I describe an ethic for business administration based on the social tradition of the Catholic Church. I find that much current thinking about business falters for its conceit of truth. Abstractions such as the shareholder-value model contain truth - namely, that business is an economic enterprise to manage for the wealth of its owners. But, as in all abstractions, this truth comes at the expense of falsehood -namely, that persons are assets to deploy on behalf of owners. This last is (...) "wrong" in both senses of the word - it is factually wrong in that persons are far more than business assets, they are supernatural beings, children of God; and it is morally wrong in that it is an injustice to treat them as the former when they are the latter. I draw upon the social tradition of the Catholic Church to recognize that the business of business is not business, but is instead the human person. Following Church teachings, I describe a person-centered ethic of business based upon eight social principles that both correct and enlarge the shareholder-centered ethic of much current business thinking. I discuss implications of this person-centered ethic for business administration. (shrink)

I ask why an increasing number of business scholars today are drawn to an idea of “positive business” that they cannot account for scientifically. I answer that it is because they are attracted to the real mystery of positive business which is its incomprehensible and unspeakable divinity. I begin by asking why the research literature has yet to speak of positive business plainly and with one voice. I find that it lacks for the right words because it comes to human (...) being in business as a science attuned to its objects rather than as a religion attuned to its spirit. Next, I say what I can about the real mystery of business, keeping in mind that we can say about it only what we can say about God. This brings me at last to the Christian insight that human being, in business and everywhere else, is the mystery of Jesus Christ in whom we are reconciled to God. Business is positively human as it invites us to be as Christ, to be a fully human person in joyful communion with others in God. This, in sum, is how to speak plainly and with one voice of the positive business that our hearts desire but our science cannot say. (shrink)

Lloyd E. Sandelands unites the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas and the social teachings of the Catholic Church to describe how business leaders can help people in their organizations become more truly and fully human. Being at Work is a much-needed marriage of metaphysical philosophy and managerial common sense.

I ask why an increasing number of business scholars today are drawn to an idea of “positive business” that they cannot account for scientifically. I answer that it is because they are attracted to the real mystery of positive business which is its incomprehensible and unspeakable divinity. I begin by asking why the research literature has yet to speak of positive business plainly and with one voice. I find that it lacks for the right words because it comes to human (...) being in business as a science attuned to its objects rather than as a religion attuned to its spirit. Next, I say what I can about the real mystery of business, keeping in mind that we can say about it only what we can say about God. This brings me at last to the Christian insight that human being, in business and everywhere else, is the mystery of Jesus Christ in whom we are reconciled to God. Business is positively human as it invites us to be as Christ, to be a fully human person in joyful communion with others in God. This, in sum, is how to speak plainly and with one voice of the positive business that our hearts desire but our science cannot say. (shrink)

The target article speaks loudest about what it cannot see – that man exists in God. Its claim that supernatural beliefs are “evolved errors” rests on unwarranted assumption and mistaken argument. Implications for evolutionary study are considered.

This book is a work of philosophy concerning how we should think about social life. Whereas social science has traditionally been a study of social physics it must become a study of social life.

This paper reclaims the idea that human society is a form of life, an idea once vibrant in the work of Toennies, Durkheim, Simmel, Le Bon, Kroeber, Freud, Bion, and Follett but moribund today. Despite current disparagements, this idea remains the only and best answer to our primary experience of society as vital feeling. The main obstacle to conceiving society as a life is linguistic; the logical form of life is incommensurate with the logical form of language. However, it is (...) possible to extend our conceptual reach by appealing to alternative symbolisms more congenial to living form such as, and especially, art. (shrink)

Human society is unique in the animal kingdom in the degree to which it depends upon its members reflective awareness of self and society. Whereas much has been learned about the sense of self, little is known about the sense of society. This paper develops three points about the human sense of society: First, this sense is a feeling of life, what German writers have called Lebensgefuhl. The paper begins by defining feeling as a psychical moment or‘phase’of bodily activity. The (...) paper later develops die idea mat what is felt of society is always an embodiment of its vital form; its social life. Second, die sense of society is a feeling of society, as distinct from a feeling in society and from a feeling of self. The middle third of die paper distinguishes these concepts and links die feeling of society to writings of Freud and Durkheim in which elements of this feeling are found. And third, feelings of society prominently include participation, love, and play. These feelings, which are embodiments of vital social form, are illustrated and discussed in die penultimate section of die paper. Having registered these three points, die paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of implications for expanding die scope of inquiry in social science. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA “thin spot” in thinking about business endangers our human being. This article traces a change in business thinking over the last generations to note how, under the spell of the scientific method and the thrall to utilitarian values, our understanding of our self has grown harder, more determined, and less sympathetic. Bringing together ideas about the meaning of self from the study of semiotics and from the author's own religious faith, this article describes how we can reclaim our human (...) being by grounding thinking about business in faith that reaches to God. (shrink)

This book speaks to the need for God in business today. Together, the chapters of this book build toward a comprehensive ethic of business administration. God and Mammon finds that business today needs to serve the human person, who is a creative being in the image of God.

I am a typical late middle-aged professor of business. I ask whether or not I have taken people seriously in my work as a researcher and teacher. I discover I have not. I explain how—by following the canons of administrative science in my research and by following the norms of instruction in my teaching—I have been encouraged to ignore the spiritual being of people that is their essence and better part. I conclude with ideas about how I can mend my (...) ways. (shrink)

Behavior, language, development, identity, and science—all of these phenomena are commonly characterized as 'social' in nature. But what does it mean to be 'social'? Is there any intrinsic 'mark' of the social shared by these phenomena? In the first book to shed light on this foundational question, twelve distinguished philosophers and social scientists from several disciplines debate the mark of the social. Their varied answers will be of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in the theoretical foundations (...) of the social sciences. (shrink)

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery. For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind (...) or soul and body. (shrink)

Covers the philosophy of 200-800 CE and its place in literature, science, and religion. Includes a digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during the period.

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery.For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind or (...) soul and body.This study argues that Plato's analysis of personhood is intended to cohere with his two-world metaphysics as well as a radical separation of knowledge and belief. Gerson demonstrates that Plato's account of persons plays a key role not just in his theory of mind, but in his theory of knowledge, his metaphysics, and his ethics. A proper understanding of Plato's account of persons must therefore place it in the context of his doctrines in these areas. Knowing Persons fills a significant gap by showing the way to such an understanding. (shrink)

THE PRE-SOCRATIC ORIGINS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY § INTRODUCTION St Augustine informs us that pagan philosophers divided theology into three parts: () civic ...

Desperately difficult texts inevitably elicit desperate hermeneutical measures. Aristotle's De Anima, book three, chapter five, is evidently one such text. At least since the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias, scholars have felt compelled to draw some remarkable conclusions regarding Aristotle's brief remarks in this passage regarding intellect. One such claim is that in chapter five, Aristotle introduces a second intellect, the so-called 'agent intellect', an intellect distinct from the 'passive intellect', the supposed focus of discussion up until this passage.1 This (...) view is a direct descendent of the view of Alexander himself, who identified the agent intellect with the divine intellect.2 Even the staunchest defender of such a view is typically at a loss to give a plausible explanation of why the divine intellect pops into and then out of the picture in the intense and closely argued discussion of the human intellect that goes from chapter four through to the end of chapter seven.3 Revolting against an extravagant postulation of entities, Michael Wedin, for example, has argued with considerable subtlety and ingenuity that there is in fact only one intellect discussed in De Anima.4 This unified intellect is fully capable of being integrated into Aristotle's hylomorphic psychology. In order to make his case, though, Wedin is himself forced (1) to discount the importance of some texts and (2) to interpret others in a way that strains credulity. (shrink)

ONE FREQUENTLY READS CASUAL REFERENCES to Neo-Platonic metaphysics as emanationist. It is somewhat less common to find analyses of the term "emanation" so used. In this paper I shall be concerned solely with Plotinus. I hereby set aside all questions regarding any common denominator one might suppose between Plotinus and, say, Proclus.

The question posed in the title of this paper is an historical one. I am not, for example, primarily interested in the term 'Platonism' as used by modern philosophers to stand for a particular theory under discussion – a theory, which it is typically acknowledged, no one may have actually held.1 I am rather concerned to understand and articulate on an historical basis the core position of that 'school' of thought prominent in antiquity from the time of the 'founder' up (...) until at least the middle of the 6th century C.E.2 Platonism was unquestionably the dominant philosophical position in the ancient world over a period of more than 800 years. Epicureanism is perhaps the sole major exception to the rule that in the ancient world all philosophers took Platonism as the starting-point for speculation, including those who thought their first task was to refute Platonism. Basically, Platonism sent the ancient philosophical agenda. Given this fact, understanding with some precision the nature of Platonism is obviously a desirable thing for the historian of ancient philosophy. (shrink)

This set reprints key articles on Aristotle's logic, metaphysics, physics, cosmology, biology, psychology, ethics, politics, rhetoric, and aesthetics, discussing the major issues of concern in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship.

In this paper I explore Plato's reasons for his rejection of the so-called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistm) is non-propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, (...) I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self-reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self-reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self-reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self-reflexive mental states. (shrink)

Among the concepts central to Plato's metaphysical vision are those of identity, sameness, and difference. For example, it is on the basis of a claim about putative cases of sameness among different things that Plato postulates the existence of separate Forms. It is owing to the apparent sameness between instances of Forms and the Forms themselves that Plato is compelled somehow to take account of potentially destructive vicious infinite regress arguments. Further, in reflecting on the Forms and their relations among (...) themselves, it is their self-identity that seems to be threatened or at least compromised. And in providing an account of the possibility of cognition in Timaeus, Plato evidently sees the need to incorporate principles of identity and difference into the soul's very fabric. In this paper, I propose to explore some of the systematic connections between these concepts. Translators have sometimes obscured the fact that there are such connections. The Greek terms taujtovn, e{teron, and o{moion (ajnovmoion) are variously rendered, often in ways that obscure the metaphysics. For example, taujtovn is most commonly rendered in English as "same," which, predictably, leads o{moion to be translated as "like" or "similar." This has suggested to some that if two things are "like" or "similar," then they are not "the same." But "like" and "similar" are not, as I shall show, well-formed or perspicuous metaphysical concepts. There is no justification for foisting them on Plato; rendering the terms thus often leads scholars to miss the force of Plato's arguments. In addition, translating taujtovn as "same" threatens to trivialize a fundamental concept in Plato, leading to complaints that to say that something is "the same as itself" is to say nothing at all. (shrink)

One of the major puzzling themes in the history of Platonism is how theology is integrated with philosophy. In particular, one may well wonder how Plato's superordinate first principle of all, Idea of the Good, comes to be understood by his disciples as a mind or in some way possessing personal attributes. In what sense is the Good supposed to be God? In this paper I explore some Platonic accounts of the first principle of all in order to understand where (...) the integration of the personal into the metaphysical is organic and where it is not. I conclude that the “ontological” and the “henological” construals of the first principle of all differ in their openness to “intellectualizing” that principle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpretations of the “De Anima.” by H.J. BlumenthalLloyd P. GersonH.J. Blumenthal. Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpretations of the “De Anima.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 244. Cloth, $57.50.The label ‘Neoplatonism’, coined in the eighteenth century to indicate a putative and rather ill-defined development within the Platonic tradition, is to this day applied in sundry ways. Presumably, ‘Neoplatonic’ (...) is supposed to be distinguished from ‘Platonic’, but the problem with this is that most of those ancient philosophers called ‘Neoplatonic’ thought of themselves simply as Platonists, that is, as authentic interpreters and continuators of Plato. Nevertheless, there are several important and relatively clear differentiations to be made among those within this tradition. One such refers to those Platonists who attempted to appropriate Aristotle’s philosophy. This was done principally in two ways. For Plotinus, Aristotelian concepts and distinctions were employed to defend Plato against Peripatetic attacks. For Porphyry and the later Platonic commentators on the works of the Aristotelian corpus, Aristotle was co-opted as an authority on the philosophy of the sensible world, leaving the higher, intelligible world to Plato. The commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima are particularly revealing in this regard. For one would assume that in matters regarding the soul it would be extremely difficult to see Aristotle and Plato as anything other than irreconcilable. Aristotle’s hylomorphism and explicit denial of the immortality of the soul hardly seem to be compatible with that which can be called, even on the most charitable interpretation, genuinely Platonic. In fact, the reconciliation of Aristotelian and Platonic soul doctrines is one of the central tasks late Platonists set for themselves. As Blumenthal notes: “Whatever the historical truth about the relation of Aristotle’s thought to Plato’s may have been, the Neoplatonist regarded it as propaedeutic to Plato’s as well as aiming at the same goal” (25).H. J. Blumenthal’s long-anticipated monograph explores in minute detail the extant commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima written by late Platonic or, if one insists, Neoplatonic philosophers. This book builds upon a large body of frequently groundbreaking work by the author on various facets of late Greek philosophy. The main commentaries studied are those of John Philoponus and the unknown authors dubbed ‘Pseudo-Philoponus’ and Pseudo-Simplicius’, though there is also considerable attention paid to Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on De Anima and, of course, [End Page 315] Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentary on De Anima has not survived but whose own immensely influential Peripatetic treatise on the soul does.This book is divided into two parts: I. Commentaries and Commentators and II. Interpretations of the De Anima. The first part provides the essential background to the second. Anyone approaching the Aristotelian commentators for the first time will find here a most useful guide. Even those who have some familiarity with this material will benefit from the author’s extensive knowledge of detail and judicious examination of some of the difficult issues of dating, authorship, philosophical lineage, and so on.The second section of the book concentrates on the De Anima commentaries. Here the author, following the order of the text of De Anima, systematically surveys the positions of the commentators on some of the central issues taken up in Aristotle’s work. These include the commentators’ efforts to reconcile Aristotle’s definition of the soul with Platonic assumptions about its nature and Plato’s tripartite division of the soul with Aristotle’s not entirely clear divisions. One of the instructive features of this comparative study of the commentaries is to see frequently how the issues that seize the imagination of modern commentators trouble the ancients not at all and vice versa.Most readers will be mainly interested in the chapters on the commentaries on the latter part of Book Two and Book Three of De Anima. From Plotinus onward, some of the most original philosophizing in the Platonic tradition focuses on self-consciousness, memory, imagination, and the integrative operation of the rational and arational powers. The last two chapters are filled with material about these issues as well as the... (shrink)

In this closely argued monograph, the author examines one chapter of Plotinus’s treatise V.3 [49], titled “On the Knowing Hypostasis and That Which is Beyond.” In the fifth chapter of that work, Plotinus makes the case for asserting that knowledge is primarily or essentially self-knowledge. This is certainly not a novel claim in the history of ancient philosophy, as Kühn amply demonstrates. It is a central claim in Aristotle’s epistemology and the later Peripatetic tradition. What is of particular interest for (...) the Plotinian account of knowledge as self-knowledge is that it is made in response to a skeptical argument found in Sextus Empiricus, although it is likely that it did not originate with him. That argument attempts to pose the following dilemma for any “dogmatist” who embraces self-knowledge. Either this self-knowledge is in effect one “part” of the knower knowing another “part,” or else it is one “part” knowing not another “part,” but rather knowing “itself.” The first horn of the dilemma means that self-knowledge is not knowledge at all, since the putative knower would have to be able to show that the first “part” is representing the second part accurately. And this is something that cannot be done without the first. (shrink)