In discussion of the interpretation of quantum mechanics the terms ‘ontic’ and ‘epistemic’ are often used in the sense of pertaining to what exists, and pertaining to cognition or knowledge respectively. The terms are also often associated with the formal definitions given by Harrigan and Spekkens for the wavefunction in quantum mechanics to be ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic in the context of the ontological models framework. The formal definitions are contradictories, so that the wavefunction can be either ψ-epistemic or ψ-ontic but (...) not both. However, we argue, nothing about the informal ideas of epistemic and ontic interpretations rules out wavefunctions representing both reality and knowledge. The implications of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem and many other issues may be rethought in the light of our analysis. (shrink)

In quantum mechanics, the wavefunction predicts probabilities of possible measurement outcomes, but not which individual outcome is realised in each run of an experiment. This suggests that it describes an ensemble of states with different values of a hidden variable. Here, we analyse this idea with reference to currently known theorems and experiments. We argue that the ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction fails to properly identify ensemble interpretations and propose a more useful definition. We then show that all local ψ-ensemble interpretations which reproduce (...) quantum mechanics violate Statistical Independence. Theories with this property are commonly referred to as superdeterministic or retrocausal. Finally, we explain how this interpretation helps make sense of some otherwise puzzling phenomena in quantum mechanics, such as the delayed choice experiment, the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb detector, and the Extended Wigner's Friends Scenario. (shrink)

Bell’s theorem is often said to imply that quantum mechanics violates local causality, and that local causality cannot be restored with a hidden-variables theory. This however is only correct if the hidden-variables theory fulfils an assumption called Statistical Independence. Violations of Statistical Independence are commonly interpreted as correlations between the measurement settings and the hidden variables. Such correlations have been discarded as “fine-tuning” or a “conspiracy”. We here point out that the common interpretation is at best physically ambiguous and at (...) worst incorrect. The problem with the common interpretation is that Statistical Independence might be violated because of a non-trivial measure in state space, a possibility we propose to call “supermeasured”. We use Invariant Set Theory as an example of a supermeasured theory that violates the Statistical Independence assumption in Bell’s theorem without requiring correlations between hidden variables and measurement settings. (shrink)

Quantum Counterfactual Communication is the recently-proposed idea of using quantum physics to send messages between two parties, without any matter/energy transfer associated with the bits sent. While this has excited massive interest, both for potential ‘unhackable’ communication, and insight into the foundations of quantum mechanics, it has been asked whether this process is essentially quantum, or could be performed classically. We examine counterfactual communication, both classical and quantum, and show that the protocols proposed so far for sending signals that don’t (...) involve matter/energy transfer associated with the bits sent must be quantum, insofar as they require wave-particle duality. (shrink)

A correction to this paper has been published: doi:10.1007/s10701-021-00450-z.

FROM ITS INCEPTION PRAGMATISM HAS DISPLAYED an ambivalent relation to Hegelianism. John Dewey conceived his experimentalism as a more modest alternative to Hegel's system of absolute idealism, which he deemed "too grand for present tastes." At the same time, pragmatists from James and Dewey to Quine and Rorty have all assimilated important Hegelian motifs. These include most importantly a deep suspicion of modern representationalist epistemology, in both its rationalist and empiricist versions; a conception of intelligence as a form of practice, (...) best conceived in terms of making, doing, and acting; and a commitment to a nonreductionist, holistic appreciation of our beliefs about the world. To this list Rorty adds an appreciation of Hegel's conception of the philosophical enterprise as Nachdenken, as a kind of edifying recollective summary. (shrink)

SummaryThe aim of the study was to assess the relationship between adverse life events, a tendency to respond with a high level of anxiety, and height and adiposity of adolescents. The sample included 575 persons aged 10–15 from the Wielkopolska region of Poland. The influence of adverse events during the 6 months before the examination and anxiety trait, as assessed with a STAIC questionnaire, on body height and BMI was analysed. Also sex, age, chronic diseases and socioeconomic status indicators were (...) assessed. One-way and two-way ANOVA was used for assessment of relationships. Adverse events had no influence on body height and BMI. Subjects with a high level of anxiety trait were shorter than subjects with a normal level of anxiety trait. The association of anxiety trait and body height was significant after adjustment for sex, age, chronic diseases and history of adverse life events. The analysis showed no statistically significant influence of adverse life events on height and BMI and a significant relationship between the general tendency to respond with anxiety and body height of adolescents. This suggests that psychological characteristics associated with the cognitive tendency to interpret events as threatening, and consequently, to respond with stress, may be involved in the variability of biological traits regardless of the objective harmfulness of the situation. (shrink)

One of the central questions of the field of Religious Studies is "What is religion and how might we best understand it?". Sigmund Freud was surely a paradigmatic cartographer of this terrain. Among the first theorists to explore the unconscious fantasies, fears, and desires underlying religious ideas and practices, Freud can be considered a grandfather of the field. Yet Freud's legacy is deeply contested. His reputation is perhaps at its lowest point since he came to public attention a century ago, (...) and students often assume that Freud is sexist, dangerous, passe, and irrelevant to the study of religion. How can Freud be taught in this climate of critique and controversy? The fourteen contributors to this volume, all recognized scholars of religion and psychoanalysis, describe how they address Freud's contested legacy: they "teach the debates." They describe their courses on Freud and religion, their innovative pedagogical practices, and the creative ways they work with resistance. P I focuses on institutional and curricular contexts: contributors describe how they teach Freud at a Catholic and Jesuit undergraduate institution, a liberal seminary, and a large multicultural university. In Part II contributors describe courses structured around psychoanalytic interpretations of religious figures and phenomena: Ramakrishna, Jesus and Augustine, myth and mysticism. Part III focuses explicitly on courses structured around major debates over gender, Judaism, anti-semitism, religion and ritual. Part IV describes courses in which psychoanalysis is presented as a powerful pedagogy of transformation and insight. (shrink)

By tracing the general evolution of HusserI’s theory of logic and mathematics, this essay explores Husserl’s identification and strategic overcoming of the two forms of psychologism--Iogical psychologism and transcendental psychologism--that bar the way to rigorous phenomenological inquiry. In the early works “On the Concept of Number” and the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl himself falls victim to a particular form of logical psychologism. By the time of the Logical Investigations this problem has been dealt with: the method of eidetic intuition enables (...) an account of the “origins” of logical and mathematical concepts without reducing such concepts to mere predicates of mental acts. The task of Formal and Transcendental Logic is to disclose the more pervasive problem of transcendental psychologism, one that taints even the theory of pure logic articulated in the Logical Investigations. A radical solution is provided through the development of an “ultimate logic” of transcendental subjectivity. (shrink)

By tracing the general evolution of HusserI’s theory of logic and mathematics, this essay explores Husserl’s identification and strategic overcoming of the two forms of psychologism--Iogical psychologism and transcendental psychologism--that bar the way to rigorous phenomenological inquiry. In the early works “On the Concept of Number” and the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl himself falls victim to a particular form of logical psychologism. By the time of the Logical Investigations this problem has been dealt with: the method of eidetic intuition enables (...) an account of the “origins” of logical and mathematical concepts without reducing such concepts to mere predicates of mental acts. The task of Formal and Transcendental Logic is to disclose the more pervasive problem of transcendental psychologism, one that taints even the theory of pure logic articulated in the Logical Investigations. A radical solution is provided through the development of an “ultimate logic” of transcendental subjectivity. (shrink)

Although many people choose to sign consent forms and participate in research, how many thoroughly read a consent form before signing it? Across 3 experiments using 348 undergraduate student participants, we examined whether personality characteristics as well as consent form content, format, and delivery method were related to thorough reading. Students repeatedly failed to read the consent forms, although small effects were found favoring electronic delivery methods and traditional format forms. Potential explanations are discussed and include participant apathy, participants trying (...) to save time by not reading the consent form, and participant assumptions about consent forms. (shrink)

This essay examines the reasons for Hegel's frequently professed claim that Kant's Critique of Judgment simultaneously reveals the internal limits of critical philosophy and opens the door to his own system of speculative idealism. It evaluates Hegel's contention that the conceptions of aesthetic experience, organic purposiveness, and the intuitive intellect developed in the third Critique together conspire to undermine the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the theories of nature and freedom advanced in the first and second Critiques . Finally it (...) explains how Hegel understands his logic and real philosophy as a realist and quasi-naturalistic alternative to Kant's subjective idealism, one that purports to generate a system of categories adequate not only to dead matter but also to organic life and free self-conscious spirit. (shrink)

FROM ITS INCEPTION PRAGMATISM HAS DISPLAYED an ambivalent relation to Hegelianism. John Dewey conceived his experimentalism as a more modest alternative to Hegel's system of absolute idealism, which he deemed "too grand for present tastes." At the same time, pragmatists from James and Dewey to Quine and Rorty have all assimilated important Hegelian motifs. These include most importantly a deep suspicion of modern representationalist epistemology, in both its rationalist and empiricist versions; a conception of intelligence as a form of practice, (...) best conceived in terms of making, doing, and acting; and a commitment to a nonreductionist, holistic appreciation of our beliefs about the world. To this list Rorty adds an appreciation of Hegel's conception of the philosophical enterprise as Nachdenken, as a kind of edifying recollective summary. (shrink)

Hegel’s definition of the state as a common public authority in The German Constitution marks his first thorough attempt to understand the authority of the modern state in terms of the rule of law. Such an understanding of the state constitutes an important advance in Hegel’s political philosophy since, in his early political-theological writings, the legal relation was in essence excluded from the political sphere. Positing a fundamental opposition between legality and authentic ethical life, Hegel interpreted societies in which legal (...) forms become particularly pronounced as societies founded on degenerate political institutions and caught up in an inexorable process of decline. Until Hegel grasped the positive ethical significance of legal authority, something accomplished in The German Constitution, his theory of the state remained largely determined by a Greek-inspired, virtue-based paradigm of political life. Only with the overcoming of this paradigm could he move to a comprehensive analysis of both modern institutional structures and the political theories that attempt to understand and justify them. Hegel’s evolving theory of modern legal form thus provides an important index and measure of his complex stance toward modern political society and of his critical assessment of the self-interpretations of modernity offered by the natural right tradition and the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Farrell characterizes his book as a counternarrative to Richard Rorty's influential account of the breakdown of traditional pictures of mind, language, and reality brought about by the linguistic and interpretive turn in recent Anglo-American and European philosophy. It is not Farrell's aim to breathe new life into these old ideas but instead to retell the story of their demise and in so doing to challenge the conclusions drawn by Rorty. Thus whereas Rorty's critique of the notion of mind as the (...) mirror of nature leads to an antirealist and relativist account of belief and to the claim that for the pragmatist the concept of the world as it is in itself is philosophically bankrupt, Farrell's competing account of the disenchantment of subjectivity clears the way for a "modest" theory of epistemological and moral realism. Rejecting the interpretation of the world as the mere "shadow of our practices", this theory attempts to demonstrate that our scientific and moral beliefs can, and in fact most often do, "track" the world itself. (shrink)

The issue of religious freedom while serving a sentence of imprisonment often occupies scientists from around the world. Basically, they agree that a prisoner, regardless of the act for which he or she has been convicted, has the right to religious freedom. Problems are posed, however, by the question of delimiting this freedom, especially at the level of the right to practise a chosen religion during prison isolation. The decisions of international tribunals and national courts are not uniform owing to (...) the generality of the rules governing this issue. The initial research question that we pose is this: how does society perceive the right to religious freedom in prisons? Does a convict have the right to demand respect for the rules of his or her religion regarding diet, clothes, appearance and participation in religious services? We look for answers to these questions in research conducted in Polish society, one that is confronted by international regulations. (shrink)

Hanc quoque ‘iucunditatem’, si vis, transfer in animum , rnodo intellegas inter ilium qui dicat Tanta laetitia auctus sum ut nihil constet et eum qui Nunc demum mihi animus ardet, quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, esse ilium medium [Quamquam haec inter nos nuper notitia admodum est] qui nee laetetur nee angatur, itemque inter eum qui potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus et eum qui crucietur summis doloribus esse eum qui utroque careat.

Hanc quoque ‘iucunditatem’, si vis, transfer in animum, rnodo intellegas inter ilium qui dicat Tanta laetitia auctus sum ut nihil constet et eum qui Nunc demum mihi animus ardet, quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, esse ilium medium [Quamquam haec inter nos nuper notitia admodum est] qui nee laetetur nee angatur, itemque inter eum qui potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus et eum qui crucietur summis doloribus esse eum qui utroque careat.

The aim of this paper is to bring an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cog­ito: is the cogito known by intuition or by inference? There have been several studies based on both analytical and historical approaches to the dispute, and it seems that we have exhausted all interpretations. Nevertheless, I wish to revisit this dispute, as it ap­pears that the previous studies have overlooked Descartes’s use of words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various (...) discourses on the cogito con­sistently. In this paper, I focus on the terms which Descartes uses to indicate the varied status of the cogito, such as ‘haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc propositionem, ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc conclusionem: cogito, ergo sum’, and so on; Descartes changes carefully the terms in each of the cogito arguments. By focusing on these terms, I try to interpret Descartes’s explanations consistently. (shrink)

At Book 5.324–37, the DRN’s narrator says that the world is young, claims that the nature of the world has been understood only recently, and asserts that he is either the ‘very first’/‘most pre-eminent’ or, as I suggest here, ‘among the first’/‘among the most pre-eminent’ to turn Greek Epicureanism into Latin. It is the last of these three claims that concerns us:denique natura haec rerum ratioque repertast 335nuper, et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertusnunc ego sum in patrias qui possim (...) vertere voces.Commentators and translators persistently interpret the phrase primus cum primis at line 336 to mean ‘the very first’, taking cum primis as an intensifier of primus and providing primus with a temporal denotation. A comment by Reid is typical: ‘The phrase cum primis, as used by [Lucretius], has lost its literal sense, and means “particularly”, “especially”’. It is not immediately clear, however, whether one should choose the temporal or qualitative denotation for primus or whether one should allow ambiguity and grant that some readers may interpret the adjective temporally while others may interpret it qualitatively. I suggest that the passage primus cum primis ipse repertus | nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim vertere voces means ‘I myself have now been discovered to be a pre-eminent person, among pre-eminent people, of the type who is able to turn this into our native tongue’. Cum primis should be understood literally, following standard Latin grammar, as an ablative construed with cum denoting accompaniment rather than as an intensifier. While Leonard and Smith suggest that ‘the phrase cum primis … seems to have originated in the idea of accompaniment and implicit comparison’, here I show that the prepositional phrase cum primis retains its original meaning of accompaniment in Lucretius. As I shall argue, we should be sceptical of commentators who exhort us to interpret cum primis at 5.336 as an intensifier, since the phrase makes good sense, following standard Latin grammar, as an ablative of accompaniment, and Lucretius’ use of the phrase cum primis elsewhere is always qualitative, never temporal. Moreover, several scholars have used 5.336 to date early Italian Epicureans, including C. Amafinius, and the interpretation of 5.336, accordingly, affects Lucretius’ temporal position, as well as, perhaps, his intellectual engagement in relation to Italian Epicureans. There is, then, much at stake in the interpretation of 5.336, since the narrator may be found to be either honest or not, when he positions Lucretius in relation to the translation of Epicureanism into Latin. (shrink)

Cicero, in his letters , writes the following sentence : memini in senatu disertum consularem ita eloqui: ‘hanc culpam maiorem an illam dicam?’ potuit obscenius? ‘non’ inquis ; ‘non enim ita sensit’ Wherein does the coarseness lie? Critics find in lam dicam a word ‘ landicam,’ which they define by ‘clitoris’. But possibly culpam is, whether by equivoque or by definition, the offending word.

Thomas Aquinas a quodam nostri temporis viro docto de potentiis inquirenti “dispositionalis modalitatis propugnator fortissimus” nominatus est. Huius tractationis scopus est, hanc assertionem criticae subicere analysi. Imprimis autem nonnulla Aquinatis de potentiis doctrinae elementa exponuntur, ea disceptationibus, quae nostro tempore aguntur, conferendo. Deinde duae de potentiarum modalitatis natura sententiae contrariae explicantur: scil. “modalitas dispositionalis” et “necessitas conditionata”. Quo exacto Aquinatis textus examinantur inquirendo, utram illarum sententiarum ille docuerit. Testimonia demum postremae faventia inveniuntur. Loco conclusionis auctor suadet, quomodo Aquinas exempla a (...) “modalitate dispositionali” sectatoribus proposita explicare posset. Ad quaestionem in titulo positam igitur auctor respondit opinionem de Aquinate ut fortissimo modalitatis dispositionalis propugnatore esse falsam, idque tropaeum cuidam alteri esse tribuendum.Aquinas has been labelled “the greatest advocate of dispositional modality”, by one contemporary power theorist. This paper’s goal is to critically analyse this claim. Before doing so, however, it first explicates some components of Aquinas’s ontology of powers, putting him in dialogue with contemporary discussions. Next it explicates the two competing views of the modality of powers, dispositional modality and conditional necessity, and proceeds to examine the textual basis as to which of the two Aquinas held. Ultimately the paper finds evidence in favour of the latter. The paper then concludes with a suggestion as to how Aquinas would explain examples given by those who advocate the dispositional modality position. In answer to the title, therefore, the paper argues that thinking of Aquinas as the greatest advocate of dispositional modality is a fiction, and that this award belongs to someone else. (shrink)

rentano’s theory of inner perception, evidence and truth upsets some widespread assumptions in contemporary philosophy. It rests on an unusual notion of inner perception and on a nominal theory of judgement; it attributes a central role to evidence in epistemology and treats mental states as being intrinsically true. The present contribution aims first at presenting and elucidating some of Brentano’s views on these matters. In some crucial points Brentano’s position will be modified and hopefully en- hanced in a way that (...) is compatible with the overall picture.1 Considerable space will be devoted to the examination of some of the most important objections that have been or might be raised against the position presented on Brentano’s behalf. If by far not invulnerable, the position un- der scrutiny should hopefully appear more challenging than what it is often taken to be. (shrink)

Although modern texts of Propertius have generally inclined to conservatism, there remains a number of cases where editors have chosen, in Housman's phrase, timidly to alter what they might without rashness have defended; or where the arguments so far advanced in favour of the best attested reading leave room for supplement. Thus: I. 6. 25 f. me sine, quem semper uoluit fortuna iacere, hanc animam extremae reddere nequitiae. extrema … nequitia Fonteine.

Although modern texts of Propertius have generally inclined to conservatism, there remains a number of cases where editors have chosen, in Housman's phrase, timidly to alter what they might without rashness have defended; or where the arguments so far advanced in favour of the best attested reading leave room for supplement. Thus: I. 6. 25 f. me sine, quem semper uoluit fortuna iacere, hanc animam extremae reddere nequitiae. extrema … nequitia Fonteine.

In the midst of his fulminations against Cleopatra, Propertius denounces her land of Egypt in the following ‘wholly admirable parenthesis:’ Noxia Alexandria, dolis aptissima tellus Et totiens nostro Memphi cruenta malo, Tres ubi Pompeio detraxit harena triumphos! Toilet nulla dies hanc tibi, Roma, notam. Issent Phlegraeo melius tibi funera campo Vel tua si socero colla daturus eras.

Quomodo versus lyrici legendi sint, plerumque inter metricos constat, licet de origine singulorum versuum vel colorum dubia moveantur; at ne illud quidem confirmari potest in genere illo peculiari, quo multae strophae Pindari et Bacchylidis et nonnullae poétarum scenicorum compositae sunt. Quod in talibus versibus maxime conspicuum est, hoc est, quod metra τоû σоυ et διπλασíоυ γéνоυς; in eis coniunguntur vel coniungi videntur, ita, ut ambitus utriusque partis aut par aut non multum maior minorve sit. lam antiqui metrici parum compertum habebant, (...) qua ratione eiusmodi versus explicarent. Cum maior pars ceterorum versuum lyricorum etiam post Alexandri aetatem in usu essent et doctrina grammaticorum hanc quoque materiam complecteretur, pauca versuum illorum vestigia remanebant, postquam chori lyrici et dramatici conticuerunt. Habemus quidem Meliambos Cercidae eodem genere carmina pangere conati, quo clarissimi illi veteres, sed eos perlegentes statim sentimus artem intermortuam non ab isto Megalopolitano nova vita donatam esse; nihil enim frigidius cogitari potest, quam si quis oda pindarica recitata ad Cercidae versus se convertat eosque alta voce pronuntiare conetur. Metrici graeci et romani praeter paucos versus eosque singillatim genus nostrum non tractant nee quisquam ex eorum numero de genere toto disseruit. Horatium et suamet ipsum arte prae ceteris excellentem et doctrina metrica haud mediocriter imbutum non aliter ac nos huius aevi philologos nescire, quomodo carmina pindarica ab ipso poeta componerentur, ex Oda notissima patet, in qua Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari frustra in re desperata desudare perhibetur. Ad universam lyricorum graecorum artem pertinent, quae a Cicerone in Oratore affirmantur, qui tamen clausulis orationis numerosae operam dans rem metricam non neglexit: sed in versibus res est apertior, quamquam etiam a modis quibusdam cantu remoto soluta esse videatur oratio, maximeque id in optima quoque eorum poëtarum, qui λυρικоí a graecis nominantur, quos, cum cantu spoliaveris, nuda paene remanet oratio. Causam hanc vel maximam esse puto in nullo alio carmina pangendi genere musicam, saltationem, metrum tam arte cohaesisse; cum poësis non iam pars habebatur υθμιξου, quod φθγγοδ, σχμα, συλλαβ definiebant, ut Aristoxeni terminis utar , via stabilita ambitum singulorum versuum ac colorum statuere conarentur et indoloem pedum metricorum conicendo indicarent. (shrink)

The first sentence of the Annals reads urbem Romam a principio reges habuere. Commentators observe the echo of Sallust, Catiline 6.1 urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, and of Claudius, ILS 212 quondam reges hanc tenuere urbem. In a stimulating recent contribution David Levene also compares the first sentence of Justinus' Epitome of the Histories of Pompeius Trogus: principio rerum gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat. A fourth potential model may now be taken into consideration: Ἀθηναῖοι (...) τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχρῶντο βασιλɛίαι. (shrink)

Since Hermann first suggested the likelihood of a considerable loss of verses from the text of the Heraclidae it has been generally assumed that the play has suffered either from some mischance in the copying of the manuscript or else at the hand of an interpolator. Hermann held that the end of the play had been lost: ‘Fabulae extrema pars videtur intercidisse, in qua fieri non poterat quin de Macaria referretur, eaque res solitis celebraretur lamentis.’ Kirchhoff places the lacuna after (...) line 629: ‘Post hunc versum multa desunt. Macariae narratio et Alcmenae matris [sic] lamentationes cum chori cantico integro; novit hanc fabulae partem auctor argumenti: **ταύτην μxs22EFν εxs1F50γενxs22EFς xs22EFποθανοxs22EFσαν xs22EFτίμησαν αxs1F50τοxs22EF δxs22EF τοxs1F7Aς πολεμxs22EFους xs22EFπιγνόντες παρόντας εxs1F30ς τxs22EFν μάχην xs1F65ρμησαν.’ Wilamowitz argues against the assumption of a ‘mechanischer Ausfall’ of a whole passage, and maintains that the play has been revised by a fourth century régisseur in order to adapt it to the capacity of his theatrical troupe. (shrink)

Although modern texts of Propertius have generally inclined to conservatism, there remains a number of cases where editors have chosen, in Housman's phrase, timidly to alter what they might without rashness have defended; or where the arguments so far advanced in favour of the best attested reading leave room for supplement.Thus:I. 6. 25 f. me sine, quem semper uoluit fortuna iacere,hanc animam extremae reddere nequitiae.extrema … nequitia Fonteine.

Responsione nostra disputationem cum L. Novák prosequimur, qui tractationem nostram, cui titulus “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk”, impugnavit. Impugnatio a L. Novák sub titulo “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” conscripta ansam praebuit nobis ad nonnulla, quae dixeramus, non solum clarius, sed etiam latius ac profundius explananda. Qua in re inprimis ad hoc attendimus, quomodo S. Thomas mathematicam, scientiasque medias necnon philosophiam intellexerit. Adhuc in nostra sententia sistimus, duplicem scil. ac valde diversam interpretationem harum disciplinarum (...) proponi posse. Quamquam multi textus testantur, S. Thomam mathematicam scientiasque medias realistice intellexisse, inveniuntur tamen apud eum dicta nonnulla, quae interpretationi favent instrumentalisticae. Hanc duplicem interpretationem prae oculis ponere multum iuvat, nostro iudicio, ad subsequentem intellectualem historiam, praecipue modernae aetatis, adaequate intelligendam.In our contribution we continue our discussion with L. Novák, who criticised our paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk.” Novák’s critique titled “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” served as an incentive for us not only to clarify certain points, but also to deepen our original exposition. We focused on Aquinas’s understanding of mathematics, the middle sciences and philosophy. We still insist that two substantially different interpretations of these disciplines are possible. On the one hand, there is much evidence for Aquinas’s realistic approach to mathematics and the middle sciences. On the other hand, ideas can also be found in Aquinas’s texts supporting an instrumentalist reading. In our opinion, it is important to point out these two approaches to the mathematical sciences in order to adequately understand the subsequent evolution of the history of ideas, especially in the modern period. (shrink)

sola scripturarum ars est, quam sibi omnes passim uindicent: ‘scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim’ [Hor. Epist. 2.1.117]. hanc garrula anus, hanc delirus senex, hanc soloecista uerbosus, hanc uniuersi praesumunt, lacerant, docent, antequam discant. alii adducto supercilio grandia uerba trutinantes inter mulierculas de sacris litteris philosophantur, alii discunt—pro pudor!—a feminis, quod uiros doceant, et, ne parum hoc sit, quadam facilitate uerborum, immo audacia disserunt aliis, quod ipsi non intellegunt. taceo de meis similibus, qui si forte ad scripturas sanctas post saeculares litteras (...) uenerint et sermone conposito aurem populi mulserint, quicquid dixerint, hoc legem dei putant nec scire dignantur, quid prophetae, quid apostoli senserint, sed ad sensum suum incongrua aptant testimonia, quasi grande sit et non uitiosissimum dicendi genus deprauare sententias et ad uoluntatem suam scripturam trahere repugnantem. quasi non legerimus Homerocentonas et Vergiliocentonas ac non sic etiam Maronem sine Christo possimus dicere Christianum, quia scripserit: ‘iam redit et uirgo, redeunt Saturnia regna, iam noua progenies caelo demittitur alto’ [Verg. Ecl. 4.6–7], et patrem loquentem ad filium: ‘nate, meae uires, mea magna potentia solus’ [Verg. Aen. 1.664], et post uerba saluatoris in cruce: ‘talia perstabat memorans fixusque manebat’ [Verg. Aen. 2.650]. puerilia sunt haec et circulatorum ludo similia, docere, quod ignores, immo, et cum stomacho loquar, nec hoc quidem scire, quod nescias. (shrink)

Ridicule can be used in order to create concurrence as well as to en-hance antagonism. This paper deals with ridicule that is used by a critic when he is responding to a standpoint or to a reason advanced in support of a standpoint. Ridicule profits from humor’s good repu-tation, and correctly so, even when it is used in argumentative contexts. However, ridicule can be harmful to a discussion. This paper will deal with ridicule from the perspective of strategic maneuvering (...) between the individual rhetorical objec-tive of effecting persuasion and the shared dialectical objective of resolving the dispute on its merits. In what ways can ridicule be used in strategic maneuvering and under what conditions are these uses dialectically sound? (shrink)

‘Quid vero fit, quod poeta hanc plantam, tanquam munus locustae inprimis gratum, commemoret, nemo dixit; nee ego dicere possum’—so Jacobs in his note on the seventh line of this epigram. Among later commentators, Mackail thinks ‘can hardly mean “leek” here’ and he assumes it to be ‘groundsel’; Dain in the Budé edition is satisfied with the rather prosaic explanation that it is an ‘observation très juste … la cigale ne se nourrit que des sues des plantes’. I hope to show (...) that the diet of leeks and dewdrops from the mouth is promised by the love-sick swain of Meleager's poem for the same specific reason—to refresh the grasshopper's ‘voice’ for a new day's beguilement by song and persuasion to the sleep which will again free him from the cares of love. Although the ancients were aware of the means by which such insects produced their incessant sound, they remained faithful to the poetic tradition, which made them drink dew as a prelude to their singing, first found in Hesiod, Scut. 395, and clearly expressed in a couplet of Antipater of Thessalonica. (shrink)

emended in with the note ‘hanc formam doricam defendere studet G. Fraenkel Glotta ii. 33’.Fraenkel argues that this form is the product of a conscious effort to avoidconfusion and not ‘ein bloss‘.

emended in with the note ‘hanc formam doricam defendere studet G. Fraenkel Glotta ii. 33’.Fraenkel argues that this form is the product of a conscious effort to avoidconfusion and not ‘ein bloss‘.