This paper argues that the common argument, that a state’s monopoly of violence is a necessary condition for peace, is flawed. First, it rests on anthropological assumptions about violent tendencies in human nature that may be valid for our society but cannot claim to correctly picture the (universal) human nature. Secondly, monopolies of violence are in reality less functional than they would need to be; most importantly, their agents distribute more violence than necessary or legitimate. Given their structural and institutional (...) nature, this is hardly surprising, maybe even unavoidable. Therefore, the claim that a monopoly of violence is an indispensable or at least the best means to establish peace should be viewed more critically. For this reason anarchist proposals should not only not be scorned, they should rather be openly discussed and re-evaluated. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)

A brilliant collection of short essays on literary subjects--e.g. Beckett, Balzac, Proust, Thomas Mann, Dickens, Goethe, Heine, the lyric, realism, the essay, and the contemporary novel--by the great social theorist (1903-1969), originally published in 1958 as Noten zur literature (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main), and here translated by Adorno's former student, Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...) We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. (shrink)

We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...) and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in new ways, it also offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts. (shrink)

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...) are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a). (shrink)

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, (...) which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy. (shrink)

The widely discussed "discursive dilemma" shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where different thresholds may be used for different propositions. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the required thresholds for various collective rationality requirements. We also consider sequential (...) quota rules, which ensure collective rationality by adjudicating propositions sequentially and letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. Sequential rules may be path-dependent and strategically manipulable. We characterize path-independence and prove its essential equivalence to strategy-proofness. Our results shed light on the rationality of simple-, super-, and sub-majoritarian decision-making. (shrink)

The Christian does not live in a vacuum, says the author, but in a world of government, politics, labor, and marriage. Hence, Christian ethics cannot exist in a vacuum what the Christian needs, claims Dietrich Bonhoeffer, is concrete instruction in a concrete situation. Although the author died before completing his work, this book is recognized as a major contribution to Christian ethics. The root and ground of Christian ethics, the author says, is the reality of God as revealed in (...) Jesus Christ. This reality is not manifest in the Church as distinct from the secular world such a juxtaposition of two separate spheres, Bonhoeffer insists, is a denial of God's having reconciled the whole world to himself in Christ. On the contrary, God's commandment is to be found and known in the Church, the family, labor, and government. His commandment permits man to live as man before God, in a world God made, with responsibility for the institutions of that world. (shrink)

"Das Buch ist gut zu lesen und als Urlaubslektüre zu empfehlen." (Sachverhalte 3/2015) "Der klare und sachlogisch überzeugende Argumentationsgang des vorliegenden Bands macht ihn, in Kombination mit einer sehr gelungenen, sprachlichen Gestaltung zu einem echten Lesevergnügen und kann für philosophische 'Einsteiger' zum Beginn einer philosophischen Liebesgeschichte werden. Für Lehrende der Philosophie an Schule und Hochschule ist Tiedemanns Band (…) Fundgrube sowie fachlich fundierter und didaktisch ausgezeichnet aufbereiteter Begleiter durch Unterricht und Seminar." (Mathias Balliet, ZDPE 1/2015) Liebe, Sexualität und Freundschaft gehören (...) nicht nur zu den intensivsten Erfahrungen des Menschen, sie werfen auch zahlreiche Fragen auf: Wie wichtig sind sie für ein gelungenes Leben? Wie genau unterscheiden sich Liebe und Freundschaft? Ist Sexualität ein eigenständiges Phänomen oder notwendig mit Liebe verbunden? Besteht Liebe eher aus selbstloser Fürsorge oder aus eigennütziger Habsucht? Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart haben sich namhafte Denker von Sokrates über Rousseau bis hin zu Sigmund Freud und Simone de Beauvoir dieser Fragen angenommen und dabei erstaunliche Antworten formuliert. Die Philosophie der Liebe ist so vielgestaltig wie ihr Gegenstand. Ist platonische Liebe wirklich lustfeindlich und entsagungsvoll? Beruht die christliche Sexualmoral auf einem Mutterkomplex? Muss man dichten können wie Goethe, um mit Schiller befreundet zu sein? Ist alle Liebe so egoistisch, wie Schopenhauer uns einreden will, oder sind wahre Liebe und Freundschaft vielleicht doch für jeden von uns möglich? Das Buch bietet einen abwechslungsreichen Streifzug durch die Antworten der Ideengeschichte und lädt ein zum Weiterdenken. Love, sexuality and friendship are not only among the most intense of human experiences, they also give rise to many questions: How important are they for a successful life? How exactly do love and friendship differ? Is sexuality an independent phenomenon or does it have to be connected with love? Is love more a matter of selfless care or of selfish desire? From antiquity to the present day prominent thinkers from Socrates through Rousseau to Sigmund Freud and Simone de Beauvoir have taken on these questions and come up with surprising answers. The philosophy of love is as varied as love itself. Is Platonic love really opposed to pleasure and obsessed with self-denial? Is Christian sexual morality based on a mother-complex? Is it necessary to write like Goethe to be friends with Schiller? Is all love as egotistical as Schopenhauer would have us believe, or are true love and friendship still possible for all of us? This book takes us on a diverse foray into the answers offered by intellectual history and invites us to think further for ourselves. (shrink)

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete, arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of consistent individual judgment sets to consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.

The logic L (Qu) extends first-order logic by a generalized form of counting quantifiers ("the number of elements satisfying... belongs to the set C"). This logic is investigated for structures with an injectively ω-automatic presentation. If first-order logic is extended by an infinity-quantifier, the resulting theory of any such structure is known to be decidable [6]. It is shown that, as in the case of automatic structures [21], also modulo-counting quantifiers as well as infinite cardinality quantifiers ("there are χ many (...) elements satisfying...") lead to decidable theories. For a structure of bounded degree with injective ω-automatic presentation, the fragment of L(Qu) that contains only effective quantifiers is shown to be decidable and an elementary algorithm for this decision is presented. Both assumptions (ω-automaticity and bounded degree) are necessary for this result to hold. (shrink)

Called by Karl Barth the brilliant Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, this book is finally being recognized as Bonhoeffers magnum opus and one of the most important works of Christian ethics of the last century.

The church. Catholic and Reformed, has followed a past-centered approach in thinking about norms. But the focus of theological reflection ought to be on the present, on situations which release and refocus the recollection of parts of the tradition and so become occasions for the Word of God.

Comparative approaches to language evolution are essential but cannot by themselves resolve the timing and context of evolutionary events since the last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Archaeology can help to fill this gap, but only if properly integrated with evolutionary theory and the ethnographic, ethological, and experimental analogies required to reconstruct the broader social, behavioral, and neurocognitive implications of ancient artifacts. The current contribution elaborates a technological pedagogy hypothesis of language origins by developing the concept of an evolving human technological (...) niche and applying it to investigate two key transitions posited by Arbib’s Mirror System Hypothesis: from complex action recognition and imitation to proto-language, and from proto-language to language. (shrink)

The first-order theory of a string automatic structure is known to be decidable, but there are examples of string automatic structures with nonelementary first-order theories. We prove that the first-order theory of a string automatic structure of bounded degree is decidable in doubly exponential space (for injective automatic presentations, this holds even uniformly). This result is shown to be optimal since we also present a string automatic structure of bounded degree whose first-order theory is hard for 2EXPSPACE. We prove similar (...) results also for tree automatic structures. These findings close the gaps left open in [28] by improving both the lower and the upper bounds. (shrink)

Constraint has played a major role in brain evolution, but cannot tell the whole story. In primates, adaptive specialization is suggested by the existence of a covarying visual system, and may explain some residual variation in the constraint model. Adaptation may also appear at the microstructural level and in the globally integrated system of brain, body, life history and behavior.

Die Fachdidaktik der Philosophie und Ethik fordert Problemorientierung und Lebensweltbezug. Exkursionen, außerschulische Lernorte oder ‚Outdoor Education‘ haben allerdings bisher kaum Berücksichtigung in der fachdidaktischen Forschung erfahren. Eine systematische Auslotung von möglichen Kooperationen, Synergieeffekten oder Unvereinbarkeiten wurde bisher nicht geleistet. Der vorliegende Band versucht diese Lücke zu schließen und eine erste Grundlage für weiterführende Forschungen, Erprobungen und Diskussionen zu schaffen. Er soll damit sowohl einen Beitrag zur Lehrerausbildung an Universitäten und Studienseminaren als auch für die fachdidaktische Explorationsforschung leisten.

Neue Erkenntnisse sind der Anlass, die beiden Tragödien des Sophokles neu zu interpretieren. Hierzu gehören u.a. die in den letzten Jahren gewonnenen Einsichten über die sozialen und familiären Gegebenheiten im Athen der Antike. Aus ihnen ergibt sich, dass sich die Eheschließung den materiellen Interessen des Hauses unterzuordnen hatte. Außerdem haben wir gegenwärtig ein geschärftes Bewusstsein für sexuelle Gewalt und sexuellen Missbrauch, die häufig im familiären Umfeld stattfinden. In seiner langjährigen Praxistätigkeit begegnete der Autor nicht selten Inzestopfern, kaum dagegen Tätern. Beide (...) Tragödien des Sophokles enthalten Beobachtungen über Inzest und dessen Folgen. Es scheint so, als ob Sophokles Abwehrmechanismen und Abwehrkonfigurationen der Zensoren und des Publikums Rechnung getragen hätte, um sozialkritische Inhalte darstellen zu können. (shrink)

Until recently, the prevailing view has been that moral duties to global aid can only be justified from the spirit of utilitarianism. Martha Nussbaum attempted to show that these duties can be developed from Stoic ethics. This essay shows that Nussbaum’s attempt has failed. What Nussbaum considers as stoic is in fact based on a religious myth.

Kant is a pivotal thinker in Adorno's intellectual world. Although he wrote monographs on Hegel, Husserl, and Kierkegaard, the closest Adorno came to an extended discussion of Kant are two lecture courses, one concentrating on the _Critique of Pure Reason_ and the other on the _Critique of Practical Reason_. This new volume by Adorno comprises his lectures on the former. Adorno attempts to make Kant's thought comprehensible to students by focusing on what he regards as problematic aspects of Kant's philosophy. (...) Adorno examines Kant's dualism and what he calls the Kantian "block": the contradictions arising from Kant's resistance to the idealism that his successors—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—saw as the inevitable outcome of his ideas. These lectures also provide an accessible introduction to and rationale for Adorno's own philosophy as expounded in _Negative Dialectics_ and his other major writings. Adorno's view of Kant forms an integral part of his own philosophy, since he argues that the way out of the Kantian contradictions is to show the necessity of the dialectical thinking that Kant himself spurned. This in turn enables Adorno to criticize Anglo-Saxon scientistic or positivist thought, as well as the philosophy of existentialism. This book will be of great interest to those working in philosophy and in social and political thought, and it will be essential reading for anyone interested in the foundations of Adorno's own work. (shrink)

Didactics of philosophy and ethics demands problem based orientation and relevance for real life experiences. However, excursions, extracurricular places of learning or 'outdoor education' have hardly been taken into account. A systematic exploration of possible cooperations, synergy effects or incompatibilities has not yet been carried out. The present volume attempts to close this gap and to create an initial basis for further research, testing and discussion. It is intended to make a contribution to teacher training at universities and study seminars (...) as well as to exploratory research in subject didactics. (shrink)