The difficulties of relativistic particle theories formulated by means of canonical quantization, such as those of Klein–Gordon and Dirac, ultimately led theoretical physicists to turn to quantum field theory to model elementary particle physics. In order to overcome these difficulties, the theories of the present approach are developed deductively from the physical principles that specify the system, without making use of canonical quantization. For a free particle these starting assumptions are invariance of the theory and covariance of position with respect (...) to Poincaré transformations. In pursuing the approach, the effectiveness of group theoretical methods is exploited. The coherent development of our program has shown that robust classes of representations of the Poincaré group, discarded by the known particle theories, can in fact be taken as bases for perfectly consistent theories. For massive spin zero particles, six inequivalent theories have been determined, two of which do not correspond to any of the current ones; all of these theories overcome the difficulties of Klein–Gordon one. The present lack of the explicit transformation properties of position with respect to boosts prevents the complete determination of non zero spin particle theories. In the past a particular form of these transformation properties was adopted by Jordan and Mukunda. We check its consistency within the present approach and find that for spin \ particles there is only one consistent theory, which is unitarily related to Dirac’s; yet, once again, it requires classes of irreducible representations previously discarded. (shrink)

In the framework of the histories approach to quantum mechanics developed by Griffiths and Omnès, we consider the question of the uniqueness of the probability assigned to the histories; the question was solved by Omnès only in special cases. We find conditions which ensure uniqueness of such probability in the general case.

We single out an alternative, strict interpretation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criterion of reality, and identify the implied extensions of quantum correlations. Then we prove that the theorem of Bell, and the non-locality theorems without inequalities, fail if the new extensions are adopted. Therefore, these theorems can be interpreted as arguments against the wide interpretation of the criterion of reality rather than as a violation of locality.

A relation ≺ϕ between noncommuting 1-0 quantum observables (i.e., projections) is introduced, ϕ being the state vector of the system. This relation extends the empirical implication between commuting projections. An operational interpretation of the new relation is given, which can be expressed also in counterfactual terms. It is shown that a relation proposed some years ago by Hardegree, namely the Sasaki arrow ↪ϕ, can be interpreted in terms of the relation ≺ϕ; furthermore, this new relation turns out to be successful (...) also in cases in which the Sasaki arrow fails. (shrink)

Current theories of massless free particle assume unitary space inversion and anti-unitary time reversal operators. In so doing robust classes of possible theories are discarded. In the present work theories of massless systems are derived through a strictly deductive development from the principle of relativistic invariance, so that a kind of space inversion or time reversal operator is ruled out only if it causes inconsistencies. As results, new classes of consistent theories for massless isolated systems are explicitly determined. On the (...) other hand, the approach determines definite constraints implied by the invariance principle; they were ignored by some past investigations that, as a consequence, turn out to be not consistent with the invariance principle. Also the problem of the localizability for massless systems is reconsidered within the new theoretical framework, obtaining a generalization and a deeper detailing of previous results. (shrink)

We discuss the problem of how a (commutative) generalized observable in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space (communtative effect-valued resolution of the identity) can be considered as an unsharp realization of some standard observable (projection-valued resolution of the identity). In particular, we give a concrete procedure for constructing such a standard observable. Some results about the “uniqueness” of the resulting observable are also examined.

The theoretical scheme proposed by Aerts for describing two separated entities as a whole within a question-state structure is considered. The quoted author claims that two relevant axioms characterizing quantum physics cannot hold for a quantum, nonclassical entity consisting of two quantum separate entities. We suggest that Aerts' theory is not adequate, from the empirical point of view, to describe this situation.

The notion of coexistence between questions is introduced in the framework of Piron's approach to quantum physics, using Aerts' notion of performable-together questions. Relationships between coexistence of questions and Piron's compatibility of propositions are investigated. In particular, properties generated by coexistent and primitive questions are compatible.

The mathematical description of the three distinct fundamental notions of “individual sample” of “preparing procedure,” and of “Piron's state” of a physical entity are precisely introduced in the framework of the Piron's “preparation-question structure” (without specific axioms C, P, A) based on Ludwig's “selection structure.” We compare our realization of the above notions with a similar use of the standard terminology of the “Geneva School” adopted by Pykacz and Santos in a recent paper.

Antonio Signorini’s contribution to the constitutive theory of non-linear elasticity is reconstructed and analyzed. Some uninformed opinions suggesting he had a minor role, lacking of significant results, are discussed and refuted. It is shown that Signorini should be rightly credited for being among the first scholars aware of the central problem of non-linear elasticity: the determination of the general form of the elastic potential.

This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of interest for cognitive sci- entists, neuroscientists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, and philosophers of science. Indeed, contemporary developments in neuroscience and psy- chology suggest that scientists are likely to deal with a multiplicity of levels, where each of the different levels entails laws of behavior appropriate to that level (Berntson et al., 2012). Also, gathering and modeling data at the different levels of analysis is not suffi- (...) cient: the integration of information across levels of analysis is a crucial issue. Given such state of affairs, a number of interesting questions arise. How can the autonomy of explanatory levels be properly understood in behavioral explanation? Is reductionism a satis- factory strategy? How can high-level and low-level models be constrained in order to be actually explanatory of both behav- ioral and neurological or molecular evidence? What is the kind of relationship between those models? (shrink)

The recent in vitro derivation of gamete‐like cells from mouse embryonic stem (mES) cells is a major breakthrough and lays down several challenges, both for the further scientific investigation and for the bioethical and biolegal discourse. We refer here to these cells as gamete‐like (sperm‐like or oocyte‐like, respectively), because at present there is still no evidence that these cells behave fully like bona fide sperm or oocytes, lacking the fundamental proof, i.e. combination with a normally derived gamete of the opposite (...) sex to yield a normal individual. However, the results published so far do show that these cells share some defining features of gametes. We discuss these results in the light of the bioethical and legal questions that are likely to arise would the same process become possible with human embryonic stem (hES) cells. (shrink)

The moving spotlight account (MS) is a view that combines an eternalist ontology and an A-theoretic metaphysics. The intuition underlying MS is that the present time is somehow privileged and experientially vivid, as if it were illuminated by a moving spotlight. According to MS-theorists, a key reason to prefer MS to B-theoretic eternalism is that our experience of time supports it. We argue that this is false. To this end, we formulate a new family of positions in the philosophy of (...) time, which differ from MS in that, intuitively, they admit a plurality of moving spotlights. We argue that these ‘deviant’ variants of MS cannot be dismissed as conceptually incoherent, and that they are as well-supported by our experience as is MS. One of these variants, however, is consistent with the B-theory. Thus, if our experience of time supports MS, then it supports the B-theory as well. (shrink)

The Italian Twin Registry (ITR) has been carrying out several genetic-epidemiological studies. Collection and storage of biological material from study participants has recently increased in the light of biobanking development. Within this scenario, we aimed at investigating understanding, awareness and attitude towards blood/DNA donation of research participants. About these quite unknown dimensions more knowledge is needed from ethical and social perspectives.

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is ‘open’, i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Fine to tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open (...) futurists must adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of “actual future”, it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions. (shrink)

L’essai analyse la structure de la philosophie politique de Fichte en l’inscrivant dans le contexte formé par les concepts politiques mis en place par la doctrine du droit naturel. De cette science, qui a pour éléments principaux les droits des individus, la souveraineté et la représentation, Fichte découvre la logique, qu’il poursuit jusqu’à son aporie constitutive. Dans la période de maturité de sa pensée, le philosophe paraît dépasser l’autosuffisance du droit naturel en direction d’une philosophie de la pratique, ce qui (...) semble conforme à l’évolution de la Doctrine de la Science.Duso’s essay focuses on Fichte’s political philosophy stressing its relation to the context of modern political concepts and their origin within the modern science of natural right. Fichte analyses its elements and thinks back over its logic, showing its aporetical core. In the years of his maturity Fichte seems to go beyond the self-sufficiency of natural rights theories towards a philosophy of practice more consonant with the developments of his Doctrine of the Science. (shrink)

In this paper we show that it is possible to eliminate the converse operator from the propositional dynamic logic CPDL (Converse PDL), without compromising the soundness and completeness of inference for it. Specifically we present an encoding of CPDL formulae into PDL that eliminates the converse programs from a CPDL formula, but adds enough information so as not to destroy its original meaning with respect to satisfiability, validity, and logical implication. Notably, the resulting PDL formula is polynomially related to the (...) original one. This fact allows one to build inference procedures for CPDL, by encoding CPDL formulae into PDL, and then running an inference procedure for PDL. (shrink)

Premessa p.9 Capitolo I: Identità ebraica e nuovo pensiero p.13 Capitolo II: Qohelet nel “nuovo pensiero” p.81 Capitolo III: Etica e politica: un dialogo tra religioni? p. 149 Capitolo IV: Dal trascendentalismo all’esteriorità: fondazione etica della maestria p.207 Capitolo V: Dal primato della politica al primato dell’etica p.245 Capitolo VI: Emmanuel Lévinas: per una trascendenza non idolatrica p.287 Capitolo VII: Dall’umanismo dei superbi all’umanismo dell’altro uomo p.231.

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of (...) rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration. (shrink)

Retracing the primary common aspects between anthropological and psychoanalytic thought, in this article, we will further discuss the main common points between the notions of the unconscious according to Carl Gustav Jung and Claude Lévi-Strauss, taking into account the thought of Erich Neumann. On the basis of very simple elementary logic considerations centered around the basic notion of the separation of opposites, our observations might be useful for speculations on the possible origins of rational thought and hence on the origins (...) of consciousness. (shrink)

Artefacts do not always do what they are supposed to, due to a variety of reasons, including manufacturing problems, poor maintenance, and normal wear-and-tear. Since software is an artefact, it should be subject to malfunctioning in the same sense in which other artefacts can malfunction. Yet, whether software is on a par with other artefacts when it comes to malfunctioning crucially depends on the abstraction used in the analysis. We distinguish between “negative” and “positive” notions of malfunction. A negative malfunction, (...) or dysfunction, occurs when an artefact token either does not or cannot do what it is supposed to. A positive malfunction, or misfunction, occurs when an artefact token may do what is supposed to but, at least occasionally, it also yields some unintended and undesirable effects. We argue that software, understood as type, may misfunction in some limited sense, but cannot dysfunction. Accordingly, one should distinguish software from other technical artefacts, in view of their design that makes dysfunction impossible for the former, while possible for the latter. (shrink)

A widespread opinion holds that norms and codes of conduct as such can only be established via words, that is, in some lexical form. This perspective can be criticized: some norms produced by human acts are not word-based at all. For example, many norms are actually conveyed through graphics (e. g. road signs and land-use maps), sounds (e. g. the referee’s whistle), a silent gesture (the traffic warden’s signal to halt). In this article, we will focus on the norms that (...) are created by means of drawings and can be termed “drawn norms” or “graphical norms.” Specifically, we will inquire into the phenomenon of graphical norms with particular regard to traffic signs and land-use plans, and we will discuss the philosophical and legal problems to which these phenomena give rise. (shrink)

This book provides a general survey of the main concepts, questions and results that have been developed in the recent interactions between quantum information, quantum computation and logic. Divided into 10 chapters, the books starts with an introduction of the main concepts of the quantum-theoretic formalism used in quantum information. It then gives a synthetic presentation of the main “mathematical characters” of the quantum computational game: qubits, quregisters, mixtures of quregisters, quantum logical gates. Next, the book investigates the puzzling entanglement-phenomena (...) and logically analyses the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox and introduces the reader to quantum computational logics, and new forms of quantum logic. The middle chapters investigate the possibility of a quantum computational semantics for a language that can express sentences like “Alice knows that everybody knows that she is pretty”, explore the mathematical concept of quantum Turing machine, and illustrate some characteristic examples that arise in the framework of musical languages. The book concludes with an analysis of recent discussions, and contains a Mathematical Appendix which is a survey of the definitions of all main mathematical concepts used in the book. (shrink)

This volume illustrates both theoretically and empirically the differences between religious diversity and religious pluralism. It highlights how the factual situation of cultural and religious diversity may lead to individual, social and political choices of organized and recognized pluralism. In the process, both individual and collective identities are redefined, incessantly moving along the continuum that ranges from exclusion to inclusion. The book starts by first detailing general issues related to religious pluralism. It makes the case for keeping the empirical, the (...) normative, the regulatory and the interactive dimensions of religious pluralism analytically distinct while recognizing that, in practice, they often overlap. It also underlines the importance of seeking connections between religious pluralism and other pluralisms. Next, the book explores how religious diversity can operate to contribute to legal pluralism and examines the different types of church-state relations: eradication, monopoly, oligopoly and pluralism. The second half of the book features case studies that provide a more specific look at the general issues, from ways to map and assess the religious diversity of a whole country to a comparison between Belgian-French views of religious and philosophical diversity, from religious pluralism in Italy to the shifting approach to ethnic and religious diversity in America, and from a sociological and historical perspective of religious plurality in Japan to an exploration of Brazilian religions, old and new. The transition from religious diversity to religious pluralism is one of the most important challenges that will reshape the role of religion in contemporary society. This book provides readers with insights that will help them better understand and interpret this unprecedented transition. (shrink)

In this Introduction we lay out the context of a ‘Continental philosophy of biology’ and suggest why Georges Canguilhem’s place in such a philosophy is important. There is not one single program for Continental philosophy of biology, but Canguilhem’s vision, which he referred to at one stage as ‘biological philosophy’, is a significant one, located in between the classic holism-reductionism tensions, significantly overlapping with philosophy of medicine, philosophy of technology and other themes moving away from the more common existential and (...) phenomenological motifs of post-war European thought. Chapters examine (among other themes) his relation to Lebensphilosophie, to authors such as Kant, Nietzsche and Marjorie Grene, and to current theoretical biology. (shrink)

This book is a systematic analysis of John R. Searle’s philosophy of mind. Searle’s view of mind, as a set of subjective _and_ biologically embodied processes, can account for our being part of nature _qua_ mindful beings. This model finds support in neuroscience and offers reliable solutions to the problems of consciousness, mental causation, and the self.

So-called Locke's thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke's thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of (...) the same kind. It is argued that anyone who subscribes to certain standard metaphysical arguments, which are generally taken for granted in the debate about Locke's thesis, is virtually compelled to accept the counter-examples. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic discussion, mainly for non-economists, on economic approaches to the concept of sustainable development. As a first step, the concept of sustainability is extensively discussed. As a second step, the argument that it is not possible to consider sustainability only from an economic or ecological point of view is defended; issues such as economic-ecological integration, inter-generational and intra-generational equity are considered of fundamental importance. Two different economic approaches to environmental issues, i.e. neo-classical environmental economics and ecological (...) economics, are compared. Some key differences such as weak versus strong sustainability, commensurability versus incommensurability and ethical neutrality versus different values acceptance are pointed out. (shrink)