends upon the efficient deployment of resources to T1. The results also demonstrate that mental training can result in increased control over the distribution of limited brain resources. Our study supports the idea that plasticity in brain and mental function exists throughout life and illustrates the usefulness of systematic mental training in the study of the human mind. (shrink)

COVID-19 has created additional challenges in mental health services, including the impact of social distancing measures on care and treatment. For situations where a detention under mental health legislation is required to keep an individual safe, psychiatrists may consider whether to conduct an assessment in person or using video technology. The Mental Health Act 2003 does not stipulate that an assessment has to be conducted in person. Yet, the Code of Practice envisions that detention assessments would be (...) conducted face to face in all circumstances. During the pandemic, the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, a statutory body with a duty to promote best practice of the Act, has been asked whether it may be acceptable and indeed preferable for some assessments to be conducted via video technology. Where an assessment is needed to determine if a patient needs to be detained, and where there is a need for social distancing or the need for ‘shielding’, remote assessments may in some circumstances be preferable. In this article, we outline the modification of the Mental Welfare Commission’s previous outright rejection of virtual assessments as the pandemic progressed and discuss the ethical and legal issues the possibility of remote assessments has exposed. We also discuss the limits and when a virtual assessment is not considered ethical. As the pandemic moves from a state of emergency into a ‘new normal’ in psychiatric services during second, or subsequent, waves, the use and place of remote assessments for detention needs to be considered. (shrink)

On many occasions, care givers are faced with problems in which “drastic” types of treatment seem clearly inappropriate but “lesser” interventions still appear to be advisable, if not indeed mandatory. In the hospital setting, examples are frequent: the demented elderly patient, still very much capable of brief social interactions and still able to enjoy at least limited life, who although clearly not a candidate for coronary bypass surgery is, nevertheless, a patient in whom an intercurrent pneumonia deserves treatment; the severely (...) retarded youngster in whom appendectomy seems clearly warranted but for whom long-term dialysis seems ill-advised. The examples are legion, and their variety defies an easy, stereotypical solution. Why, one may ask, is the treatment of intercurrent pneumonia or operating on an acute appendix “clearly indicated” while coronary bypass and long-term dialysis “clearly” are not? The reactions of care givers in the past have often consisted of attempts to give half-hearted treatment or to treat fully even against their better judgment. The lack of conceptual guidelines that might help sort out such problems has inevitably led either to an inflexible absolutism in which all possible treatment to sustain life or no treatment at all is given or has resulted in a pathetic attempt to act but act minimally with the hope that such actions will be ineffective. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, the biopsychosocial model was proposed by George Engel to be the new paradigm for medicine and psychiatry. The model assumed a hierarchical structure of the biological, psychological and social system and simple interactions between the participating systems. This article holds the thesis that the original biopsychosocial model cannot depict psychiatry's reality and problems. The clinical validity of the biopsychosocial model has to be questioned. It is argued that psychiatric interventions can only stimulate but not determine their target (...) systems, because intervention and outcome are only loosely coupled. Thus, psychiatric interventions have in principle limited ranges which differ according to the type of intervention and according to the system to be stimulated. Psychosocial interventions face far more obstacles to be overcome than psychopharmacogical therapy. (shrink)

Neuroimaging offers great potential to clinicians and researchers for a host of mental and physical conditions. The use of imaging has been trumpeted for forensic psychiatric and psychological evaluations to allow greater insight into the relationship between the brain and behavior. The results of imaging certainly can be used to inform clinical diagnoses; however, there continue to be limitations in using neuroimaging for insanity cases due to limited scientific backing for how neuroimaging can inform retrospective evaluations of mental (...) state. In making this case, this paper reviews the history of the insanity defense and explains how the use of neuroimaging is not an effective way of improving the reliability of insanity defense evaluations. (shrink)

RésuméJe défends que la théorie de l'empathie d'Edith Stein représente une solution de remplacement aux théories de l'empathie fondées sur la simulation. Les théories simulationnistes impliquent l'utilisation de ses propres ressources cognitives pour reproduire les états mentaux des autres en imaginant être dans leur situation. Je soutiens que cette compréhension de l'empathie est problématique dans le contexte des soins de santé mentale, car elle peut conduire à la cooptation et à l'assimilation des expériences d'une autre personne. En réponse, je soutiens (...) que la théorie de Stein est préférable parce qu'elle implique l'appréciation des expériences de l'autre telles qu'elles sont pour lui, et que cette explication alternative de l'empathie évite l'assimilation des expériences des autres. (shrink)

This article is the second one in a series dealing with mental health ethics in Cuba. It reports on ethical dilemmas, resources and limitations to their resolution, and recommendations for action. The data, obtained through individual interviews and focus groups with 28 professionals, indicate that Cubans experience dilemmas related to the interests of clients, their personal interests, and the interest of the state. These conflicts are related to power differentials among clients and professionals, professionals from various disciplines, and professionals (...) and organizational authorities. Resources to solve ethical dilemmas include government support, ethics committees, and collegial dialogue. Limitations include minimal training in ethics, lack of safe space to discuss professional disagreements, and little tolerance for criticism. Recommendations to address ethical dilemmas include better training, implementation of a code of ethics, and provision of safe space to discuss ethical dilemmas. The findings are discussed in light of the role of power in applied ethics. (shrink)

Validity of physical laws for any aspect of brain activity and strict correlation of mental to physical states of the brain do not imply, with logical necessity, that a complete algorithmic theory of the mind-body relation is possible. A limit of decodability may be imposed by the finite number of possible analytical operations which is rooted in the finiteness of the world. It is considered as a fundamental intrinsic limitation of the scientific approach comparable to quantum indeterminacy and the (...) theorems of logical undecidability. An analysis of these limits, applied to dispositions of future behaviour, suggests that limits of decodability of the psycho-physic relation may actually exist with respect to brain states with self-referential aspects, as they are involved in mental processes. Limits for an algorithmic theory of the mind-body problem suggested by this study are formally similar to other intrinsic limits of the scientific method such as quantum indeterminacy and mathematical undecidability which are also related to self-referential operations. At the metatheoretical level, hard sciences, despite their reliability, universality and objectivity, depend on metatheoretical presuppositions which allow for multiple philosophical interpretations. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent (...) pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction. (shrink)

The present study aims to survey Chinese mental health professionals’ attitudes toward therapeutic confidentiality with adolescent patients in specific clinical situations, and compare Chinese adolescents’ and parents’ beliefs about when most mental health professionals would breach confidentiality. A sample of 36 mental health practitioners, 152 parents, and 164 adolescents completed a survey to assess their opinions about when confidentiality should be breached in 18 specific clinical situations. Nearly half of the parents and adolescents and 78% of the (...) therapists in our sample selected “yes” in response to the question of whether the principle of confidentiality applies to adolescents. However, 49% of parents indicated “no,” and 53% of adolescents indicated “not sure.” Compared to adolescents, parents were significantly more likely to believe that therapists would breach confidentiality for the high-breach-likelihood items. For the low-breach-likelihood items, adolescents and parents were significantly more likely than therapists to believe confidentiality should be breached. Results from this study provide data to inform the development, refinement, practical implementation, and communication of guidelines and recommendations specific to adolescents receiving psychotherapy in China. (shrink)

On June 16, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a defendant facing serious criminal charges is appropriate in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only in limited circumstances. The treatment must be medically appropriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and necessary to significantly further important government interests, after taking account of less-intrusive alternatives.Charles Sell, a former dentist, had a long history of (...) mental illness. He had been hospitalized twice, in 1982 and 1984, after expressing paranoid ideas to law enforcement officials. In May 1997, Sell was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering. He was released on bail after a magistrate determined that he was currently competent to stand trial. (shrink)

On June 16, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a defendant facing serious criminal charges is appropriate in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only in limited circumstances. The treatment must be medically appropriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and necessary to significantly further important government interests, after taking account of less-intrusive alternatives.Charles Sell, a former dentist, had a long history of (...) mental illness. He had been hospitalized twice, in 1982 and 1984, after expressing paranoid ideas to law enforcement officials. In May 1997, Sell was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering. He was released on bail after a magistrate determined that he was currently competent to stand trial. (shrink)

Dieter Declercq’s Satire, Comedy, and Mental Health (2021) examines the nature and value of satire, critically reviews familiar ways of construing its value, and mounts an argument for understanding satire’s value in terms of the contributions it can make to our mental health. Declercq has much to say about longstanding debates—for example, over whether satire is a powerful political weapon (vs. a waste of political time and energy) and whether satire functions as a catalyst for needed emotional catharsis (...) (vs. merely a welcome distraction). But the most important contribution Satire, Comedy, and Mental Health makes is to open a new line of enquiry about satire—namely, enquiry into the relationship between satire and mental health—thereby widening the debate over satire’s significance and value. Specifically, Declercq argues that satire is most impressive for how it helps us cope with the limits of critique—that is, with our awareness that unjust suffering will persist despite our very best efforts. Critique cannot cure the world because we do not have endless resources to devote to solving all the world’s problems and righting all the world’s wrongs; even if we did, our efforts will not always be successful. Indeed, in some cases, our efforts might make things worse. We are finite and limited beings who simply cannot perfectly design, create, choreograph, and maintain the perfect utopias we so desire. This refreshingly new perspective makes this book an important addition to the scholarly literature on satire. (shrink)

Acknowledgements / 4 Introduction / 5 DESCARTES / 1. Cartesian Science and the Instrumentalization of the Body / 35 FREUD / 2. An Introduction to Freud’s Early Attempt at an Eliminative Materialist Psychology / 55 3. The Libido, Trauma, and the Hidden Forces of the Death Drive in Freud’s Metapsychology / 81 HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE / 4. What Does the Master Really Want? Development and Structure in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit / 116 5. Suffering as Negativity or Necessity? Hegel and (...) Nietzsche on the Master/Slave Dialectic / 140 6. Nietzsche’s Supreme Phantasm / 160 BERGSON / 7. The Ambiguity of Sensation / 170 8. The Force of the Present: A Bergsonian Challenge to Psychophysics / 189 9. Life and Death in the Philosophy of Henri Bergson / 214 Bibliography / 243. (shrink)

Healthcare systems and health professionals are facing a litany of stressors that have been compounded by the pandemic, and consequently, this has further perpetuated suboptimal mental health and burnout in nursing. The purpose of this paper is to report select findings from a larger, national study exploring gendered experiences of mental health, leave of absence (LOA), and return to work from the perspectives of nurses and key stakeholders. Given the breadth of the data, this paper will focus exclusively (...) on the qualitative results from 53 frontline Canadian nurses who were purposively recruited for their workplace insight. This paper focuses on the substantive theme of “Breaking Point,” in which nurses articulated a multiplicity of stress points at the individual, organizational, and societal levels that amplified burnout and accelerated mental health LOA from the workplace. These findings exemplify the complexities that underlie nurses' mental health and burnout and highlight the urgent need for multipronged individual, organizational, and structural interventions. Robust and timely interventions are needed to restore the health of the nursing profession and sustain its future. (shrink)