This paper argues for the primacy of language over vision as a means of communication. Words convey information more clearly, accurately, reliably, and profoundly than images do. Images by themselves give only impressions; they do not denote, unless accompanied by some sort or level of description. Also, any visual image, whether physical or mental, unless it is eidetic, must involve some degree of interpretation, interpolation, or description for it to be capable of conveying information, having meaning, or even being intelligible. (...) Pictorialism is the theory that mental imagery is visual, while descriptionalism holds that mental imagery is nonvisual. As an epistemology, pictorialism supports representationalism as a philosophy of art. The poverty and limitations of representational theories of art militate against pictorialism. Descriptionalism as an epistemology supports several versions of symbolist theories of art. The richness and versatility of symbolic interpretations of art works support descriptionalism. Pictorialism fails the test of consistency unless eidetic imagery exists. Any pictorialism that claims support from noneidetic imagery or invokes the photographic fallacy is in fact a crypto- or quasi-descriptionalism. Since the photographic fallacy denies eidetic imagery, it is invalid and misbegotten as a defense of pictorialism. The interplay between the richness of visual images and the precision of verbal descriptions is a key element in developing a comprehensive pedagogy of aesthetics. (shrink)

The three theories considered here, real continuous time, real serial time, and unreal time, are each in some sense a reaction to Hume’s theory of serial or “spatialized” time. Hence, Hume’s theory is elaborated on as a foundation for the discussion and comparison of the subsequent three. This brief excursion into the nature of time may help to illuminate the differences among these three and to suggest some of their possible implications, particularly with regard to the existential difference between intuited (...) or transcendent time and experienced or immanent time and the qualitative or ontological difference between the eternal and the temporal. (shrink)

The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates (1) whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or (2) whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable dead end and either (...) manages to create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or (3) whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason. (shrink)

The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable dead end and either manages to (...) create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason. (shrink)

Lofts’s purpose is to interpret Cassirer in the light of francophone post-structuralist thought, particularly that of Jacques Lacan. Portraying a cautious neo-Kantian as a proto-post-structuralist may seem almost perverse, but the notion has potential. Unfortunately, the book reads as if it were still in rough draft. Its sections are disconnected, its arguments and insights are truncated or aphoristic, its style is careless, and it is poorly edited. Orthographical and typographical errors abound, even to the point of printing Lofts’s own name (...) wrong once. The long note about Hegel repeats previous text. Lofts’s analysis does not flow with the stream of the history of philosophy, but rather leaps from stone to stone in that stream, lingering too long on some stones and avoiding others. Dilthey, Gadamer, and Habermas, for example, are conspicuously absent from the discussion. Originally presented as Lofts’s dissertation, this book seems not yet to have proceeded far enough beyond that phase to warrant wider distribution. (shrink)

Miklowitz’s central historical thesis is that Hegel’s “bold claims of metaphysics were burst into fragments under blows from Nietzsche’s hammer”. This thesis fails to account for the many profitable readings of Hegel as an epistemologist rather than a metaphysician. In Miklowitz’s reading, Hegel seems to fit the Schopenhauerian caricature of the pompous Schwabian concocting “grandiose... hubristic” pretensions to absolute knowledge “that would have made even Faust blush”.

Yovel is a prolific, diligent, and sagacious Israeli scholar who has published extensively on Maimonides, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, and who holds named chairs in philosophy at both Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the New School for Social Research. That such a prominent Jewish intellectual has created a perceptive book-length analysis of an important topic which frequently inspires articles and books by non-Jews is a welcome addition to the literature on German philosophy. It is all the more welcome since (...) Yovel’s study is philosophical rather than political or ideological, applies an accurate comparative reading of a wide variety of Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s texts, and sees their separate estimations of the Jews respectively in the light of each’s entire philosophical project. (shrink)

This is a lucid and ambitious book. It is about Heidegger, not Hegel. Boer recognizes that her “wide-ranging” endeavor to “give a systematic interpretation of Heidegger’s entire thinking” is a difficult project that “entails risks”. She meets the challenge head on, considering not only the usually expected texts in Heidegger’s corpus, but also devoting “considerable attention to texts that have only been available for a few years”.

Yovel is a prolific, diligent, and sagacious Israeli scholar who has published extensively on Maimonides, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, and who holds named chairs in philosophy at both Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the New School for Social Research. That such a prominent Jewish intellectual has created a perceptive book-length analysis of an important topic which frequently inspires articles and books by non-Jews is a welcome addition to the literature on German philosophy. It is all the more welcome since (...) Yovel’s study is philosophical rather than political or ideological, applies an accurate comparative reading of a wide variety of Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s texts, and sees their separate estimations of the Jews respectively in the light of each’s entire philosophical project. (shrink)

Lofts’s purpose is to interpret Cassirer in the light of francophone post-structuralist thought, particularly that of Jacques Lacan. Portraying a cautious neo-Kantian as a proto-post-structuralist may seem almost perverse, but the notion has potential. Unfortunately, the book reads as if it were still in rough draft. Its sections are disconnected, its arguments and insights are truncated or aphoristic, its style is careless, and it is poorly edited. Orthographical and typographical errors abound, even to the point of printing Lofts’s own name (...) wrong once. The long note about Hegel repeats previous text. Lofts’s analysis does not flow with the stream of the history of philosophy, but rather leaps from stone to stone in that stream, lingering too long on some stones and avoiding others. Dilthey, Gadamer, and Habermas, for example, are conspicuously absent from the discussion. Originally presented as Lofts’s dissertation, this book seems not yet to have proceeded far enough beyond that phase to warrant wider distribution. (shrink)

This is a lucid and ambitious book. It is about Heidegger, not Hegel. Boer recognizes that her “wide-ranging” endeavor to “give a systematic interpretation of Heidegger’s entire thinking” is a difficult project that “entails risks”. She meets the challenge head on, considering not only the usually expected texts in Heidegger’s corpus, but also devoting “considerable attention to texts that have only been available for a few years”.

A book on this topic is long overdue. It is high time that a competent Hegel scholar recognized and assessed the danger posed to Hegel’s whole system by the skeptical tradition, argued that Hegel’s Jena writings, culminating in the Phenomenology, are primarily works of epistemology rather than metaphysics, examined Hegel’s own views on ancient and modern skepticism, identified and criticized Hegel’s own strategies for defending his thought against the skeptical threat, and took Hegel seriously as an epistemologist. Forster does all (...) this and more, and does it very well. (shrink)

Thomas Szasz wrote over thirty books and several hundred articles, replete with mordant criticism of psychiatry. His works made him arguably one of the world's most recognized psychiatrists, albeit one of the most controversial. This book critically examines the legacy of a man who challenged the very concept of mental illness.

I would like to begin by discussing the legal and administrative framework of the role of the federal government in public health. At the heart of it is, of course, the Constitution. At the Department of Health and Human Services we depend, as does much of the federal government, on our power to regulate interstate commerce. Since the Supreme Court in 1942 removed essentially any restraint from the meaning of interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn, the federal government has been (...) regulating with wide latitude, in spite of small and, arguably, equivocal reverses in recent years. However, even though the Supreme Court no longer provides any real constitutional check on the federal government's interstate commerce power, some other restraints persist. For example, many parts of the health system have traditionally been deemed inherently state functions, such as the licensing and disciplining of doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, as well as the practice of medicine itself. (shrink)

I would like to begin by discussing the legal and administrative framework of the role of the federal government in public health. At the heart of it is, of course, the Constitution. At the Department of Health and Human Services we depend, as does much of the federal government, on our power to regulate interstate commerce. Since the Supreme Court in 1942 removed essentially any restraint from the meaning of interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn, the federal government has been (...) regulating with wide latitude, in spite of small and, arguably, equivocal reverses in recent years. However, even though the Supreme Court no longer provides any real constitutional check on the federal government's interstate commerce power, some other restraints persist. For example, many parts of the health system have traditionally been deemed inherently state functions, such as the licensing and disciplining of doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, as well as the practice of medicine itself. (shrink)

Cancers rely on multiple, heterogeneous processes at different scales, pertaining to many biomedical fields. Therefore, understanding cancer is necessarily an interdisciplinary task that requires placing specialised experimental and clinical research into a broader conceptual, theoretical, and methodological framework. Without such a framework, oncology will collect piecemeal results, with scant dialogue between the different scientific communities studying cancer. We argue that one important way forward in service of a more successful dialogue is through greater integration of applied sciences (experimental and clinical) (...) with conceptual and theoretical approaches, informed by philosophical methods. By way of illustration, we explore six central themes: (i) the role of mutations in cancer; (ii) the clonal evolution of cancer cells; (iii) the relationship between cancer and multicellularity; (iv) the tumour microenvironment; (v) the immune system; and (vi) stem cells. In each case, we examine open questions in the scientific literature through a philosophical methodology and show the benefit of such a synergy for the scientific and medical understanding of cancer. (shrink)

Vítima, quer do contexto, quer da sua recepção, a obra de Eric Weil (1904-1977), editada entre os anos 50 e 70 do século passado, não tem obtido o devido acolhimento pela comunidade filosófica. Se as interpretações magistrais de Kant (Problèmes kantiens. Paris: Vrin, 1970) e de Hegel (Hegel et l’état. Paris; Vrin, 1950) constituem referências cada vez mais frequentes nos trabalhos da especialidade (os quais persistem, contudo, em ignorar os importantes artigos sobre a filosofia dos dois autor...

Qu'en est-il de la philosophie élaborée par quelqu'un, Augustin, qui finit par rompre avec la philosophie ? Et qu'en est-il du mode de partage entre positions philosophiques et positions religieuses ? L'étude du cas particulier des relations d'Augustin avec le scepticisme académicien permet à la fois de poser ces questions et celles qui leur sont afférentes, et d'y répondre. À partir de l'étude du livre V des Confessions, puis de la présentation de la doctrine académicienne par Cicéron, E. Dubreucq précise (...) ce que furent les relations d'Augustin avec ce scepticisme académicien fait de doute fondamental dans le rapport à la vérité avec, pour risque, le désespoir dont l'auteur des Confessions fit l'expérience. Dans l'itinéraire augustinien, les doctrines académiciennes et néoplatoniciennes ne servent que de temps intermédiaire dans la quête de l'union au Christ auquel elles étaient finalement orientées. What can be said about the philosophy elaborated by some one like Augustine, who ended up by breaking with philosophy ? What can be said about the mode of separation between philosophical and religious positions ? A study of the particular case of Augustine’s relationship with academic scepticism permits us both to ask these questions and others related to them, and to answer them. Starting with a study of book V of the Confessions, followed by a presentation of academic doctrine by Cicero, E. Dubreucq explains what Augustine’s relationship was with this academic scepticism, a fundamental doubt of fact in the rapport to truth, with, as a risk, the despair which the author of the Confessions experienced. In the Augustinian itinerary, academic and Neoplatonic doctrines only serve as an intermediary time in the search for union with Christ, to which they were finally oriented. (shrink)

Le volume que nous présentons ici est le résultat d’un travail collectif entrepris pour la première fois exclusivement sur la notion de reprise, telle que l’a proposée Eric Weil (1904-1977), par des chercheurs venus du Portugal, de France, du Brésil, d’Italie, de Roumanie, du Burkina Faso et du Chili. Né en Allemagne, Eric Weil a étu­dié avec Ernst Cassirer qui l’a dirigé sur des recherches concernant les philosophes de la Renaissance, comme Pietro Pomponazzi et Marsile Ficin. Naturalisé fran...

RésuméL'intention de l'auteur du présent article est de montrer que des liens manifestes peuvent s'établir entre la philosophie de F. Gonseth et celle de L. Wittgenstein de même que celles de trois penseurs repréentatifs de la philosophie dite analytique: J.L. Austin, W.V. Quine et J. Searle. Il importe en effet de dénoncer certaines mises en opposition fallacieuses et de souligner le bénéfice à tirer d'un dialogue entre le courant de pensée anglo‐saxon et celui d'Europe occidentale. En toile de fond, la (...) philosophie du language! On se souviendra à cet égard que F. Gonseth a sans cesse défendu la thèse qu'un jeu de prêté‐rendus s'établit en recherches scientifiques comme en recherches philosophiques sur le front de l'énonciation et sur le front de l'expérimentation. Il en résulte que la mise à l'épreuve de la pertinence du langage ne s'effectue correctement que si l'on prononce un verdict sur le complexe discours‐activités. C'est dire l'importance accordée par F. Gonseth à l'insertion non seulement des mots, mais de l'expression discursive en sa globalité dans des contextes précisants. (shrink)

Foundational theories of mental content seek to identify the conditions under which a mental representation expresses, in the mind of a particular thinker, a particular content. Normativists endorse the following general sort of foundational theory of mental content: A mental representation r expresses concept C for agent S just in case S ought to use r in conformity with some particular pattern of use associated with C. In response to Normativist theories of content, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Åsa Wikforss propose a (...) dilemma, alleging that Normativism either entails a vicious regress or falls prey to a charge of idleness. In this paper, I respond to this argument. I argue that Normativism can avoid the commitments that generate the regress and does not propose the sort of explanation required to charge that its explanation has been shown to be problematically idle. The regress-generating commitment to be avoided is, roughly, that tokened, contentful mental states are the product of rule-following. The explanatory task Normativists should disavow is that of explaining how it is that beliefs and other contentful mental states are produced. I argue that Normativism, properly understood as a theory of content, does not provide this kind of psychological explanation, and therefore does not entail that such explanations are to be given in terms of rule-following. If this is correct, Normativism is not the proper target of the dilemma offered by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss. Understanding why one might construe Normativism in the way Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss must, and how, properly understood, it avoids their dilemma, can help us to appreciate the attractiveness of a genuinely normative theory of content and the importance of paying careful attention to the sort of normativity involved in norm-based theories of content. (shrink)

Gender is known to be a term used to define the sociocultural form of the existence of gender: man and woman act not as natural definitions but as sociocultural phenomena. If gender is determined on the basis of physical, organic and psychophysiological characteristics, then, unlike it, gender is derived from the social, cultural and historical features of human being. Human behavior in society and how it is perceived in it and defines gender as a social gender. Gender is thus one (...) of the ways of social stratification of a society that, in combination with such socio-demographic factors as race, nationality, class, age, organizes the system of social hierarchy. Because gender is not a natural thing but a social construct, it implies self-awareness and self-determination. Gender has always been and remains a meaningful term. In the social sciences, "gender" has become more narrowly defined, denoting "social gender", that is, socially determined roles, identities and spheres of activity of men and women, which depend not on biological sexual differences, but on the social organization of society. Central to gender studies is the problem of social inequality between men and women. (shrink)

It is known that antiquity understood man as an organic part of the cosmos, which occupies the highest place among natural beings. Instead, the Middle Ages led man beyond the limits of cosmic natural life, proclaiming, on the one hand, an invisible connection with the transcendent God, and, on the other, humiliating the complete dependence caused by his fall upon Divine grace. The Middle Ages are about the discovery of the "inner man", who in the cosmos does not meet anything (...) and know the depths of which can only be obtained by the supernatural light of grace [Haydenko P.P. Evolution of the concept of science.- M., 1980.- C. 409, 425]. Self-knowledge, like the knowledge of God, medieval philosophical thought subordinated the religious task of saving the soul. She transferred the center of gravity of ethics from the sphere of knowledge to the sphere of faith, giving priority to freedom rather than reason - which led to the assertion of man as an active subject of action as opposed to the objectively contemplative attitude of antiquity. Such activity of the subject, despite its purely religious orientation, subsequently played an important role in the formation of the identity of the Renaissance individual. (shrink)