The classical theory of preference among monetary bets represents people as expected utility maximizers with concave utility functions. Critics of this account often rely on assumptions about preferences over wide ranges of total wealth. We derive a prediction of the theory that bears on bets at any fixed level of wealth, and test the prediction behaviorally. Our results are discrepant with the classical account. Competing theories are also examined in light of our data.

This paper is a critical review of Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression . The principal focus is on Green’s contention that all expression is at route, a form of signalling by an agent or by some mechanism of the organism which has been evolutionary selected for signalling. Starting from the idea that in some but not all expression an agent seeks to express his or her self, I question the centrality of communication to the idea of expression.

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

Das wachsende wissenschaftliche Interesse an Tieren, ihren Fähigkeiten und Interaktionen mit den Menschen sowie verhaltensbiologische Erkenntnisse und tierphilosophische Einsichten führen zu einer Neubewertung der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Dies bleibt nicht ohne Konsequenzen für die Theologie. Sie muss nach den philosophischen und theologischen Ursachen für ihre weitgehende „Tiervergessenheit“ fragen sowie die Potenziale entfalten, die zum Beispiel die Heilige Schrift und die Schöpfungsspiritualität für die Gestaltung der Beziehung zu den Tieren bieten. Dabei balanciert sie auf dem schmalen Grat, den Mensch-Tier-Differentialismus zu überwinden, ohne das (...) je Eigene von Menschen und Tieren zu verwischen. Dieser Band leistet eine interdisziplinäre Annäherung an eine christliche Tierethik, die sich nicht als isolierte binnenphilosophische oder -theologische Bereichsethik versteht, sondern Antworten sucht auf gesamtgesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen mit Fragen der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Mit Beiträgen von Andreas Aigner, Heike Baranzke, Martina Besler, Julia Blanc, Katharina Ebner, Matthias Eggel, Julia Enxing, Matthias Gauly, Herwig Grimm, Anita Idel, Kurt Kotrschal, Peter Kunzmann, Martin M. Lintner, Susana Monsó, Ute Neumann-Gorsolke, Jakob Ohm, Christina Potschka, Kurt Remele, Michael Rosenberger, Markus Vogt und Markus Wild. (shrink)

This book is an extensive review & analysis of Aristotelian thought as received & adapted by such medieval commentators as Ammonius, Philoponus, Boethius, al-Farabi, Yahya ibn 'Adi, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham, & Giles of Rome. The discussions range from metaphysics to logic, linguistics, & epistemology, encompassing such topics as being, god, causation, actuality, potentiality, universals, individuation, signification, cognition, certainty, infallibility, error, ignorance, (...) analogy, grammar, interpretation, foundationalism, & the eucharist & transubstantiation. (shrink)

Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the qualification ‘directly’ here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke’s discussion of G. E. Moore and surface perception to answer Austin’s scepticism.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States housed 2.3 million inmates in 7,147 incarceration structures that, because of age, overcrowding, and poor ventilation, exacerbated the spread of airborne infections. The flow of individuals into and out of correctional facilities compounded the challenges in keeping them COVID-free. This article focuses on the work of the health and administrative leadership, in partnership with judicial and police personnel, to prevent COVID-19 inside the Albemarle-Charlottesville Regional Jail and to mitigate its spread when the (...) jail population and/or its staff became infected. From the onset, implementing science-based policies and upholding the human right to health and healthcare for all were priorities. (shrink)

:La iglesia entiende la vida conyugal como un sacramento, es decir, como un signo y un instrumento de la relación de Dios con la humanidad. La vida esponsal es signo del amor de Dios para con la humanidad y de la alianza de Cristo con la Iglesia, pero también es una forma origi-nal de “hacer teología”, de conocer el amor y la gracia de Dios dando testimonio de ellos. En este sen-tido, constituye un instrumento eficaz para hacer realmente pre-sente y (...) poder experimentar el amor y la gracia de Dios. El Con-cilio Vaticano II subrayó enfáticamente la comprensión bíblica del matrimonio como alianza, superando una visión eminentemente jurídica y destacando la dimensión personal del amor y de la vida conyugal. Se trata de algo muy significativo para el desarrollo de la espiritualidad del matrimonio. (shrink)

Protein turnover (PT) has been formally defined only in equilibrium conditions, which is ill‐suited to quantify PT during dynamic processes that occur during embryogenesis or (extra) cellular signaling. In this Hypothesis, we propose a definition of PT in an out‐of‐equilibrium regime that allows the quantification of PT in virtually any biological context. We propose a simple mathematical and conceptual framework applicable to a broad range of available data, such as RNA sequencing coupled with pulsed‐SILAC datasets. We apply our framework to (...) a published dataset and show that stimulation of mouse dendritic cells with LPS leads to a proteome‐wide change in PT. This is the first quantification of PT out‐of‐equilibrium, paving the way for the analysis of biological systems in other contexts. (shrink)

The purpose of this article has been to show what social sciences can contribute to advance in the knowledge and understanding of personal and social problems derived from suffering from rare vision diseases. It concludes that the incorporation of data in the National Patient Registries is an opportunity to encourage research into the problems existing in our social and cultural context, in the search for solutions that will lead to improvements in treatment, health care, psycho-social care, education, employment, etc. and (...) in the evaluation of results. In short, in the conditions and quality of life of patients and their families. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter (...) topic are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)