The purpose of this study is to describe the development of philosophy in Poland since the end of the Second World War and the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy which, owing to international political events, has assumed an impor tant role in the intellectual life of contemporary Poland. This task could not have been accomplished without relating post-war developments to those of the inter war period. Consequently, the period studied covers the years 1918-1958. Yet another extension was necessary. Marxism-Leninism regards sociology (...) as a part of philosophy. Moreover, Marxism-Leninism often resorts to sociology to support or justify some of its philosophical views. Finally, its criticism of 'bourgeois philosophy' is often concerned with social philosophy and socio logical theories which supposedly are implicit or explicit in 'bourgeois philoso phy'. For this reason it was desirable to consider in this study some theoretical and methodological problems of the social sciences. They are taken into ac count when they illuminate philosophical controversies or the evolution of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Marxism-Leninism is not only a new line of development but also a new point of departure in Polish philosophy. It provides a striking contrast with the established philosophical tradition which originated roughly at the time when G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell initiated the analytical trend in English philosophy. The contrast can be epitomised by the contradistinction of philoso phy and ideology, chosen as the title of this study. (shrink)

A natural experiment was conducted studying the relations among student cheating, motivation, religiosity, and attitudes toward cheating. Students enrolled in a dual religious/college curriculum were surveyed regarding their cheating behavior, attitudes toward cheating, religiosity, and learning/grade motivations toward classes. Business and liberal arts college students were represented. Results strongly support the following conclusions. First, grade orientation is associated with increases in self-reported cheating. Second, among these religious students, more religiosity correlates with reduced reports of cheating in all courses. This result (...) appears to be due to the unique effect of religion on self-reported cheating rates and, depending on course content, on a reduction of grade orientation in religious students. Third, business students report more cheating than their liberal arts counterparts, even when taking the same courses. They have less critical attitudes toward cheating and greater grade orientation, both of which statistically contribute to this difference, but other factors are involved as well. Keywords: academic integrity, motivation, religiosity, cheating. (shrink)

A natural experiment was conducted studying the relations among student cheating, motivation, religiosity, and attitudes toward cheating. Students enrolled in a dual religious/college curriculum were surveyed regarding their cheating behavior, attitudes toward cheating, religiosity, and learning/grade motivations toward classes. Business and liberal arts college students were represented. Results strongly support the following conclusions. First, grade orientation is associated with increases in self-reported cheating. Second, among these religious students, more religiosity correlates with reduced reports of cheating in all courses. This result (...) appears to be due to the unique effect of religion on self-reported cheating rates and, depending on course content, on a reduction of grade orientation in religious students. Third, business students report more cheating than their liberal arts counterparts, even when taking the same courses. They have less critical attitudes toward cheating and greater grade orientation, both of which statistically contribute to this difference, but other factors are involved as well. Keywords: academic integrity, motivation, religiosity, cheating. (shrink)

En este artículo damos a conocer ciertos documentos que nos aportan nuevos indicios para conocer cuál ha sido la trayectoria seguida por un cuadro atribuido a Zurbarán que perteneció a la Congregación del Oratorio de San Felipe Neri de Sevilla y que, con el tiempo, pasó amanos diferentes. Tal circunstancia nos sirve de pretexto para trazar, bien que someramente, un breve relato acerca de las vicisitudes en las que se vieron inmersos los patrimonios artísticos de los dos templos que sirvieron (...) de marco a las celebraciones religiosas de los oratorianos sevillanos, a saber, la desaparecida iglesia de San Felipe Neri y el templo del antiguo colegio carmelitano de San Alberto. (shrink)

The array seen when saccading across a point light source blinking in the dark is displaced in the direction of the saccade. This displacement reflects an abrupt shift of spatiotopic coordinates that precedes the actual eye movement. The extraretinal signal mediating this discrete shift appears to be an oculomotor reference signal, specifying intended eye orientation, that changes discretely before saccades.

The shift towards "empirical bioethics" was largely triggered by a recognition that stakeholders' views and experiences are vital in ethical analysis where one hopes to produce practicable recommendations. Such perspectives can provide a rich resource in bioethics scholarship, perhaps challenging the researcher's perspective. However, overreliance on a picture painted by a group of research participants—or on pre‐existing literature in that field—can lead to a biased view of a given context, as the subjectivity of data generated in these ways cannot (and (...) should not wholly) be escaped. In response, we propose the implementation of a complementary approach of ethno‐immersion in bioethics research. By positioning oneself in the context being researched, the researcher can better understand the realities of that context. The researcher's understanding will, naturally, be subjective too. However, it will act as a better developed and more informed outsider view, when considering the picture painted by participants and previous studies, thus enabling the researcher to introduce more nuance when analysing data. We introduce this approach after examining what we call the context detachment problem, whereby some bioethics scholarship—empirical or otherwise—fails to reflect the reality of the healthcare setting it concerns. Our proposed ethno‐immersion (which differs from formal ethnography) is then explored as a response, highlighting its benefits, and answering the question of timing within a research project. Finally, we reflect on the applicability of our proposal to non‐empirical bioethics scholarship, concluding that it remains important but may require some adjustments. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 199-201.

Readers of fiction tend to have better abilities of empathy and theory of mind. We present a study designed to replicate this finding, rule out one possible explanation, and extend the assessment of social outcomes. In order to rule out the role of personality, we first identified Openness as the most consistent correlate. This trait was then statistically controlled for, along with two other important individual differences: the tendency to be drawn into stories and gender. Even after accounting for these (...) variables, fiction exposure still predicted performance on an empathy task. Extending these results, we also found that exposure to fiction was positively correlated with social support. Exposure to nonfiction, in contrast, was associated with loneliness, and negatively related to social support. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic is putting the NHS under unprecedented pressure, requiring clinicians to make uncomfortable decisions they would not ordinarily face. These decisions revolve primarily around intensive care and whether a patient should undergo invasive ventilation. Certain vulnerable populations have featured in the media as falling victim to an increasingly utilitarian response to the pandemic—primarily those of advanced years or with serious existing health conditions. Another vulnerable population potentially at risk is those who lack the capacity to make their own (...) care decisions. Owing to the pandemic, there are increased practical and normative challenges to following the requirements of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Both capacity assessments and best interests decisions may prove more difficult in the current situation. This may create a more paternalistic situation in decisions about the care of the cognitively impaired which is at risk of taking on a utilitarian focus. We look to these issues and consider whether there is a risk of patients who lack capacity to make their own care decisions being short-changed. (shrink)

The collection presents a variety of promising new directions in Royce scholarship from an international group of scholars, including historical reinterpretations, explorations of Royce's ethics of loyalty and religious philosophy, and contemporary applications of his ideas in psychology, the problem of reference, neo-pragmatism, and literary aesthetics.

Technology presents a means of improving health outcomes for vast numbers of individuals. It has historically been deployed to streamline healthcare delivery and reach those who would previously have faced obstacles to accessing services. It has also enabled improved health education and management. Telemedicine can be employed in everything from primary care consultations to the monitoring of chronic diseases. Despite recommendation by the World Health Organization, countries have been slow to embrace such technology in the health sector. Nonetheless, it is (...) expected to become more prevalent with increased digitization. Further, amidst the COVID‐19 pandemic, there was a rush to implement forms of telemedicine where possible to prevent patients breaking social distancing rules. In this paper, I present and defend what I term the ‘telemedical imperative’. The telemedical imperative represents a duty for healthcare systems to implement remote access to services where possible, thereby furthering the mission of equity in access to healthcare. It is intended as an addition to in‐person services rather than a replacement. After highlighting the benefits of telemedicine, I provide four criteria that must be met for the telemedical imperative to arise. The first three—safety, effectiveness, and acceptability—are consistent and essential. The fourth adapts to the service in question and requires that there be no other obstacles specific to that service that cannot reasonably be overcome. Finally, I address several potential objections to the telemedical imperative based on more general concerns around the implementation of telemedicine. (shrink)

Histories of psychiatry in the United States can shed light on current areas of need in mental health research and treatment. Often, however, these histories fail to represent accurately the distinct trajectories of psychiatric care among black and white populations, not only homogenizing the historical narrative but failing to account for current disparities in mental health care among these populations. The current paper explores two parallel histories of psychiatry in the United States and the way that these have come to (...) influence current mental health practices. Juxtaposing the development of psychiatric care and understanding as it was provided for, and applied to, black and white populations, a picture of the theoretic foundations of mental health emerges, revealing the separate history that led to the current uneven state of psychiatric care. (shrink)

Direct-to-consumer genetic testing is a growing phenomenon, fuelled by the notion that knowledge equals control. One ethical question that arises concerns the proband’s duty to share information indicating genetic risks in their relatives. However, such duties are unenforceable and may result in the realisation of anticipated harm to relatives. We argue for a shift in responsibility from proband to provider, placing a duty on test providers in the event of identified actionable risks to relatives. Starting from Parker and Lucassen’s 'joint (...) account model', we adapt Kilbride’s application of the rule of rescue and balance it against the relative’s right not to know, placing responsibility on the providers of direct-to-consumer genetic testing. Where the risk of disease to a relative is actionable, we argue providers ought to share results even in the face of the proband’s objections. Confidentiality issues are navigated by a pre-emptive consent model, whereby consumers agree to the sharing of certain information with their relatives ahead of testing and as a condition of testing. When a relative is informed, the proband’s privacy is protected by maximal deidentification, and the rights of the relative are met by a stepwise approach to informing that allows them to decide how much information they receive. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LettersZbigniew Szawarski and Jacek A. PiatkiewiczPolish Code of Medical EthicsMadam:In the December 1992 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal you published the Polish Code of Medical Ethics with introductions by Jacek A. Piatkiewicz and Robert Baker. Jacek Piatkiewicz writes (p. 362), and Robert Baker follows him, that the new code "was approved by an overwhelming majority (449 for, 75 against, 58 abstaining)." I am afraid that these (...) figures are inconsistent with the data supplied by the Polish mass media. The leading Polish newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza (16 December 1991), states that 354 delegates voted for the new code and 317 against it. The same figures are quoted by the most authoritative Polish political weekly, Polityka (4 January 1992).Mr. Piatkiewicz does not mention either that 40 delegates left the convention before the vote in protest over the undemocratic proceedings. If we add those 40 potentially negative votes to the 317 votes against, then the result is not at all "an overwhelming approval" for the new code.I am not a physician myself, and I was not present at the Second National Congress of Physicians in Bielsko-Biala, however, I find this discrepancy disturbing. Respect for facts seems to me equally imperative as respect for human life.Jacek A. Piatkiewicz Replies:In his letter Mr. Szawarski denies the data I presented on the vote approving the Polish Code of Medical Ethics. He has quoted the figures published by the Polish mass media as the true ones. Interestingly enough, he did not try to confirm them with the Polish General Medical Chamber, which has the original documents on the Extraordinary Second National Congress of Physicians. The figures I cited regarding the Code's approval are clearly stated on page 63 of the Congress proceedings.So where do the figures presented in Mr. Szawarski's letter come from? As Mr. Szawarski states, these figures have been published in some Polish newspapers, among them "the most authoritative Polish political weekly, Polityka" (a description that was especially accurate during the Communist period of Poland's history). The figures are simply untrue. The figures presented refer only to the result of the vote on article 37 of the Code, which concerns abortion. The very narrow margin (354 for, 317 against, 38 abstaining) decided the formulation of the exceptions to the abortion ban, which are "saving the mother's life and health" and "when pregnancy is the result of a criminal act." But what was the alternative considered in the vote? It was the single exception, "to save the mother's life," that was in the [End Page 355] original draft of the Code (page 44 of the Congress proceedings).Mr. Szawarski finds the discrepancy in the figures cited disturbing. I am disturbed too, but the cause of my concern is of a completely different nature. Why does Mr. Szawarski not try to reconcile "the discrepancy" by asking organizers of the Congress for an explanation?Zbigniew SzawarskiCentre for Philosophy and Health Care University of Swansea, WalesJacek A. PiatkiewiczGeneral Medical Council of PolandCopyright © 1993 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis asserts that the concept of medical disorder includes a naturalistic component of dysfunction and a value component, both of which are required for disorder attributions. Muckler and Taylor, defending a purely naturalist, value-free understanding of disorder, argue that harm is not necessary for disorder. They provide three examples of dysfunctions that, they claim, are considered disorders but are entirely harmless: mild mononucleosis, cowpox that prevents smallpox, and minor perceptual deficits. They also reject the proposal that dysfunctions (...) need only be typically harmful to qualify as disorders. We argue that the proposed counterexamples are, in fact, considered harmful; thus, they fail to disconfirm the harm requirement: incapacity for exertion is inherently harmful, whether or not exertion occurs, cowpox is directly harmful irrespective of indirect benefits, and colorblindness and anosmia are considered harmful by those who consider them disorders. We also defend the typicality qualifier as viably addressing some apparently harmless disorders and argue that a dysfunction’s harmfulness is best understood in dispositional terms. (shrink)

Access to abortion care has been hugely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has prompted several governments to permit the use of telemedicine for fully remote care pathways, thereby ensuring pregnant people are still able to access services. One such government is that of England, where these new care pathways have been publicly scrutinised. Those opposed to telemedical early medical abortion care have raised myriad concerns, though they largely centre on matters of patient safeguarding. It is argued that healthcare professionals (...) cannot adequately carry out their safeguarding duties if the patient is not in the room with them. These concerns lack empirical support. Emerging evidence suggests that safeguarding processes may, in fact, be more effective within telemedical abortion care pathways. In this article, we address two specific safeguarding concerns: (1) that a remote consultation prevents a healthcare professional from identifying instances of abuse, and (2) that healthcare professionals cannot reliably confirm the absence of coercion during a remote consultation. We demonstrate that such concerns are misplaced, and that safeguarding may actually be improved in telemedical care pathways as victims of abuse may find it easier to engage with services. It is inevitable that some individuals will fall through the net, but this is unavoidable even with in-person care and thus does not constitute a strong critique of the use of telemedicine in abortion care. These safeguarding concerns set aside, then, we argue that the current approval that enables telemedical early medical abortion should be afforded permanence. (shrink)

All four UK nations have, in recent years, introduced “opt out” organ donation systems. Whilst these systems are largely similar, they operate independently. A key feature of each policy is a residency requirement, stipulating that opt out may only apply where the deceased had been ordinarily resident in that nation for at least 12 months. A resident of Scotland who dies in England, for example, would not fall under opt out. Public awareness is the underlying reasoning for such stipulations. A (...) residency requirement was appropriate when Wales was the only UK nation with an opt out system, but, I suggest, the continued imposition of intra-UK borders on organ donation is unjustified now that all four nations operate the same policy. Further, it has the potential to limit organ donation. There is a need for all four systems to be amended to allow for UK-wide applicability, such that providing the deceased was ordinarily resident in the UK, they can fall under opt out in any of the four nations. I argue that such an amendment is ethically justified – continuing to satisfy the public awareness criterion – and practically straightforward. In doing so, I emphasise that my proposed amendment should extend only to the four UK nations, stopping short of the Crown Dependencies even though they also operate opt out systems for organ donation. (shrink)

Joint attention (JA) is hypothesized to have a close relationship with developing theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. We tested the co-occurrence of ToM and JA in social interactions between adults with no reported history of psychiatric illness or neurodevelopmental disorders. Participants engaged in an experimental task that encouraged nonverbal communication, including JA, and also ToM activity. We adapted an in-lab variant of experience sampling methods (Bryant, Coffey, Povinelli, & Pruett, 2013) to measure ToM during JA based on participants’ subjective reports (...) of their thoughts while performing the task. This experiment successfully elicited instances of JA in 17/20 dyads. We compared participants’ thought contents during episodes of JA and non-JA. Our results suggest that, in adults, JA and ToM may occur independently. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LettersZbigniew Szawarski and Jacek A. PiatkiewiczPolish Code of Medical EthicsMadam:In the December 1992 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal you published the Polish Code of Medical Ethics with introductions by Jacek A. Piatkiewicz and Robert Baker. Jacek Piatkiewicz writes (p. 362), and Robert Baker follows him, that the new code "was approved by an overwhelming majority (449 for, 75 against, 58 abstaining)." I am afraid that these (...) figures are inconsistent with the data supplied by the Polish mass media. The leading Polish newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza (16 December 1991), states that 354 delegates voted for the new code and 317 against it. The same figures are quoted by the most authoritative Polish political weekly, Polityka (4 January 1992).Mr. Piatkiewicz does not mention either that 40 delegates left the convention before the vote in protest over the undemocratic proceedings. If we add those 40 potentially negative votes to the 317 votes against, then the result is not at all "an overwhelming approval" for the new code.I am not a physician myself, and I was not present at the Second National Congress of Physicians in Bielsko-Biala, however, I find this discrepancy disturbing. Respect for facts seems to me equally imperative as respect for human life.Jacek A. Piatkiewicz Replies:In his letter Mr. Szawarski denies the data I presented on the vote approving the Polish Code of Medical Ethics. He has quoted the figures published by the Polish mass media as the true ones. Interestingly enough, he did not try to confirm them with the Polish General Medical Chamber, which has the original documents on the Extraordinary Second National Congress of Physicians. The figures I cited regarding the Code's approval are clearly stated on page 63 of the Congress proceedings.So where do the figures presented in Mr. Szawarski's letter come from? As Mr. Szawarski states, these figures have been published in some Polish newspapers, among them "the most authoritative Polish political weekly, Polityka" (a description that was especially accurate during the Communist period of Poland's history). The figures are simply untrue. The figures presented refer only to the result of the vote on article 37 of the Code, which concerns abortion. The very narrow margin (354 for, 317 against, 38 abstaining) decided the formulation of the exceptions to the abortion ban, which are "saving the mother's life and health" and "when pregnancy is the result of a criminal act." But what was the alternative considered in the vote? It was the single exception, "to save the mother's life," that was in the [End Page 355] original draft of the Code (page 44 of the Congress proceedings).Mr. Szawarski finds the discrepancy in the figures cited disturbing. I am disturbed too, but the cause of my concern is of a completely different nature. Why does Mr. Szawarski not try to reconcile "the discrepancy" by asking organizers of the Congress for an explanation?Zbigniew SzawarskiCentre for Philosophy and Health Care University of Swansea, WalesJacek A. PiatkiewiczGeneral Medical Council of PolandCopyright © 1993 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The thesis that humanity progresses in a lawlike manner from inferior states (of wellbeing, cognitive skills, culture, etc.) to superior ones dominated eighteenth- and nineteenth- century thought, including authors otherwise as diverse as Kant and Ernst Haeckel. Positioning himself against this philosophically and scientifically popular view, Nietzsche suggests that humanity is in a prolonged state of decline. I argue that Nietzsche’s rejection of the thesis that progress is inevitable is a product of his acceptance of Lamarck’s use-and-disuse theory of evolution (...) and his belief that society selects for traits beneficial to society and negatively selects for traits that promote individual flourishing. This explains Nietzsche’s emphasis on self-development as cultivating traits that Nietzsche views as valuable and that would, by Lamarck’s theory of evolution, become heritable and so help steer our evolutionary trajectory, correcting our decline. (shrink)

The freedom to choose for oneself is a part of what it means to be a human being.Jackson J In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 20...

The last decade has seen significant developments in UK health policy, with are largely claimed to be evidence based. However, such a characterisation ought, in many cases, to be questioned. Policies can be broadly understood as based primarily on either a logical or empirical case. In the absence of relevant empirical evidence, policymakers understandably appeal to logical cases. Once such evidence is available, however, it can inform policy and enable the logical case to be set aside. Such a linear policy (...) process is not always the reality, and logical cases often continue to guide policy decisions in direct opposition to empirical evidence. In this paper, I discuss two recent examples of this disconnect between logical and empirical cases in UK health policy. The first—organ donation—illustrates an example of a significant policy change being made in opposition to the evidence. I refer to this as the improvidence approach. The second—abortion—provides an example of policymakers not making a change that has extensive supporting data. I refer to this using the more recognisable language of the precautionary approach. Ultimately, I argue that both the improvidence and precautionary approaches are examples of problematic public policy where policymakers provide no explicit justification for going against the evidence. (shrink)

Dehumanization is routinely invoked in social science and law as the primary factor in explaining how propaganda encourages support for, or participation in, violence against targeted outgroups. Yet the primacy of dehumanization is increasingly challenged by the apparent influence of revenge on collective violence. This study examines critically how various propaganda influence audiences. Although previous research stresses the dangers of dehumanizing propaganda, a recently published study found that only revenge propaganda significantly lowered outgroup empathy. Given the importance of these findings (...) for law and the behavioral sciences, this research augments that recent study with two additional samples that were culturally distinct from the prior findings, showing again that only revenge propaganda was significant. To explore this effect further, we also conducted a facial electromyography (fEMG) among a small set of participants, finding that revenge triggered significantly stronger negative emotions against outgroups than dehumanization. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 423-433, May 2022.

The purpose of this special issue and the conference that inspired it was to address the issue of conceptual integration in a science of consciousness. We felt this to be important, for while current efforts to scientifically investigate consciousness are taking place in an interdisciplinary context, it often seems as though the very terms being used to sustain a sense of interdisciplinary cooperation are working against it. This is because it is this very array of common concepts that generates a (...) sense of unity among consciousness researchers, despite the fact the concepts mean different things in different disciplines. These Concepts of Consciousness include the following: realism, representation, intentionality, information, control, memory and self. Given this list, we believed we could best approach the issue of potential conceptual integration by addressing each concept from different perspectives and asking the following: how do uses of the concept differ, must these meanings be synthesized in order for there to be a unified science of consciousness, is a unified conceptual scheme necessary to establish an independent science of consciousness, is a unified conceptual scheme possible, if it is not possible, why not, and if it is possible, what might it look like? To this end we invited, for each concept, two scholars who made extensive use of the identified concept in their work. The papers entailed in this special issue constitute the outcome of this effort, and in what follows we offer a brief examination of possible forms of integration the papers seem to collectively suggest. (shrink)

In ‘Rethinking Disease’, Powell and Scarffe1 propose what in effect is a modification of Jerome Wakefield’s2 3 harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder. The HDA maintains that ‘disorder’ is a hybrid factual and value concept requiring that a biological dysfunction, understood as a failure of some feature to perform a naturally selected function, causes harm to the individual as evaluated by social values. Powell and Scarffe accept both the HDA’s evolutionary biological function component and its incorporation of a value component. (...) Their proposed ‘new twist’ is to revise the value component: ‘Our proposed definition of disease is as follows: a biomedical state is a disease only if it implicates a biological dysfunction that is, or would be, properly disvalued’. So, they propose that a disorder is a ‘properly disvalued dysfunction’ rather than a ‘harmful dysfunction’, an approach they term ‘thickly normative’ in contrast to the thin normative approach of the HDA. There has been a surge of interest recently in better understanding the ‘harm’ component of the HDA. Powell and Scarffe’s analysis is a helpful contribution to this discussion. We focus here exclusively on their proposal regarding the analysis of the concept of disorder and ignore many important related issues that the authors address, ranging from prioritising resource allocation between disorders and non-disorders to whether the concept of disorder should be replaced by a generic welfarist concept. The resolution of these additional issues depends on first understanding ‘disorder’. The authors’ proposed changes to the HDA also deserve evaluation because the HDA, which has been endorsed by leading nosologists,4 plays an influential role in nosological debate across categories of disorder ranging, for example, from sexual paraphilias5 to psychopathy.6 A basic problem is that Powell and Scarffe misinterpret …. (shrink)

The risk of tort liability for health maintenance organizations and other managed care plans has dramatically increased in recent years. This is due in part to the growing percentage of health care rendered through managed care plans. The cost-containment mechanisms commonly used by managed care plans, such as limiting access to services and/or choice of providers, creates a climate ripe for disputes that may end up in court. As dissatisfied patients and providers seek recourse in the courts, tort doctrines are (...) extended and new legal theories emerge as needed. For example, the concepts of direct and vicarious tort liability developed in the hospital context have been extended by courts to encompass HMOs. vicarious liability claims, based on ostensible agency or respondeat superior doctrines, have been brought against HMOs and managed care plans for negligent treatment by physicians selected to provide care to members. (shrink)

The risk of tort liability for health maintenance organizations and other managed care plans has dramatically increased in recent years. This is due in part to the growing percentage of health care rendered through managed care plans. The cost-containment mechanisms commonly used by managed care plans, such as limiting access to services and/or choice of providers, creates a climate ripe for disputes that may end up in court. As dissatisfied patients and providers seek recourse in the courts, tort doctrines are (...) extended and new legal theories emerge as needed. For example, the concepts of direct and vicarious tort liability developed in the hospital context have been extended by courts to encompass HMOs. vicarious liability claims, based on ostensible agency or respondeat superior doctrines, have been brought against HMOs and managed care plans for negligent treatment by physicians selected to provide care to members. (shrink)