All scientific disciplines go through periods of self-analysis. However, this analysis often takes place as if inside a closed arena, from which it is difficult to gain a long view. Instead, in hopes of identifying the properties that define it, each discipline examines its own features in a mirror that it holds up to itself.Yet there are other times, perhaps less frequent, when these self-evaluations are accompanied by an inquiry into the extent to which the discipline's intellectual characteristics are shaped (...) by its relationship to other disciplines. (shrink)

Véritable journal de bord du structuralisme sur la longue durée, le présent ouvrage rend compte en détail de ce qui aura été l'apport fondamental du structuralisme en tant que moment scientifique, tant en linguistique qu'en anthropologie considérée au sens large du terme. Dans ce contexte, la priorité accordée à l'étude de la dimension formelle des phénomènes humains aura permis, de façon inattendue, de comprendre ces derniers à l'articulation étroite des dimensions formelle, sociale et symbolique. Sur cette base, l'ouvrage reprend de (...) front les débats aigus qu'initièrent des philosophes et des écrivains de premier rang durant la deuxième moitié du XXe siècle. Ceux-ci soupçonnaient le structuralisme de conduire à récuser les capacités créatrices de l'homme et à lui dénier tout rôle dans l'Histoire. Or, la diversité sociale et culturelle, abondamment travaillée et illustrée dans le cadre du moment structuraliste- y compris dans une association avec d'autres paradigmes scientifiques-, témoigne en tout lieu et en tout temps des capacités créatrices de l'homme, individuelles et collectives, et de son inscription active dans l'Histoire."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Un spécialiste du judaïsme et un rabbin éclairent les enjeux du monothéisme juif dans le monde contemporain par un retour à ses origines.0.

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article rebuts Ramsey's earlier theory, in 'Universals of Law and of Fact', of how laws of nature differ from other true generalisations. It argues that our laws are rules we use in judging 'if I meet an F I shall regard it as a G'. This temporal asymmetry is derived from that of cause and effect and used to distinguish what's past as what we can know about without knowing our present intentions.

How should national societies build legitimate and inclusive collective identities amidst prolific multiculturalism and linguistic diversity? We argue that cultural ownership of particular ways of framing ethics should be part of this collective identity building process. We should avoid unfair domination of minority cultural identities, but how do we do this when ethical discourses themselves tend to be shaped by particular dominant identities? We look into the case of the challenges that a particular multicultural society, the Philippines, faces in its (...) ongoing collective identity building project on three levels: ethnic and linguistic differences, the historical layers of foreign culture that have each influenced these distinct cultural identities in different degrees, and the apparent domination of Tagalog linguistic culture over others. Our answer to the question of legitimate and inclusive collective identity comes from an inter-linguistic dialogue that can be effected between cultures by harnessing similarities of ethical concepts, without compromising cultural differences. We present three different possible approaches under the following headings: Pilipino ethics, Filipino ethics and Philippine ethics, each representing a particular stance to the dominant Tagalog linguistic culture. We argue for the third option, which is the most inclusive because of how it equalizes the status of all participating cultures in the dialogue. We also draw from the possibilities afforded by the phenomena of Scandinavian semicommunication and what this practice offers in making collective identity building more inclusive. (shrink)

This paper provides an update semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It does so by giving a dynamic twist to the ‘Premise Semantics’ for counterfactuals developed in Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1981). It also offers an alternative solution to the problems with naive Premise Semantics discussed by Angelika Kratzer in ‘Lumps of Thought’ (Kratzer, 1989). Such an alternative is called for given the triviality results presented in Kanazawa et al. (2005, this issue).

This note is a postscript to Ramsey's 'Truth and Probability'. It replaces that article's psychological reading of subjective probability with a reading of it as a consistency condition on the theory that we act to maximise expected utility.

For three decades Frank Cioffi has been at the center of the debate over Freud's legacy and the legitimacy of psychoanalysis.

How do nuclear technologies become commonplace? How have the borders between the exceptional and the banal been drawn and redrawn over the last 70 years in order to make nuclear energy part of everyday life? This special issue analyzes the role of fun and display, broadly construed, in shaping the cultural representation and the material circulation (or non-circulation) of nuclear technologies. Four case studies, covering the United States, Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, and Ukraine from the 1950s to the 2000s, explore (...) how specific forms of public display and playful practices of cultural production were used as means to banalize (or de-banalize) nuclear energy. This introduction addresses the main theoretical and historiographical signposts of the special issue and outlines the different ways in which the articles explore them. (shrink)

In the literature on social ontology, two perspectives on collective agency have been developed. The first is the internal perspective, the second the external one. The internal perspective takes the point of view of the members as its point of departure and appeals, inter alia, to the joint intentions they form. The idea is that collective agents perform joint actions such as dancing the tango, organizing prayer meetings, or performing symphonies. Such actions are generated by joint intentions, a topic which (...) has been investigated extensively in recent decades.1 The external perspective takes the point of view of outsiders as its point of departure. Here the idea is that outsiders ascribe certain properties to collections of individuals that thereby acquire a new status. An example that is discussed in some detail below is provided by universities that, at least initially, had to be recognized by the pope in order to perform the actions that are characteristic of universities, in particular the awarding of academic degrees. This perspective has received considerably less attention.2 In this paper I present and defend a new account of collective agents from the external perspective. I call it ‘the status account’. At the heart of this account lies the idea just mentioned. A collective agent can come into existence by outsiders granting a collection of individuals some kind of status. I call a collective agent for which this holds a ‘corporate agent’, because such an agent is or has been, in a sense to be explained, incorporated. I develop this idea by distinguishing between two kinds of rules: status rules and constitutive rules. Status rules explicate the normative attributes that are characteristic of a particular kind of corporate agent. Constitutive rules specify the conditions that have to be met for a certain collection of individuals to have those attributes. The status account shares some important features with John Searle’s social ontology.3 The advantages that my account has over Searle’s are discussed in section 2.2, immediately after the account has been introduced in section 2.1. Before doing that, however, I shall discuss the internal perspective.. (shrink)

This paper investigates (modal) extensions of Heyting-Brouwer logic, i.e., the logic which results when the dual of implication (alias coimplication) is added to the language of intuitionistic logic. We first develop matrix as well as Kripke style semantics for those logics. Then, by extending the Gö;del-embedding of intuitionistic logic into S4, it is shown that all (modal) extensions of Heyting-Brouwer logic can be embedded into tense logics (with additional modal operators). An extension of the Blok-Esakia-Theorem is proved for this embedding.

The article argues that universals of law, i.e. the laws of nature, are the general axioms of a deductive system of all knowledge, and their deductive consequences. Universals of fact are generalisations deducible from these together with particular facts.

This paper investigates the structure of lattices of normal mono- and polymodal subframelogics, i.e., those modal logics whose frames are closed under a certain type of substructures. Nearly all basic modal logics belong to this class. The main lattice theoretic tool applied is the notion of a splitting of a complete lattice which turns out to be connected with the “geometry” and “topology” of frames, with Kripke completeness and with axiomatization problems. We investigate in detail subframe logics containing K4, those (...) containing polymodal Altn and subframe logics which are tense logics. (shrink)

What is it that troubles and preoccupies us about the anxieties and anguishes of social and private life? Have advances in the disciplines of psychoanalysis, psychology or the social sciences in general ministered to our needs in these areas? In this forcefully argued collection of essays, Frank Cioffi examines Wittgenstein's reflections on the comparative claims of clarification and empirical enquiry. Though writing out of admiration and indebtedness, he expresses reservations as to the limits Wittgenstein places on the relevance and (...) desirability of empirical knowledge. His discusssions extend from Wittgenstein's reflections on human sacrifice and other ritual practices dealt with by Frazer to Freud's account of the sources of anxiety, depression, dreams and laughter. He asks both whether it is empirical investigation or more lucid reflection that these phenomena demand, and what kind of question this itself is. (shrink)

Respecto del pasaje en cuestión (Verg. Ecl. 9. 44-55), la tradición manuscrita no se muestra uniforme: la mayor parte de los MSS asignan los vv. 46-50 a Meris; algunos pocos (M y γ) los asignan a Lícidas. El artículo aporta fundamentación en favor de la atribución de esos versos a Lícidas; repasa diversas soluciones adoptadas en ediciones y comentarios recientes, incluyendo la última edición crítica (Ottaviano, 2013), en la que se adopta (equivocadamente, a nuestro criterio) la enmienda nisi en el (...) v. 45. A continuación, las cuatro evocaciones de canto realizadas por Lícidas y Meris son analizadas en el marco de dos oportunos señalamientos de Schmidt (1972): a. el particular concepto de ‘autoría’ que rige en la ficción de oralidad propia de la poesía bucólica; b. la relación que se establece en la égloga entre el contenido de esas evocaciones y las categorías de poeta y uates declaradas en los vv. 32-36. (shrink)

Ubiquitous news, global information access, instantaneous reporting, interactivity, multimedia content, extreme customization: Journalism is undergoing the most fundamental transformation since the rise of the penny press in the nineteenth century. Here is a report from the front lines on the impact and implications for journalists and the public alike. John Pavlik, executive director of the Center for New Media at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, argues that the new media can revitalize news gathering and reengage an increasingly distrustful and (...) alienated citizenry. The book is a valuable reference on everything from organizing a new age newsroom to job hunting in the new media. (shrink)

We shall describe the set of strongly meet irreducible logics in the lattice ϵLin.t of normal tense logics of weak orderings. Based on this description it is shown that all logics in ϵLin.t are independently axiomatizable. Then the description is used in order to investigate tense logics with respect to decidability, finite axiomatizability, axiomatization problems and completeness with respect to Kripke semantics. The main tool for the investigation is a translation of bimodal formulas into a language talking about partitions of (...) general frames into intervals so that relative to both Kripke frames and descriptive frames the expressive power of both languages coincides. (shrink)

It is known that even seemingly small fragments of the first-order temporal logic over the natural numbers are not recursively enumerable. In this paper we show that the monodic fragment is an exception by constructing its finite Hilbert-style axiomatization. We also show that the monodic fragment with equality is not recursively axiomatizable.

We study hyperdefinable groups, the most general kind of groups interpretable in a simple theory. After developing their basic theory, we prove the appropriate versions of Hrushovski's group quotient theorem and the Weil–Hrushovski group chunk theorem. We also study locally modular hyperdefinable groups and prove that they are bounded-by-Abelian-by-bounded. Finally, we analyze hyperdefinable groups in supersimple theories.

Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertai...

In The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism, Alessandro Ferrara seeks a philosophical breakthrough from what looks like it could be a pending dead-end for democracy. The best hope, Ferrara superbly maintains, lies through an extension or updating – a “renewal,” as he calls it – of lines of thought bequeathed to us, by John Rawls and others, under the name of political liberalism. Somewhere near the crux of Ferrara’s reflection stands a class of institutional fixtures whose (...) name is missing from his title. I mean the class “constitution.” I use that word to name a country’s scriptural basic law, its publicly cognizable corpus of canonically worded sentences ordaining the country’s basic institutional framework. My suggestion will be that it is no less tellingly a “constitutional” than a “democratic” horizon that Ferrara’s work, in conjunction with Rawls’s, shows us to be facing. (shrink)

John Rawls proposed, as what he called “the liberal principle of legitimacy,” that coercive exercises of political power can be justified to free and equal dissenters when “in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse.” Does “unwritten constitution” there refer to norms of constitutional import, but that subsist only as custom, not as law? To norms that subsist as common law but not as code law? To empirical regularities (...) of political practice, as opposed to normative rules and standards? Which interpretation is best? (shrink)

Frank Cioffi; V—Intention and Interpretation in Criticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 85–106, https://doi.o.

This paper investigates partitions of lattices of modal logics based on superintuitionistic logics which are defined by forming, for each superintuitionistic logic L and classical modal logic , the set L[] of L-companions of . Here L[] consists of those modal logics whose non-modal fragments coincide with L and which axiomatize if the law of excluded middle p V p is added. Questions addressed are, for instance, whether there exist logics with the disjunction property in L[], whether L[] contains a (...) smallest element, and whether L[] contains lower covers of . Positive solutions as concerns the last question show that there are (uncountably many) superclean modal logics based on intuitionistic logic in the sense of Vakarelov [28]. Thus a number of problems stated in [28] are solved. As a technical tool the paper develops the splitting technique for lattices of modal logics based on superintuitionistic logics and ap plies duality theory from [34]. (shrink)