ZusammenfassungDer Artikel skizziert die Grundlagen einer neuen Subdisziplin innerhalb der Religionswissenschaft, der Religionsethologie. Religionsethologie lässt sich letztlich auf Charles Darwin selbst zurückführen, der bereits in seinem Buch The expression of the emotions in man and animals belegen konnte, dass jede Form von Verhalten für das Überleben der Art genau so wichtig ist wie die Adaptation des Phänotypus. In den Geisteswissenschaften wurde der Darwinsche Ansatz sofort aufgegriffen und von bedeutenden Forschern wie Karl Meuli, Aby Warburg und in jüngerer Zeit von Roy (...) Rappaport, Marvin Harris und anderen aufgegriffen und fruchtbar gemacht, indem sie einerseits religiöse Universalien herausarbeiten, andererseits aber auch die Grundzüge einer religiösen Evolution darstellen konnten. Religion ist demnach tief in der Biologie des Menschen verwurzelt und kann demzufolge auch unter biologischen Gesichtspunkten erforscht werden. (shrink)

Since the publication of Roy Bhaskar'sA Realist Theory of Science in 1975,critical realism has emerged as one of the most powerful new directions in the philosophy of science and social science, offering a real alternative to both positivism and postmodernism. This reader makes accessible in one volume key readings to stimulate debate about and within critical realism, including: the transcendental realist philosophy of science elaborated inA Realist Theory of Science; Bhaskar's critical naturalist philosophy of social science; the theory of explanatory (...) critique, which is central to critical realism; and the theme of dialectic, which is central to Bhaskar's most recent writings. The volume includes extracts from Bhaskar's most important books, as well as selections from all of the other most important contributors to the critical realist program. It also includes both a general introduction and original introductions to each section. (shrink)

Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that (...) there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, he attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. They should be used, he says, as they generally are used--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. All of these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error. Collectively, however, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one formal logic that correctly (or best, or legitimately) codifies the logical consequence relation in natural language. This essay provides a taxonomy of different variations on the logical pluralist theme based on a five-part structure, and then identifies an unoccupied position in this taxonomy: perspectival logical pluralism. Perspectival pluralism provides an attractive position from which to formulate a philosophy of logic from a feminist perspective (and from other, identity-based perspectives, such (...) as critical race theory). An example of how such an account might be developed is sketched. The essay concludes by defusing an obvious objection to the perspectival approach: the claim that the correct logic (or logics), in virtue of the formal nature of logic, should be independent of considerations regarding the identity of the reasoner. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those intuitions. (...) The good news is that natural selection ensures a degree of reliability for the intuitions. The bad news is that the evolutionary account seems to limit the range of reliable thought experiment to highly practical and concrete contexts. In the fifth section, I provide reasons for thinking that we are not as slavishly limited as a pessimistic construal of natural selection suggests. Nevertheless, I promote the idea that biology is a promising source of predictions and diagnoses of thought experiment failures. (shrink)

We study the logic of so-called lexicographic or priority merge for multi-agent plausibility models. We start with a systematic comparison between the logical behavior of priority merge and the more standard notion of pooling through intersection, used to define, for instance, distributed knowledge. We then provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of priority merge, as well as a proof theory in labeled sequents that admits cut. We finally study Moorean phenomena and define a dynamic resolution operator for (...) priority merge for which we also provide a complete set of reduction axioms. (shrink)

Unique in presenting a thoroughgoing examination of the mathematical aspects of the neo-logicist project (and the particular philosophical issues arising from these technical concerns).

You face two buttons. Pushing one will destroy Greensboro. Pushing the other will save it. There is no way for you to know which button saves and which destroys. What ought you to do? Answer: You ought to make the correct guess and push the button that saves Greensboro. Second question: Do you have an obligation to push the correct button?

What is the nature of the intellectual enterprise - general equilibrium analysis - that so many economists regard as the centerpiece of their discipline? In this book, Roy Weintraub considers both the modern history of the analysis, and the methodological puzzles that it, and mathematical economic theory in general, pose. Professor Weintraub argues that previous writings on the history and method of general equilibrium theory have been curiously biased and misleading. He provides a clear and careful presentation of the development (...) of the theory from the 1930s through to the Arrow-Debreu work of the 1950s. This historical analysis is the centre of the book: a case study which permits the author to justify the status of general equilibrium theory in economics and the activity in which economic theorists engage. He argues that previous methodological investigations have been distorted by their use of inappropriate models taken from the philosophy of science that were developed to appraise work in the physical sciences. (shrink)

'As an introduction to early modern thinking and the impact of past ideas on present lives, this book can find few equals and no superiors. Porter is a witty, humane writer with an extraordinary vocabulary and a sparkling sense of fun. Whether he is quoting from obscure medical texts or analysing scabrous diaries, dishing the dirt on long-dead bigwigs or evoking sympathy for human suffering, his grasp is masterly and his erudition appealing. I wish I could read it again for (...) the first time: you can.' Times Educational Supplement, Book of the Week In this startlingly brilliant sequel to the prize-winning ENLIGHTENMENT Roy Porter completes his lifetime's work, offering a magical, enthusiastic and charming account of the writings of some of the most attractive figures ever to write English. (shrink)

Despite its internal divisions and the uncertainty surrounding many of its foundations, there is a growing consensus that the on‐going search for an alternative model of the mind finds a minimal theoretical identity in the pursuit of an anti‐Cartesian conception of mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this anti‐Cartesianism remains more or less explicitly committed to the neo‐Brentanian idea that intentionality is an essential feature of the mental—an idea that has prevailed since the advent of modern cognitive science in the 1950s. An issue (...) of compatibility is thereby raised, as neo‐Brentanism arguably sides with cognitive Cartesianism. The main goal of the paper is to put into full light one specific aspect of this largely unperceived problem of compatibility by arguing that the neo‐Brentanian property of intentionality is an essentially representational one that runs counter to the salient anti‐representationalism of anti‐Cartesianism. And, that this representational essence confronts the search for alternative models of the mind of an anti‐Cartesian kind with the following theoretical issue: To what extent is it possible to devise a non‐Brentanian property of intentionality, particularly one that is fully dissociated from the property of representation? This issue is shown to be much deeper and more difficult than it looks once the nature of representation is properly apprehended; it seems to be still waiting for an answer in the current search for an alternative model of the mind, if only because it has not yet be set in fully adequate terms. (shrink)

Philosophical work on comics from within the “analytic” tradition is a relatively new phenomenon, and still somewhat of a niche subfield in the philosophy of ar.

Durante la presencia española en el sudeste asiático se mantuvieron contactos con otros países de su entorno. Uno de ellos fue Japón. El archipiélago nipón cambió de dirigente tras la batalla de Sekigahara, estableciéndose tras ella una nueva dinastía que dirigiría al país hasta 1868, la familia Tokugawa. En los primeros años de este gobierno las relaciones con los españoles fueron cambiantes, pasando de una situación favorable a terminar rompiéndose. Es en esos primeros años se hallan Rodrigo de Vivero y (...) Sebastián Vizcaíno. Ambos personajes se entrevistaron tanto con Ieyasu como con Hidetada Tokuwaga. Vivero estuvo en Japón poco antes de que las relaciones entre ambas potencias se rompiesen; por su parte, Vizcaíno las vivió en primera persona. De sus estancias quedaron sus percepciones del país nipón recogidas en dos Relaciones manuscritas. El objetivo que aquí se persigue es analizar y exponer ordenadamente los datos extraídos de sus manuscritos acerca de las costumbres de los japoneses, su arte, su arquitectura, su estructura social, etc. desde el punto de vista de dos personajes que a diferencia de los misioneros no se involucraron en la sociedad japonesa. Palabras clave: Rodrigo de Vivero, Sebastián Vizcaíno, Japón, Tokugawa, Nueva España, Filipinas.During the Spanish presence in Southeaster Asia, contacts were maintained with other neighboring countries. One of them was Japan. The Japanese archipelago changed its leadership after the Battle of Sekigahara, establishing a new dynasty after it that would lead the country until 1868, the Tokugawa family. In the first years of this government relations with the Spanish were changing, going from a favourable situation to breaking up. It is in those early years that Rodrigo de Vivero and Sebastián Vizcaíno is found. Both characters interviewed both Ieyasu and Hidetada Tokuwaga. Vivero was in Japan shortly before relations between the two powers were broken; for his part, Vizcaíno lived that in the first person. From his stays remained his perceptions of the Japanese country collected in two manuscript Narrations. The objective pursued here is to analyze and orderly expose the data extracted from his manuscripts about the customs of the Japanese, their art, their architecture, their social structure, etc. from the point of view of two characters who, unlike the missionaries, were not involved in Japanese society. Key words: Rodrigo de Vivero, Sebastián Vizcaíno, Namban, Iberian century, Japan, Tokugawa, New Spain, Philippines. (shrink)

Ethics in the West too often equates morality with universal moral principles, thus imposing lifestyles and moral criteria that do not respect differences and local histories. Even Christianity proposes ethics that is based on eternal, absolute and universal truths or principles, independent of sociocultural and historical contexts. The problem is that these universal moral laws become a means of social control to exclude those who are different: non-Christian religions, nonwhite races, non-Western cultures, and poor and marginalized social classes everywhere. To (...) these can be added minorities marginalized because of sexual orientation, physical handicaps, and women of all sectors and cultures. Another kind of ethics is urgent. For these reasons, Christians in Latin America and other parts are seeking innovative ways of envisioning ethics from their marginalized and discriminated social locations in order to find another possible ethics, an ethics that is not universal and not based on eternal truths or principles, but rather is contextual and historical and that takes into account real-life realities. Only an ethics that does this will be liberative. Important steps toward this other possible ethics have been taken by the theology of liberation by developing a contextual and intercultural morality. (shrink)

Kripshe treats ‘god’ as an empty natural kind term such as ‘unicorn’. She applies Saul Kripke's fresh views about empty natural kinds to ‘god’. Metaphysically, says Kripshe, there are no possible worlds in which there are gods. Gods could not have existed, given that they do not actually exist and never did. Epistemologically, godlessness is an a posteriori discovery. Kripshe dismisses the gods in the same breath that she dismisses mermaids. Semantically, the perspective Kripshe finds most perspicacious, no counterfactual situation (...) is properly describable as one in which there are gods. Perhaps it is not quite a necessary truth that there are no gods. According to Saul Kripke, failed natural kind terms are ill-defined. Incorporating ill-defined terms into declarative sentences yields only mock propositions. Just as the meteorologist has no professional interest in mock thunder, the logician has no professional interest in mock propositions. Kripshe disagrees with agnostics who assign a low probability to ‘There is at least one god’. The bearers of probabilities must be propositions. Despite this deference to science, Kripshe agrees with the a priori atheist that, necessarily, no future experience could constitute an encounter with a god. Divine revelation is impossible. Kripshe's a posteriori necessary atheism compares favorably to familiar forms of atheism and to non-cognitivists. It reveals interesting challenges to a coherent formulation of atheism. (shrink)

Islamic building codes require mosques to face Mecca. The further Islam spreads, the more apt are believers to fall into a quandary. X faces Y only when the front of X is closer to Y than any other side of X. So the front of the mosque should be oriented along a shortest path to Mecca. Which way is that? Does the path to Mecca tunnel through the earth? Or does the path follow the surface of the earth?

This paper is devoted to a solution to Moore's problem. After explaining what Moore's problem is and after considering the main approaches toward solving the problem, I provide a definition of Moorean sentences in terms of pure Moorean propositions. My solution to Moore's problem essentially involves a description of how one can contradict oneself without uttering a contradiction, and a set of definitions that exactly determines which sentences are Moorean and which are close relatives of Moorean sentences.

Jacques Ellul, by far the most significant author in the serious discussions on the interface between religion and technology, is apparently not known to the science‐and‐religion field. The reason is the imprecise use of the terminology. In scientific formulation the relationship can be summarized as technology /religion:: science/theology. The first pair are robust three‐dimensional templates of most human experience; the second pair are linear, abstract concerns of a minority of citizens. In the parallel community—now well developed throughout academia—of science, technology, (...) and society, where the technology/religion matters have been discussed more than the science/religion pair, John Caiazza's point that “techno‐secularism is the real problem” has been front and center for some decades. Among the theologians most aware of this, Raimundo Panikkar, Langdon Gilkey, and Huston Smith, Smith is the one who has taken the case much further than Caiazza, recognizing the danger of the real theological challenge from the religion of scientism and actively working against it. I write from a unique background among those involved in this debate—that of being deeply embedded simultaneously both in the modern science and technology establishment and in the reform of the religious enterprise for fifty years. I make the case that matters are worse than even Smith posits. He shows that scientism as a fundamentalist modern secularism serves the exact function of the theology behind the practiced religion of America and the West, that is, technology. An unexpected ray of hope has appeared in the sudden emergence of whole‐person healing (also known as complementary and alternative medicine), which is used regularly by well over half the population. This reintroduction of the spiritual dimension into this key technology of health will certainly be a major turning point. (shrink)

The majority of disucssions of Benardete’s Paradox conclude that the traveller approaching the infinite series of gods will be mysteriously halted despite none of the gods erecting any barriers. Using a revision-theoretic analysis of Benardete’s puzzle, four distinct possible outcomes that might occur given Benardete’s set-up are distinguished. This analysis provides additional insight into the puzzle at hand, via identifying heretofore unnoticed possible outcomes, but it also serves as an example of how the revision theoretic framework can be used to (...) construct exhaustive taxonomies of potential outcomes in apparently contradictory situations. (shrink)