In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...) strongly suggested by Putnam's text. I will show that the latter argument obviously does not work. The more promising argument which I reconstruct on behalf of Putnam raises some interesting questions about the relation between the contents of one's beliefs and one's environment and about how this relation affects the evaluation of anti-skeptical arguments. I conclude that my reconstructed argument ultimately fails as a response to Cartesian skepticism: the argument engenders a skepticism about knowledge of meaning, or propositional content, which undercuts its anti-skeptical force. (shrink)

In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.

In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.

Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.

It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...) - adult or child - toward the prospect of his death is different; it is not unreasonable in certain cases to regard one's own death as a bad thing for oneself. If this is so, then the question arises as to why death is bad, in those cases in which it is bad. (shrink)

This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.

Michael McKinsey has argued that content externalism has the absurd consequence that one can know a priori that water exists. Richard W. Miller responds that when a prioricity is properly understood, McKinsey's argument should not be seen as a _reductio of externalism. This paper disputes Miller's understanding of a prioricity.

A Kantian transcendental argument is an argument which purports to show that the existence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. Both the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism satisfy this characterization. But we have seen that even a successful Kantian transcendental argument would be somewhat disappointing. Even though such an argument would refute the extreme Cartesian skepticism about the very existence of physical objects, it would not certify any (...) of one's claims to know facts about particular physical objects: it would not refute the weaker skeptical position I have sketched.5 How- ever, it would clearly be of great interest if one could show that the existence of physical objects is a condition for the possibility of self- conscious experience. Accordingly, I would like to investigate some problems surrounding the construction of Kantian transcendental arguments. (shrink)

In part I of the present work, I used the term 'Kantian transcendental argument' to refer to any argument which purports to establish that the existence of outer objects is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. In this second part, then, I examine Kantian transcendental arguments which proceed from the premise that one is the subject of widely construed self-conscious experience.

In "Of Personal Identity,", Hume attempts to explain how one arrives at the fiction of a substantial self which retains its numerical identity through time. In "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses," Hume offers a similar explanation of the origin of another fiction - that of objects which enjoy a continued and distinct existence. In this paper, I will argue that his pair of parallel explanations does not jointly account for the pair of fictions to be explained.

We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).

In "Nozick on Scepticism", Graeme Forbes attempts to establish a Transmission Principle for knowledge which has been challenged by a number of anti-sceptical philosophers (such as Nozick). This principle (or something like it) seems to be required by Cartesian sceptical arguments, so if it could be refuted, this would apparently rid us of such scepticism. I do not believe that Nozick or anyone else has refuted the principle, yet I will argue that Forbes has certainly failed to establish it.

Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.

RÉSUMÉ: Dans un article récent, Victoria McGeer a proposé une conception de la connaissance de soi, qui se présente comme une alternative au modèle du rapporteurprédicteur selon lequel confesser des croyances consiste à rapporter des «états sousjacents» de soi-même. McGeer met l’accent, à la place, sur une approche actantielle: la connaissance de soi, selon elle, est engendrée par les actions responsables que l’agent entreprend pour rendre vrais ses propres aveux quant à ses croyances. Le présent article est une discussion critique (...) de cette conception de McGeer. Une première objection a rapport à l’explication du comportement, et une seconde concerne la tentative du modèle actantiel pour rendre compte du caractère d’autorité de la connaissance de soi. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDans un article récent, Victoria McGeer a proposé une conception de la connaissance de soi, qui se présente comme une alternative au modèle durapporteur prédicteur selon lequel confesser des croyances consiste à rapporter des «états sous-jacents» de soi-même. McGeer met l'accent, à la place, sur une approche actantielle: la connaissance de soi, selon elle, est engendrée par les actions responsables que l'agent entreprend pour rendre vrais ses propres aveux quant à ses croyances. Le présent article est une discussion critique de (...) cette conception de McGeer. Une première objection a rapport à l'explication du comportement, et une seconde concerne la tentative du modèle actantiel pour rendre compte du caractère d'autorité de la connaissance de soi. (shrink)

This paper describes the implications of the transition from Ontology conceived as fundamental metaphysical logos to ontologies construed as postmodern historical applications of this, and then, finally, to Trans-Ontology as the ultimate, futuristic innovation of Transhumanism. If modernity counts as the key shift that has occurred in our living and understanding of the world since the dawn of history, postmodernism seems to be the record of a transition from the absolute Grand Narratives of modernity to a scenario consisting of polycentric, (...) equally justified narratives. Thus, the historical failure of the old Ontology, in the form of monarchy, absolutism, monotheistic religions, Eurocentrism, and nationalism, entails the plurality of approaches and diversity of flexible transformations of ontologies. Yet such a purportedly liberating evolution is encountered en route to the likewise postmodern trans-humanist impulse that aims at a complete transformation of the traditional human essence by means of a theurgist, miraculous, Trans-Theological technology. The latter’s goal is to normalize the arrival of a paradoxically innovative universe, where transhuman beings will rebuild the world, and re-essentialize it. Ultimately, this universal integralism will be based on an ever-growing ludic character, coupled with a mathematically scheduled playfulness, aiming at a transformed, fully integrated and manageable entity. (shrink)

(2012). On Human Kinds and Role Models: A Critical Discussion about the African American Male Teacher. Educational Studies: Vol. 48, Black Teachers Theorizing, pp. 296-315.

The radio is a unique and powerful medium, particularly well‐suited for the sharing of ideas and teaching techniques of inquiry through demonstration. In this chapter, the author offers a few short comments on the goals of public philosophy before turning to a broader theoretical analysis of the radio. Walter Benjamin's work from the 1920s and 30s offers particularly illuminating insights into how we experience the medium of the radio. An analysis of his writings about the radio points to many of (...) the practical questions anyone pursuing public philosophy on the radio should consider. The author concludes by noting some important contemporary examples of public philosophy on the radio and a few words about the future of philosophy through radio. (shrink)

The paper deals with Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. It considers the objections to the argument raised by David Lewis, Mark Heller, James van Cleve, Anthony Brueckner and others, to the effect that Putnam's reasoning fails to undermine versions of metaphysical realism which construe reference along externalist lines. I argue that the version of Putnam's argument that his critics have attacked is indeed powerless against externalist accounts of reference, but that, on a different construal, the argument (...) puts genuine pressure on externalism. On the version of the argument that I develop, the thrust of the model-theoretic considerations is that an externalist construal of reference would make grasp of reference facts impossible. (shrink)