COVID-19 has created additional challenges in mental health services, including the impact of social distancing measures on care and treatment. For situations where a detention under mental health legislation is required to keep an individual safe, psychiatrists may consider whether to conduct an assessment in person or using video technology. The Mental Health Act 2003 does not stipulate that an assessment has to be conducted in person. Yet, the Code of Practice envisions that detention assessments would be conducted face to (...) face in all circumstances. During the pandemic, the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, a statutory body with a duty to promote best practice of the Act, has been asked whether it may be acceptable and indeed preferable for some assessments to be conducted via video technology. Where an assessment is needed to determine if a patient needs to be detained, and where there is a need for social distancing or the need for ‘shielding’, remote assessments may in some circumstances be preferable. In this article, we outline the modification of the Mental Welfare Commission’s previous outright rejection of virtual assessments as the pandemic progressed and discuss the ethical and legal issues the possibility of remote assessments has exposed. We also discuss the limits and when a virtual assessment is not considered ethical. As the pandemic moves from a state of emergency into a ‘new normal’ in psychiatric services during second, or subsequent, waves, the use and place of remote assessments for detention needs to be considered. (shrink)

Different sectors have expressed the need to address the different notions of pluralism that characterize modern society, as well as their difficulties. The article provides a critical reading of three significantly different approaches to the issue: Chantal Mouffe's On the Political, John Rawls' Political Liberalism, and William E. Connolly's Pluralism. It discusses their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the possibilities they provide to understand pluralism and take their theoretical contributions to the field of practice.

Desde diversos ámbitos se ha señalado la necesidad de abordar las nociones y difi-cultades del pluralismo que caracteriza a la sociedad actual. Se busca aportar una lectura crítica de tres abordajes considerablemente diferentes del tema: En torno a lo político (2005) de Chantal Mouffe, Political Liberalism (1996) de John Rawls y Pluralism (2005) de William E. Connolly. Se sopesan sus fortalezas y debilidades, así como las posibilidades que brindan para comprender el pluralismo y llevar los aportes teóricos a la (...) esfera práctica. (shrink)

It describes and explains the patient-centered model examining and evaluating qualitative and quantitative research. It comprehensively covers the evolution and the six interactive components of the patient-centered clinical method, taking the reader through the relationships between the patient and doctor and the patient and clinician. All the editors are professors in the Department of Family Medicine at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.

In this foundational work in contemporary political theory, William Connolly makes a distinctive contribution to our understanding of the relationship between ...

This extremely accessible textbook provides a wide-ranging analysis of the relations between philosophy and feminist thought. Examining not only feminist critiques of philosophical ideas, Gatens also looks at the ways in which feminist theory can be informed by philosophical analysis and debates. Gatens adopts an historical approach, beginning with an analysis of Mary Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau. She then examines attempts by Harriet Taylor and J. S. Mill to extend liberal principles to women's situation. Other chapters discuss the work of (...) more recent philosophers, including Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, Mary Daly and Dale Spender. Gatens concludes with a discussion of current debates in the politics of sexual difference. (shrink)

This paper offers a new approach to an old debate about superaddition in Locke. Did Locke claim that some objects have powers that are unrelated to their natures or real essences? The question has split commentators. Some (Wilson, Stuart, Langton) claim the answer is yes and others (Ayers, Downing, Ott) claim the answer is no. This paper argues that both of these positions may be mistaken. I show that Locke embraced a robust epistemic humility. This epistemic humility includes ignorance of (...) the real essences of bodies, of the causal processes underlying the production of natural phenomena, and of God’s method of creation. I show how this epistemic humility offers strong support for an agnostic response to the question of superaddition. Locke did not intend to claim that bodies either do or do not have properties unrelated to their real essences. Instead, his primary goal in discussing the topic was to emphasize the strict limits to human knowledge. (shrink)

Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke’s stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke’s claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke’s general remarks about demonstration as well as his (...) claims about demonstration in natural philosophy, mathematics, and morality. Careful attention to these detailed discussions motivates a reevaluation of Locke’s views on demonstrative knowledge of morality. Specifically, while Locke did believe that some demonstrative moral knowledge might be in-principle available to us he also believed that facts about the difficulty of demonstration meant that this knowledge would in-practice be largely unattainable. (shrink)

This chapter revisits three key disagreements between Locke and Berkeley. The disagreements relate to abstraction, the idea of substance, and the status of the primary/secondary quality distinction. The goal of the chapter is to show that these disagreements are rooted in a more fundamental disagreement over the nature of ideas. For Berkeley, ideas are tied very closely to perceptual content. Locke adopts a less restrictive account of the nature of ideas. On his view, ideas are responsible for both perceptual content (...) and non-perceptual mental content. Recognizing this allows for the following analysis of their disputes. Berkeley often appeals to introspection to suggest that we do not have some particular idea. But Locke’s arguments that we have a particular idea often appeal to the functional role the idea has in our cognitive economy rather than to facts about our immediate phenomenology. (shrink)

Did George Eliot’s work as translator of the critical writings on religion of Ludwig Feuerbach and Benedict Spinoza influence her work as a novelist? Did she hold a comprehensive philosophy of religion? Through an examination of her non-fictional and fictional writings this chapter argues that we should take seriously Eliot’s claim that her novels are ‘experiments in life’. Building on the critiques of religion offered by Spinoza and Feuerbach, Eliot’s novels address the philosophical question: is morality possible in a godless (...) world? The capacities necessary to a moral life are imagination, sympathy, and reflection. Her fiction contributes to the reformation of moral consciousness by experimenting with the interplay between these capacities. (shrink)

Modern, or continental, rationalism refers to the works of the seventeenth‐century philosophers René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz. While there is much to mark each philosopher off from the others, there are nevertheless several shared fundamental assumptions that warrant the common title of “rationalist.” Each philosopher believed that mathematics and geometry were appropriate models on which to base philosophical methodology. Each, whilst critical of founding knowledge on mere faith – which they believed could only lead to skepticism – nevertheless (...) relied on theological arguments at various points in their philosophies. All three philosophers share a distrust of the notion that sensation, emotion (passion), and the body are capable of providing knowledge. Reason alone, on all three philosophers' accounts, is the a priori faculty which can provide secure foundations for human knowledge. It is Descartes' philosophy that has received most critical attention from feminist theorists. Spinoza has received less attention and Leibniz is all but ignored. At the end of this article, some attempt will be made to explain this uneven treatment of the modern rationalists. (shrink)

Institutional Review Boards are confronted with new challenges in the face of expanding technologies while fulfll-ing their existing regulatory mandate to ensure that plans are in place to protect subjects and to inform them of risks and benefts of research participation. Existing regulations and guidance do not address the issue of incidental fndings , thus leaving awareness of the issue and the application of ethical principles to IRB judgment alone. In order to assure that researchers are aware of the potential (...) for IFs, IRBs must identify which studies are likely to identify IFs and establish what plans should be put into place prior to study initiation to assure the subjects are appropriately informed of the likelihood of IFs, how IFs will be communicated to subjects, and whether the burden of follow-up falls on the researchers or is the subject's responsibility. (shrink)

With rapidly expanding technological capacity, research has outpaced the existing infrastructure of ethical and regulatory guidance. In the area of incidental findings, this is particularly true.The regulations under which most Institutional Review Boards operate were established over 25 years ago and have not been substantially altered in the intervening years. The technology available today that creates the opportunity for IFs was not conceived of, or considered, in the crafting of those regulations. Therefore, little guidance can be derived directly from these (...) regulations. Rather, aspects of existing ethical guidance and regulations can be adapted to assist IRBs and researchers in dealing with issues surrounding IFs. (shrink)

Clarke, Moira On the East coast of America, every 13 or 17 years, billions of red-eyed magicicadas emerge from underground. For the next few weeks every tree resounds with a near-deafening symphony, a courting ritual that has been measured at 94 decibels. Finally, the resulting offspring burrow back into the earth, there to remain inactive for the exact same duration, 13 or 17 years.

It has typically been assumed that affective and social components of disagreement, such as trust and fair treatment, can be handled separately from substantive components, such as beliefs and logical principles. This has freed us to count as “deep” disagreements only those which persist even between people who have no animosity towards each other, feel equal to one another, and are willing to argue indefinitely in search of truth. A reliance on such ideal participants diverts us from the question of (...) whether we have swept away the opportunity for some real arguers to have their voices heard, and for those voices to determine the real substance of the disagreement. If affective and social issues need to be assessed side by side with belief differences and reasoning paradigms, investigating trust may assist us to understand and make progress on the affective and social components that are involved in disagreement. (shrink)

For individuals pursuing medically assisted gender transition, gender-affirming surgical treatments, such as oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries) and orchiectomy (removal of the testicles), cause sterility, and gender-affirming hormone treatment with medications (i.e., testosterone and estrogen) may negatively impact infertility. The major United States (US) medical associations already endorse fertility preservation (FP) through cryopreservation (i.e., “freezing” egg and sperm) for transgender individuals. Despite these endorsements from the relevant medical societies, medical insurance coverage for FP remains very limited in the US. Given (...) the high out-of-pocket costs for FP services, fertility preservation remains financially out of reach for many transgender individuals who may desire it. We present an ethical justification for universal FP coverage for all transgender and gender diverse (TGD) individuals who request this option during medically assisted gender transition. First, we argue that gender-affirming medical care is analogous to other medical interventions and treatment regimens that compromise fertility, such as cancer care, and that both types of interventions need to be afforded the same medical benefits and assistance in pursuing fertility goals. Second, we argue that the lack of FP for transgender individuals contributes to the ongoing and profound transphobia and anti-trans bias that has been exacerbated in the past several years across the healthcare landscape in the United States. We argue that the provision of FP coverage for transgender individuals is necessary for clinicians and third-party payers to state their unequivocal support for TGD patients and their healthcare needs. (shrink)

This short essay analyzes an unusual typographical feature in the Epistle to the Reader that precedes Locke’s Essay. Specifically, it asks why there is a line prior to Christiaan Huygens’ name in the famous Underlaborer Passage. The paper provides a thorough look at the line’s longevity through early editions of the Essay and considers a number of possible explanations for the line’s presence. It is argued that the line may well have held some meaning for early readers; contemporary scholars should (...) be motivated to investigate the issue further. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 3, Page 404-420, Fall 2022.

Moira Howes and Catherine Hundleby ABSTRACT: While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises...

Debates about female genital mutilation/cutting have polarized opinion between those who see it as an abuse of women’s health and human rights, to be ‘eradicated’, and those who may or may not oppose the practice, but see a double standard on the part of western campaigners who fail to challenge other unnecessary surgical interventions — such as male circumcision or cosmetic surgery — in their own communities and cultures. This article interrogates these debates about FGM/c in the context of measures (...) to reduce it in the UK over recent decades. It does not suggest that FGM/c is a legitimate practice, seeing it, rather, as an abuse of women’s and children’s rights that should be combated using a combination of measures. However, it argues that reduction strategies are undermined by inconsistencies in the law and the failure to back up the law with research and education. (shrink)

While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.

Students in critical thinking courses are often instructed to "read carefully" as a prerequisite to thinking critically. This instruction, which seems like a simple preliminary caution, in fact reveals controversial assumptions about how readers read, and whether critical thinking instruction presupposes the reading skill it purports to teach.

Moira Gatens investigates the ways in which differently sexed bodies can occupy the same social or political space. Representations of sexual difference have unacknowledged philosophical roots which cannot be dismissed as a superficial bias on the part of the philosopher, nor removed without destroying the coherence of the philosophical system concerned. The deep structural bias against women extends beyond metaphysics and its effects are felt in epistemology, moral, social and political theory. The idea of sexual difference is contextualised in (...) _Imaginary Bodies_ and traced through the history of philosophy. Using her work on Spinoza, Gatens develops alternative conceptions of power, new ways of conceiving women's embodiment and their legal, political and ethical status. (shrink)

We welcome Ms Smajdor’s critique into our investigations of expected future tax gains to the state from children conceived by in vitro fertilisation .1 To better inform the JME readership, we wish to correct some misinterpretations of our research by Smajdor, and to highlight some weaknesses of current IVF funding policies.Our investigation sought to establish the long-term net tax contribution from an IVF-conceived child, assuming that the child was average in every respect .2 We conducted this analysis on the basis (...) that IVF, and other assisted reproductive treatments, are unique among all medical interventions—unique in the sense that their success leads to the creation of human life; a life that would not have existed had the technology not been available and accessible to couples willing to undergo treatment. Hence, this method provides us with an opportunity to explore lost tax revenue to the state resulting from children that have not been born due to limited public access to IVF treatments currently observed in the UK and many other countries.In our investigations, the costs of IVF were treated as an investment in human capital with future long-term cost and revenue implications for the state. Our evaluation ignored the many humanistic reasons for offering IVF treatment to infertile couples and concentrated solely on the possible economic benefits.3 The perspective of the analysis was that of the state; hence …. (shrink)

The paper applies the theoretical frameworks of epistemic injustice and narrativist philosophy of history to read the process of re-signification of an event that took place in a prison in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1978, called “Massacre in the Seventh Ward” or “Mutiny of the Mattresses”. By looking into this case, we explore the exercise of epistemic resistance through category expansion, drawing on the most recent developments on hermeneutical injustice as a deficiency in the application (and not (...) only in the content) of the available concepts. This allows us to identify the selected case as an example of hermeneutical injustice, and to highlight some characteristics of such injustice that remain under-analysed in the specialised literature, linked to agency, temporality, and the concrete forms adopted by resistance. Among the latter, we highlight the role that can be played by the exercise of what in philosophy of history has been called the “practical past”: an intervention in the dispute of meanings about the past, born out of an explicit commitment to the present. Finally, the conclusions present some caveats to be considered in the study of epistemic injustice in the context of institutions such as prisons. (shrink)

This book may be taken as a plea for a return to a teleological moral philosophy. Mrs Roberts examines responsibility and freedom in terms of human interests and purposes and seeks to establish the autonomy of the personal decision. F. H. Bradley's criteria for moral responsibility serves as a starting point, but Mrs Roberts finds these theoretical and remote. She builds up an account of the social context in which we learn to use words like 'responsibility', 'freedom' and 'action'. Ambiguities (...) in the use of 'action' and 'perception' are dealt with at length. (shrink)

There is a well-established social practice whereby we hold one another responsible for the things that we say. Speakers are held liable for the truth of the contents they express and they can be sanctioned and/or held to be unreliable or devious if it turns out what they say is false. In this paper chapter we argue that a better understanding of this fundamental socio-linguistic practice – of ascribing what we will term (following Borg (2019)) ‘linguistic liability’ – helps to (...) shed light on a core debate in semantics and pragmatics, concerning how and where to draw the line between different kinds of content. We suggest that attributions of linguistic liability form a heterogenous (rather than a homogenous) class and seek to show that different kinds of liability judgements are useful because they track divergent kinds of content – specifically the kinds that have come to prominence in recent theorising theorizing about the semantics/pragmatics divide. (shrink)

Why would the work of the 17th century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza concern us today? How can Spinoza shed any light on contemporary thought? In this intriguing book, Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd show us that in spite of or rather because of Spinoza's apparent strangeness, his philosophy can be a rich resource for cultural self-understanding in the present. _Collective Imaginings_ draws on recent re-assessments of the philosophy of Spinoza to develop new ways of conceptualising issues of freedom and (...) difference. This ground-breaking study will be invaluable reading to anyone wishing to gain a fresh perspective on Spinoza's thought. (shrink)

Flew claims that Manser has made several errors in his argument and in so doing presented a view of Darwinian evolutionary theory which is incorrect. This is a view with which I concur though the case against Manser's argument does not appear to have been put as clearly as it might have been. As Flew points out, Manser has made two kinds of objection to Darwinian, and presumably Neo-Darwinian, theory: that the terms employed in the theory are not clearly and (...) independently defined, and that the theory makes no predictions and as such is un-falsifiable. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between honour and recognition in the context of normative heterosexuality, and the implications of this relationship for sustaining and transforming problematic sexual norms. Building on recent attempts to move beyond a narrow and restrictive focus on consent as a means of thinking through the ethics of heterosexual sex, we reflect critically on the concept of honour in this domain. Honour, in our approach, is a cluster concept that houses a number of related normative values and (...) affective attitudes, including respect, self-respect, pride, dignity, esteem, integrity, trust, and honesty. We examine how honour is distributed by heterosexual imaginaries in ways that privilege men in the sexual encounter, and argue that part of cultivating ethical heterosexual relations is to imagine a sexual honour code where both men and women see themselves, and are seen by their counterpart, as entitled to sexual respect. To conclude, the paper examines and defends the cultivation of ethical, just, and honourable heterosexual relations as a necessarily embodied, intersubjective, and imaginative endeavour that involves challenges to, and shifts within, multiple imaginaries and sensibilities that cluster to support damaging norms of sexual conduct. (shrink)

Feminist critiques of science show that systematic biases strongly influence what scientific communities find salient. Features of reality relevant to women, for instance, may be under-appreciated or disregarded because of bias. Many feminist analyses of values in science identify problems with salience and suggest better epistemologies. But overlooked in such analyses are important discussions about intellectual virtues and the role they play in determining salience. Intellectual virtues influence what we should find salient. They do this in part by managing the (...) emotions, which are cognitively involved in what we actually do find salient. One reason intellectual virtues do not factor more strongly in feminist epistemology is the mistaken assumption that they could not serve as explicit epistemic community standards for scientific inquiry. There are good reasons, however, to think in terms of community intellectual virtue and consequently, to advance explicit public standards of intellectual virtue for scientific research. To show how explicit public standards for intellectual virtue might improve reasoning in biased conditions, I analyze a striking oversight in several evolutionary immunological hypotheses concerning women's reproduction and sexuality. I conclude that feminist epistemology would benefit from greater consideration of intellectual virtues, particularly in connection with social epistemological insights. (shrink)

Trait emotional intelligence concerns our perceptions of our emotional abilities, that is, how good we believe we are in terms of understanding, regulating, and expressing emotions in order to adapt to our environment and maintain well-being. In this article, we present succinct summaries of selected findings from research on the location of trait EI in personality factor space, the biological underpinnings of the construct, indicative applications in the areas of clinical, health, social, educational, organizational, and developmental psychology, and trait EI (...) training. Findings to date suggest that individual differences in trait EI are a consistent predictor of human behavior across the life span. (shrink)